Thrust levers - moving or not?
Thread Starter
Thrust levers - moving or not?
Thought I might start a new thread just to explore the subject of moving and non moving thrust levers, as touched on by some other threads.
It would be interesting to know which of us like and dislike each system, and for those who dislike non moving levers, did you fly with moving ones before?
For those now flying Airbus but who have used moving levers before; what do you miss? Is it the feedback of the autothrust in your hand or is it the ease with which adjustments can be made if the autothrust gets it wrong?
I personally never flew an autothrust aircraft until I qualified on Airbus FBW, so I don't have any moving thrust lever experience.*
*apart from BAe146, but that doesn't really count !
It would be interesting to know which of us like and dislike each system, and for those who dislike non moving levers, did you fly with moving ones before?
For those now flying Airbus but who have used moving levers before; what do you miss? Is it the feedback of the autothrust in your hand or is it the ease with which adjustments can be made if the autothrust gets it wrong?
I personally never flew an autothrust aircraft until I qualified on Airbus FBW, so I don't have any moving thrust lever experience.*
*apart from BAe146, but that doesn't really count !
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 114
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thrust levers - moving or not?
Flown both, now on the bus where they don't move. Prefer ones that move.
I presume not moving ones are quite a lot cheaper to build hence the attraction for manufacturers.
Times when I would like moving ones are as follows.
In the cruise, usually fairly high when a bit of turbulence/ wind change runs you close to an over speed and the jet is way to slow to respond.
On the approach in a 319 when its holding 10kts fast due to " auto thrust misbehaviour".
Mainly though for those few moments approaching the flare when the speed washes off and the auto thrust does nothing.
Moving levers should not really be used for SA though, just because the levers have motored all the way forward does not mean the engines are producing that power. The BA 777 that dropped short at LHR would be an example.
I presume not moving ones are quite a lot cheaper to build hence the attraction for manufacturers.
Times when I would like moving ones are as follows.
In the cruise, usually fairly high when a bit of turbulence/ wind change runs you close to an over speed and the jet is way to slow to respond.
On the approach in a 319 when its holding 10kts fast due to " auto thrust misbehaviour".
Mainly though for those few moments approaching the flare when the speed washes off and the auto thrust does nothing.
Moving levers should not really be used for SA though, just because the levers have motored all the way forward does not mean the engines are producing that power. The BA 777 that dropped short at LHR would be an example.
Join Date: Jun 2014
Location: Village of Santo Poco
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I was on the E170/175 prior to the 320. I remember playing with the thrust levers quite a bit on approaches, the FMA showed OVRD in the Thrust window more often than not. Can't say I miss it, the 'Bus system seems to work fine so far.
Join Date: Jan 2014
Location: N5109.2W10.5
Posts: 720
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I prefer moving thrust levers and agree with the findings of the 1991 poll of BA Airbus rated pilots:
"BA concludes that from a Flight Operations perspective a future system should consider providing movement between the idle and climb power positions, whilst retaining the A320 thrust setting and engagement “detents” technique."
by Steve Last & Martin Alder.
British Airways Airbus A320 Pilots' Autothrust Survey
If this had been the case, then we wouldn't be having the discussion:
flying below VAPP - What to do? with over 4,800 PPrune observers wondering the same. (as of Aug 13)
"BA concludes that from a Flight Operations perspective a future system should consider providing movement between the idle and climb power positions, whilst retaining the A320 thrust setting and engagement “detents” technique."
by Steve Last & Martin Alder.
British Airways Airbus A320 Pilots' Autothrust Survey
If this had been the case, then we wouldn't be having the discussion:
flying below VAPP - What to do? with over 4,800 PPrune observers wondering the same. (as of Aug 13)
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: fairly close to the colonial capitol
Age: 55
Posts: 1,693
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
For SA, movement is certainly useful, despite the example of the (exceedingly rare*) failure of both RR powerplants on BA038. On approach, TL movement can provide clues of misconfiguration or near-windshear conditions.
