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OEB Alpha Prot

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Old 21st Feb 2015, 16:11
  #21 (permalink)  
 
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This does not change the fact that at this time there was no warning of the ramifications of only one F/D being on when in this configuration, at the time of this crash those of us on the type were in fact interviewd by the BOE, As for the SFO crash, words fail me,the fundementals of aircraft handling are simply not being taught in many places, no amount of "magic" can solve this, certainly more "gongs and whistles" have not proved to be the answer.
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Old 21st Feb 2015, 17:44
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Originally Posted by vodmor
FCOM DSC-22-40-10 When a FAC is disengaged (FAC pushbutton set off) but still valid, the flight envelope function of the FAC remains active.
Keyword might be "a".

As mucking with FACs to degrade control law is beyond the scope of line operations, FCOM can't be used as reference to what would happen. If the operator chooses to include handling in degraded laws in post-heavy-maintenance flight tests, which computers to shutoff, how, when and with what precautions will be included in test schedule. Absolutely nothing from it is allowed to be used in line flying.

Originally Posted by clunckdriver
This does not change the fact
...that only one FD was active yet alpha floor activated at 135 ft RA, too late to prevent the impact so your statement:

Originally Posted by clunckdriver
if Airbus had simply stated in training and manuals that having one F/D of and one on would inhibit Alpha Floor, {it was neither taught or in the manuals at this time} this crash would simply not have taken place.
...is quite false. Since you insist you are early bus pilot in America and so should be very well versed in Airbus, could you please explain us your misunderstanding of Airbus autoflight fundamentals? Or for that matter, fundamentals of any modern AFCS at all?
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Old 21st Feb 2015, 18:20
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Clandestino, there were many changes to software to rectify this and other problems problems I think you will find, however although an engineer ,I havnt flown the "Skud" for at least twenty six years,[ could be longer, but my training files are not something I keep handy these days!} so forgive me if I dont recall the endless manual updates which made reporting for duty such a new experience every time, as for your out of place comments about my ability to understand "fundementals" I can only presume that you are some joy to fly with! Please try to reign in your ego and lighten up.{PS, I see you state that I am American, actually Canada is not American, well not yet anyway!}

Last edited by clunckdriver; 21st Feb 2015 at 19:32.
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Old 22nd Feb 2015, 06:18
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clunckdriver
Your statements below show you are not sure whose side you are on. You wrongly blame deactivated protection(because it wasn't) in one statement while in the other you are against the modern preventive innovations. FDs had nothing to do with alpha floor. FDs when both are off ATHR changes to speed mode and that would have taken care off their inadvertent entry in OP DES . B777 A/throttle is worse in SFO it quietly went to sleep as per design and suppose to wake up but didn't. FAA has asked them to improve it.
if Airbus had simply stated in training and manuals that having one F/D of and one on would inhibit Alpha Floor, {it was neither taught or in the manuals at this time} this crash would simply not have taken place.
the fundementals of aircraft handling are simply not being taught in many places, no amount of "magic" can solve this, certainly more "gongs and whistles" have not proved to be the answer.
Surely you can't remember everything but you could always take a breather before coming out with a howler like that.

Last edited by vilas; 22nd Feb 2015 at 06:33.
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Old 22nd Feb 2015, 06:36
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We are not discussing you or me around here.

What we are discussing is your statement where nice description of FLCH trap was made and concrete example of accident due to it given.

Problem is; FLCH trap (inhibition of autothrottle wake-up on B777 with one FD off and other in FLCH) is not applicable to Airbi, not just because there is no FLCH on them but there is no OP DES trap either and there was never one! Fundamental part is that as Indian Airlines was OP DESed into ground, any 747 can be FLCHed or 737 LVL CHGed in the same manner.

BTW, speaking about "fundementals", it's not even full 27 years yet since A320 entered the service. Not to fly it Canada for more than 26 years would be quite a feat.

Do you have anything to add or are we closing this case?
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Old 22nd Feb 2015, 08:15
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Yes, you are correct on the start up dates on the 320 in Canada, however as I stated I no longer keep a diary or training files handy,{ have enough to do with the paper work involved in runing our present company,in fact its 0400 hours here right now and am busy aranging our eAPIS for crossing into the USA today, oh how I miss having all this bumph done by dispatch!} As you semm to delight in personel attacks I have to agree with you, lets both simply can it, its a conversation of the deaf.
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Old 22nd Feb 2015, 12:46
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Do any of the thread contributors have a reference to show how the protections are processed from detection to the final stage of the aircraft applying a correction. The Fcom doesn't explain this very well.
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Old 22nd Feb 2015, 15:58
  #28 (permalink)  
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Airbus transparency

Airbus needs to be more transparent, as they have been obliviously stuff that needs to be out there. ( We are not even getting into the Electrical abnormals with all the modifications that have had to be done, consequences where you can lose all your screens or comms,etc. ) Airbus needs to provide more information to pilots on this stuff, whether it is pretty or not. Airbus the truth comes out in the end. ( In normal ops when you are fatigued the 320 remains a decent safe airplane to fly when you are doing a lot of sectors and tired.)


Also ¨Airbus had simply stated in training and manuals that having one F/D of and one on would inhibit Alpha Floor, {it was neither taught or in the manuals at this time} this crash would simply not have taken place¨

Airbus stated never have on FD and on FD off, but yes should told us more about what they knew.

It΄s ironic and a contradiction, to train pilots not to think outside the box.

But pilots have had to go outside the box switching off Two ADRs to get too Alternate law. Look at Lufthansa.

