Why is automation dependency encouraged in modern aviation ?
I remember you telling that story before, Centaurus, and it still amazes me. It is absolutely unacceptable, (the crew's inaction was unacceptable - not your story!).
I also remember flying BAe 146s out of Heathrow. Our aircraft had no auto-thrust, no auto trim and only basic Ap's, and we had to capture the VOR radials manually. So the SIDs and noise abatements were basically flown raw data on the HDG bug. When we were inbound to Heathrow, we manually joined and flew the Ockham hold on raw data with the heading bug - making the drift compensation ourselves, there being no automatics for holding. It all worked and we were pretty good at it through constant practice.
Many years later, if ATC vectored us in too tight and above the glide-slope in an A320, I found it much easier to drop out the AP and manually fly the aircraft down to the G/S than fiddle about with the ALT and V/S. On very turbulent approaches, I take the AP out earlier rather than later, to get into the groove of the weather conditions, so that by around 4 nm, my responses are nicely up to speed and in control of the aircraft. (I normally leave the A/THR in on A320/321 though - it usually does a fine job).
So why do we get pilots such as those Centaurus observed, and of the recent gear-up and overrun accidents? It has to be down to poor checking, and letting pilots through who should be failed and retrained. I am also not sure about company TREs examining their own pilots - it must be very difficult to remain objective consistent and fair, and to fail a senior manager or a chief pilot?
Automation dependancy is to some degree caused by pilots who have very low experience of hand flying and raw data - maybe none in commercial line flying. Automation in an Airbus FBW is so good that a poor or inexperienced pilot can "get away with it" 95% of the time - like car drivers who have a licence to drive only an automatic and would not be able to cope with a manual car. This is not the fault of the Airbus but of the old training and checking regime. Chief pilots need to bring in protocols to strongly encourage or even mandate manual flying on the line. I believe that Airbus more recently trained new pilots without the automatics to start with, and only bring those in once the basic hand flying has been grasped?
I also remember flying BAe 146s out of Heathrow. Our aircraft had no auto-thrust, no auto trim and only basic Ap's, and we had to capture the VOR radials manually. So the SIDs and noise abatements were basically flown raw data on the HDG bug. When we were inbound to Heathrow, we manually joined and flew the Ockham hold on raw data with the heading bug - making the drift compensation ourselves, there being no automatics for holding. It all worked and we were pretty good at it through constant practice.
Many years later, if ATC vectored us in too tight and above the glide-slope in an A320, I found it much easier to drop out the AP and manually fly the aircraft down to the G/S than fiddle about with the ALT and V/S. On very turbulent approaches, I take the AP out earlier rather than later, to get into the groove of the weather conditions, so that by around 4 nm, my responses are nicely up to speed and in control of the aircraft. (I normally leave the A/THR in on A320/321 though - it usually does a fine job).
So why do we get pilots such as those Centaurus observed, and of the recent gear-up and overrun accidents? It has to be down to poor checking, and letting pilots through who should be failed and retrained. I am also not sure about company TREs examining their own pilots - it must be very difficult to remain objective consistent and fair, and to fail a senior manager or a chief pilot?
Automation dependancy is to some degree caused by pilots who have very low experience of hand flying and raw data - maybe none in commercial line flying. Automation in an Airbus FBW is so good that a poor or inexperienced pilot can "get away with it" 95% of the time - like car drivers who have a licence to drive only an automatic and would not be able to cope with a manual car. This is not the fault of the Airbus but of the old training and checking regime. Chief pilots need to bring in protocols to strongly encourage or even mandate manual flying on the line. I believe that Airbus more recently trained new pilots without the automatics to start with, and only bring those in once the basic hand flying has been grasped?
I hand fly much more than usual in my company which is very good about manual flying. I keep my SEP current too. Most of the F.O.s are very good, well trained individuals who like to fly but most are still expecting an 'AP1 on' call after gear up and I often hear 'I'll put the autopilot in right after departure' in their briefings (CAVOK or near it). There's a bit of varience of course and the auto thrust is almost always left in. Point is they have picked this up from nervous Nellies in the training department and then the line and assume it's the norm. Add to that the P1s who have memorised all the FDR flags and have evolved theories of 'If anything happens they'll have my licence and I'll be thrown in jail' and you are not going to have a situation where the F.O. is going to do much hand flying lest the most minor correction be necessary or a trivial amber FDR flag be raised.
Point is the example has to be set from the left seat for the day when they are sitting there and something breaks and I am sitting back in 4A with a well preserved widowed heiress intending to enjoy retirement.
