Crew workload in manual flying
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You missed the point of my comments, I fear.
(a) it would have helped had you provided the qualifications in your last post in the body of the earlier post
(b) likewise, I have no engineering problem with flying above Vmo
(c) the problem I had was that the non-certification background folks reading your previous post could, very easily, form a view which ought not to be formed
The EASA/FAA rules are significantly in harmony so, without undertaking a study into the EASA differences, I presume that the requirements will be very similar. As to the test requirements, they are provided, generically, in the relevant AC. I have a certification background so that incorporates a reasonable (if now getting dated) understanding of the story.
However, your last post has clarified the origin of the previous comments so my concerns are now well relaxed.
(a) it would have helped had you provided the qualifications in your last post in the body of the earlier post
(b) likewise, I have no engineering problem with flying above Vmo
(c) the problem I had was that the non-certification background folks reading your previous post could, very easily, form a view which ought not to be formed
The EASA/FAA rules are significantly in harmony so, without undertaking a study into the EASA differences, I presume that the requirements will be very similar. As to the test requirements, they are provided, generically, in the relevant AC. I have a certification background so that incorporates a reasonable (if now getting dated) understanding of the story.
However, your last post has clarified the origin of the previous comments so my concerns are now well relaxed.
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Food for thought....with the drastically-decreased volume of air traffic these days, the scope for hand-flying the aircraft is far greater.
In recent years, our frequent operations into empty airfields in Cuba gave us full rein to conduct manual, visual approaches with raw data, manual thrust and no FD's. If IMC, then procedural approaches, again hand-flown, were the order of the day for many.
And yet, I recall some SFO's, now captains, were reluctant to disconnect. Therein the problem lies.
Now the opportunity exists, for those fortunate folk still flying for a living, to get a good grip on the forgotten and important art of hand-flying a transport aircraft.
In recent years, our frequent operations into empty airfields in Cuba gave us full rein to conduct manual, visual approaches with raw data, manual thrust and no FD's. If IMC, then procedural approaches, again hand-flown, were the order of the day for many.
And yet, I recall some SFO's, now captains, were reluctant to disconnect. Therein the problem lies.
Now the opportunity exists, for those fortunate folk still flying for a living, to get a good grip on the forgotten and important art of hand-flying a transport aircraft.
Interesting thread:
As a long retired captain my take:
I frequently practised manual flight as and when the ATC environment allowed, both with and without flight director.
No FD speeds up the scan.
I was frequently asked why by my FOs.
My response. My worst case scenario is I am crossing the Atlantic on a filthy night, pax sleeping soundly. Alternates all on limits.
Then an engine on the 76 or 75 goes bang taking a lot of electrics with it, ( Happens, AF 380, Martinair 767 ).
I am then faced with a single engine non precision hand flown approach,to minima perhaps without FD , to Nar or Kef, airports I have never been to.
Faced with dealing with the technical aspects in that situation is absolutely NOT the time to also refresh hand flying skills.
I hope and believe I could have got the jet safely down in that scenario because actually flying the jet was second nature, not least because I regularly practiced it and setting of the FMC etc is done as and when circumstances dictate, CRM !
Hand flying is actually quite enjoyable too, its why I now pay 120 quid an hour to fly a Warrior !
Back to my morning coffee on a rainy day !
As a long retired captain my take:
I frequently practised manual flight as and when the ATC environment allowed, both with and without flight director.
No FD speeds up the scan.
I was frequently asked why by my FOs.
My response. My worst case scenario is I am crossing the Atlantic on a filthy night, pax sleeping soundly. Alternates all on limits.
Then an engine on the 76 or 75 goes bang taking a lot of electrics with it, ( Happens, AF 380, Martinair 767 ).
I am then faced with a single engine non precision hand flown approach,to minima perhaps without FD , to Nar or Kef, airports I have never been to.
Faced with dealing with the technical aspects in that situation is absolutely NOT the time to also refresh hand flying skills.
I hope and believe I could have got the jet safely down in that scenario because actually flying the jet was second nature, not least because I regularly practiced it and setting of the FMC etc is done as and when circumstances dictate, CRM !
