When are you allowed to put your hand back on thrust levers after V1?
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I fly on a business jet, and we always include in the emergency briefing "no actions below 400ft, except gear retraction". So I put my hands back on the thrust levers at 400ft. For example in case of an engine fire, the flying pilot takes the appropriate engine back to idle, after reaching 400ft. The PNF then confirms it and shuts it off according to the checklist (memory items). This is according to our OM(B) and I think it makes sense.
Taking your hand of at V1 ensures that you don't reject. It's a mental message. This manoeuvre requires predetermined action since there is no time to think. Keeping your hand there you are tempting yourself. On another day you may live to regret
ASN Aircraft accident British Aerospace BAe-748-378 Srs. 2B G-OJEM London-Stansted Airport (STN)
There may be one time in a pilot's career he may be forced to throw away the book and make an instant decision far removed from a company SOP.
That accident was one such case.
So it is a false premise to say dogmatically "Taking your hand off at V1 ensures that you don't reject."
Obviously, if that were the case, I would have already informed my colleague during the emergency part of the take off briefing so as to prevent him / her from thinking that I am rejecting the take-off after the V1
I can see it now. "In the likely event we are attacked by an enemy fighter I will corkscrew towards him. If he comes underneath us I will bunt like hell and maybe even drop a bomb on the Hun bastard. Do you agree with that Mr Copilot? Please don't hesitate to say you disagree of if you have a better idea. Although I am the captain of this crew we are still a democracy and you are always welcome to speak up in the name of CRM
By the time you are given a command you should have flown enough, thought enough and listened to other captains in the bar enough to have some idea of what you are going to do in a catastrophic situation. You'll still get some things wrong.
A colleague had an uncontained #2 failure in a trijet and abandoned after V1. They were light on a long runway. The aircraft had lost three of its four hydraulic systems.
N.B. I am NOT recommending stopping after V1.
A colleague had an uncontained #2 failure in a trijet and abandoned after V1. They were light on a long runway. The aircraft had lost three of its four hydraulic systems.
N.B. I am NOT recommending stopping after V1.
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My goodness, how things have changed over the years where nowadays we are required to brief the PM of practically anything that might happen. Can you just imagine in the old days of WW2 if this dogmatic requirement that the PF cover his arse via the CVR because of fear of legal implications.
I can see it now. "In the likely event we are attacked by an enemy fighter I will corkscrew towards him. If he comes underneath us I will bunt like hell and maybe even drop a bomb on the Hun bastard. Do you agree with that Mr Copilot? Please don't hesitate to say you disagree of if you have a better idea. Although I am the captain of this crew we are still a democracy and you are always welcome to speak up in the name of CRM
I can see it now. "In the likely event we are attacked by an enemy fighter I will corkscrew towards him. If he comes underneath us I will bunt like hell and maybe even drop a bomb on the Hun bastard. Do you agree with that Mr Copilot? Please don't hesitate to say you disagree of if you have a better idea. Although I am the captain of this crew we are still a democracy and you are always welcome to speak up in the name of CRM
Unfortunately I did not say this, but something different: if the conditions I mentioned on my post were to appear on a particular day I would not hesitate to share my mental model with my colleague regarding use of thrust levers; this could happen two, three times or maybe never during my career, but it only takes 10 seconds longer and it could be useful to sort out any doubts and perplexities on my colleagues and to avoid instinctive and unwanted actions; It seems to me that this is one of the reasons why we apply the CRM rules in “modern” aviation.
Last edited by EI-PAUL; 12th Apr 2018 at 11:12.
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There may be one time in a pilot's career he may be forced to throw away the book and make an instant decision far removed from a company SOP.
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Read the following accident report where because of the particular circumstances at the time, the pilot rejected the takeoff seconds after airborne. If he had elected to continue the take off, the fire was so severe that the aircraft would have surely crashed in flames.
ASN Aircraft accident British Aerospace BAe-748-378 Srs. 2B G-OJEM London-Stansted Airport (STN)
There may be one time in a pilot's career he may be forced to throw away the book and make an instant decision far removed from a company SOP.
That accident was one such case.
So it is a false premise to say dogmatically "Taking your hand off at V1 ensures that you don't reject."
ASN Aircraft accident British Aerospace BAe-748-378 Srs. 2B G-OJEM London-Stansted Airport (STN)
There may be one time in a pilot's career he may be forced to throw away the book and make an instant decision far removed from a company SOP.
That accident was one such case.
So it is a false premise to say dogmatically "Taking your hand off at V1 ensures that you don't reject."
Good grief, three pages discussing when the pilot can put his hands on the throttles! I agree with taking them off at V1; but we did NOT do so in the USAF and don’t have a record of overruns due to aborts past V1. It’s a nice training standard, has a perhaps a marginally rational reasoning, but once airborne past the DER, surely no one would try landing a jet transport. Yes, I’ll acknowkedge the idiots in
Phillie on the Airbus.
gf
Phillie on the Airbus.
gf
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If doing a reduced thrust takeoff and then there is an engine failure, my carrier allows the PF to call for TOGA if needed/desired. He thens sets TOGA, and the PNF verifies it. If the PNF thinks more power might be helpful, he can call "TOGA available."
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If the PNF thinks more power might be helpful, he can call "TOGA available."
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Old joke
Three pages and nobody's brought up the 30 year old joke about the progress of cockpit automation?
