Automation dependency stripped of political correctness.
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safetypee, re, "...but cheaper, perhaps not.", and, "A CS 25 for every element?"
Yes, understand both points. I wanted to at least challenge the notion of "cheaper" in the examining of the balance between raw capability, the implied promise of enhanced safety and the overall notion, "should we do this...?"
Yes, understand both points. I wanted to at least challenge the notion of "cheaper" in the examining of the balance between raw capability, the implied promise of enhanced safety and the overall notion, "should we do this...?"
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I would disagree that it is a gross assumption. More a strong correlation with a limited data set.
I admire your ambition in attempting to portray my suggestion that lack of practice will impact flying skills as somehow contentious and unscientific.
Automation reduces practise in manual flying.
This is an uncontested fact as far as I'm aware. It is, after all, the whole point.
Reduced practise reduces skill levels in all areas of human activity.
This is also an uncontested fact.
Thus, automation reduces skill levels.
Please point out the logical fallacy in any of that.
A vague remembering of how to hand fly your aircraft is not enough when you need it. Remember that generally the loss of automation tends to be associated with other non-normal events requiring a large part of the capacity of the pilot.
Due to the amazing engineering standards of today, and the rarity of actually having to do something, people have started to believe that what we do whilst waiting for an emergency is "being a pilot"
It is not.
When everything is working properly, even the people on this forum who believe that we need humans on board would admit that the aircraft can do it itself. They contend that humans are better at dealing with problems than computers, and they may be right at the moment.
If you are arguing that the majority of pilots are adequate to "undertake the tasks expected in an operational environment", all you are saying is that they are good enough to do an entirely unnecessary job. When it is all going well, nobody needs them!
When it isn't, many are inadequate.
It would be better to consider why those few pilots flew as they did. Perhaps the problem is not with what you observed, but the process of training; why didn’t the trainer/checker intervene, what did the operator know, the interpretation of regulations, what was the organisation’s attitude, and did the regulator have oversight of this. None of which involves automation or dependency.
Regulations and operator attitude are further down the line and another question, but don't affect the actual inability of pilots to fly.
You never know when the toys are going to fail. That is kind of he point, thus the only way to achieve this would be to never fly non precision approaches in limiting crosswinds.
If you are suggesting that pilots should just say no, then good luck with that.
Not only is it turgid management speak, but are you saying that we should manage our expectations rather than attempt to improve events?!?
Or are you coming to the same conclusion as me that we cannot expect pilots to do any better so remove them.........
Last edited by Tourist; 26th Jan 2016 at 17:53.
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Tourist; always love a challenge:
First separate technology from automation; EGPWS, ACAS, technologies have improved safety.
FADEC, automated engine control. 747-8 and 787 had restrictions for Cb related icing, because the FADEC was unable to manage ice crystals. Worst case was that all engines were affected simultaneously, and with ice damage may not restart. Thus the need to avoid the conditions, not practice flying without power.
First separate technology from automation; EGPWS, ACAS, technologies have improved safety.
FADEC, automated engine control. 747-8 and 787 had restrictions for Cb related icing, because the FADEC was unable to manage ice crystals. Worst case was that all engines were affected simultaneously, and with ice damage may not restart. Thus the need to avoid the conditions, not practice flying without power.
i.e. Is it just an engineering issue rather than control issue?
Last edited by Tourist; 27th Jan 2016 at 02:41.
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What I think also needs to be included in this debate, but I don't have an ideal answer, is the characteristics of the modern airline pilot. Before we become mired in the very futuristic assumptions of what an airliner flight deck might look like and entail, let's look closer the present. One problem I see is the very diverse culture in airlines. Some still encourage and expect good stick & rudder skills. Some quite the opposite and have a 'trained monkey' attitude. I've worked and trained in both and the latter made me squirm. This demonstrated that there is not a common characteristic of an airline pilot; even if the pax want there to be when the chips are down.
Thinking back to my days of needles & dials and Heath Robinson automatics I reflect on the aptitude tests necessary to become a pilot. I went through the RAF & BA's selection process, and passed both: very similar when it came to hand eye coordination and multi tasking. The legacy carriers, overall, wanted uni'-graduates of maths & science education. They wanted team players & leaders and strong personalities. (And it seems they still do, but then treat you like little Johnnies when you are in.) The RAF wanted uni-graduates for officer college, but the characteristics were similar. Both wanted hotshots who were sharp cookies. Indeed the job in 70's with embryonic jets and very basic ATC environment required the opposite of trained monkeys. The captain really needed to be the guy on the spot in charge.