The thing about 'old-fashioned' driven levers I appreciate the most however, is I can, without a doubt, move the thrust levers and know (*see above) I will get an engine response and not have to spend time second-guessing the automation mode. During low altitude operations this can be critically important.
In defence of the Airbus non-moving philosophy, as they say, training, training, training. In critical situations, if you perform the memory items correctly, the design is in no way an impediment to the safe operation of the aircraft. Turns out that is the case with just about everything flying today.
The thing about 'old-fashioned' driven levers I appreciate the most however, is I can, without a doubt, move the thrust levers and know (*see above) I will get an engine response and not have to spend time second-guessing the automation mode. During low altitude operations this can be critically important.
In defence of the Airbus non-moving philosophy, as they say, training, training, training. In critical situations, if you perform the memory items correctly, the design is in no way an impediment to the safe operation of the aircraft. Turns out that is the case with just about everything flying today.
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In defence of the Airbus non-moving philosophy, as they say, training, training, training.
This topic has been touched on in other threads. Now there is a direct question. My thoughts, following the quote above, is that I'm not sure training for its own sake should be opposite to what is natural instinct when under a moment of pressure & stress. Human natural instincts will generally take over when the brain is scrambled. Don't fight it, embrace it.
Non-AB; when on a manual approach you set a thrust for the job in hand. If slowing down through the flaps you have a low power setting. When final configuration is achieved you set a sensible thrust setting and make fine adjustments to maintain speed. Even on an LVO ILS you 'follow through' the a/c including the A/T. It is reassuring to feel the a/c doing its proper job. When you can not 'feel' the a/c responding to circumstances you have to increase your scan rate to include the thrust meters. Is it a sensible setting?? Is this increased work load what you really want; is it a good idea? Does it lead to a false trust and a blasé attitude that all will be OK. Feel is a great sense that pilots use at all times. This is now removed and transferred to sight. That requires more brain power & concentration; IMHO. Is that an improvement?
On take off and CLB non-moving thrust levers is no problem. In CRZ it is no problem as long as you monitor speed and the N1%; in descent they are mostly at idle; you should monitor speed and N%. All these phases are usually a monitoring phase. However, on approach and G/A, following the a/c and what it's doing is very important. So why not, when the a/c goes into 'APP Mode" design the T/L's to move? It would be a doddle and put the pilot back into the loop where they should be. A visual approach, manually flown, is not a time to be a monitor. If you fly manually and control the T/L's yourself, that's normal. If you fly an A/P ILS with A/T why not make the A/T's move and keep the piloting sense alive? It would be so easy, technically. Is there a will? There is certainly a way.
Why are line pilots not more involved with the evolution of technology and the feedback after a coupe of years of introduction? Sometimes I feel we are forced into adjusting our behaviour, not always naturally, to suit the ideas of the technocrats. I'm not a dinosaur, but a round peg fits a round-ish hole better than a square one.
This topic has been touched on in other threads. Now there is a direct question. My thoughts, following the quote above, is that I'm not sure training for its own sake should be opposite to what is natural instinct when under a moment of pressure & stress. Human natural instincts will generally take over when the brain is scrambled. Don't fight it, embrace it.
Non-AB; when on a manual approach you set a thrust for the job in hand. If slowing down through the flaps you have a low power setting. When final configuration is achieved you set a sensible thrust setting and make fine adjustments to maintain speed. Even on an LVO ILS you 'follow through' the a/c including the A/T. It is reassuring to feel the a/c doing its proper job. When you can not 'feel' the a/c responding to circumstances you have to increase your scan rate to include the thrust meters. Is it a sensible setting?? Is this increased work load what you really want; is it a good idea? Does it lead to a false trust and a blasé attitude that all will be OK. Feel is a great sense that pilots use at all times. This is now removed and transferred to sight. That requires more brain power & concentration; IMHO. Is that an improvement?