The answer to when after V1 it's OK to put your mitt back on the throttles? Watch the dog as you move your hand judiciously toward the quadrant, and see how he reacts.
(On narrowbody airbus you can even hear the dog barking his head off when on the ground the pilot runs one but not both engines. Dogs are sticklers for symmetry.)
Used to be, running an airliner took a crew of 4 highly experienced grey hairs: captain, FO, engineer, navigator. Gradually, automation has reduced the workload and skill required. Latest cockpits require one 19 year old flight academy grad and a dog. And the dog's job is to bite if the pilot tries to touch any of the controls.
(On narrowbody airbus you can even hear the dog barking his head off when on the ground the pilot runs one but not both engines. Dogs are sticklers for symmetry.)
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Removing the hand at V1 is important to prevent a reject, notwithstanding the one in million possibility of need to do otherwise. Putting it back in Airbus it is on when required basis, if below THR RED ALT place it back after airborne. In OEI, WS what's the big deal? Just do what is required. The only requirement to keep the hand there is minimum at 1000ft on approach.
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What I find curious is that pilots are quoting the type specific FCTM. How can this be anything other than airmanship across all types? And it is not something that needs writing down. There is too much of that already and basic 'pilot thinking' has been replaced by SOP memorising.
RAT 5: That is because some people are used to moving autothrottle systems that MAY slide back whereas on the Airbus family, the thrust lever detents are just electrical switches for the FADEC. Thinking back to the days when I flew with real Flight Engineers even they, after having "trimmed" the power settings would keep their hands well away from the throttles prior to selection of climb thrust.
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Still, many keep missing the point, which has nothing to do with automation, nothing to do with specific type.
All (except some weirdos) seem to aknowledge the fact that the hand MUST be removed at V1.
The majority seem to aknowledge the fact that this is because our hand in that position is a real danger, as the long list of statistics demonstrate.
Strangely, very few have asked themselves my original question.
Many answers call for AIRMANSHIP as the magic solution to everything, but this is often a comfortable reply for those who don't dig enough.
The fact is that a wrong reaction at a very low altitude IS NOT REVERSIBLE.
That's why we shouldnt put our hand back there below 400ft (same value for the actions in an emergency, for the same reason).
All (except some weirdos) seem to aknowledge the fact that the hand MUST be removed at V1.
The majority seem to aknowledge the fact that this is because our hand in that position is a real danger, as the long list of statistics demonstrate.
Strangely, very few have asked themselves my original question.
Many answers call for AIRMANSHIP as the magic solution to everything, but this is often a comfortable reply for those who don't dig enough.
The fact is that a wrong reaction at a very low altitude IS NOT REVERSIBLE.
That's why we shouldnt put our hand back there below 400ft (same value for the actions in an emergency, for the same reason).
Only half a speed-brake
LEM: in agreement with all of your last post.
A certain Co's policy:
Departure: Hand goes off at V1, back on only once you need it (covers all cases). And stays until FL 100.
Arrival: PF below FL 100.
As a general rule, in Sterile phase PF should keep the hands on the steering and TLs, staying head-up at all times. Not other activity is desirable - OM.A rule.
In alignment with the above, for the non-A/THR types, hand also goes on the TLs at 1000' to level-off. That A/C is the initial/entry with the operator, thus many continue to do so on the larger fleet as a personal habit.
A certain Co's policy:
Departure: Hand goes off at V1, back on only once you need it (covers all cases). And stays until FL 100.
Arrival: PF below FL 100.
As a general rule, in Sterile phase PF should keep the hands on the steering and TLs, staying head-up at all times. Not other activity is desirable - OM.A rule.
In alignment with the above, for the non-A/THR types, hand also goes on the TLs at 1000' to level-off. That A/C is the initial/entry with the operator, thus many continue to do so on the larger fleet as a personal habit.
Only half a speed-brake
Note: on the back-driven A/THR type, the technique for PM was :
- after moving the L/G lever up
- place hand palm-down on the quadrant, behind the TLs
- after moving the L/G lever up
- place hand palm-down on the quadrant, behind the TLs
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Countless accidents have happened because the captain initiated a reject beyond V1.
Either because:
A wrong decision.
An instinctive reaction in panic or whatever.
A heart attack or similar.
The captain of a BOAC Trident suffered one, and the takeoff was rekected when just airborne.... all dead.
Countless accidents have happened because the captain initiated a reject beyond V1.
Either because:
A wrong decision.
An instinctive reaction in panic or whatever.
A heart attack or similar.
The captain of a BOAC Trident suffered one, and the takeoff was rekected when just airborne.... all dead.
I seem to remember that the hands were removed from the thrust levers but the Captain then put his hands on them and closed them whilst still firmly on the ground due to running in to standing water and certainly no heart attack and no one died.... I might be wrong though about the hands.
I can't think of another Trident accident anything like similar except G-ARPI where it was suggested the Captain Stan Key might have been suffering a heart attack but that certainly wasn't a reject or anything near.
Not thinking of a TWA Tristar aborting after getting airborne at JFK are you? But then no one was killed in that.
To add.... I remove hands at V1 and then guard them at Thrust reduction, nothing in the FCOM contradicts that as far as I'm aware......I also take my hands off the thrust levers after landing and then let my oppo pull reverse..... but that's a different conversation
Last edited by Capt Ecureuil; 14th Apr 2018 at 17:48.