Point is the example has to be set from the left seat for the day when they are sitting there and something breaks and I am sitting back in 4A with a well preserved widowed heiress intending to enjoy retirement.
'Is the use of automation encouraged.' Autos = AP, AT, FD, HUD; any technology which can replace or supplement manual or cognitive task.
Industry depends on automation; without it, normal operation, traffic density, challenge the economics of aviation.
Historically, tedious long-haul cruise was automated - monitoring, evolving from checking system operation, to now overseeing the 'big picture' managed by highly reliable systems with auto alerting; but humans are poor monitors, we don't monitor - monitoring is a flawed concept.
The other area of automation was for operations beyond human capability. Initially low vis approaches, now RNAV, RVSM, etc, this is the dependancy, which in a not too distant future, sees manual flight as the reversionary mode, the skills set for recovery after autos fail.
Workload has changed, not necessarily less, its different in time and situation; similarly for error, new forms of error, could be easier seen due to clearer alerting and more information. Thus we might mistakenly relate auto use with improved safety and low workload, but often without adequate understanding of context, training content, experience; this is the encouragement, we wish to be safe.
Differences in operator perception might be seen as differences in encouraging use of autos or not.
The industry is safer (as measured after the fact), but risks still exist - we have to manage the uncertainty in future operations (before the fact). Whilst accidents have decreased, the proportion of aircraft with autos has increased thus we may create false associations.
Reconsider the dominant contributions of auto accidents; not lack of manual flight in normal operation as often reported - the industry is much safer than that. More likely degraded mental skills in managing situations - more surprise because of unfamiliarity due to highly reliable systems.
The level of experience required in abnormal situations is now inadequate. Operations and expectations must be matched to actual experience, not that imagined from training or manual flight in benign situations.
Industry depends on automation; without it, normal operation, traffic density, challenge the economics of aviation.
Historically, tedious long-haul cruise was automated - monitoring, evolving from checking system operation, to now overseeing the 'big picture' managed by highly reliable systems with auto alerting; but humans are poor monitors, we don't monitor - monitoring is a flawed concept.
The other area of automation was for operations beyond human capability. Initially low vis approaches, now RNAV, RVSM, etc, this is the dependancy, which in a not too distant future, sees manual flight as the reversionary mode, the skills set for recovery after autos fail.
Workload has changed, not necessarily less, its different in time and situation; similarly for error, new forms of error, could be easier seen due to clearer alerting and more information. Thus we might mistakenly relate auto use with improved safety and low workload, but often without adequate understanding of context, training content, experience; this is the encouragement, we wish to be safe.
Differences in operator perception might be seen as differences in encouraging use of autos or not.
The industry is safer (as measured after the fact), but risks still exist - we have to manage the uncertainty in future operations (before the fact). Whilst accidents have decreased, the proportion of aircraft with autos has increased thus we may create false associations.
Reconsider the dominant contributions of auto accidents; not lack of manual flight in normal operation as often reported - the industry is much safer than that. More likely degraded mental skills in managing situations - more surprise because of unfamiliarity due to highly reliable systems.
The level of experience required in abnormal situations is now inadequate. Operations and expectations must be matched to actual experience, not that imagined from training or manual flight in benign situations.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Dec 2015
Location: France
Posts: 507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Why do I get the feeling the real purpose of this thread is for non-airline and non-commercial pilots to boast they are “real pilots” and airline pilots are nothing more than children of magenta? To sneer down and smugly educate your airline brethren as if they cannot fly anymore? Are you guys jealous on missing out on the big leagues?
As far as lack of hand flying goes, I say it’s not a problem. There is little hand flying value to be gained anyway when the aircraft is in a stable climb or descent. The real value of manual manipulation skills are shown on an approach onto a short runway in gusty, wind shear or variable wind conditions. Hit the main gear on the markers and then exit first available taxiway as there’s another aircraft close up your backside. Won’t be able to do that unless you have good manual skills, yet airline pilots do it everyday all over the world without applause, even the so called “children of magenta”. I’d say less than 0.5% of landings are Autoland, and a auto land is pretty useless in all but the calmest wind conditions anyway.
As far as lack of hand flying goes, I say it’s not a problem. There is little hand flying value to be gained anyway when the aircraft is in a stable climb or descent. The real value of manual manipulation skills are shown on an approach onto a short runway in gusty, wind shear or variable wind conditions. Hit the main gear on the markers and then exit first available taxiway as there’s another aircraft close up your backside. Won’t be able to do that unless you have good manual skills, yet airline pilots do it everyday all over the world without applause, even the so called “children of magenta”. I’d say less than 0.5% of landings are Autoland, and a auto land is pretty useless in all but the calmest wind conditions anyway.