Hand flying is actually quite enjoyable too, its why I now pay 120 quid an hour to fly a Warrior !
Back to my morning coffee on a rainy day !
Last edited by RetiredBA/BY; 19th Aug 2020 at 10:09.
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I reckon that I haven't read the whole thread, just the OP, but here is my question: since when following the FD bars is considered manual flying? I remember when I once asked a 4.000 hours FO "would you like to do a visual?", he said "yes, why not?" and I had to take the controls merely minutes after I switched off the FD because his pitch attitude was swinging from almost 8 degrees nose up to below the horizon. And that was with A/T ON.
Manual flying is not about workload, or just exercising the wrist muscles (yup, we use those for something entirely different), is about not needing a third party to know what is the proper pitch attitude, the right thrust setting, and the variations of both when banking the plane to maintain the desired trajectory. Any other thing is just an aiming exercise that will actually absorb the focus of the pilot.
Or maybe I am missing something here...
Manual flying is not about workload, or just exercising the wrist muscles (yup, we use those for something entirely different), is about not needing a third party to know what is the proper pitch attitude, the right thrust setting, and the variations of both when banking the plane to maintain the desired trajectory. Any other thing is just an aiming exercise that will actually absorb the focus of the pilot.
Or maybe I am missing something here...
My problem is that what some people believe will relieve me some workload, will in facts increase it.
The first occurence of this was single pilot IR training.
In a holding pattern, I used to (want to) keep my heading bug in a certain direction, even when flying away from it, and use an angular difference (180°, 90° to one side or the other...) to follow my real heading.
Instructors told me I had to move my heading bug before each turn.. Which added workload with no reason that I could see, in a single pilot environment..
Now, in a multi pilot environment, I still don't need a heading bug to know where to go, but it's pretty obvious that the heading bug or nav mode should agree with the actual flight path, because there is another pilot who needs to easily understand what is happening. So for instance if I'm making a visual approach, I will choose headings myself, and the heading bug needs to be in accordance for the other pilot.
But now there is a rule, for which the only reason given in this topic was "to avoid destabilizing the flight path" which prevents me from touching the FCU (but I still can manipulate my QNH button and set it myself even in manual flying..), so I have to ask. And in some situations, when the PM is not immediately available to hear the instruction, it clearly takes more resource than turning the knob myself, which I did very well on my own in single pilot operations.
To sum it up, I'm not talking about the increase in workload strictly due to manual flying, I'm talking about the increase workload due to rules that are added on top.
A very minor problem indeed, but I like to go in dept in the working environment.
Since when did recovering from a stall become a "memory item" ? I thought it was "basic airmanship", taught from hour 8 of PPL training.
Last edited by KayPam; 19th Aug 2020 at 20:11.
- You don't put flaps down in a C172 in stall recovery
- No speed brakes in a 172
- Airliner don't always have the convenient "nose drop" of a C172. Due to the aerodynamics of the swept wing, they can even be flattish (AF447). Positive action may be required.
- Power on too early can lead you into secondary stalls.
Only half a speed-brake
Further explanation comes from the Airbus nomenclature. By their own broader definition
The headscratch why a stall recovery is a procedure as opposed to manoeuvre is understandable. The above post explains pretty well, although after AF447 it really needs to be a PROC anyway (and it had been a PROC even prior).
A MEMORY ITEM [...]when the flight crew has no time to refer to the ECAM/QRH/FCOM to ensure a safe flight path,
But now there is a rule, for which the only reason given in this topic was "to avoid destabilizing the flight path" which prevents me from touching the FCU (but I still can manipulate my QNH button and set it myself even in manual flying..), so I have to ask. And in some situations, when the PM is not immediately available to hear the instruction, it clearly takes more resource than turning the knob myself, which I did very well on my own in single pilot operations.
FCU PM manipulation is not solely for destabilising reasons.
Grab your FCTM and find out. It's near the front in the Airbus Operating Philosophy chapter> TASKSHARING RULES AND COMMUNICATION. Look it up.