On take off and CLB non-moving thrust levers is no problem. In CRZ it is no problem as long as you monitor speed and the N1%; in descent they are mostly at idle; you should monitor speed and N%. All these phases are usually a monitoring phase. However, on approach and G/A, following the a/c and what it's doing is very important. So why not, when the a/c goes into 'APP Mode" design the T/L's to move? It would be a doddle and put the pilot back into the loop where they should be. A visual approach, manually flown, is not a time to be a monitor. If you fly manually and control the T/L's yourself, that's normal. If you fly an A/P ILS with A/T why not make the A/T's move and keep the piloting sense alive? It would be so easy, technically. Is there a will? There is certainly a way.
Why are line pilots not more involved with the evolution of technology and the feedback after a coupe of years of introduction? Sometimes I feel we are forced into adjusting our behaviour, not always naturally, to suit the ideas of the technocrats. I'm not a dinosaur, but a round peg fits a round-ish hole better than a square one.
Keep 'em Moving
Some months back a young pilot's post asked for advice on intercepting the ILS glideslope from above. What I wanted to say was, "Ensure that the plane is trimmed for the proper approach speed. Ease back on the power to increase the rate of descent while holding speed. Just above the glideslope, ease the power forward and establish the correct rate of descent."
I realized that would not answer his question so I didn't answer. What he wanted was what buttons to push. He didn't want to know how to fly the airplane. He wanted a rote procedure. Aircraft developers talk about reducing pilot workload but there are certain things that are integral to flying and one is feeling the airplane respond to throttle movement.
I'm reminded of AF447. They didn't know how to fly an airplane either.
I realized that would not answer his question so I didn't answer. What he wanted was what buttons to push. He didn't want to know how to fly the airplane. He wanted a rote procedure. Aircraft developers talk about reducing pilot workload but there are certain things that are integral to flying and one is feeling the airplane respond to throttle movement.
I'm reminded of AF447. They didn't know how to fly an airplane either.
Last edited by Smilin_Ed; 15th Aug 2015 at 00:10. Reason: Clarity
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Wanderlust
Posts: 3,403
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Smilin_Ed
May be the pilot who asked knew how to do it manually but wanted to know how to do it with automation. What's wrong with that? Good, what you wanted to say but didn't, because that wouldn't have helped him. A good pilot must also have thorough knowledge of automation as well.
May be the pilot who asked knew how to do it manually but wanted to know how to do it with automation. What's wrong with that? Good, what you wanted to say but didn't, because that wouldn't have helped him. A good pilot must also have thorough knowledge of automation as well.
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: fairly close to the colonial capitol
Age: 55
Posts: 1,693
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Ensure that the plane is trimmed for the proper approach speed. Ease back on the power to increase the rate of descent while holding speed. Just above the glideslope, ease the power forward and establish the correct rate of descent."
No one on the AB 'side' wants to hear this but it's simple.
There is NO advantage to non moving, non backdriven autothrottles / thrust whatever.
For the Pilots that is, same with the non linked sidesticks.
It mat save a few bucks in maintenance but it's a crappy idea that has worked brilliantly to isolate Pilots from what is going on with their aircraft.
There is NO advantage to non moving, non backdriven autothrottles / thrust whatever.
For the Pilots that is, same with the non linked sidesticks.
It mat save a few bucks in maintenance but it's a crappy idea that has worked brilliantly to isolate Pilots from what is going on with their aircraft.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: in the magical land of beer and chocolates
Age: 52
Posts: 506
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Has there ever been an accident where the non moving throttles where a substantial contributing factor, honest question, I don't recall one but there might be those that do ?
What I do know is that moving throttles are by no means an assurance for better piloting per se.
Just look at the TK 737 crash at AMS where there where no less than 3 pilots in the cockpit, the speed decreased too much, throttles iddled but nobody seemed to notice until it was too late anyway.
Also not 100% sure but ASIANA214 also had pilots thinking the AT was still connected, it was not but the non moving throttles seemed to make both pilots non the wiser.
What I do know is that moving throttles are by no means an assurance for better piloting per se.
