bubbers44

GOULI, you are correct. No pilot would allow the PF to pull back a control yoke to the stops and hold it there. Only if the control inputs are hidden from him would he allow this mishandling, especially at high altitude, to happen.

Maintaining cruise attitude and power would have made this pitot tube malfunction a non event. That is what we were taught early in our flight training.

infrequentflyer789

Presumably those people in the accident record who did exactly that, despite yokes, shakers, pushers, manual trim, non-fbw etc., are not actually pilots then - along the lines of "no true scotsman" ?

I don't sit at the pointy end, but one thing I have learned from the user interface work I have done is that no matter how easy you try and make it for the user to do the right thing with the interface, and how hard you try and make it to do the wrong thing, sooner or later you always encounter the user who is actively trying to do the wrong thing. And they will find a way to succeed.

The real question is not what interface changes can be made to help the pilots do what they want to do, it is working out why this, and a lot of other crews, pulled _back_ and wanted to pull back to try and recover a stall. And why PNFs either think the same and assist, just acquiesce, or never make an effective attempt to take control.

"Climb, climb, climb"
”But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while”

They were falling out of the sky, and they both wanted to resolve this by climbing (and they checked the engines are at full thrust as well I think). Stall is only ever mentioned by the automated warning, how many times, over 100 ?, never by any of the pilots.

DozyWannabe

Apart from where the report explicitly criticises the stall warning behaviour and recommends a review of the control and warning interfaces, right?

Again, I disagree. From my perspective it seems that while there are indeed lobbyists for the manufacturers - and an all-pervading corporate tendency to "circle the wagons" on the part of all manufacturers and vendors, it's also fair to say that on the other side there exists a subset of pilots - and some pilots' unions in particular - who act almost blindly as "lobbyists" in the other direction.

Sadly, what this means is that members of both of these "lobby" groups have ended up metaphorically sticking their fingers in their ears while loudly and repeatedly stating that their own case is a fundamental truth. This perception of an immutable "other side" means that we end up with both parties trying to shout the other down - and pretty much the only beneficiaries of this situation are journalists, many of whom make a lucrative living from a "let's you and him fight" scenario.

Except for the point that, like a lot of general journalism on the subject, the article assumes that technological advances and increased automation capabilities are aimed at removing human pilots from the flight deck in the foreseeable future which, to the best of my knowledge, is absolutely not the case (though it does make for interesting copy and is a psychological trigger for knee-jerk responses).

At some point, it's going to be necessary for those with an entrenched viewpoint on both sides of the argument to re-evaluate that position. Of course the legal/marketing departments of the manufacturers are always going to be aggressive in defending their products - for better or worse in this day and age they wouldn't be doing their jobs if they didn't. But I must say that the engineering side of things has accepted in recent times that while the technology has solved a lot of the inherent safety questions (and the stats absolutely support that conclusion), it has also added a new set of challenges in terms of safety. That the human/technology interface will always be something of a "work-in-progress" also seems to be generally accepted. However, the tech-sceptics on the piloting side also need to accept that the worst-case scenarios they predicted back in the '80s have not come to pass.

Ultimately both sides need to let go of the past. For example, at this point in time you will have F/Os coming on to the line who weren't even born when BZ made his infamous "concierge" remarks, and as such bringing that up at this point in time is largely irrelevant.

Furthermore, there needs to be an acceptance that when it comes to aviation safety, "blame" is a counter-productive concept. And I'm sorry to say this, but from my point of view it appears that the "tech-sceptic" piloting lobby is very much behind on this. Various articles and discussion from that end maintain that the AF447 BEA report "blames" the crew, when in fact it does no such thing.

+1-Yes-Thank you-Got it in one.

With all due respect, I think that's a very valid theory (particularly given your experience in that area) - however due to the nature of investigation of fatal accidents it can never be any more than that.

Again, with respect, I feel a little dubious on that point for two reasons. Firstly, if my experience in the sim was anything to go by as regards the real aircraft, the spring-centre of the sidestick was certainly positive enough such that I don't believe inadvertent pitch input would be an easy thing to accomplish. Secondly, he makes a very specific reference to the fact he was deliberately pulling up, which does not tally with the idea the pitch aspect was unintentional.