About your perfect crosswind landing : it is only feasible if the pilot managed to bring the aircraft on the runway axis, at 50 above the threshold, with a slope as close as possible to -3°.
If you're high, you'll land long or hard (or at least risk it). If you're low, you could land short. If you're not on the axis at the threshold, it is a bad start..
So some credit goes to short final management (from 500ft to 50ft). And being able to manage it consistently without FDs is not the easiest thing.
To speak for myself, recently line checked, I usually fly manually at least up to slats retraction and usually to about FL80.
In descent, if my fatigue is at low enough level (which is not the case after 3-4-5 earlies), I usually disconnect everything while on the last descent before loc interception.
Plus, chances are you will progress and decrease drastically this figure !
I only see crew fatigue as a factor, and maybe very turbulent conditions which would ask for keeping FDs on.
'Is the use of automation encouraged.' Autos = AP, AT, FD, HUD; any technology which can replace or supplement manual or cognitive task.
Industry depends on automation; without it, normal operation, traffic density, challenge the economics of aviation.
Historically, tedious long-haul cruise was automated - monitoring, evolving from checking system operation, to now overseeing the 'big picture' managed by highly reliable systems with auto alerting; but humans are poor monitors, we don't monitor - monitoring is a flawed concept.
The other area of automation was for operations beyond human capability. Initially low vis approaches, now RNAV, RVSM, etc, this is the dependancy, which in a not too distant future, sees manual flight as the reversionary mode, the skills set for recovery after autos fail.
Industry depends on automation; without it, normal operation, traffic density, challenge the economics of aviation.
Historically, tedious long-haul cruise was automated - monitoring, evolving from checking system operation, to now overseeing the 'big picture' managed by highly reliable systems with auto alerting; but humans are poor monitors, we don't monitor - monitoring is a flawed concept.
The other area of automation was for operations beyond human capability. Initially low vis approaches, now RNAV, RVSM, etc, this is the dependancy, which in a not too distant future, sees manual flight as the reversionary mode, the skills set for recovery after autos fail.
Some of your sentences seem contradictory. Pilots (humans) are bad at monitoring. Pilots should monitor the automatic flying of the aircraft. Which should it be ?
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Wanderlust
Posts: 3,404
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi dr dre, I originally missed your post #51, but well said 
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: IRS NAV ONLY
Posts: 1,230
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There are plenty of good reasons to keep the automation, outside of turbulence and fatigue, e.g. flying to a procedural airport with two languages spoken on the frequency, ton of VFR traffic around and high terrain in the vicinity. Am I going to be flying raw data? No. Am I going to keep the autopilot in and encourage my colleague that we both keep an extremely good look out and listen out to avoid other traffic? You betcha.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 2,514
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I hate to be the one to ask, but if you don't mind me asking, what's your total airline experience?
There are plenty of good reasons to keep the automation, outside of turbulence and fatigue, e.g. flying to a procedural airport with two languages spoken on the frequency, ton of VFR traffic around and high terrain in the vicinity. Am I going to be flying raw data? No. Am I going to keep the autopilot in and encourage my colleague that we both keep an extremely good look out and listen out to avoid other traffic? You betcha.
There are plenty of good reasons to keep the automation, outside of turbulence and fatigue, e.g. flying to a procedural airport with two languages spoken on the frequency, ton of VFR traffic around and high terrain in the vicinity. Am I going to be flying raw data? No. Am I going to keep the autopilot in and encourage my colleague that we both keep an extremely good look out and listen out to avoid other traffic? You betcha.
A few of us still around would have read Handling the Big Jets by Captain D.B. Davies. For those that haven't, allow me to cut and paste blurbs from the fly leaf. Read what you will into these comments.
From IFALPA New Bulletin: " this book can be truly described as the best of its kind in the world and not only for the fact that there is no other book on modern aircraft handling characteristics .....we can recall no book which bears so directly on the pilot's problem as does 'Handling the Big Jets." Written by a test pilot for airline pilots, the book is likely to become a standard text book.....I would strongly recommend the book to all airline pilots who fly jets, or who will be flying jets in the future.
From Flight International.'..."this is no dry text book..It is a tremendous, but notably readable, vade-mecum of jet tranport flying qualities and design characteristics intended primarily for pilots who have yet to make the transition to jets, but which is packed with information of value to he most experienced of jet captains.'
