Why is automation dependency encouraged in modern aviation ?
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Auto/Manual flight
I'm way out of date in this discussion but I don't think the basic principle has changed.
Back in the eighties I flew the Sikorsky S61helicopter on the North Sea. The only 'automation' was the basic stability, which fixed-wing pilots take for granted, provided by a vertical gyro and a heading hold. All approaches, usually an ILS into Aberdeen or an NDB approach to a rig were flown manually using 'raw data.' During IBC's, the stabilisation may have been failed and flying an unstabilised helicopter during an NDB approach is bloomin' hard work.
In the eighties the company bought the Commercial Chinook helicopter which had an AFCS, broadly similar to an autopilot, providing heading/VOR/altitude holds and coupled ILS's. Coupled flight was used extensively and the only time I flew a manual ILS was during my first IBC. The lack of practice was all too apparent to me as well as the TRE and I resolved to do much more hands on flying.
Back in the eighties I flew the Sikorsky S61helicopter on the North Sea. The only 'automation' was the basic stability, which fixed-wing pilots take for granted, provided by a vertical gyro and a heading hold. All approaches, usually an ILS into Aberdeen or an NDB approach to a rig were flown manually using 'raw data.' During IBC's, the stabilisation may have been failed and flying an unstabilised helicopter during an NDB approach is bloomin' hard work.
In the eighties the company bought the Commercial Chinook helicopter which had an AFCS, broadly similar to an autopilot, providing heading/VOR/altitude holds and coupled ILS's. Coupled flight was used extensively and the only time I flew a manual ILS was during my first IBC. The lack of practice was all too apparent to me as well as the TRE and I resolved to do much more hands on flying.
Simulator instructors in the job full time could write a book on what they occasionally witness in the horror box. But the risk of hurt feelings and subsequent danger of litigation are always there. There was one event I saw however, that will forever stick in my mind. The automation was perfect but it was the flight crew handling of an unexpected slight technical defect that was the worry. This event convinced me not only of the pressing need for airline pilots to maintain raw data manual flying competency but of the ever present insidious effect in some countries of ethnic culture when it comes to flight safety mores.
The Pprune Rumours and News Forum, mentions the FDR from the crashed Sriwijaya Air Boeing 737 Classic was recently located. The Preliminary Report published by the Indonesian regulatory authority confirms the suspicion that an autothrottle malfunction led to a split throttle situation. This defect had been recorded on the same aircraft previously. The CVR is yet to be located but there appears little doubt that the crew subsequently lost control of the aircraft even though the situation should have been easily recoverable. This closely parallels what this writer witnessed during a simulator session several years ago and was described in Post 52 of this thread.
Malfunctions of this type, although seemingly innocuous and even remote, should have been demonstrated in the simulator during type rating training. The usual counter is that malfunctions of this nature are so rare as to be a waste of valuable simulator time . Yet accidents involving autoththrottles and leading to crashes are not new.
During an instructor practice session I was caught by surprise when my colleague demonstrated the effect of a blocked captain's static vent during takeoff and initial climb in the 737 Classic. He didn't warn me. . Everything seemed normal until shortly after liftoff when the captain's altimeter failed to move despite the first officers call of 'Positive Rate of climb' on his altimeter. The captains ASI began a steady reduction of speed, his VSI showed zero rate of clmb but the ground speed agreed with the first officer's ASI reading. The stick shaker sounded as the captains ASI fell back. All these indications were the result of the captain's static vent being blocked. I had never seen this demonstration before during my own type rating training years earlier. I could see the potential for mishandling when faced with such confusing instrument indications at such a critical time on takeoff.
From then I used that experience when conducting type rating training. Then one day when the simulator was not being used, I sat at the instructor panel and explored the many malfunctions on different systems and their indications. Failure of one or both autothrottle clutches at various stages of flight was one such system. It wasn't in the company training syllabus but after seeing for myself how easily a split throttle could lead to a flight path problem if not picked up quickly, I recommended it should be part of type rating training. Fortunately, Ops Management agreed and autothrottle malfunctions were slipped into the syllabus.
In another era I flew long range maritime aircraft on shipping reconnaisance and anti-submarine exercises. There were no simulators in those days so we practiced simulated night ditching hundreds of miles out to sea by laying our own flare path using flame floats and carried out a dummy approach in the ditching configuration and airspeeds. It was only then I realised the importance of good raw data instrument flying skills when we went around again at 500 feet on the radio altimeter. But at least we knew what to expect if ever the worst happened and a ditching was necessary. Keep in mind most of us in the squadron were relatively young and enthusiastic but with nothlng like the thousands of log book hours of airline captains. But we knew how to fly because we had been taught well.
Details for simulator sessions are usually published in each company's operations manual. Training time is limited for cost and scheduling reasons. Same with type rating syllabus. Sequences practiced and tested contain mostly regulatory requirements. Little time is left for practicing rare events such as loss of all engines in flight with their subsequent 'dead stick' landings, ditching on instruments at night, GPWS escape manoevres, go-around on instruments from a big bounce; and dare I add recovery from unusual attitudes following an autothrottle malfunction.
Despite all the regulatory box-ticking, accidents caused by poor flying ability will continue to occur. Sometimes these are culture related accidents. IMHO, the priority in simulator training needs to be away from endless autopilot use wasting an hour on a flight from A to B practicing command management, correct radio calls, lengthy and time consuming checklist reading. I could go on, but mercifully for readers I'd better get off my soap box now
Last edited by Centaurus; 11th Feb 2021 at 00:37.
Yes, this echoes my experience of simulator training. We spend 2 hours on a LOFT flight where we get one easy, one medium and one difficult failure to deal with, all in real time. Passenger PAs, radioing company Operations Dept, the lot.
