Why is automation dependency encouraged in modern aviation ?
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I'm not sure accidents have nothing to do with the subject..
They show that a problem exists.
Have you ever seen a general aviation accident where the aircraft stalled from a high cruise altitude and never recovered ?
This does not mean, obviously, that general aviation is exempt from piloting errors, but they have much less training (PPL vs CPL or ATPL + TR), much less practise (average of 12 hours vs 600 hours per year), and only pilot required.
So flying errors are much more suprising for commercial aviation. It looks like we don't make the most of our advantages (two pilots, and potentially far higher practise)
They show that a problem exists.
Have you ever seen a general aviation accident where the aircraft stalled from a high cruise altitude and never recovered ?
This does not mean, obviously, that general aviation is exempt from piloting errors, but they have much less training (PPL vs CPL or ATPL + TR), much less practise (average of 12 hours vs 600 hours per year), and only pilot required.
So flying errors are much more suprising for commercial aviation. It looks like we don't make the most of our advantages (two pilots, and potentially far higher practise)
Last edited by vilas; 6th Dec 2020 at 16:22.
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What I meant in reply to that by saying "you're looking in the wrong place" is that what improves the performance (as well as minimizes the chance of falling off the rails due to deviations, distractions, multitasking, stress, etc.) of a maneuver is the constituent basic elements of flying: the inputs pitch, bank, and thrust; and the results altitude, VSI, airspeed, heading, and course; and all of their interplay. (And whether holding all that together simultaneously, takes part of your mental capacity or all of it... or even more than all of it.) In other words, general "flying" as opposed to "flying an approach" (another maneuver). General "flying" is what we should be looking at. Ability to handle those elements together comes from hand flying. And while we have no opportunity to practice the one particular assembly of them in question (the go around) we do have the opportunity to develop them otherwise, by general hand flying. And while that doesn't get us all of the way to full go around expertise (as daily go around practice would), it sure gets us a lot farther than doing nothing.
I read the 2.4 Transfer section of that document (https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536308.pdf) and it had a lot of different definitions of what transfer might mean, and different situations under those definitions. But I didn't really find anything that matches what we're talking about closely. But I did find this in one of the early summarizing paragraphs:
"Unless there is continuous deliberate practice at difficult tasks, the only thing one can do “on the job” is forget and actually experience degradation of skill. "
Perceptual-motor skills, manual flight handling, feel of the aircraft, could transfer between approach and GA, but less so the mental skill of knowing when to GA, or knowing that the aircraft will 'intersect the ground 2300 feet short of the runway', knowing that the need is to 'level the wings', - the orientation (the understanding) part of OODA.
The rest of your post is, to me, vague and somewhat rambling. It touches on many things, but I'm afraid I can't follow the path you've laid, through those things, to an overall point.
Note that the report relates advance proficiency with expertise, a deffiniton not alway used in aviation.
Also, and importantly, that task is considered in different ways; manual task includes both cognitive and motor skills - tactical, whereas flying involves manual tasks and higher order cognitive skills in awareness, understanding, and decision making - strategy. Higher order skills should transfer, but rarely do - we may not have them to begin with (training) or with the basics they are not practiced, improved, higher levels of expertise.
Re 'regulator beliefs', see refs - as we choose to interpret them.
A conclusion of sorts: the issue is less of 'know what' but more of 'know how', tacit knowledge, experience from being there, doing it, remembering that something has been achieved.
Like riding a bike; tell me, I fall off, but having fallen off and continuing to seek the skill, there comes success, but still being unable to explain how this was achieved.
Also, and importantly, that task is considered in different ways; manual task includes both cognitive and motor skills - tactical, whereas flying involves manual tasks and higher order cognitive skills in awareness, understanding, and decision making - strategy. Higher order skills should transfer, but rarely do - we may not have them to begin with (training) or with the basics they are not practiced, improved, higher levels of expertise.
Re 'regulator beliefs', see refs - as we choose to interpret them.
A conclusion of sorts: the issue is less of 'know what' but more of 'know how', tacit knowledge, experience from being there, doing it, remembering that something has been achieved.
Like riding a bike; tell me, I fall off, but having fallen off and continuing to seek the skill, there comes success, but still being unable to explain how this was achieved.
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Do you think that if they saw the VSI and altitude tapes (and in the QZ case, also the airspeed tape) and incorporated that information into a picture of the airplane's state, that could have had an effect on the outcome?