Nowadays the ability to pay is quite a major requirement by the airlines and I wonder at the aptitude tests necessary for selection before flight school; or is that also ability to pay, I suspect so.
Now, in this modern flight deck and looking further forward, I question if the best characteristics of an airline pilot have been re-thought. I still see legacy airline application forms stating just what type of person they are seeking. IMHO they are all over qualified for the monitoring role that 99.9% of their life will entail. OK, the long-haul captain really is a manager in the sky. Ultimately, when the pursuer needs help or a decision, then the 4 striper will be called upon and carry the responsibility. Any captain has to contend with Wx problems, fuel problems etc. etc. I'm not sure a university degree will help more than those who have just sound common sense.
Simply this; if the flight deck is going to change so much towards automation, cabin crew are more highly trained to solve the everyday problems, ATC and airports are more hi-tech, sat' phones can connect you to Ops who make commercial decisions, etc. etc., are the basic characteristics & qualities demanded by many airlines appropriate for the job now & in 30 years time?
Without considering this we can end up with 'the wrong stuff' in charge.
Thinking back to my days of needles & dials and Heath Robinson automatics I reflect on the aptitude tests necessary to become a pilot. I went through the RAF & BA's selection process, and passed both: very similar when it came to hand eye coordination and multi tasking. The legacy carriers, overall, wanted uni'-graduates of maths & science education. They wanted team players & leaders and strong personalities. (And it seems they still do, but then treat you like little Johnnies when you are in.) The RAF wanted uni-graduates for officer college, but the characteristics were similar. Both wanted hotshots who were sharp cookies. Indeed the job in 70's with embryonic jets and very basic ATC environment required the opposite of trained monkeys. The captain really needed to be the guy on the spot in charge.
Nowadays the ability to pay is quite a major requirement by the airlines and I wonder at the aptitude tests necessary for selection before flight school; or is that also ability to pay, I suspect so.
Now, in this modern flight deck and looking further forward, I question if the best characteristics of an airline pilot have been re-thought. I still see legacy airline application forms stating just what type of person they are seeking. IMHO they are all over qualified for the monitoring role that 99.9% of their life will entail. OK, the long-haul captain really is a manager in the sky. Ultimately, when the pursuer needs help or a decision, then the 4 striper will be called upon and carry the responsibility. Any captain has to contend with Wx problems, fuel problems etc. etc. I'm not sure a university degree will help more than those who have just sound common sense.
Simply this; if the flight deck is going to change so much towards automation, cabin crew are more highly trained to solve the everyday problems, ATC and airports are more hi-tech, sat' phones can connect you to Ops who make commercial decisions, etc. etc., are the basic characteristics & qualities demanded by many airlines appropriate for the job now & in 30 years time?
Without considering this we can end up with 'the wrong stuff' in charge.
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Agree with everything you say RAT5.
I would say that the airlines have already unofficially been altering the requirements that they ask for for a long time.
For many, "can you pay" is the requirement.
Interestingly, the airlines that do this don't seem to have worse safety rates than the ones that demand hoop jumping, so perhaps they are correct.
I would say that the airlines have already unofficially been altering the requirements that they ask for for a long time.
For many, "can you pay" is the requirement.
Interestingly, the airlines that do this don't seem to have worse safety rates than the ones that demand hoop jumping, so perhaps they are correct.
Tourist, “… automation reduces skill levels.”
The NASA report The Retention of Manual Flying Skills in the Automated Cockpit concluded ‘… that while pilots’ instrument scanning and aircraft control skills are reasonably well retained when automation is used, the retention of cognitive skills needed for manual flying may depend on the degree to which pilots remain actively engaged in supervising the automation.’
Thus what might be observed as weak stick and rudder skills actually represent problems with cognition.
This view may also be reflected in a recent Airbus presentation criticising the regulatory focus on training/checking vs the need to learn (cognitive exercise?). Also, that Airbus training now considers manual skills sequentially with the management of the ‘automated’ systems (cognition); this could provide a better understanding of what technology/automation provides and how to manage situations when the technology is unavailable.