This leads me to the author's advice to airline pilots which, in my opinion is the crux of the wide ranging differences of opinion between Pprune readers on the subject of automation versus the perceived need to maintain manual handling skills. Bear with me when I again cut and paste.
"Do not become lazy in your professional lives. The autopilot is a great comfort, so are the flight director and approach coupler. But do not get into the position where you need these devices to complete the flight. Keep in practice at raw ILS particularly in crosswinds. Keep in practice in hand-flying the aeroplane at altitude and in making purely visual approaches.
Airline flying really is money for old rope most of the time; but when things get hairy then you earn your pay. As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired - and this is a bit of a trap. The demand of jet transport flying can be best met by enthusiasm. Personal enthusiasm for the job is beyond value because it is a built-in productive force, and those who have it do not have to be pushed into practice and the search for knowledge. Enthusiasm thus generates its own protection. This is the frame of mind which needs to be developed for the best execution of the airline pilots's task"
The author mentions a known fact and that is "As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired." This can show up when the opportunity arises for a spot of hand flying and an enthusiastic first officer asks his captain "Do you mind if I hand fly this ILS raw data all the way down?" The captain demurs - if only because he either doesn't trust his first officer to fly a smooth approach or he perceives trouble if a FOQA pings the fact the FD is off on the copilot's side. An invite to tea and bikkies looms. So the captain knocks back the first officer's request with "its best to leave the autopilot in until DH."
Davies states "The demand of jet transport flying can be best met with enthusiasm." The problem nowadays, is that rules and tolerances are far tighter than when Davies wrote his book. With Big Brother FOQA monitoring every flick of a switch, it becomes all too onerous for the captain to risk straying from the magenta line of SOP. The first officer then becomes a captive audience to the captain's caution. In time, the same first officer becomes a captain and the problem is perpetuated
Regrettably, all this leads to the conclusion that in todays sophisicated electronic aviation environment it maybe safer in terms of pilot job security to leave hand flying a crosswind raw data ILS and its ilk to simulator practice only. . And that becomes another story.
From IFALPA New Bulletin: " this book can be truly described as the best of its kind in the world and not only for the fact that there is no other book on modern aircraft handling characteristics .....we can recall no book which bears so directly on the pilot's problem as does 'Handling the Big Jets." Written by a test pilot for airline pilots, the book is likely to become a standard text book.....I would strongly recommend the book to all airline pilots who fly jets, or who will be flying jets in the future.
From Flight International.'..."this is no dry text book..It is a tremendous, but notably readable, vade-mecum of jet tranport flying qualities and design characteristics intended primarily for pilots who have yet to make the transition to jets, but which is packed with information of value to he most experienced of jet captains.'
This leads me to the author's advice to airline pilots which, in my opinion is the crux of the wide ranging differences of opinion between Pprune readers on the subject of automation versus the perceived need to maintain manual handling skills. Bear with me when I again cut and paste.
"Do not become lazy in your professional lives. The autopilot is a great comfort, so are the flight director and approach coupler. But do not get into the position where you need these devices to complete the flight. Keep in practice at raw ILS particularly in crosswinds. Keep in practice in hand-flying the aeroplane at altitude and in making purely visual approaches.
Airline flying really is money for old rope most of the time; but when things get hairy then you earn your pay. As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired - and this is a bit of a trap. The demand of jet transport flying can be best met by enthusiasm. Personal enthusiasm for the job is beyond value because it is a built-in productive force, and those who have it do not have to be pushed into practice and the search for knowledge. Enthusiasm thus generates its own protection. This is the frame of mind which needs to be developed for the best execution of the airline pilots's task"
The author mentions a known fact and that is "As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired." This can show up when the opportunity arises for a spot of hand flying and an enthusiastic first officer asks his captain "Do you mind if I hand fly this ILS raw data all the way down?" The captain demurs - if only because he either doesn't trust his first officer to fly a smooth approach or he perceives trouble if a FOQA pings the fact the FD is off on the copilot's side. An invite to tea and bikkies looms. So the captain knocks back the first officer's request with "its best to leave the autopilot in until DH."
Davies states "The demand of jet transport flying can be best met with enthusiasm." The problem nowadays, is that rules and tolerances are far tighter than when Davies wrote his book. With Big Brother FOQA monitoring every flick of a switch, it becomes all too onerous for the captain to risk straying from the magenta line of SOP. The first officer then becomes a captive audience to the captain's caution. In time, the same first officer becomes a captain and the problem is perpetuated
Regrettably, all this leads to the conclusion that in todays sophisicated electronic aviation environment it maybe safer in terms of pilot job security to leave hand flying a crosswind raw data ILS and its ilk to simulator practice only. . And that becomes another story.