Just look at the TK 737 crash at AMS where there where no less than 3 pilots in the cockpit, the speed decreased too much, throttles iddled but nobody seemed to notice until it was too late anyway.
Also not 100% sure but ASIANA214 also had pilots thinking the AT was still connected, it was not but the non moving throttles seemed to make both pilots non the wiser.
Quote from kbrockman:
"Has there ever been an accident where the non-moving throttles were a substantial contributing factor, honest question, I don't recall one but there might be those that do ?"
If there has, it's very hard to establish beyond doubt.
During final approach using A/THR on an aeroplane with "driven" thrust levers, it's normal good practice for the PF to rest his/her hand gently on the levers. That applies whether the AP is being used or not. As has been said, it has the twin advantage of providing tactile feedback to the PF, and enabling him/her to override or modify the A/THR inputs on the rare occasions that may be necessary.
It's also been pointed out (particularly by Airbus Industrie) that, in a decaying-speed situation, any forward movement of the thrust levers MIGHT be taken by the PF as sufficient indication that total thrust is increasing. The only true indication of that are, of course, the N1 and/or EPR gauges. However, what can be said is that an absence of thrust-lever movement would alert the PF to A/THR failure. On FBW Airbuses, the thrust levers are stationary in the CLB gate until landing, unless the PF is using manual thrust.
In the early days on the A320, there were a number of incidents on visual approaches using A/THR during which the PF did not realise that, due to his mismanagement of the FMGC and with one or both FDs still on, the system was still in IDLE mode (OPDES). In those days, there was no protection in IDLE/OPDES mode to stop the speed dropping below VLS (until Alpha-Floor). This was a contributory factor to the fatal accident of an Indian Airlines A320 at Bangalore.
"Has there ever been an accident where the non-moving throttles were a substantial contributing factor, honest question, I don't recall one but there might be those that do ?"
If there has, it's very hard to establish beyond doubt.
During final approach using A/THR on an aeroplane with "driven" thrust levers, it's normal good practice for the PF to rest his/her hand gently on the levers. That applies whether the AP is being used or not. As has been said, it has the twin advantage of providing tactile feedback to the PF, and enabling him/her to override or modify the A/THR inputs on the rare occasions that may be necessary.
It's also been pointed out (particularly by Airbus Industrie) that, in a decaying-speed situation, any forward movement of the thrust levers MIGHT be taken by the PF as sufficient indication that total thrust is increasing. The only true indication of that are, of course, the N1 and/or EPR gauges. However, what can be said is that an absence of thrust-lever movement would alert the PF to A/THR failure. On FBW Airbuses, the thrust levers are stationary in the CLB gate until landing, unless the PF is using manual thrust.
In the early days on the A320, there were a number of incidents on visual approaches using A/THR during which the PF did not realise that, due to his mismanagement of the FMGC and with one or both FDs still on, the system was still in IDLE mode (OPDES). In those days, there was no protection in IDLE/OPDES mode to stop the speed dropping below VLS (until Alpha-Floor). This was a contributory factor to the fatal accident of an Indian Airlines A320 at Bangalore.
Join Date: Jun 2014
Location: Mordor
Posts: 335
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
For long time I have considered myself a proponent of moving TL (as most pilots are) even though the only A/T aircraft I have flown was the Bus.
However, I had a couple of jumpseat visits in the 737/767/787 FFS and witnessed quite a lot of trouble the moving TL's (sorry, throttles
) could give - eg. when the pilot forgot to disconnect the A/T during low speed RTO, or understanding mode reversions, fighting with A/T during flight, disconnecting servos the etc.
Having seen this (plus reading some accident/incident reports where A/T was a contributor), I have started to lean towards the Airbus system being actually simpler and more intuitive.
The only problem of the non-moving TL's is less intuitive intervention when the system is not doing what pilots want. I believe, however, that this could be addressed by training and some changes in procedures. We should be taught/trained/encouraged to grab the TL's (like Boeing guys do) instead of pushing buttons to get the engines do what we want...