Expectations; … consider the assumptions which we make, e.g. in many accident threads, posts often state “I cannot believe how they (accident crew) did not see, could not do,” …. This is reflects the posters assumptions – the expectation that the crew should have been able to see, do, etc, based on hindsight and that all crews will behave in a rational manner in all circumstances.
Similar assumptions are embedded within regulation, crews are expected to be aware of an audio stall warning, whereas in unprotected aircraft a stick-shake may be more effective; crews are expected to be aware of a high nose attitude, but with plan continuation bias are reluctant to lower the nose because they pulled up, whereas a stick-pusher could be very effective.
We should continuously review our expectations, and the basis of our beliefs.
We need to learn from incidents and accidents; not via biased hindsight, but by reconsidering the underlying assumptions in the event. This involves 'double loop learning' – “… the modification or rejection of a goal in the light of experience, … it recognises that the way a problem is defined and solved can be a source of the problem.”
Also, by James Reason Diagnosing “vulnerable system syndrome”.
A conclusion is that we need to recognise that there is a limit to human ability; identify and reduce the contributors and circumstances of the limiting conditions, and in parallel maintain a high level of human performance, with the focus on cognition, - understand the situation before acting.
The NASA report The Retention of Manual Flying Skills in the Automated Cockpit concluded ‘… that while pilots’ instrument scanning and aircraft control skills are reasonably well retained when automation is used, the retention of cognitive skills needed for manual flying may depend on the degree to which pilots remain actively engaged in supervising the automation.’
Thus what might be observed as weak stick and rudder skills actually represent problems with cognition.
This view may also be reflected in a recent Airbus presentation criticising the regulatory focus on training/checking vs the need to learn (cognitive exercise?). Also, that Airbus training now considers manual skills sequentially with the management of the ‘automated’ systems (cognition); this could provide a better understanding of what technology/automation provides and how to manage situations when the technology is unavailable.
Expectations; … consider the assumptions which we make, e.g. in many accident threads, posts often state “I cannot believe how they (accident crew) did not see, could not do,” …. This is reflects the posters assumptions – the expectation that the crew should have been able to see, do, etc, based on hindsight and that all crews will behave in a rational manner in all circumstances.
Similar assumptions are embedded within regulation, crews are expected to be aware of an audio stall warning, whereas in unprotected aircraft a stick-shake may be more effective; crews are expected to be aware of a high nose attitude, but with plan continuation bias are reluctant to lower the nose because they pulled up, whereas a stick-pusher could be very effective.
We should continuously review our expectations, and the basis of our beliefs.
We need to learn from incidents and accidents; not via biased hindsight, but by reconsidering the underlying assumptions in the event. This involves 'double loop learning' – “… the modification or rejection of a goal in the light of experience, … it recognises that the way a problem is defined and solved can be a source of the problem.”
Also, by James Reason Diagnosing “vulnerable system syndrome”.
A conclusion is that we need to recognise that there is a limit to human ability; identify and reduce the contributors and circumstances of the limiting conditions, and in parallel maintain a high level of human performance, with the focus on cognition, - understand the situation before acting.
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Alf
I have just read the NASA report.
Couple of points.
1. You can call it weak stick and rudder or cognition or whatever you want. The report makes clear that automation damages pilot skills.
2. The report, which I agree with by the way, is hardly scientific either. It uses a self selecting group of only 16 pilots and makes many "gross assumptions" For example:
"It is important to note that this recommendation assumes that pilots attain an initial level of mastery with these skills (Farr, 1987"
3. Interesting quote that agrees strongly with my points earlier:
"This proposal suggests the need for a further study of the effect of active monitoring on procedural skill retention and, perhaps more importantly, if improvements in the human monitoring of automated systems are even possible. There is accumulating evidence of the difficulty in maintaining one’s thoughts focused on the activities of an automated system that seldom fails (Casner & Schooler, 2014)"
I have just read the NASA report.
Couple of points.
1. You can call it weak stick and rudder or cognition or whatever you want. The report makes clear that automation damages pilot skills.