Last edited by Centaurus; 28th Nov 2020 at 02:25.
Join Date: Mar 2012
Location: Having a margarita on the beach
Posts: 2,419
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A few of us still around would have read Handling the Big Jets by Captain D.B. Davies. For those that haven't, allow me to cut and paste blurbs from the fly leaf. Read what you will into these comments.
From IFALPA New Bulletin: " this book can be truly described as the best of its kind in the world and not only for the fact that there is no other book on modern aircraft handling characteristics .....we can recall no book which bears so directly on the pilot's problem as does 'Handling the Big Jets." Written by a test pilot for airline pilots, the book is likely to become a standard text book.....I would strongly recommend the book to all airline pilots who fly jets, or who will be flying jets in the future.
From Flight International.'..."this is no dry text book..It is a tremendous, but notably readable, vade-mecum of jet tranport flying qualities and design characteristics intended primarily for pilots who have yet to make the transition to jets, but which is packed with information of value to he most experienced of jet captains.'
This leads me to the author's advice to airline pilots which, in my opinion is the crux of the wide ranging differences of opinion between Pprune readers on the subject of automation versus the perceived need to maintain manual handling skills. Bear with me when I again cut and paste.
"Do not become lazy in your professional lives. The autopilot is a great comfort, so are the flight director and approach coupler. But do not get into the position where you need these devices to complete the flight. Keep in practice at raw ILS particularly in crosswinds. Keep in practice in hand-flying the aeroplane at altitude and in making purely visual approaches.
Airline flying really is money for old rope most of the time; but when things get hairy then you earn your pay. As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired - and this is a bit of a trap. The demand of jet transport flying can be best met by enthusiasm. Personal enthusiasm for the job is beyond value because it is a built-in productive force, and those who have it do not have to be pushed into practice and the search for knowledge. Enthusiasm thus generates its own protection. This is the frame of mind which needs to be developed for the best execution of the airline pilots's task"
The author mentions a known fact and that is "As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired." This can show up when the opportunity arises for a spot of hand flying and an enthusiastic first officer asks his captain "Do you mind if I hand fly this ILS raw data all the way down?" The captain demurs - if only because he either doesn't trust his first officer to fly a smooth approach or he perceives trouble if a FOQA pings the fact the FD is off on the copilot's side. An invite to tea and bikkies looms. So the captain knocks back the first officer's request with "its best to leave the autopilot in until DH."
Davies states "The demand of jet transport flying can be best met with enthusiasm." The problem nowadays, is that rules and tolerances are far tighter than when Davies wrote his book. With Big Brother FOQA monitoring every flick of a switch, it becomes all too onerous for the captain to risk straying from the magenta line of SOP. The first officer then becomes a captive audience to the captain's caution. In time, the same first officer becomes a captain and the problem is perpetuated
Regrettably, all this leads to the conclusion that in todays sophisicated electronic aviation environment it maybe safer in terms of pilot job security to leave hand flying a crosswind raw data ILS and its ilk to simulator practice only. . And that becomes another story.
From IFALPA New Bulletin: " this book can be truly described as the best of its kind in the world and not only for the fact that there is no other book on modern aircraft handling characteristics .....we can recall no book which bears so directly on the pilot's problem as does 'Handling the Big Jets." Written by a test pilot for airline pilots, the book is likely to become a standard text book.....I would strongly recommend the book to all airline pilots who fly jets, or who will be flying jets in the future.
From Flight International.'..."this is no dry text book..It is a tremendous, but notably readable, vade-mecum of jet tranport flying qualities and design characteristics intended primarily for pilots who have yet to make the transition to jets, but which is packed with information of value to he most experienced of jet captains.'
This leads me to the author's advice to airline pilots which, in my opinion is the crux of the wide ranging differences of opinion between Pprune readers on the subject of automation versus the perceived need to maintain manual handling skills. Bear with me when I again cut and paste.
"Do not become lazy in your professional lives. The autopilot is a great comfort, so are the flight director and approach coupler. But do not get into the position where you need these devices to complete the flight. Keep in practice at raw ILS particularly in crosswinds. Keep in practice in hand-flying the aeroplane at altitude and in making purely visual approaches.