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The everlasting, never-ending debate on what should and shouldn't be a memory item has been around in the world of Airbus ever since. Some years ago, before a nice little modification was performed on the PTU inhibition logic, there were talks about the OEB concerning G/Y system low pressure followed by an overheat of its opposite system becoming a memory item as well. Or at least the part of it requiring you to switch off the PTU. But then they did the maths that it would take about 2 minutes for the PTU to overheat the remaining hydraulic system and decided that it was not worth making pilots memorise one more procedure. And then the modification cleared the OEB for most aircraft. These days you can only see it on some old aircraft, often flown by some second-league operator who doesn't want to invest money into clearing OEBs unless absolutely necessary.
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- You don't put flaps down in a C172 in stall recovery
- No speed brakes in a 172
- Airliner don't always have the convenient "nose drop" of a C172. Due to the aerodynamics of the swept wing, they can even be flattish (AF447). Positive action may be required.
- Power on too early can lead you into secondary stalls.
Even on a 172 you know you need pitch down, with positive action if required and even for a 15 year-old glider pilot it's obvious the speebrakes need to go away to recover a better airfoil. On both types you also learn not to pull too early and that power too early does not necessarily help.
For the flaps it's a little bit different, but my point is : you should not have to learn a memory item during a type rating to be able to get out of a stall. The procedure of course, has to be learnt in order to optimise the technique (for example here, when do we put the flaps out? While we start pulling ?)
In the memory item, airbus felt obligated to add that in case of one engine inoperative, thrust asymmetry should be countered with rudder action. In itself, it is very surprising that Airbus had to write something that any student pilot who has thought about multi engine flying could tell you.
Next step is airbus writing :
Vr.... Announce. Rotation... Perform
Note : to perform the rotation, the sidestick has to be pulled aft
...
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It can be argued all these items are basic airmanship.
Even on a 172 you know you need pitch down, with positive action if required and even for a 15 year-old glider pilot it's obvious the speebrakes need to go away to recover a better airfoil. On both types you also learn not to pull too early and that power too early does not necessarily help.
For the flaps it's a little bit different, but my point is : you should not have to learn a memory item during a type rating to be able to get out of a stall. The procedure of course, has to be learnt in order to optimise the technique (for example here, when do we put the flaps out? While we start pulling ?)
In the memory item, airbus felt obligated to add that in case of one engine inoperative, thrust asymmetry should be countered with rudder action. In itself, it is very surprising that Airbus had to write something that any student pilot who has thought about multi engine flying could tell you.
Next step is airbus writing :
Vr.... Announce. Rotation... Perform
Note : to perform the rotation, the sidestick has to be pulled aft
...
Even on a 172 you know you need pitch down, with positive action if required and even for a 15 year-old glider pilot it's obvious the speebrakes need to go away to recover a better airfoil. On both types you also learn not to pull too early and that power too early does not necessarily help.
For the flaps it's a little bit different, but my point is : you should not have to learn a memory item during a type rating to be able to get out of a stall. The procedure of course, has to be learnt in order to optimise the technique (for example here, when do we put the flaps out? While we start pulling ?)
In the memory item, airbus felt obligated to add that in case of one engine inoperative, thrust asymmetry should be countered with rudder action. In itself, it is very surprising that Airbus had to write something that any student pilot who has thought about multi engine flying could tell you.
Next step is airbus writing :
Vr.... Announce. Rotation... Perform
Note : to perform the rotation, the sidestick has to be pulled aft
...
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KayPam
Suggest you go back to square one and buy the book "Teach Yourself to Fly."by Nigel Tangye
Its blurb says:
First published in 1938, Teach Yourself To Fly was not only one of the very first Teach Yourself books to be published but the first to actually change the world. It was used on the eve of the second world war to prepare pilot recruits and conscripts before they were called for service, and as such it was read religiously by thousands of young men, some as young as 17, and directly impacted on the British war effort.