2. The report, which I agree with by the way, is hardly scientific either. It uses a self selecting group of only 16 pilots and makes many "gross assumptions" For example:
"It is important to note that this recommendation assumes that pilots attain an initial level of mastery with these skills (Farr, 1987"
3. Interesting quote that agrees strongly with my points earlier:
"This proposal suggests the need for a further study of the effect of active monitoring on procedural skill retention and, perhaps more importantly, if improvements in the human monitoring of automated systems are even possible. There is accumulating evidence of the difficulty in maintaining one’s thoughts focused on the activities of an automated system that seldom fails (Casner & Schooler, 2014)"
It’s time for the defence to rest its case, in the belief that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to justify more automation.
However, as there is less clarity between the need for more training, and the reduction in the situational contributing factors which affect human behaviour, perhaps we need proportionate adjustments in both; together with some improvement in existing technologies (automation).
Some reading while the jury is out: Airlines aren't learning enough from near misses.
Original paper: Original paper: Madsen - 2015 - Risk Analysis.
However, as there is less clarity between the need for more training, and the reduction in the situational contributing factors which affect human behaviour, perhaps we need proportionate adjustments in both; together with some improvement in existing technologies (automation).
Some reading while the jury is out: Airlines aren't learning enough from near misses.
Original paper: Original paper: Madsen - 2015 - Risk Analysis.
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alf5071h;
If I may, are you including the notions of "muscle-memory" in the cognitive category or might it be a separate subject?
I ask this from a sense that cognition is a reasoning/memory higher level "thinking" process whereas "muscle-memory", is perhaps autonomic, which requires actual, ongoing practise which is both cognitive and physical. (I"m a pilot, not a scientist or researcher so don't know what to call it, but I know it exists, and not only for airplanes but also for gymnasts, musicians, dancers, sculpters, race-car drivers, etc., etc.).
For what it's worth, I play a musical instrument, (piano), and know that there is a clear and definite connection between the cognitive and the physical (again, the autonomic, in terms of muscle-memory). That is how those who play a musical instrument can memorize and play entire concertos, (or gigs, etc.), without music in front of them, for example. (I emphasize that this is entirely different from those possessing rare gifts of a true "photographic memory" in which the pages of music are mentally "in view", in detail and recallable at will!).
In fact (and off-topic), I would venture the notion that playing a musical instrument has heretofor unanticipated but definite cognitive and physical transfers to other activities, which have yet to be fully explored. I would include flying an aircraft in this category.
In my experience as a pilot for 42 years, 35 of them on heavy transports, there is a strong connection between the two and they both require constant "nourishment", (physical practise), if they are to remain available and useful, "at the surface".
In fact, let us use music to illustrate the counterexample: - if the music isn't "in the hands" as described above, no amount of cognitive horsepower can make the hands perform flawlessly; the muscle memory has to be there from recent experience.*
*again, the "gifted" case does not prove the negative - for almost all persons, the above is going to be the case.
If I may, are you including the notions of "muscle-memory" in the cognitive category or might it be a separate subject?
I ask this from a sense that cognition is a reasoning/memory higher level "thinking" process whereas "muscle-memory", is perhaps autonomic, which requires actual, ongoing practise which is both cognitive and physical. (I"m a pilot, not a scientist or researcher so don't know what to call it, but I know it exists, and not only for airplanes but also for gymnasts, musicians, dancers, sculpters, race-car drivers, etc., etc.).
For what it's worth, I play a musical instrument, (piano), and know that there is a clear and definite connection between the cognitive and the physical (again, the autonomic, in terms of muscle-memory). That is how those who play a musical instrument can memorize and play entire concertos, (or gigs, etc.), without music in front of them, for example. (I emphasize that this is entirely different from those possessing rare gifts of a true "photographic memory" in which the pages of music are mentally "in view", in detail and recallable at will!).
In fact (and off-topic), I would venture the notion that playing a musical instrument has heretofor unanticipated but definite cognitive and physical transfers to other activities, which have yet to be fully explored. I would include flying an aircraft in this category.
In my experience as a pilot for 42 years, 35 of them on heavy transports, there is a strong connection between the two and they both require constant "nourishment", (physical practise), if they are to remain available and useful, "at the surface".
In fact, let us use music to illustrate the counterexample: - if the music isn't "in the hands" as described above, no amount of cognitive horsepower can make the hands perform flawlessly; the muscle memory has to be there from recent experience.*
*again, the "gifted" case does not prove the negative - for almost all persons, the above is going to be the case.