Here we are with people questioning wether FACs or ADRs should be switched off.

It appears that the Alpha Prot OEB is not enough, or is it ?
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Old 22nd Feb 2015, 16:52
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The OEB is quite explicit regarding the requirement to turn off two ADR. I do agree with you that there needs to be more explanation in the manuals. Today is the anniversay of the first flight twenty eight years ago of the A320 and here we are many years later still questioning many aspects of how it works.
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Old 22nd Feb 2015, 17:18
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Airbus needs to be more transparent, as they have been obliviously stuff that needs to be out there.
Active Airbii pilots know where to get the stuff...their Flight Technical dept. and at AirbusWorld.
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Old 22nd Feb 2015, 17:19
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I have been trying to access Airbusworld and my airline will not give me access.
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Old 22nd Feb 2015, 18:58
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@JHR

Here we are with people questioning wether FACs or ADRs should be switched off.
Indeed HERE are those people.

But pilots have had to go outside the box switching off Two ADRs to get too Alternate law. Look at Lufthansa.
They just switch off 1 ADR (the outlier but [GOOD] ADR#3 already rejected by EFCS), which took them in ALT law.

I have been trying to access Airbusworld and my airline will not give me access.
That's regrettable but NOT Airbus withholding you the 'stuff'.

Last edited by A33Zab; 22nd Feb 2015 at 19:25.
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Old 22nd Feb 2015, 21:47
  #33 (permalink)  
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Access to Airbus Flight Ops Support

tubby linton
I have been trying to access Airbusworld and my airline will not give me access.

Tubby, if you have any questions on any aspect of operating the Bus just raise them through your Ops Support Group and keep at them until you get a satisfactory response. It is a sad fact that many line guys don't have access to Airbusworld / Flight Operations (or any other domains on that portal) either because they don't know it exists or don't have an inclination to find out or accept a rebuttal from their company when making a request for access or information. It is also disquieting to know that so many people at the sharp end have insufficient knowledge of the machine they operate and the physical environment in which they operate. Don't stand for it - go get the information !
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Old 23rd Feb 2015, 01:37
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tubby linton
Previously Airbus had given access to some TRTO instructors to airbussupply but now they have removed that access except their own instructors. All operators have access to airbusworld but it is sad that many are not aware of the wealth of information it has and are simply not interested.
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Old 23rd Feb 2015, 12:41
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Originally Posted by A33Zab
They just switch off 1 ADR (the outlier but [GOOD] ADR#3 already rejected by EFCS), which took them in ALT law.
You seem to have more info than we do ... but it would be another case where the System would be better advising the crew of the suspected rogue data instead of keeping them in the dark ...
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Old 23rd Feb 2015, 13:44
  #36 (permalink)  
 
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You seem to have more info than we do
Information from presentation:

Abnormal Valpha Prot
In-service event ( A321)
• At FL250, speed became managed at 290kt but the Autopilot (AP) was unable to reach the target speed. Airspeed remained around 250kt.
• At FL 310, during a L/H turn, the crew reported PFD showing Valpha-prot rising upward current airspeed (245kt).
The flight crew manually disconnected the AP
• Alpha protection activated with an order of pitch down
• Aft stick input maintained for 55 min to keep level flight at FL270
• ADR 2 switched off, leading to alternate law
• Remaining of flight performed in alternate law


• During climb, the following AOA values were recorded:
• AOA1 = 4.5° constant value
• AOA 2 = 4.5° constant value
• AOA 3 = normal behaviour
• The Flight Controls computers rejected the AOA n°3 (no cockpit effects)
• When the flight crew disconnected the AP, the Mach was 0.675.
Alpha prot =f(Mach= 0.675)=4.2°
Alpha prot activated with an associated pitch down
• The protection remained active until reversion to alternate law
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Old 23rd Feb 2015, 14:07
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Thanks for the info.
Aft stick input maintained for 55 min to keep level flight at FL270
What ... ?

(no cockpit effects)
... is my grievance.
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Old 23rd Feb 2015, 14:35
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They need to modify the fault accommodation logic by giving information to the crew. That will improve the situation.
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Old 23rd Feb 2015, 18:20
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@CONF iture.

Quote:
(no cockpit effects)
... is my grievance.
Not only this one...I'm awaiting any positive remark on Airbus on your behalf.

(no cockpit effects) is not completely true,
- the crew reported PFD showing Valpha-prot rising upward current airspeed (245kt).
and
- INOP SYS: CAT3 DUAL

(no cockpit effects) is related to the EFCS rejection of ADR 3.

55 min with continued SS deflection makes us wonder what and with whom this may have been discussed?
Home base calling TLS during lunch hour?

But anyway, what to announce? when 2 out of 3 supplies equal but erroneous data, the median being at the same value and the 3rd source deviating from it.

ECAM MSG: NAV SOMETHING WRONG ?

Last edited by A33Zab; 23rd Feb 2015 at 19:19.
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Old 23rd Feb 2015, 20:47
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- the crew reported PFD showing Valpha-prot rising upward current airspeed (245kt).
Did materialize during a turn due to G increase - not much time to react.
- INOP SYS: CAT3 DUAL
So much stuff can lead to such STS - not really an indication.

But anyway, what to announce? when 2 out of 3 supplies equal but erroneous data, the median being at the same value and the 3rd source deviating from it.
ECAM MSG: NAV SOMETHING WRONG ?
NAV AOA DISCREPANCY could be IMO the most logical and informative option.
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