This beautiful new printing of the book captures all of the feelings of that extraordinary time - it's nostalgic, understated, inspiring and very British indeed, warning young pilots, amongst other things, not to feel 'too discouraged' in the event of a crash landing.
Technology has changed hugely, but the principles of aviation as they were in the middle of the twentieth century are perfectly summarised in this lovely book. Get hold of the right vehicle, and it really can teach you to fly.
What happens when you're up there, however, is your responsibility.
............................................................ ............................................................ ............................................................ ............................................................ .............................................
A friend of mine back in the 1950's flew a Tiger Moth on his first solo after seven hours of dual instruction. On his second solo he flew to the nearby training area and in his flying suit pocket carried the book Teach Yourself to Fly. For the next 30 minutes and using the book for guidance, he taught himself aerobatics. In later years he became an RAAF fighter pilot on Sabres and Meteors and even became the Chief Flying Instructor of the RAAF Central Flying School. On further later years he became the Australian Department of Civil Aviation Senior Examiner for Airmen on the Boeing 747 and 737 before retirement. In his home library,Teach Yourself to Fly still has pride of place.
I am not sure why I am placing this post on Pprune; except reading the minutae I read on this thread that today's airline pilots have forced down their throats, makes me wonder how I ever survived flying transport jets using the K.I.S.S principle
Suggest you go back to square one and buy the book "Teach Yourself to Fly."by Nigel Tangye
Its blurb says:
First published in 1938, Teach Yourself To Fly was not only one of the very first Teach Yourself books to be published but the first to actually change the world. It was used on the eve of the second world war to prepare pilot recruits and conscripts before they were called for service, and as such it was read religiously by thousands of young men, some as young as 17, and directly impacted on the British war effort.
This beautiful new printing of the book captures all of the feelings of that extraordinary time - it's nostalgic, understated, inspiring and very British indeed, warning young pilots, amongst other things, not to feel 'too discouraged' in the event of a crash landing.
Technology has changed hugely, but the principles of aviation as they were in the middle of the twentieth century are perfectly summarised in this lovely book. Get hold of the right vehicle, and it really can teach you to fly.
What happens when you're up there, however, is your responsibility.
............................................................ ............................................................ ............................................................ ............................................................ .............................................
A friend of mine back in the 1950's flew a Tiger Moth on his first solo after seven hours of dual instruction. On his second solo he flew to the nearby training area and in his flying suit pocket carried the book Teach Yourself to Fly. For the next 30 minutes and using the book for guidance, he taught himself aerobatics. In later years he became an RAAF fighter pilot on Sabres and Meteors and even became the Chief Flying Instructor of the RAAF Central Flying School. On further later years he became the Australian Department of Civil Aviation Senior Examiner for Airmen on the Boeing 747 and 737 before retirement. In his home library,Teach Yourself to Fly still has pride of place.
I am not sure why I am placing this post on Pprune; except reading the minutae I read on this thread that today's airline pilots have forced down their throats, makes me wonder how I ever survived flying transport jets using the K.I.S.S principle
@Kay Pam, I would suggest that in a stall, the instinctive airmanship bit is to dip the nose as soon as the stall becomes apparent. The memory drill part, if there is one, would be to then check the aircraft config and thrust setting.
Flying a hold: Instead of using the heading bug to indicate your hold axis, why not use the VOR beam bar. As you know, an auto-pilot in HDG mode will follow the heading bug, so for flying big jets you will need to point the heading bug where you want to fly and relearn a system for flying holds that enables you to visualise the hold. One normally uses the VOR beam bar anyway - it is useful for indicating the join, the hold axis and the abeam point, as well as the VOR radial tracking when inbound, (assuming the hold is referenced to a VOR, obviously).
Regarding "obvious" memory drills, a senior TRE in a previous airline forgot to raise the gear when he and his F/O had a real EFATO in a 757 one day, so a check of the gear became part of that airline's EFATO drill.