Last edited by FDMII; 29th Jan 2016 at 22:08.
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Good one, alf! 
Although I would not say we do generally not need more automation. There are still areas where more automation can help.
RAAS / ROPS comes to mind. Better TO Config warnings, which include position of the aircraft. Or the whole concept of approaches with vertical guidance.
But all these technologies should and will be support for pilots, who remain in charge, have the final authority over the action, and deal with daily problems and malfunctions as they arise.
The only area where I am convinced we need less automation, is in the automation policy. Pilots need regular AP/FD/ATHR off flying at appropriate times to learn and memorize pitch and power values and to maintain a good scan of the basic T.
Although I would not say we do generally not need more automation. There are still areas where more automation can help.
RAAS / ROPS comes to mind. Better TO Config warnings, which include position of the aircraft. Or the whole concept of approaches with vertical guidance.
But all these technologies should and will be support for pilots, who remain in charge, have the final authority over the action, and deal with daily problems and malfunctions as they arise.
The only area where I am convinced we need less automation, is in the automation policy. Pilots need regular AP/FD/ATHR off flying at appropriate times to learn and memorize pitch and power values and to maintain a good scan of the basic T.
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Originally Posted by Tourist
An Airbus is designed to always have human pilots. Therefore, humans are part of the strategy for dealing with problems.
The Airbus was initially designed with protections to correct mistakes made by pilots ... certainly not the other way around.
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After discovery of principles according to which the Universe runs(the process continues) the next logical step was to use them to make human life more comfortable, safety is also part of that. All these inventions have caused loss of human life and will regrettably continue to do so. It is perhaps the price of those comforts. Medicines that are discovered to save lives have taken lives, get banned and newer safer ones are discovered. Aviation is no exception to this. Car brakes fail you don't switch to horses but make better brakes. It is perfectly reasonable to expect better safety from the gadgets but can one be paranoid about them?
Been following this automation dependency thread with great interest. Certainly much to learn for us all. However, at times posts appear to become a little intense.
Saw the following video on a caravan website I frequent and, with much tongue in cheek, offer it as a brief interlude of light relief (of a quasi-automated nature). Hopefully the mods will tolerate the non-aviation theme.
Volkswagen Trailer Assist
Saw the following video on a caravan website I frequent and, with much tongue in cheek, offer it as a brief interlude of light relief (of a quasi-automated nature). Hopefully the mods will tolerate the non-aviation theme.
Volkswagen Trailer Assist
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To have to deal with conventional problems is far enough, absolutely no need to have to deal with unconventional ones that the supposed magical automation created on its own.
The Airbus was initially designed with protections to correct mistakes made by pilots ... certainly not the other way around.
The Airbus was initially designed with protections to correct mistakes made by pilots ... certainly not the other way around.
It does not have to be flawless, merely on balance equal and cheaper.
Airlines are businesses.
They try to make the best balance of safety and cost.
They are allowed to.
If they can make aircraft without pilots as safe and cheaper or safer at the same price they will.
They do not have to be perfect.
They will still have accidents, probably different ones that many on here will decry as things that would not have happened if a human was on board and "proof" that it was a bad idea, but what matters is whether they have less accidents, not whether they have any.
The equation is really simple.
Are more accidents at the moment "black swan" events where a human might help, or basic human error events where a computer would have been fine.
I believe it is more the latter already, and as tech advances it will become more and more obvious.
Alf is all about adapting how we use pilots to best effect.
That is all well and good, and a useful interim phase, but we are just nibbling at the edges of the problem which s the simple fact that tech no longer is better at just the blue collar jobs like manufacturing and weaving etc.
The next revolution is here and standing in it's way will just breed a new generation of angry luddites.
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The next revolution is here and standing in it's way will just breed a new generation of angry luddites.
Perhaps they are called passengers??
Perhaps they are called passengers??
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Autonomous cars are going to go a long way towards laying the groundwork though.
FDMII, "muscle-memory", yes, we appear to be considering the same aspects. “… a form of procedural memory that involves consolidating a specific motor task into memory through repetition. This process decreases the need for attention and creates maximum efficiency within the motor and memory systems. Examples of muscle memory are found in many everyday activities that become automatic and improve with practice, such as riding a bicycle, playing a musical instrument” (Wiki).
