N1 - 0, N2 - 0 (737 argument with an instructor)
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As usual in aviation though, we tend to miss the big picture. It’s obvious the correct QRH will lead into an engine shutdown anyway. So the goal of safely handling an engine failure will be achieved. Providing you didn’t flip the plane upside down of course.
I think in these kind of situations, you just have to nod, pretend to write something down, then do your own research later.
A simple risk/benefit analysis of pulling the fire handle (or not) with a possibly severely damaged engine and accessories tends to lean towards doing it. If it isn’t shot to bits and some time later you really need it back, the procedure is completely reversible. On the other hand, if it is badly broken and still connected to hydraulics, fuel, pneumatics and electrics, there is a chance this may lead to further significant problems, like loss of hydraulic systems, smoke/fumes in the air con or even fire in the nacelle (or a combination of these). Which would you rather be dealing with while flying around on one engine?
Another point is that with increasing severity, there is also an increasing likelihood of high energy bits taking out some/all of the warning systems. A while ago one of our jets had an uncontained failure (on the ground, luckily) which punched holes in the aircraft and set it on fire but there weren’t any immediate warnings...
A simple risk/benefit analysis of pulling the fire handle (or not) with a possibly severely damaged engine and accessories tends to lean towards doing it. If it isn’t shot to bits and some time later you really need it back, the procedure is completely reversible. On the other hand, if it is badly broken and still connected to hydraulics, fuel, pneumatics and electrics, there is a chance this may lead to further significant problems, like loss of hydraulic systems, smoke/fumes in the air con or even fire in the nacelle (or a combination of these). Which would you rather be dealing with while flying around on one engine?
Another point is that with increasing severity, there is also an increasing likelihood of high energy bits taking out some/all of the warning systems. A while ago one of our jets had an uncontained failure (on the ground, luckily) which punched holes in the aircraft and set it on fire but there weren’t any immediate warnings...
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You must NEVER leave a training session with question marks popping over your head unless there are some evident contradictions within the documentation or some wording is poorly chosen by the manufacturer/operator. In that case the instructor MUST come back at the earliest stage with an answer to the trainees after consultation with technical pilot or CFI, HT, or anybody who can answer the question.
Worst thing to see in training is people getting out of sim sessions with uncertainties and the inability of the instructor to clearly explain WHY something works the way it does.
I understand that but at the end of the day, most people are trying to get signed up for another six months with the minimum of drama and an extended argumentative debrief is probably not high on their wish-list. There are normally friendly trainers or Standards pilots who can explain/educate in a non-jeopardy environment, plus provide appropriate feedback if necessary.
After 4hrs inside an unreliable box on legs, it’s the last thing you need. I agree about leaving unsure but as long as you clear it up before you go flying again, confidence can return...
After 4hrs inside an unreliable box on legs, it’s the last thing you need. I agree about leaving unsure but as long as you clear it up before you go flying again, confidence can return...
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I understand that but at the end of the day, most people are trying to get signed up for another six months with the minimum of drama and an extended argumentative debrief is probably not high on their wish-list. There are normally friendly trainers or Standards pilots who can explain/educate in a non-jeopardy environment, plus provide appropriate feedback if necessary.
After 4hrs inside an unreliable box on legs, it’s the last thing you need. I agree about leaving unsure but as long as you clear it up before you go flying again, confidence can return...
After 4hrs inside an unreliable box on legs, it’s the last thing you need. I agree about leaving unsure but as long as you clear it up before you go flying again, confidence can return...
There are unfortunately too many instructors and examiners in the wrong position and often this has nothing to do with their knowledge or skills, it has to do with the attitude or their ability to be good "educators".
This event is an example of a hazard of misapplication - misunderstanding the concept of SOPs; an extreme SOP culture where all events are expected to follow the rules. Life is far from that perfection; training should concentrate more on process, understanding, thinking about an appropriate course of action, opposed to placing events into neat training boxes to be ticked off.
Also a reminder of how the industry forgets, mislays knowledge, most of which applies today but is put aside because of rarity of events; a weakness from improving safety standards.