However, I had a couple of jumpseat visits in the 737/767/787 FFS and witnessed quite a lot of trouble the moving TL's (sorry, throttles
) could give - eg. when the pilot forgot to disconnect the A/T during low speed RTO, or understanding mode reversions, fighting with A/T during flight, disconnecting servos the etc. Having seen this (plus reading some accident/incident reports where A/T was a contributor), I have started to lean towards the Airbus system being actually simpler and more intuitive.
The only problem of the non-moving TL's is less intuitive intervention when the system is not doing what pilots want. I believe, however, that this could be addressed by training and some changes in procedures. We should be taught/trained/encouraged to grab the TL's (like Boeing guys do) instead of pushing buttons to get the engines do what we want...
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Wanderlust
Posts: 3,403
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chris Scott
Bangalore accident was not due to non moving thrust levers but due to basically not monitoring the FMA to confirm ATHR mode but assuming it to be in speed mode. And off course they did not monitor the speed at all because there was not a single call about speed despite the fact it was 27KTS. below Vapp. If you consider SFO accident where despite moving auto throttle and tactile feed back of B777 the result was same because the reason was also same, not monitoring speed which was 31KTS. below Vapp. In both the incidents very experienced captains were under command checks. The fact is no matter which aircraft one is flying you cannot fly an approach without monitoring speed. One of the reasons a new system is disliked because it takes you out of your comfort zone. You need to develop a new skill, a new habit. I noticed Airbus FBW seems to bring out strong emotional responses, it is loved or hated but rarely ignored. A casual inquiry about an airbus procedure draws even some Boeing pilots to respond to it with ridiculous caveats like " I don't know anything about airbus but". Where there are discussion threads by all means give your opinions. But when a airbus guy asks for type specific procedure it should be left to airbus guys to answer.
Bangalore accident was not due to non moving thrust levers but due to basically not monitoring the FMA to confirm ATHR mode but assuming it to be in speed mode. And off course they did not monitor the speed at all because there was not a single call about speed despite the fact it was 27KTS. below Vapp. If you consider SFO accident where despite moving auto throttle and tactile feed back of B777 the result was same because the reason was also same, not monitoring speed which was 31KTS. below Vapp. In both the incidents very experienced captains were under command checks. The fact is no matter which aircraft one is flying you cannot fly an approach without monitoring speed. One of the reasons a new system is disliked because it takes you out of your comfort zone. You need to develop a new skill, a new habit. I noticed Airbus FBW seems to bring out strong emotional responses, it is loved or hated but rarely ignored. A casual inquiry about an airbus procedure draws even some Boeing pilots to respond to it with ridiculous caveats like " I don't know anything about airbus but". Where there are discussion threads by all means give your opinions. But when a airbus guy asks for type specific procedure it should be left to airbus guys to answer.
vilas,
You should try reading the whole of my post more carefully - in particular the last paragraph. I said that pilot mismanagement of the FMGC was a "contributory factor" in the Bangalore accident. I left it to the reader to decide if, in a conventional system with moving ("driven") thrust levers, the PF might have realised that the thrust was commanded to idle by the A/THR system.
You should try reading the whole of my post more carefully - in particular the last paragraph. I said that pilot mismanagement of the FMGC was a "contributory factor" in the Bangalore accident. I left it to the reader to decide if, in a conventional system with moving ("driven") thrust levers, the PF might have realised that the thrust was commanded to idle by the A/THR system.
Slight thread drift for a moment but still has something to do with throttles.
The Boeing 737 FCTM under the sub-heading Manual Flight, states the PM should make AFDS mode selections at the request of the PF.
Sub-heading Automatic Flight, states when the autopilot is in use, the PF makes the AFDS mode selections. The PM may select new altitudes but must ensure the PF is aware of any changes.
The problem arises when the aircraft is flying with one engine inoperative with the autopilot engaged. In normal two engine flight the rudder is rarely used. In asymmetric flight, rudder is used especially where thrust changes mean rudder adjustment to correct for changing yaw. In asymmetric flight the autothrottle is switched off as per QRH.