447 and 8501 although the result is same the situation is different. AF447 they hadn't undergone any training for UAS. In the ungodly hour of midnight over the Atlantic, in IMC, Airspeed gone they were not going to device a procedure. We are not birds so in the air we can act out of our training, learnt habits but if fear washes out the conscious layer there are no instincts to guide a human to safety. The speed was lost only for one minute. But the crew's cognitive ability was gone. They stopped seeing anything, they stopped hearing anything, they stopped feeling anything but just kept doing something with their hand that had nothing to do with present situation. The only chance they had was that they froze and didn't do anything. May be the Aircraft would have descended on its own and in warmer temperatures icing would have gone. If they could see altitude then why not they also feel the stall buffet, also hear the stall warning? There's no point 447 has been beaten to death.
Last edited by vilas; 9th Dec 2020 at 15:45.
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While I have the utmost respect for your knowledge about the A320, I have to respectfully disagree with your operational philosophy.
Perhaps you’re a better pilot than I. I just know that a few minutes in the sim every few months would leave me woefully unprepared should the lights start flashing on a stormy night. On top of that, I find immense satisfaction in turning off the magic and having fun.
Perhaps you’re a better pilot than I. I just know that a few minutes in the sim every few months would leave me woefully unprepared should the lights start flashing on a stormy night. On top of that, I find immense satisfaction in turning off the magic and having fun.
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As I said I don't like to discuss 447 because this topic will hijack the thread again. Since you asked
447 and 8501 although the result is same the situation is different. AF447 they hadn't undergone any training for UAS. In the ungodly hour of midnight over the Atlantic, in IMC, Airspeed gone they were not going to device a procedure. We are not birds so in the air we can act out of our training, learnt habits but if fear washes out the conscious layer there are no instincts to guide a human to safety. The speed was lost only for one minute. But the crew's cognitive ability was gone. They stopped seeing anything, they stopped hearing anything, they stopped feeling anything but just kept doing something with their hand that had nothing to do with present situation. The only chance they had was that they froze and didn't do anything. May be the Aircraft would have descended on its own and in warmer temperatures icing would have gone. If they could see altitude then why not they also feel the stall buffet, also hear the stall warning? There's no point 447 has been beaten to death.
447 and 8501 although the result is same the situation is different. AF447 they hadn't undergone any training for UAS. In the ungodly hour of midnight over the Atlantic, in IMC, Airspeed gone they were not going to device a procedure. We are not birds so in the air we can act out of our training, learnt habits but if fear washes out the conscious layer there are no instincts to guide a human to safety. The speed was lost only for one minute. But the crew's cognitive ability was gone. They stopped seeing anything, they stopped hearing anything, they stopped feeling anything but just kept doing something with their hand that had nothing to do with present situation. The only chance they had was that they froze and didn't do anything. May be the Aircraft would have descended on its own and in warmer temperatures icing would have gone. If they could see altitude then why not they also feel the stall buffet, also hear the stall warning? There's no point 447 has been beaten to death.
That said, the main point of this argument seems to be “they weren’t trained for that”. Please correct me if I’m wrong.
If not, we face things for which we were not specifically trained every day. We depend on our skill and experience to resolve them. The PF was ultimately unable to recognise and recover from a stall. There’s only one way to fix that, and using a ton of automation most of the time, and only disconnecting after a thorough briefing in day VMC isn’t it.
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If I want ‘fun’ I climb into an Extra or a Pitts. When I go to work I operate the Company’s aircraft to the best of my ability to ensure a safe and efficient flight. That means using the equipment in the most professional way that I can. ‘Turning the magic off and having fun’ says it all.
If for whatever reason, you don’t think flying is fun, that sounds like something you should consider before putting on the uniform next time
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It’s pretty sad to see how many pilots when asking what they miss the most about not flying they will reply:” the extra money”. They don’t mind staying home doing nothing as long they get paid...
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Why is automation dependency encouraged in modern aviation ? Basic topic. Dependency is rarely encouraged but use of automation is encouraged. If you are tired, in marginal weather you will use automation. That is the reason, consistent results. It's not impossible to land manually in Cat3 but not with any surety or safety. The Use of automation is not to hide inability to do it manually and use of manual flying should not be because of mistrust or dislike of automation. Both are integral part of a professional pilot. Accidents convey what happened but why it happened is many times a conjecture. Practice raw data where possible and prudent. But is Quixotic spirit really required? If someone is in the wrong job and doesn't enjoy what he is doing it can happens, you can't change him.