From many years ago, and dusted off in the 90s for the PSM+ICR studies, a long lost example of Engine Malfunction Analysis - for crew.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/f18gotbmjs...lysis.pdf?dl=0
PSM+ICR page 2 https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1623.pdf
'The simulator propulsion system malfunction models in many cases are inaccurate and/or do not have key cues of vibration and/or noise. There is also no robust process that ensures the quality and realism of simulator propulsion system malfunction models or that the malfunctions which are used in the training process are those most frequently encountered in service or those most commonly leading to inappropriate crew response. This shortfall leads, in some cases, to negative training.
While current training programs concentrate appropriately on pilot handling of engine failure (single engine loss of thrust and resulting thrust asymmetry) at the most critical point in flight, they do not address the malfunction characteristics (auditory and vibratory cues) most likely to result in inappropriate response.
The changing pilot population, coupled with reduced exposure to in-service events from increased propulsion system reliability, is resulting in large numbers of flight crews who have little or no prior experience with actual propulsion system failures.'
Also a reminder of how the industry forgets, mislays knowledge, most of which applies today but is put aside because of rarity of events; a weakness from improving safety standards.
From many years ago, and dusted off in the 90s for the PSM+ICR studies, a long lost example of Engine Malfunction Analysis - for crew.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/f18gotbmjs...lysis.pdf?dl=0
PSM+ICR page 2 https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1623.pdf
'The simulator propulsion system malfunction models in many cases are inaccurate and/or do not have key cues of vibration and/or noise. There is also no robust process that ensures the quality and realism of simulator propulsion system malfunction models or that the malfunctions which are used in the training process are those most frequently encountered in service or those most commonly leading to inappropriate crew response. This shortfall leads, in some cases, to negative training.
While current training programs concentrate appropriately on pilot handling of engine failure (single engine loss of thrust and resulting thrust asymmetry) at the most critical point in flight, they do not address the malfunction characteristics (auditory and vibratory cues) most likely to result in inappropriate response.
The changing pilot population, coupled with reduced exposure to in-service events from increased propulsion system reliability, is resulting in large numbers of flight crews who have little or no prior experience with actual propulsion system failures.'
Absolutely Alf.
I remember when I converted onto the 737-200 (wow!) back in the mists of time, when combative Instrument Ratings were a thing, it was almost expected that you’d have run the drills before the gear had fully locked up. Okay, a little bit in jest but not much. No time for analysis, mutual decision making, flightpath assured and all that modern rubbish!
This perpetuated the slavish following of SOPs, IMO, as that was the way to impress the instructor. Watch those hands dance over the levers! See how quick and confident I am! Luckily, being an average kind of pilot, I managed to survive without too much mental trauma but some were not so lucky.
I recall doing a 2-day sim with a captain I’d flown with before on the line - really nice chap and competent operator; not a “rules” guy at all. One of items was a “LOFT” exercise, run by the co-pilot in real time, with various scenarios for the instructor to choose from: due to lack of time, we got a confirmed bomb threat. OK, said I, there’s a familiar airfield right in front of us on a ~3deg approach, let’s go for it at Vmo and do as much of the QRH as we can on the way in. I found the capt. somewhat evasive and continually trying to slow down (not a bad thing in itself) but also determined to do all the checklists right to the bitter end, even if it meant going into the hold. I managed to persuade him that time was of the essence (tick tock tick tock) and through constant intervention managed to get the aircraft on the ground and everyone off pretty swiftly.
In the debrief afterwards, the trainer asked the capt. if he thought I was pushing a bit hard during the approach, and he replied that no, he’d have done exactly the same thing IN REAL LIFE. Unsurprisingly, the rather observant trainer caught that one immediately and asked why it should be any different to the sim? The capt. then described how as a junior F/O many years ago he’d been shouted at by a trainer and told that he would never get a command and shouldn’t be flying at all. His crime? Missing one item off an unimportant checklist. Since then he’d had a pathological fear of simulators, to the point where he had difficulty sleeping during the week before and was physically sick in the car park before each session. He could only survive by doing what was printed on the checklists: no more, no less. He then broke down in tears.
The trainer and I both looked at each other and mouthed a silent “F...”.
Nowadays we’re all nice people(?) and there are peer support groups, industrial psychologists, free mental health care, etc. Back then? Not so much and the expectation was more biased to “man up and deal with it”. Still makes my blood boil how some people were permanently scarred by completely avoidable incidents.