@RetiredBA/BY #123, good post
Flying a hold: Instead of using the heading bug to indicate your hold axis, why not use the VOR beam bar. As you know, an auto-pilot in HDG mode will follow the heading bug, so for flying big jets you will need to point the heading bug where you want to fly and relearn a system for flying holds that enables you to visualise the hold. One normally uses the VOR beam bar anyway - it is useful for indicating the join, the hold axis and the abeam point, as well as the VOR radial tracking when inbound, (assuming the hold is referenced to a VOR, obviously).
Regarding "obvious" memory drills, a senior TRE in a previous airline forgot to raise the gear when he and his F/O had a real EFATO in a 757 one day, so a check of the gear became part of that airline's EFATO drill.
@RetiredBA/BY #123, good post
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That's one reason. Another one is that any manual is a legal document the content of which is likely to be overviewed by the investigating authority in case the brown stuff hits the fan. The legal eagles don't necessarily have a good idea of what is and isn't common sense to a pilot, but they are all very good at analysing text. And what if they find that the contributing system, procedure, maneuver or whatever was not explained in sufficient detail? Hint - think the B737MAX grounding. Or at least a massive claim to the manufacturer. Hence, the manufacturers prefer to sometimes overdo the texts but stay on the safe side.
Only half a speed-brake
Don't anyone wish one certain crew not that long ago robotically applied the unreliable speed drill after takeoff, once their AoA packed up?
If it can be described as a procedure then it better be prescribed as a procedure, drill-trained and audited as a procedure. I really do see how unusual that may look to a common aviator's naked eye, but public mass transport with its worldwide size requires not to depend on individuals' "natural common sense reaction". That is not wishful thinking but rather the lessons learned.
Speed-brake / spoilers drill examples:
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19951220-1
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19990601-0
Not to mention the stall ones:
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=20090601-0
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=20090212-0
If it can be described as a procedure then it better be prescribed as a procedure, drill-trained and audited as a procedure. I really do see how unusual that may look to a common aviator's naked eye, but public mass transport with its worldwide size requires not to depend on individuals' "natural common sense reaction". That is not wishful thinking but rather the lessons learned.
Speed-brake / spoilers drill examples:
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19951220-1
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19990601-0
Not to mention the stall ones:
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=20090601-0
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=20090212-0
KP, increased workload, #1.
Operations with auto flight have changed beyond recognition with increasing technology, particularly flight management.
Similarly with FD + AT, which many people mistakenly interpret as manual flight - to improve 'skill'; whereas reality is increased workload due to manual + flight management, same drills, calls, etc, to use technology.
Manual flight without FD and AT should refresh some of the basics of flying, differences in aircraft feel - inertia, and most important which are the important parameters to monitor; pitch, speed, power, and their interaction, improving the feel and anticipation of the aircraft response, … , but not requiring the same level of flight management, no need for drills, calls, etc, improving skills which should help during automatic operations.
Unfortunately many operators and regulators fail to appreciate these aspects, distant from the reality of operations.
Part of the problem stems from renewed focus on risk management. 'Corporate' risk management is more about the management's exposure to risk. For the crew, this means more procedures and checks, and greater responsibility for the day-to-day risk management.
Little of this directly improves safety, but often increases workload - ' follow SOPs' - you will be safe; the expectation that crews will manage uncertainty as if it were known, because of drills and checks.
The 'back to basics' are not the same basics as in training aircraft, but the those of flying current large aircraft. How to apply the ab initio skills on the line; the basics adapted to your aircraft.
Books:- not 'how to fly', but an updated version of 'Handling the Big Jets', manual flight with modern control systems. Additionally a book on 'Managing modern aircraft systems - flying', but written for management and training, concerning workload and HF, drills, calls, procedures.
Operations with auto flight have changed beyond recognition with increasing technology, particularly flight management.
Similarly with FD + AT, which many people mistakenly interpret as manual flight - to improve 'skill'; whereas reality is increased workload due to manual + flight management, same drills, calls, etc, to use technology.
Manual flight without FD and AT should refresh some of the basics of flying, differences in aircraft feel - inertia, and most important which are the important parameters to monitor; pitch, speed, power, and their interaction, improving the feel and anticipation of the aircraft response, … , but not requiring the same level of flight management, no need for drills, calls, etc, improving skills which should help during automatic operations.