Airline flying really is money for old rope most of the time; but when things get hairy then you earn your pay. As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired - and this is a bit of a trap. The demand of jet transport flying can be best met by enthusiasm. Personal enthusiasm for the job is beyond value because it is a built-in productive force, and those who have it do not have to be pushed into practice and the search for knowledge. Enthusiasm thus generates its own protection. This is the frame of mind which needs to be developed for the best execution of the airline pilots's task"
The author mentions a known fact and that is "As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired." This can show up when the opportunity arises for a spot of hand flying and an enthusiastic first officer asks his captain "Do you mind if I hand fly this ILS raw data all the way down?" The captain demurs - if only because he either doesn't trust his first officer to fly a smooth approach or he perceives trouble if a FOQA pings the fact the FD is off on the copilot's side. An invite to tea and bikkies looms. So the captain knocks back the first officer's request with "its best to leave the autopilot in until DH."
Davies states "The demand of jet transport flying can be best met with enthusiasm." The problem nowadays, is that rules and tolerances are far tighter than when Davies wrote his book. With Big Brother FOQA monitoring every flick of a switch, it becomes all too onerous for the captain to risk straying from the magenta line of SOP. The first officer then becomes a captive audience to the captain's caution. In time, the same first officer becomes a captain and the problem is perpetuated
Regrettably, all this leads to the conclusion that in todays sophisicated electronic aviation environment it maybe safer in terms of pilot job security to leave hand flying a crosswind raw data ILS and its ilk to simulator practice only. . And that becomes another story.
The problem is that aviation nowadays (or at least the past 10/15 years) is "cheap". That means having low hours low experienced pilots in both seats in the cockpit who will not create much troubles to the airlines in terms of demands and complaints. On the other hand airlines also need experienced crews to balance the fleet, and then everything gets quite mixed up. The answer becomes super-rigid sops with very little margins for anything that can potentially "distract" the crew form a textbook sop flight from A to B.
The problem is that aviation nowadays (or at least the past 10/15 years) is "cheap". That means having low hours low experienced pilots in both seats in the cockpit who will not create much troubles to the airlines in terms of demands and complaints
Extract from a recently published incident report.
One unusual item contained in the report was the logged flying hours claimed by the captain as well as that of the first officer.
The captain claimed a total of 6094 hours. His time on type was 5608 of which the whole lot was claimed as in command. In other words the casual reader could take it the captain had received no dual and no copilot time on type. It appears he had 496 total hours when starting on the 737 and thereafter logged everything as pilot in command.
The first officer had 252 hours total of which 175 hours was on the 737. On the face of it he would have flown only 77 flying hours total before joining the airline to eventually become second in command of the 737 at 252 hours or less.
It is very significant that Sully was a glider pilot at one time, and the 'Gimli glider' was also conveyed to the ground in one piece by two ex-glider pilots. You could say that every flight in a glider is a controlled crash, but that isn't strictly true. Gliding is real flying - you become part of the plane - something you will never be if the plane does all the flying for you.
Last edited by DaveJ75; 28th Nov 2020 at 21:47. Reason: typo
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: expat
Posts: 129
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The complicating factor is this:
Few, if any of the major automation related accidents have been caused by a lack of "stick and rudder" skills. It is more nuanced than that. The major factor they have in common has been a failure to perceive an indirect mode change or understand a confusing system failure in time to prevent an accident. Being able to manually fly a decent raw data ILS, or fly an arc within half a mile is not really that relevant. In fact it is presumptuous to suggest that the incident pilots weren't as skilled at manual flight as any of us.
Some will argue that constantly practicing manual skills gives you a better ability to detect anomalies sooner. There may be some truth in this but you'd need to do it far more than is realistically practical and it introduces it's own set of risks which may outweigh the (debatable) rewards.
Few, if any of the major automation related accidents have been caused by a lack of "stick and rudder" skills. It is more nuanced than that. The major factor they have in common has been a failure to perceive an indirect mode change or understand a confusing system failure in time to prevent an accident. Being able to manually fly a decent raw data ILS, or fly an arc within half a mile is not really that relevant. In fact it is presumptuous to suggest that the incident pilots weren't as skilled at manual flight as any of us.
Some will argue that constantly practicing manual skills gives you a better ability to detect anomalies sooner. There may be some truth in this but you'd need to do it far more than is realistically practical and it introduces it's own set of risks which may outweigh the (debatable) rewards.
The major factor they have in common has been a failure to perceive an indirect mode change or understand a confusing system failure in time to prevent an accident. Being able to manually fly a decent raw data ILS, or fly an arc within half a mile is not really that relevant. In fact it is presumptuous to suggest that the incident pilots weren't as skilled at manual flight as any of us.