I remember when I converted onto the 737-200 (wow!) back in the mists of time, when combative Instrument Ratings were a thing, it was almost expected that you’d have run the drills before the gear had fully locked up. Okay, a little bit in jest but not much. No time for analysis, mutual decision making, flightpath assured and all that modern rubbish!
This perpetuated the slavish following of SOPs, IMO, as that was the way to impress the instructor. Watch those hands dance over the levers! See how quick and confident I am! Luckily, being an average kind of pilot, I managed to survive without too much mental trauma but some were not so lucky.
I recall doing a 2-day sim with a captain I’d flown with before on the line - really nice chap and competent operator; not a “rules” guy at all. One of items was a “LOFT” exercise, run by the co-pilot in real time, with various scenarios for the instructor to choose from: due to lack of time, we got a confirmed bomb threat. OK, said I, there’s a familiar airfield right in front of us on a ~3deg approach, let’s go for it at Vmo and do as much of the QRH as we can on the way in. I found the capt. somewhat evasive and continually trying to slow down (not a bad thing in itself) but also determined to do all the checklists right to the bitter end, even if it meant going into the hold. I managed to persuade him that time was of the essence (tick tock tick tock) and through constant intervention managed to get the aircraft on the ground and everyone off pretty swiftly.
In the debrief afterwards, the trainer asked the capt. if he thought I was pushing a bit hard during the approach, and he replied that no, he’d have done exactly the same thing IN REAL LIFE. Unsurprisingly, the rather observant trainer caught that one immediately and asked why it should be any different to the sim? The capt. then described how as a junior F/O many years ago he’d been shouted at by a trainer and told that he would never get a command and shouldn’t be flying at all. His crime? Missing one item off an unimportant checklist. Since then he’d had a pathological fear of simulators, to the point where he had difficulty sleeping during the week before and was physically sick in the car park before each session. He could only survive by doing what was printed on the checklists: no more, no less. He then broke down in tears.
The trainer and I both looked at each other and mouthed a silent “F...”.
Nowadays we’re all nice people(?) and there are peer support groups, industrial psychologists, free mental health care, etc. Back then? Not so much and the expectation was more biased to “man up and deal with it”. Still makes my blood boil how some people were permanently scarred by completely avoidable incidents.
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Absolutely Alf.
I remember when I converted onto the 737-200 (wow!) back in the mists of time, when combative Instrument Ratings were a thing, it was almost expected that you’d have run the drills before the gear had fully locked up. Okay, a little bit in jest but not much. No time for analysis, mutual decision making, flightpath assured and all that modern rubbish!
This perpetuated the slavish following of SOPs, IMO, as that was the way to impress the instructor. Watch those hands dance over the levers! See how quick and confident I am! Luckily, being an average kind of pilot, I managed to survive without too much mental trauma but some were not so lucky.
I recall doing a 2-day sim with a captain I’d flown with before on the line - really nice chap and competent operator; not a “rules” guy at all. One of items was a “LOFT” exercise, run by the co-pilot in real time, with various scenarios for the instructor to choose from: due to lack of time, we got a confirmed bomb threat. OK, said I, there’s a familiar airfield right in front of us on a ~3deg approach, let’s go for it at Vmo and do as much of the QRH as we can on the way in. I found the capt. somewhat evasive and continually trying to slow down (not a bad thing in itself) but also determined to do all the checklists right to the bitter end, even if it meant going into the hold. I managed to persuade him that time was of the essence (tick tock tick tock) and through constant intervention managed to get the aircraft on the ground and everyone off pretty swiftly.
In the debrief afterwards, the trainer asked the capt. if he thought I was pushing a bit hard during the approach, and he replied that no, he’d have done exactly the same thing IN REAL LIFE. Unsurprisingly, the rather observant trainer caught that one immediately and asked why it should be any different to the sim? The capt. then described how as a junior F/O many years ago he’d been shouted at by a trainer and told that he would never get a command and shouldn’t be flying at all. His crime? Missing one item off an unimportant checklist. Since then he’d had a pathological fear of simulators, to the point where he had difficulty sleeping during the week before and was physically sick in the car park before each session. He could only survive by doing what was printed on the checklists: no more, no less. He then broke down in tears.