Unfortunately many operators and regulators fail to appreciate these aspects, distant from the reality of operations.
Part of the problem stems from renewed focus on risk management. 'Corporate' risk management is more about the management's exposure to risk. For the crew, this means more procedures and checks, and greater responsibility for the day-to-day risk management.
Little of this directly improves safety, but often increases workload - ' follow SOPs' - you will be safe; the expectation that crews will manage uncertainty as if it were known, because of drills and checks.
The 'back to basics' are not the same basics as in training aircraft, but the those of flying current large aircraft. How to apply the ab initio skills on the line; the basics adapted to your aircraft.
Books:- not 'how to fly', but an updated version of 'Handling the Big Jets', manual flight with modern control systems. Additionally a book on 'Managing modern aircraft systems - flying', but written for management and training, concerning workload and HF, drills, calls, procedures.
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Way, way back in Post #65:
And by Post #135 it is still being made to seem complicated!!!
I agree with Uplinker:
A problem that is coming across is that flying the aeroplane seems to be a problem to some (many)? Why? Isn't that what we were all taught to do when we started off? Or is the truth that these days the training is being cut back to such bare minimums that a lot of pilots aren't really being taught everything they need to know anymore? I used to teach (and still do part-time). Things have been trimmed way back on basics. And where has it got us? I know of an instructor that was criticised by a school for taking students into fully developed stalls, because 'we do not do that'. Can anyone think of any pilots that might have benefited from having been in fully developed stalls during basic training? (They might have been mentioned here...) Too many pilots have forgotten how to fly/are scared of actually flying/whatever else. They rely too much on the automation as being the first (and only?) option.
Not a word has been said in 134 posts so far (that I have noticed) that for certain circumstances there might be (is?) an increased workload in trying to fly on the 'automatics'. This Thread has prompted me to go back and re-watch Warren Vanderburgh's EXCELLENT "Children of the Magenta".
Over two decades old but still very, very, very relevant. I recommend that anyone flying an airliner should have watched it.
Back in Post #110 I stated:
Lucky due to recent circumstances but also right back in the beginning, because I learnt to fly, not to 'operate', an aeroplane. I was doing solo aerobatics when I was was 17 (legally!). OK, not everyone is going to do that, nor need to do that. But flying the aeroplane is more important than button pushing 'automation managers'. To quote Vanderburgh, "We are captains and pilots", not 'automation managers'. OK, no need to do solo aerobatics as a teenager, but some aerobatics should be useful. I asked a group of fellow pilots once, when we were discussing loss of control situations, how many of them had experience negative-G. None had. That is an extreme situation, but if they did encounter it for the first time ever in an 'upset' in an airliner, the startle effect would be huge. When I taught pilots for their CPL/IR, they always did at least one session of aerobatics. Now at some schools they don't even do fully developed stalls. Look where that has got some people.
What has come across in much of this is that actually flying the aeroplane ('manual flying') is a 'problem'. Many have posted on here the very good reasons for 'keeping your hand in' and practising it. But isn't the problem a bit deeper and that too many pilots are no longer being fully trained in how to FLY?
I agree with Uplinker:
A problem that is coming across is that flying the aeroplane seems to be a problem to some (many)? Why? Isn't that what we were all taught to do when we started off? Or is the truth that these days the training is being cut back to such bare minimums that a lot of pilots aren't really being taught everything they need to know anymore? I used to teach (and still do part-time). Things have been trimmed way back on basics. And where has it got us? I know of an instructor that was criticised by a school for taking students into fully developed stalls, because 'we do not do that'. Can anyone think of any pilots that might have benefited from having been in fully developed stalls during basic training? (They might have been mentioned here...) Too many pilots have forgotten how to fly/are scared of actually flying/whatever else. They rely too much on the automation as being the first (and only?) option.
Not a word has been said in 134 posts so far (that I have noticed) that for certain circumstances there might be (is?) an increased workload in trying to fly on the 'automatics'. This Thread has prompted me to go back and re-watch Warren Vanderburgh's EXCELLENT "Children of the Magenta".