So what we have in the one engine inoperative situation, with autopilot engaged is actually a combination of manual and autoflight. That is, manual throttle and manual rudder plus autopilot pitch and roll.
Because of the half automatics and half manual tasks associated with one engine inoperative, it then becomes an unwieldy situation where the PF makes changes to the MCP involving airspeed and heading and even altitude changes, while at the same time having one hand on the live throttle and maybe also making rudder trim adjustments. The one arm paper hangar comes to mind.
Clearly Boeing should amplify its advice on MCP changes by the PF when on one engine and the automatic pilot is engaged. . It would be sensible to have the PM make MCP changes at the request of the PF during asymmetric flight. This leaves the PF with the task of simply operating the live engine thrust and adjusting rudder pressure changes backed up by manual rudder trim if required.
While this becomes a matter of common sense, the fact remains there are pedants in the simulator who arc up if the Boeing FCTM advice is not followed to the letter
The Boeing 737 FCTM under the sub-heading Manual Flight, states the PM should make AFDS mode selections at the request of the PF.
Sub-heading Automatic Flight, states when the autopilot is in use, the PF makes the AFDS mode selections. The PM may select new altitudes but must ensure the PF is aware of any changes.
The problem arises when the aircraft is flying with one engine inoperative with the autopilot engaged. In normal two engine flight the rudder is rarely used. In asymmetric flight, rudder is used especially where thrust changes mean rudder adjustment to correct for changing yaw. In asymmetric flight the autothrottle is switched off as per QRH.
So what we have in the one engine inoperative situation, with autopilot engaged is actually a combination of manual and autoflight. That is, manual throttle and manual rudder plus autopilot pitch and roll.
Because of the half automatics and half manual tasks associated with one engine inoperative, it then becomes an unwieldy situation where the PF makes changes to the MCP involving airspeed and heading and even altitude changes, while at the same time having one hand on the live throttle and maybe also making rudder trim adjustments. The one arm paper hangar comes to mind.
Clearly Boeing should amplify its advice on MCP changes by the PF when on one engine and the automatic pilot is engaged. . It would be sensible to have the PM make MCP changes at the request of the PF during asymmetric flight. This leaves the PF with the task of simply operating the live engine thrust and adjusting rudder pressure changes backed up by manual rudder trim if required.
While this becomes a matter of common sense, the fact remains there are pedants in the simulator who arc up if the Boeing FCTM advice is not followed to the letter
Quote from Sidestick_n_Rudder:
"The only problem of the non-moving TL's is less intuitive intervention when the system is not doing what pilots want. I believe, however, that this could be addressed by training and some changes in procedures."
Hear, hear... The problem is that, as I understand it, the majority of airlines are forbidding - or at least discouraging - pilots from practising their manual-thrust skills on revenue flights. That means that pilots are poorly placed in the event of an A/THR failure, as the BA762 investigation has demonstrated:
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/airc...oe-24-may-2013
In my day, in my airline, there was no specific rule for the manual flight case. My preference for manual landings was to use manual thrust, and that included those in gusty crosswinds with windshear:
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post9078674
Because of its relative complexity, the best way to practise the transfer to manual thrust in flight is to do it when workload is low. If the AP is engaged, I recommend leaving the it engaged until manual thrust is established. During my time on the A320 series (1988 - 2001), I'm not aware of any incident attributed to the voluntary use of manual thrust. By the time I retired in 2001, however, the majority of line pilots, trainers and managers rarely disconnected the A/THR. Pity...
"The only problem of the non-moving TL's is less intuitive intervention when the system is not doing what pilots want. I believe, however, that this could be addressed by training and some changes in procedures."