The trainer and I both looked at each other and mouthed a silent “F...”.
Nowadays we’re all nice people(?) and there are peer support groups, industrial psychologists, free mental health care, etc. Back then? Not so much and the expectation was more biased to “man up and deal with it”. Still makes my blood boil how some people were permanently scarred by completely avoidable incidents.
I remember when I converted onto the 737-200 (wow!) back in the mists of time, when combative Instrument Ratings were a thing, it was almost expected that you’d have run the drills before the gear had fully locked up. Okay, a little bit in jest but not much. No time for analysis, mutual decision making, flightpath assured and all that modern rubbish!
This perpetuated the slavish following of SOPs, IMO, as that was the way to impress the instructor. Watch those hands dance over the levers! See how quick and confident I am! Luckily, being an average kind of pilot, I managed to survive without too much mental trauma but some were not so lucky.
I recall doing a 2-day sim with a captain I’d flown with before on the line - really nice chap and competent operator; not a “rules” guy at all. One of items was a “LOFT” exercise, run by the co-pilot in real time, with various scenarios for the instructor to choose from: due to lack of time, we got a confirmed bomb threat. OK, said I, there’s a familiar airfield right in front of us on a ~3deg approach, let’s go for it at Vmo and do as much of the QRH as we can on the way in. I found the capt. somewhat evasive and continually trying to slow down (not a bad thing in itself) but also determined to do all the checklists right to the bitter end, even if it meant going into the hold. I managed to persuade him that time was of the essence (tick tock tick tock) and through constant intervention managed to get the aircraft on the ground and everyone off pretty swiftly.
In the debrief afterwards, the trainer asked the capt. if he thought I was pushing a bit hard during the approach, and he replied that no, he’d have done exactly the same thing IN REAL LIFE. Unsurprisingly, the rather observant trainer caught that one immediately and asked why it should be any different to the sim? The capt. then described how as a junior F/O many years ago he’d been shouted at by a trainer and told that he would never get a command and shouldn’t be flying at all. His crime? Missing one item off an unimportant checklist. Since then he’d had a pathological fear of simulators, to the point where he had difficulty sleeping during the week before and was physically sick in the car park before each session. He could only survive by doing what was printed on the checklists: no more, no less. He then broke down in tears.
The trainer and I both looked at each other and mouthed a silent “F...”.
Nowadays we’re all nice people(?) and there are peer support groups, industrial psychologists, free mental health care, etc. Back then? Not so much and the expectation was more biased to “man up and deal with it”. Still makes my blood boil how some people were permanently scarred by completely avoidable incidents.
FullWings 
Instructors and management should read the section on continuous learning; page 4….
RPET The Resilient Performance Enhancement Toolkit 1. Erik Hollnagel, PDF Free Download
Related:- 'Deviant airline pilots: why we need them'.
https://jeroenwolbers.files.wordpres...ine-pilots.pdf
Instructors and management should read the section on continuous learning; page 4….
RPET The Resilient Performance Enhancement Toolkit 1. Erik Hollnagel, PDF Free Download
Related:- 'Deviant airline pilots: why we need them'.
https://jeroenwolbers.files.wordpres...ine-pilots.pdf
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Check the instructor
Has any one experienced the C of G being moved during a SIM detail or having it put so far aft as to make the 'a/c' virtually unflyable?
I've witnessed this and had it done to me and wonder if it's possible to have a digital record of key parameters throughout the detail to discourage trainers from playing tricks.........they're NOT all saints
I've witnessed this and had it done to me and wonder if it's possible to have a digital record of key parameters throughout the detail to discourage trainers from playing tricks.........they're NOT all saints
Last edited by a1anx; 19th Nov 2020 at 10:25.
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As a Flight Engineer for many years with over 11000 hours and many sim sessions I have seen a lot of engine problems, and N1 - 0, N2 - 0, is a engine severe damage / separation checklist, your instructor is wrong!
A tip I give people for the sim in case this should occur, (Engine failure, no vibration, all spools stopped):
If you’ve done the Severe Damage memory actions and the sim instructor questions it, tell them you felt airframe vibration. It’s impossible for the instructor to prove that you didn’t (especially if the other pilot backs you up) and you’ve then met the conditions for Severe Damage. It should then turn into a discussion if the instructor feels like pushing it.