I must say I'm in PJ2's camp there.

tdracer

Being a non-pilot, it would seem to me there is one aspect of this accident that deserves further study (which Bubbers touches on) - why would any pilot not only put the aircraft into a stall, but hold it there despite the aural warnings and indications of an extreme angle of attack for several minutes until the aircraft crashed?

It's easy to point out an inexperienced pilot, taught you can't stall an A330 and not trained how to control the airplane in Alternate law. Further I do think it is valid to suggest that the sidestick may have contributed to the PNF not realizing what the PF was doing (unlike seeing the control yoke pulled full back). But I think that misses the bigger point that other pilots have done much the same thing - holding an airplane in a stall while dropping thousands of feet until impact - on non-FBW aircraft with cross linked controls. Some were highly experienced senior pilots that certainly should have known better, and should have been under no illusion regarding their ability to stall the aircraft (Bergenair comes to mind).

So what is going on mentally that is preventing these pilots from recognizing they are in a stall, despite aural and/or stick shaker indications telling them exactly that? If we can figure out the cognitive processes involved, perhaps we can figure out how to prevent future occurrences.

DozyWannabe

In fairness, in order to believe that one must believe that he never read his FCOM - which explicitly states that the A330 can be stalled outside of Normal Law.

Thank you - I've been banging on about that one for years.

alf5071h

tdracer, you approach the point of assuming that no one would overlook all of the available cues. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate to assume that something prevented the crew recognising the situation. Thus as you conclude we need to understand the mental process, but, BUT, many very experienced researches still seek a usable answer.

The metal processes which create success or failure are the same – the way in which we think; it’s only circumstance (outcome) which distinguishes between them.
Many posters would be well served by reading articles by James Reason and heeding the risk of bias (#582). The errors which the crew suffered (only determined by hindsight) – the processes, inabilities, assumptions, are no different than the manner in which many of the views above are stated. We are our own worst enemy – or at least our thinking is; #523 attempts to show this.

In the absence of knowing the crew’s thoughts, any understanding this accident depends on supposition. There has been significant technical analysis above, part supposition and part unverified ‘fact’ more often based on assumption; we must take care to define and acknowledge the line between them.
There is still great opportunity for supposition about the crew’s thoughts and behaviour. The VF article touches on this, but I suspect that most people are uncomfortable with this approach – too personal, whereas it’s much more satisfying to blame someone (which the report avoids).

In search of a solution, the industry needs to improve individual understanding of behaviour (behaviour is triggered by thought) – HF training (not necessarily CRM). Also review situations to minimise opportunity for error, and if encountered, how to recover or reduce the effects of the outcome – not stall recovery, the situations which lead up to it, the flight path, the procedures, training. Each might be seen as small and insignificant (bias), but together at a critical time there is great hazard.
The roots of this accident might be found well before this flight started.

DozyWannabe

Care to provide a summary for those that are a little reluctant to click/download random links?

infrequentflyer789

<opens page in scratch VM for paranoia reasons, downloads file>

At the time I accessed it (not that I'm trying to make you more paranoid there, just covering all bases) it was a PDF file on a file sharing / dropbox type of site. The file seems ok, scans clean, simple PDF comprising scanned images of printed spiral-bound report - no PDF features that would need Adobe reader, so you can open it in something safer

Trouble with these docs are that they are scans of printed originals and either the scans, the original prints, or both, are poor quality. The appendices in particular may be second or third generation physical copies - printed or copied elsewhere, collated into physical report, photocopied again for distribution and then scanned, at a guess.


Summary of content - not dissimilar to the previous one. 200+ pages. In French, and with not many pictures...

I am torn as to whether the quickest and easiest approach would be:
a) to try attacking it with some professional rescan and OCR software, followed by google translate and then attempt to decipher the result - but I think it is going to be a waste of time
b) to (re)learn French properly

I have scan read the contents and parts of some interesting looking sections / pages, using my level of French, which 20+ yrs ago was "foreigner who has clearly put a bit of effort in but will need to be spoken to slowly in small words", and is now that plus "and has now forgotten a lot of it". I can still order food and wine and follow directions to the WC, i.e. the important stuff, but that doesn't help a lot here...