Over two decades old but still very, very, very relevant. I recommend that anyone flying an airliner should have watched it.
Back in Post #110 I stated:
I do "... consider [my]self VERY lucky indeed"!
What has come across in much of this is that actually flying the aeroplane ('manual flying') is a 'problem'. Many have posted on here the very good reasons for 'keeping your hand in' and practising it. But isn't the problem a bit deeper and that too many pilots are no longer being fully trained in how to FLY?
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Regarding stall recovery:
the absolute best help is the FPA Flight path Angle ( the Bird on AB).
The difference between your Aircraft symbol ( Pitch) and the FPA is your Angle of Attack.
In a stall, especially a fully developed deep stall, where you need to pitch down heavily, and hunt the recovery by a deep nose-dive, (on B747 for example),reducing and then keeping the distance on your PFD between your pitch indicator and the FPA will give you the best recovery and avoid a secondary stall.
This should be demonstrated during your next Upset recognition and recovery training.
the absolute best help is the FPA Flight path Angle ( the Bird on AB).
The difference between your Aircraft symbol ( Pitch) and the FPA is your Angle of Attack.
In a stall, especially a fully developed deep stall, where you need to pitch down heavily, and hunt the recovery by a deep nose-dive, (on B747 for example),reducing and then keeping the distance on your PFD between your pitch indicator and the FPA will give you the best recovery and avoid a secondary stall.
This should be demonstrated during your next Upset recognition and recovery training.
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I thought that steep turns were one of the mandatory items for the LPC until I realised that the concept of pushing the nose up with the rudder in a high-bank situation was completely novel to many pilots trained in the past years. Yeah, why do anything other than a couple of well-memorised drills in the sim... Most of the training scenarios are so painfully predictable that after a couple of practice runs they are no longer good for anything other than rehearsing the callouts and sequence of procedures. Give the average pilot an engine failure right after V1 and chances are that they will do just fine. Give them the very same engine failure at 1000 feet AGL and watch all the beautiful choreography get thrown out of the window.
One very interesting publication on the topic of competence is the ICAO Manual of evidence-based training. And it actually suggests that the training process goes a long way beyond the sim. There's no shortage of ways to collect data on where the critical areas for most pilots are and address those in a targeted way instead of repeating the same "worst-case" scenarios over and over again. Very encouraging to see that more and more carriers are taking it seriously.
One very interesting publication on the topic of competence is the ICAO Manual of evidence-based training. And it actually suggests that the training process goes a long way beyond the sim. There's no shortage of ways to collect data on where the critical areas for most pilots are and address those in a targeted way instead of repeating the same "worst-case" scenarios over and over again. Very encouraging to see that more and more carriers are taking it seriously.
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Regarding stall recovery:
the absolute best help is the FPA Flight path Angle ( the Bird on AB).
The difference between your Aircraft symbol ( Pitch) and the FPA is your Angle of Attack.
In a stall, especially a fully developed deep stall, where you need to pitch down heavily, and hunt the recovery by a deep nose-dive, (on B747 for example),reducing and then keeping the distance on your PFD between your pitch indicator and the FPA will give you the best recovery and avoid a secondary stall.
This should be demonstrated during your next Upset recognition and recovery training.
the absolute best help is the FPA Flight path Angle ( the Bird on AB).
The difference between your Aircraft symbol ( Pitch) and the FPA is your Angle of Attack.
In a stall, especially a fully developed deep stall, where you need to pitch down heavily, and hunt the recovery by a deep nose-dive, (on B747 for example),reducing and then keeping the distance on your PFD between your pitch indicator and the FPA will give you the best recovery and avoid a secondary stall.
This should be demonstrated during your next Upset recognition and recovery training.
As an aside, does anyone know if the accident airplanes had AoA displays?
Give the average pilot an engine failure right after V1 and chances are that they will do just fine. Give them the very same engine failure at 1000 feet AGL and watch all the beautiful choreography get thrown out of the window.