Last edited by vilas; 10th Dec 2020 at 08:23.
I can well believe it. Friend of mine flying in the Asia region crewed with a local cadet just out of flight school and who had just completed his type rating. They were flying in Cirrus cloud, calm conditions, when the cadet first officer nervously said to the captain "I don't like flying in cloud..." This from the legal second in command of a jet transport. Image the chaos that would occur if the captain became suddenly incapacitated. In fact it does't even bear thinking about.
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There's nothing unsafe in reverting to manual flight wherever and whenever this is appropriate. Nobody on here has suggested that you should try departing from a close parallel runway with the flight directors off or that you should try landing manually in CAT III for the thrill of it. Anything like that is indeed stupid and irresponsible. But, whenever the situation permits, flying manually is just as much of a normal way of doing it as any level of automation. And, in some situations, it might be the safest or even the only certified way of flying. Think landing in strong winds. The maximum certified wind values for the autoland system are usually not even close to the maximum demonstrated wind values for manual flight. Also, an automatic approach to minimum in some abnormal configurations might not be certified. Let alone that plenty of equipment failures in themselves take out the AP and leave you with no alternative to flying manually - and you'd better rehearse that under normal conditions before you've been forced to do it out of necessity.
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As I said I don't like to discuss 447 because this topic will hijack the thread again. Since you asked
447 and 8501 although the result is same the situation is different. AF447 they hadn't undergone any training for UAS. In the ungodly hour of midnight over the Atlantic, in IMC, Airspeed gone they were not going to device a procedure. We are not birds so in the air we can act out of our training, learnt habits but if fear washes out the conscious layer there are no instincts to guide a human to safety. The speed was lost only for one minute. But the crew's cognitive ability was gone. They stopped seeing anything, they stopped hearing anything, they stopped feeling anything but just kept doing something with their hand that had nothing to do with present situation. The only chance they had was that they froze and didn't do anything. May be the Aircraft would have descended on its own and in warmer temperatures icing would have gone. If they could see altitude then why not they also feel the stall buffet, also hear the stall warning? There's no point 447 has been beaten to death.
447 and 8501 although the result is same the situation is different. AF447 they hadn't undergone any training for UAS. In the ungodly hour of midnight over the Atlantic, in IMC, Airspeed gone they were not going to device a procedure. We are not birds so in the air we can act out of our training, learnt habits but if fear washes out the conscious layer there are no instincts to guide a human to safety. The speed was lost only for one minute. But the crew's cognitive ability was gone. They stopped seeing anything, they stopped hearing anything, they stopped feeling anything but just kept doing something with their hand that had nothing to do with present situation. The only chance they had was that they froze and didn't do anything. May be the Aircraft would have descended on its own and in warmer temperatures icing would have gone. If they could see altitude then why not they also feel the stall buffet, also hear the stall warning? There's no point 447 has been beaten to death.
Given that, the next question is that if they had an attention/task capacity to process that info, and did so, (i.e., they didn’t shut down) could that have effected the outcome? (This was in my last post, but you didn’t answer it.) This seems pretty obvious, so to save another tedious back and forth, I’m going to assume your answer is yes.
So the next question is, is there a possible way to tailor the situation (via regular habits and practice) so that they might not have been overwhelmed by the situation and been able to see and process the altitude and VSI into what they were doing on the artificial horizon? Or is it a futile proposition, and truth is that no matter what anyone’s level of practice and comfort with hand flying in IMC, they would be just as likely to be overwhelmed and freeze up if called to do so? In other words, there is no effect of regular practice, on how big a portion of your total attention the practised thing takes?
—
All this aside, I have to take exception to your characterizing the action to not pull up to 6000fpm from cruise for no reason, as “devising a procedure.”
Dependency is rarely encouraged but use of automation is encouraged.
Notionally true. But, if the areas where it’s not considered “prudent” (tired, marginal weather, there are too many legs per day, there are not enough legs per month, you’re increasing the other pilot’s workload, there is too much traffic, etc.) add up to leave the remaining area as essentially nothing, then dependency is de facto being encouraged. How many times can you not find something to point at? At some point, they stop being valid reasons and start being excuses.
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For the people who prefer higher levels of automation on the line, when do yo work on raw data skills? Is it in the simulator every 6-12 months? And if so, do the instructors make allowances for the fact that you may not have done it since your last sim session?
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Golden words. Enjoyable things absolutely don't have to be unsafe things. Or unprofessional ones.