Hear, hear... The problem is that, as I understand it, the majority of airlines are forbidding - or at least discouraging - pilots from practising their manual-thrust skills on revenue flights. That means that pilots are poorly placed in the event of an A/THR failure, as the BA762 investigation has demonstrated:
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/airc...oe-24-may-2013
In my day, in my airline, there was no specific rule for the manual flight case. My preference for manual landings was to use manual thrust, and that included those in gusty crosswinds with windshear:
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post9078674
Because of its relative complexity, the best way to practise the transfer to manual thrust in flight is to do it when workload is low. If the AP is engaged, I recommend leaving the it engaged until manual thrust is established. During my time on the A320 series (1988 - 2001), I'm not aware of any incident attributed to the voluntary use of manual thrust. By the time I retired in 2001, however, the majority of line pilots, trainers and managers rarely disconnected the A/THR. Pity...
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: I wouldn't know.
Posts: 4,497
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@Centaurus it becomes even more weird when you have experienced that the 737 can quite wonderfully use the autothrust in OEI flight as well as keep the rudder where it belongs as well, thus providing full automatic flight. Sadly that is only available below 1500ft during an ILS dual channel approach and during go around until another roll mode is engaged. I'm quite sure the autoflight system could work that way throughout the envelope, but it wasn't certified that way and thus we have to continue impersonating the "one armed paper hangar".
Quite honestly, the non moving thrust lever were surprisingly a non-issue during training and on the line. Except for those rare occasions where one would love to nudge the thrust up a bit for a second or two or pull it back for the same time span. That is much more easily done with a moving thrust lever where one simply overpowers the servos for a bit. Apart from that it really is not an issue. But then, i do work for an outfit where manual, FD off flight is encouraged the same way that manual thrust is during manual flight. Rarely do i see a colleague using AT during manual flight. Easiest way to get there is of course during a phase of flight where thrust is idle anyway, just pull those levers back and there you have it.
Quite honestly, the non moving thrust lever were surprisingly a non-issue during training and on the line. Except for those rare occasions where one would love to nudge the thrust up a bit for a second or two or pull it back for the same time span. That is much more easily done with a moving thrust lever where one simply overpowers the servos for a bit. Apart from that it really is not an issue. But then, i do work for an outfit where manual, FD off flight is encouraged the same way that manual thrust is during manual flight. Rarely do i see a colleague using AT during manual flight. Easiest way to get there is of course during a phase of flight where thrust is idle anyway, just pull those levers back and there you have it.
Join Date: Jan 2014
Location: N5109.2W10.5
Posts: 720
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi Chris,
M Scott's paper "The Management of Flight Safety"
https://www.google.com/webhp?sourcei...Bmanual+thrust has an interesting observation: " In British Airways, for example, the flexibility to use manual thrust on the Airbus fleet has been banned, so that pilots are increasingly relegated to monitoring the automatics. Thus the ‘system’ has become increasingly poorly ‘engineered’ from a cognitive point of view."
I gather the reason was because there were far more "incidents" on the Airbus fleet than any other fleet with low speed during manual flight. Since all BA pilots have a similar ability (on average on all fleets) one is led to conclude that there is an ergonomic disadvantage with the Airbus TL set up, or the absence of "feel" due to flight path stability with auto trim.
Hi Denti,
If you had conventional TL, you could simply disconnect and leave the TL where they were during any stage of flight.
By the time I retired in 2001, however, the majority of line pilots, trainers and managers rarely disconnected the A/THR. Pity...
https://www.google.com/webhp?sourcei...Bmanual+thrust has an interesting observation: " In British Airways, for example, the flexibility to use manual thrust on the Airbus fleet has been banned, so that pilots are increasingly relegated to monitoring the automatics. Thus the ‘system’ has become increasingly poorly ‘engineered’ from a cognitive point of view."
I gather the reason was because there were far more "incidents" on the Airbus fleet than any other fleet with low speed during manual flight. Since all BA pilots have a similar ability (on average on all fleets) one is led to conclude that there is an ergonomic disadvantage with the Airbus TL set up, or the absence of "feel" due to flight path stability with auto trim.
Hi Denti,
Easiest way to get there is of course during a phase of flight where thrust is idle anyway, just pull those levers back and there you have it.
Last edited by Goldenrivett; 15th Aug 2015 at 15:41.