All well and good, but SIM time and availability is finite and precious, and should not be squandered. Where was the go-around practice? The PFD or IAS disagree? The runaway Stab trim? The unusual attitude recovery in IMC? The stuck thrust lever? (I did a B737 rating three years ago and runaway Stab Trim was never demonstrated or practised).
The fundamental handling aspects are what should be practiced, not the long drawn out problems; those can be worked through for real if they happen on the line. But precious SIM time should be spent practising basic manual handling and practising recognising fundamental insidious instrumentation problems.
And not just one practice of each thing - that is ticked as long as it just squeaks inside the limits even though it was messy. Better to give each pilot at least 5 practises of each critical situation, e.g. a go-around, so they can refine and develop their technique, and in the case of confusing instrument indications; so they can recognise them better should they ever happen for real.
Situations that can be overwhelming to crews, such as IAS disagree with the stick shakers operating continuously, really need to be witnessed and experienced in the SIM otherwise how will pilots cope if they happen for real?
It is not enough to write down the procedures in a book and then expect all pilots to be able to recognise and deal with them. They need to physically witness and practise dealing with all the critical situations.
All well and good, but SIM time and availability is finite and precious, and should not be squandered. Where was the go-around practice? The PFD or IAS disagree? The runaway Stab trim? The unusual attitude recovery in IMC? The stuck thrust lever? (I did a B737 rating three years ago and runaway Stab Trim was never demonstrated or practised).
The fundamental handling aspects are what should be practiced, not the long drawn out problems; those can be worked through for real if they happen on the line. But precious SIM time should be spent practising basic manual handling and practising recognising fundamental insidious instrumentation problems.
And not just one practice of each thing - that is ticked as long as it just squeaks inside the limits even though it was messy. Better to give each pilot at least 5 practises of each critical situation, e.g. a go-around, so they can refine and develop their technique, and in the case of confusing instrument indications; so they can recognise them better should they ever happen for real.
Situations that can be overwhelming to crews, such as IAS disagree with the stick shakers operating continuously, really need to be witnessed and experienced in the SIM otherwise how will pilots cope if they happen for real?
It is not enough to write down the procedures in a book and then expect all pilots to be able to recognise and deal with them. They need to physically witness and practise dealing with all the critical situations.
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Flight by flight: obviously, automation increases SA by offloading tasks from the mind, leaving the remaining capacity for SA. Great. If this was the only concern, then the clear right answer would be full automation full time. Anything less would decrease safety, and should not be allowed.
But!
Overall: If the handflying task is offloaded every time, then there's no chance to practice it to where its share of the mental capacity is reduced, like every practiced activity does. So, any time performed, (including when suddenly forced to under unfavorable circumstances) it continues taking its large share of mental capacity, leaving little for SA; and this picture never changes. So, over this scale, APFD reduces SA.
The individual flight vs. overall safety concerns are necessarily contradictory. Automation overuse increases individual flight safety, but decreases overall safety. Conversely, hand flying practice decreases individual flight safety, but increases overall safety. Some system or philosophy has to account for both of them, and operate at a kind of balance point. Unfortunately the overall concern is too abstract and always easy to dismiss, fobbing it off to some [i]other[i] time we can address it. While for the individual flight, concretely we can point to the safety advantage of turning the AP on. But when the individual flight becomes all the individual flights together, the overall concern falls by the wayside.
(It's like unhealthy food, this next Bacon McStuffer won't make any difference. But this is the rationalization for every meal, and the fruits and veggies day never comes in reality.)
Only half a speed-brake
Overall: If the handflying task is offloaded every time, then there's no chance to practice it to where its share of the mental capacity is reduced, like every practiced activity does. So, any time performed, (including when suddenly forced to under unfavorable circumstances) it continues taking its large share of mental capacity, leaving little for SA; and this picture never changes. So, over this scale, APFD reduces SA.
If on a given Friday all of them went DDG/MEL, that day the safety margins would be significantly less compared to the rawdata days as the un-proficient handflying would take much greater mental resoures than it used to (should?). No dispuite.
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In an odd way, for me it does. If I'm flying with the FD on, my tendency is to follow them so closely that I haven't a clue what's going on. Wind direction, groundspeed, power? No clue. With the automation off, I'm actively scanning these parameters, and so feel more in tune with how things are going.
Automation Dependency ?
Automation, or any other current safety improvement does not increase / decrease situation awareness; it changes the circumstances of the situation - its different. We learn the skills required in one situation but fail to appreciate, or learn the changes required for alternative situations. Awareness with auto flight is not the same as with manual flight, and vice versa.
The skills we lack are knowing how and when to change the way in which to perceive and respond to different situations.
We should not think in terms of good / bad: only awareness as required for the situation, and that which will be required for managing the the next iteration of an uncertain future.
Situation awareness includes projection, thinking ahead.
Automation Dependency - when do you revise your understanding of this situation, decide to change the plan - use the steps. Time, effort, lazy, or fear, the risk of being incorrect, not getting to the top quicker and being seen to ‘fail’ by others.
Yet either route achieves the objective of getting to the top.
The issue arrises because there is a choice; so why do we, the industry argue for the need of choice - capability, safety or cost.
The skills we lack are knowing how and when to change the way in which to perceive and respond to different situations.
We should not think in terms of good / bad: only awareness as required for the situation, and that which will be required for managing the the next iteration of an uncertain future.
Situation awareness includes projection, thinking ahead.
Automation Dependency - when do you revise your understanding of this situation, decide to change the plan - use the steps. Time, effort, lazy, or fear, the risk of being incorrect, not getting to the top quicker and being seen to ‘fail’ by others.
Yet either route achieves the objective of getting to the top.
The issue arrises because there is a choice; so why do we, the industry argue for the need of choice - capability, safety or cost.