E.g. novice and expert behaviour; where an expert has achieved a skill level which can be undertaken with the minimum of conscious effort. I would also include cognitive skills, not just muscle.
‘Transfer’ is obviously not the skill, but could represent the mechanism of acquiring the skill. This would include the willingness to learn and the process of learning, paying attention, memory, and relating one aspect with another, and situations yet to be encountered. These are important aspects, perhaps missing in an automated world.
With respect to flying, expertise may take considerable time to acquire and then may only relate to a particular situation or those which can be associated with previous experiences. The latter is a process of learning, retention, and projection across scenarios which may be a hall mark of expertise.
Expertise is not a requirement for flying, but it should be everyone’s goal. However, flying does require proficiency, matching the skill level to the task; thus whilst novice pilots are safe – minimum training standard, they may not be as capable in extreme situations as they lack a sufficient range of experiences or the skills of projection and association.
I am less convinced about the need to keep practicing, yet practice is required to achieve expert behaviour in normal operations.
However in rare situations the required skill level need not be very high; it has to match the task, safe, but not perfect (the task has changed). Also, these skills may not be so well practiced, and also in this sense it’s mainly a cognitive skill – knowing what to do vs how to do it; this depends on understanding the situation.
I’m not a musician, but comparing a well prepared expert performance of a major work, with a sudden requirement to play the national anthem for a visiting head of state. Both a novice or expert could follow the new score, but the difference might be the manner in which an expert plays the music (finesse).
Of course this is preceded by the need to select the correct score for that country, where both an expert and novice could be mistaken.
E.g. novice and expert behaviour; where an expert has achieved a skill level which can be undertaken with the minimum of conscious effort. I would also include cognitive skills, not just muscle.
‘Transfer’ is obviously not the skill, but could represent the mechanism of acquiring the skill. This would include the willingness to learn and the process of learning, paying attention, memory, and relating one aspect with another, and situations yet to be encountered. These are important aspects, perhaps missing in an automated world.
With respect to flying, expertise may take considerable time to acquire and then may only relate to a particular situation or those which can be associated with previous experiences. The latter is a process of learning, retention, and projection across scenarios which may be a hall mark of expertise.
Expertise is not a requirement for flying, but it should be everyone’s goal. However, flying does require proficiency, matching the skill level to the task; thus whilst novice pilots are safe – minimum training standard, they may not be as capable in extreme situations as they lack a sufficient range of experiences or the skills of projection and association.
I am less convinced about the need to keep practicing, yet practice is required to achieve expert behaviour in normal operations.
However in rare situations the required skill level need not be very high; it has to match the task, safe, but not perfect (the task has changed). Also, these skills may not be so well practiced, and also in this sense it’s mainly a cognitive skill – knowing what to do vs how to do it; this depends on understanding the situation.
I’m not a musician, but comparing a well prepared expert performance of a major work, with a sudden requirement to play the national anthem for a visiting head of state. Both a novice or expert could follow the new score, but the difference might be the manner in which an expert plays the music (finesse).
Of course this is preceded by the need to select the correct score for that country, where both an expert and novice could be mistaken.
1202, "… areas where automation can help”, agreed, but these aspects may be easier to understand and implement if ‘technology’ (an enabler) is considered separately from ‘automation’ (actor).
TAWS, ACAS, RAAS, better ‘enable’ the pilot to understand the situation, but do not fly the aircraft.
Tourist. “Alf is all about adapting how we use pilots to best effect.”
Not so much individual adaptation (not more training), but the need for the industry to review and adjust the system-wide situational influences which could reduce the pressure of operations, so the pilot is better able to perform. Adjust operations to match human capability, not fit the human to the operation.
Not luddites, but the need to learn from the initial use of automation in today’s operations before choosing how and when to use technology and automation in the future.
TAWS, ACAS, RAAS, better ‘enable’ the pilot to understand the situation, but do not fly the aircraft.
Tourist. “Alf is all about adapting how we use pilots to best effect.”
Not so much individual adaptation (not more training), but the need for the industry to review and adjust the system-wide situational influences which could reduce the pressure of operations, so the pilot is better able to perform. Adjust operations to match human capability, not fit the human to the operation.
Not luddites, but the need to learn from the initial use of automation in today’s operations before choosing how and when to use technology and automation in the future.