There's nothing unsafe in reverting to manual flight wherever and whenever this is appropriate. Nobody on here has suggested that you should try departing from a close parallel runway with the flight directors off or that you should try landing manually in CAT III for the thrill of it. Anything like that is indeed stupid and irresponsible. But, whenever the situation permits, flying manually is just as much of a normal way of doing it as any level of automation. And, in some situations, it might be the safest or even the only certified way of flying. Think landing in strong winds. The maximum certified wind values for the autoland system are usually not even close to the maximum demonstrated wind values for manual flight. Also, an automatic approach to minimum in some abnormal configurations might not be certified. Let alone that plenty of equipment failures in themselves take out the AP and leave you with no alternative to flying manually - and you'd better rehearse that under normal conditions before you've been forced to do it out of necessity.
There's nothing unsafe in reverting to manual flight wherever and whenever this is appropriate. Nobody on here has suggested that you should try departing from a close parallel runway with the flight directors off or that you should try landing manually in CAT III for the thrill of it. Anything like that is indeed stupid and irresponsible. But, whenever the situation permits, flying manually is just as much of a normal way of doing it as any level of automation. And, in some situations, it might be the safest or even the only certified way of flying. Think landing in strong winds. The maximum certified wind values for the autoland system are usually not even close to the maximum demonstrated wind values for manual flight. Also, an automatic approach to minimum in some abnormal configurations might not be certified. Let alone that plenty of equipment failures in themselves take out the AP and leave you with no alternative to flying manually - and you'd better rehearse that under normal conditions before you've been forced to do it out of necessity.
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There was one exercice on a test (ILS approach with one engine out I believe) where the instructor insisted I flew manually. I was very surprised that the FD was allowed !
As Jacques Rosay said, flying in this manner can in no way be considered as “flying manually”.
https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/high-...manual-flying/
Personally, I have often heard during test, demonstration, acceptance or airline flights, colleagues, young or older, airline pilots or test pilots, proudly say that they would do such or such a part of the flight - in general a complete approach followed by a landing - “in manual control mode”. I would then observe how they performed and saw that all they did was actually disconnect the AP and servilely follow the Flight Director, leaving the Auto Thrust engaged. And this until start of the flare. This obviously allows an accurate trajectory to be followed, with correct captures, and good control of the speed. These functions are provided for this purpose.
However, within the scope of this article, which concerns manual flying, flying in this manner can in no way be considered as “flying manually”. Indeed, the orders given to the flight controls by the pilot consist in setting the Flight Director (FD) bars to zero, which corresponds to the orders generated by the guidance function. These stick inputs are actions done mechanically by the pilot but are in no way elaborated by him/her. These flight control orders are the same as those which the AP would give if it was engaged. Thus, the added value provided by the pilot is rather negative, as the cognitive resources that he/she uses to follow the FD bars are no longer available for the most elaborate flight monitoring and control functions. In other words, this exercise provides strictly nothing towards the manual flying training for the cases where the pilot would truly have to fly the aircraft manually.
However, within the scope of this article, which concerns manual flying, flying in this manner can in no way be considered as “flying manually”. Indeed, the orders given to the flight controls by the pilot consist in setting the Flight Director (FD) bars to zero, which corresponds to the orders generated by the guidance function. These stick inputs are actions done mechanically by the pilot but are in no way elaborated by him/her. These flight control orders are the same as those which the AP would give if it was engaged. Thus, the added value provided by the pilot is rather negative, as the cognitive resources that he/she uses to follow the FD bars are no longer available for the most elaborate flight monitoring and control functions. In other words, this exercise provides strictly nothing towards the manual flying training for the cases where the pilot would truly have to fly the aircraft manually.
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Testing automation and reliance will eventually prove that the pilot is not needed.
we are looking at 7-10 years before we see commercial flights taking off without pilots.
we are looking at 7-10 years before we see commercial flights taking off without pilots.
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Excellent synopsis by PilotLZ of the benefits of automation and why manual skills still have their place. I'm not sure that SLF mindset is ready to accept effectively being the payload for a drone, although I'm aware the average flight has minimal manual intervention.
Cargo is the best starting place, it would build a metrics database quickly which can be used to hone the software.
Cargo is the best starting place, it would build a metrics database quickly which can be used to hone the software.
Not even close... won’t be in my lifetime, and I doubt my kids lifetime either. Check with any critical systems software people - they will tell you some pretty scary stories that aren’t close to being solved...