Even to the most biased aficionado of automation, the need for pilots to have a modicum of flying skill is acknowledged. All pilots should have the ability to seamlessly switch from automatics to manual instrument flying without being concerned about lack of confidence in their own ability to handle a situation where manual skills are instantly needed. The Egyptian Flash Air Boeing 737 accident in January 2004 was only one example of many, where mode confusion led to a low altitude jet upset and the captain lacked the confidence and manual instrument flying ability to recover the situation. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_Airlines_Flight_604
Join Date: Sep 2016
Location: USA
Posts: 803
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The complicating factor is this:
Few, if any of the major automation related accidents have been caused by a lack of "stick and rudder" skills. It is more nuanced than that. The major factor they have in common has been a failure to perceive an indirect mode change or understand a confusing system failure in time to prevent an accident. Being able to manually fly a decent raw data ILS, or fly an arc within half a mile is not really that relevant. In fact it is presumptuous to suggest that the incident pilots weren't as skilled at manual flight as any of us.
Some will argue that constantly practicing manual skills gives you a better ability to detect anomalies sooner. There may be some truth in this but you'd need to do it far more than is realistically practical and it introduces it's own set of risks which may outweigh the (debatable) rewards.
Few, if any of the major automation related accidents have been caused by a lack of "stick and rudder" skills. It is more nuanced than that. The major factor they have in common has been a failure to perceive an indirect mode change or understand a confusing system failure in time to prevent an accident. Being able to manually fly a decent raw data ILS, or fly an arc within half a mile is not really that relevant. In fact it is presumptuous to suggest that the incident pilots weren't as skilled at manual flight as any of us.
Some will argue that constantly practicing manual skills gives you a better ability to detect anomalies sooner. There may be some truth in this but you'd need to do it far more than is realistically practical and it introduces it's own set of risks which may outweigh the (debatable) rewards.
Do you have any examples of the crashes you're talking about, and how this applies? Because when too general, it's too easy for people to be talking past each other, with one meaning one thing and the other interpreting that as another, and ultimately addressing different things. And though I disagree with you, I think this is a good discussion to have and want it to be clear.
I listed in post 53 some crashes, and don't know if this is a reply to that or not.
The part where we agree, is that 2 out of those 3 started with cascading mode confusion, or the pilot's situation view being different than the autopilot's. (But this was the precipitating event that started the chain, and I don't see it as a "complicating factor" on the skills required as a response.)
The part where I hope we agree (but don't know if we do, and would like to find out) is that this situation should force a manual take over. In one of those 2, this happened.
The part where it seems we disagree, is that what follows after this manual takeover should be included as the baseline "stick and rudder," or manual handling skills, or whatever you want to call it. Basic flying of the plane, as you would a Cessna 172.
You dismissively list a few maneuvers as kind of a sideshow curiosity that one can brag about but "are not really that relevant." But what would have saved those airplanes is more than being able to fly some maneuvers after mentally preparing oneself and mustering up all of one's concentration after picking an easy time, shedding all nonessential tasks, etc. Yeah you can demonstrate the "skill" that way and check the box, but it's not enough. What's required is far more than that, it's a casual ease of something done (not "practiced," but simply done as a matter of course) every day like parking your car or doing a take off on a clear and calm day. And while doing so, have spare mental capacity to handle the other elements of a normal or emergency flight. It's only with that baseline that once the cascading mode confusion starts and it becomes apparent that that the airplane is headed toward crashing, the path toward not-crashing (click-click, level the wings, N1 to 60% and VSI to -800, or whatever rough intial actions apply to the particular scenario) can be embarked on without deadly reluctance.
I don't know if you were ever an instructor, but if you were, and the student ever took the situation far outside the error you allowed for him and headed toward a crash, would you say "my plane" (the equivalent of click-click) or start talking to him faster in hopes of him fixing it himself? The pilots in these crashes very much knew they were headed for trouble, but had a reluctance to say "my plane" and fly it to safety, that could have only come from a lack of the necessary skill, in the useful/meaningful sense. (If they had the skill, why didn't they use it? Having it but being too afraid to use it when suddenly called upon, is the same as not having it.)
Plus, if we're only to be ready to fly the plane in the "let's crack-our knuckles and take a deep breath, all right let's give it a go, but only because it's VFR and we're at a quiet outstation" sense, that puts lie to the whole fig leaf of our role in the cockpit being there "to take over if the automation fails." When it fails it's gonna be the "I'm suddenly thrust from a sleeplike slumber into this cockpit with a yoke/stick in one hand, a pair of rudder pedals, a pair of throttles in the other hand, and a multitude of information sources in front of my eyes to quickly make sense of" way. And the only part of your brain that's gonna be able to meaningfully handle all of that, is the part that treats it as instinct, because it's been baked in as such via everyday routine.