As I said earlier, this situation is a sim only gamesmanship issue. In the real jet, if both spools suddenly stopped there would most definitely be vibration. Severe Damage would be the correct and obvious action.
If you’ve done the Severe Damage memory actions and the sim instructor questions it, tell them you felt airframe vibration. It’s impossible for the instructor to prove that you didn’t (especially if the other pilot backs you up) and you’ve then met the conditions for Severe Damage. It should then turn into a discussion if the instructor feels like pushing it.
As I said earlier, this situation is a sim only gamesmanship issue. In the real jet, if both spools suddenly stopped there would most definitely be vibration. Severe Damage would be the correct and obvious action.
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It's been a while, but in the airlines i flew the 737 every engine failure after take off (V1 cuts) was treated as severe damage, and the engine fire or severe damage or separation checklist was done (call: Engine fire, take action). Yes, for a simple flame out as well. Made things a lot easier as there was no differentiation, just one set of memory items and checklist to do. In cruise that would have been handled differently though.
And yes, no N1 and/or N2 was always seen as sign for severe damage. The newer level D sims had actually very noticeable airframe shudder for a seizure, you would notice that immediately.
And yes, no N1 and/or N2 was always seen as sign for severe damage. The newer level D sims had actually very noticeable airframe shudder for a seizure, you would notice that immediately.
We really have some problems these, days, abysmal instructors, seriously lacking in basic airmanship. Zero N1 and N2 tells me the engine is knackered, period.
The Boeing checklist is called for, “ engine fire, severe damage or seperation. “
Carry out the drill and do an engine out approach, not least because no N1 , N2 suggests to me the engine is not producing thrust, if, infact, its still on the wing!
Trying to second guess the cause of the problem is counterproductive. Assume the engine is dead and concentrate on the single engine procedure.
Simples.
Put the jet safely on the ground and THEN make further detailed analysis of the engine problem.
, so perhaps you should ask your instructor exactly what he meant by “engine failure”,
The 737 flies perfectly well on one.
( and yes I was a trainer, trained by Boeing on the 73 with 8000 hours on the type)
The Boeing checklist is called for, “ engine fire, severe damage or seperation. “
Carry out the drill and do an engine out approach, not least because no N1 , N2 suggests to me the engine is not producing thrust, if, infact, its still on the wing!
Trying to second guess the cause of the problem is counterproductive. Assume the engine is dead and concentrate on the single engine procedure.
Simples.
Put the jet safely on the ground and THEN make further detailed analysis of the engine problem.
, so perhaps you should ask your instructor exactly what he meant by “engine failure”,
The 737 flies perfectly well on one.
( and yes I was a trainer, trained by Boeing on the 73 with 8000 hours on the type)
Last edited by RetiredBA/BY; 20th Nov 2020 at 12:04.
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We really have some problems these, days, abysmal instructors, seriously lacking in basic airmanship. Zero N1 or N2 tells me the engine is knackered, period.
The Boeing checklist is called for, “ engine fire, severe damage or seperation. “
Carry out the drill and do an engine out approach, not least because no N1 , N2 suggests to me the engine is not producing thrust, if, infact, its still on the wing!
Trying to second guess the cause of the problem is counterproductive. Assume the engine is dead and concentrate on the single engine procedure.
Simples.
Put the jet safely on the ground and THEN make further detailed analysis of the engine problem.
, so perhaps you should ask your instructor exactly what he meant by “engine failure”,
The 737 flies perfectly well on one.
( and yes I was a trainer, trained by Boeing on the 73 with 8000 hours on the type)
The Boeing checklist is called for, “ engine fire, severe damage or seperation. “
Carry out the drill and do an engine out approach, not least because no N1 , N2 suggests to me the engine is not producing thrust, if, infact, its still on the wing!
Trying to second guess the cause of the problem is counterproductive. Assume the engine is dead and concentrate on the single engine procedure.
Simples.
Put the jet safely on the ground and THEN make further detailed analysis of the engine problem.
, so perhaps you should ask your instructor exactly what he meant by “engine failure”,
The 737 flies perfectly well on one.
( and yes I was a trainer, trained by Boeing on the 73 with 8000 hours on the type)
Ex 73 - absolutely agree.