KP, 'How do you safely revert if you never practise ?'
My implication may not have been clear enough. By all means revert to manual as is widely done, but don't expect that to change workload and safety. What ever crews do in normal conditions is unlikely to improve everyones performance in unusual conditions.
'Pilots should monitor the automatic flying of the aircraft.'
The task is to monitor the aircraft, not monitoring autos, not looking at the FMA and expecting to deduce flight path from annunciators alone. Use instruments, compare the aircraft actual situation with auto selections; i.e. what you planned, selected, expected, vs the reality.
Don't ask "whats it doing now", but "what did I ask the system to do.
Re humans - poor monitors - check standard HF and human perf texts.
'Do you generally agree with the opinion that pilots should be able to consistently fly with no automation ?'
This is not a yes / no question. Consider what drives the need for manual flight, what task, accuracy, proficiency, when, then how.
If 'consistently' refers to accuracy, then where the need for hand flying is to fly the aircraft after automation fails; accuracy ~ safe enough, but not necessarily to the higher standards required pre automation.
Professional pride should aim for the higher standard, but training and opportunity restrict skill development.
My implication may not have been clear enough. By all means revert to manual as is widely done, but don't expect that to change workload and safety. What ever crews do in normal conditions is unlikely to improve everyones performance in unusual conditions.
'Pilots should monitor the automatic flying of the aircraft.'
The task is to monitor the aircraft, not monitoring autos, not looking at the FMA and expecting to deduce flight path from annunciators alone. Use instruments, compare the aircraft actual situation with auto selections; i.e. what you planned, selected, expected, vs the reality.
Don't ask "whats it doing now", but "what did I ask the system to do.
Re humans - poor monitors - check standard HF and human perf texts.
'Do you generally agree with the opinion that pilots should be able to consistently fly with no automation ?'
This is not a yes / no question. Consider what drives the need for manual flight, what task, accuracy, proficiency, when, then how.
If 'consistently' refers to accuracy, then where the need for hand flying is to fly the aircraft after automation fails; accuracy ~ safe enough, but not necessarily to the higher standards required pre automation.
Professional pride should aim for the higher standard, but training and opportunity restrict skill development.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 2,514
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
'Do you generally agree with the opinion that pilots should be able to consistently fly with no automation ?'
This is not a yes / no question. Consider what drives the need for manual flight, what task, accuracy, proficiency, when, then how.
If 'consistently' refers to accuracy, then where the need for hand flying is to fly the aircraft after automation fails; accuracy ~ safe enough, but not necessarily to the higher standards required pre automation.
Professional pride should aim for the higher standard, but training and opportunity restrict skill development.
This is not a yes / no question. Consider what drives the need for manual flight, what task, accuracy, proficiency, when, then how.
If 'consistently' refers to accuracy, then where the need for hand flying is to fly the aircraft after automation fails; accuracy ~ safe enough, but not necessarily to the higher standards required pre automation.
Professional pride should aim for the higher standard, but training and opportunity restrict skill development.
If your training is restricting skill development, you need to oust whoever runs your training department.
Threads like this make me worry about sitting in the back of planes in some parts of the world. The last thing I want as I go off on holiday is a crew that’s going to “manage the operation” right into the ground.
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: Somewhere over the rainbow
Posts: 946
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Of course pilots should be able to hand fly in any conditions. I don’t expect my colleagues to fly as accurately as the AP but he should feel confortable at any time to disconnect the AP If required and fly within acceptable limits. But sadly many aren’t. Once a friend of mine was observing my flight; that’s part of the upgrade process. That day I was flying with a very weak first officer; one of the weakest actually: one of those guys who never ever hand fly. That day I was doing a raw data approach ( no A/THR, no bird) and to show my friend how nervous this guy was even in a perfect CAVOK day. I asked the FO to take control pretending I needed to adjust my seat. He had nothing to do really, only keep the same pitch and leave the leavers on Idle. We were still passing 6000 feet descending to 3000. As soon as he took control, I looked at him he was completely overwhelmed, nervous as hell and shaking. Not even 20 seconds later he told me very nervously: “Let me know when you ready to take control!” I then took control and told him that he needs to relax and at anytime he could practice raw data with me. He is a nice guy actually tho; I actually feel sad for him; but yeah you get the idea and this kind of weak pilots is not an isolated case. Some are even on the left seat and I bet you in your outfit too. Those guys are a timing bomb for the next air disaster but let’s keep denying it... SMH
Last edited by pineteam; 29th Nov 2020 at 13:33. Reason: Typo