There looks to be some interesting stuff in there, comparing with other UAS incidents and interviewing some of those pilots (BEA report says other crews ignored SW believing them spurious - but frustratingly did not cover _why_ the crews believed that, this report might). Seems they have also done test flights (real not sim) and tried to recreate the scenario (up to a point), various FDR comparisons with test flight and 447 appear to be shown (quality of traces about as bad as you'd expect).

Most of the report is responding to questions, those posed by the court, by Airbus (I think), and by other parties (victims counsel ?). Fair amount on human factors and procedures and FCTM.

List of causes and conclusion around p140, not sure the list aligns with BEA exactly. Conclusion says (I think) that appropriate actions by crew would have avoided accident, that UAS and Stall procedures were perfectly adequate and would have avoided accident if either was executed correctly.

Hope that helps a bit.


Note: sidestick does not appear to be mentioned Also, looks like they asked pilots (maybe the test flight pilots?) about the controllability in ALT2B and conclude it should not have been an issue.

jcjeant

Hi,

Why this second expertise ?



it was at the request of Airbus .. as they were not enterely satisfied by the results of the first expertise for some reasons ........

PJ2

alf5071h, infrequentflyer789, dozy;

Re, "The roots of this accident might be found well before this flight started." - alf5071h

I think it is reasonable to say that this is almost certainly the case.

Over time, many "streams" became the "rivers" which may legitimately be included in the examination of the accident.

The dividing line between proper examination of human factors and the notions of "blame" varies in width, (blurs), depending upon the context of the conversation; it is a useful dialog to have in its own right.

What separates the ample signs of hindsight bias and blame throughout these threads, from the reasonable examination of human factors including command-and-control issues in both the cockpit of AF447 and the wider "rivers" of organizational factors?

It is an important distinction because both must have a venue in which serious discussion can take place.

As with almost all accidents, informed supposition and circumstantial "conclusion" form part of the impressions of what actually occurred in the cockpit of AF447. None can know for sure of course but those who do the work can often reasonably surmise without concluding.

The various theories of why the PF handled the stick the way it was and why these actions continued beyond the point where standard training was to call for drills and checklists in the manner now widely understood cannot conclude anything as we do not have the required data - what was going on in the mind of the PF and PNF and why things came apart so swiftly and why the the captain was unable to take command and why the unstoppable descent rate regardless of pitch and power inputs did not register. How do the notions of "panic" or "freezing at the controls" advance understanding?

Fright and narrowed focus in sensory and thought processes are understandable human responses to rapidly-unfolding events which are both confusing and life-threatening. The industry has known about such factors since the eighties. It created the notions of organizational factors and created CRM techniques, putting Perrow's, Reason's, Helmreich's, Maurino's, Kern's, Dekker's et al. work into practise and using level D simulators to combine forces in reducing the effects of such human, visceral psychological and biological responses. The combination works, as the industry's experience has proven over and over.

But we must explain things: Where and why were the failures here? Unlike the modelling of mechanical failure, can there be no "cartesian" conclusions here but only a thorough surmising?

This does not seem good enough to set improvement and change by. The solution isn't just to do "more CRM" or "more training"; I am familiar with, and have seen superbly-trained, veteran pilots do silly things in airplanes that leave one (thankfully) merely shaking one's head.

Why does this continue, is a question for all human endeavours but is paramount in high-risk ventures. To what levels may our present sciences probe such "skews" in thought and action? What is the model by which we may understand and comprehend AF447; more crucially, what is the understanding that understands, and how do we get there?

I think these are not philosophical questions but material questions on "the critical path" to new solutions.

DozyWannabe

Believe me, I understand your frustration.

But I think that accepting the notion that there is a level of psychological shock capable of activating the mammalian "fight-or-flight" response - which even training, process and drill may not counteract - is a useful thing to understand in itself.

Don't get me wrong, it's a bloody frightening concept - and one which potentially flies in the face of several tenets the piloting community holds as dear and sacrosanct. In particular it raises a spectre that implies that even if you, as a pilot, attain a level of skill and experience on the level of, say, a Yeager or a Beamont - there nevertheless potentially exists a set of circumstances in which all that skill and experience may go out the window and as a result may not only get you killed, but killed in a manner which could easily be interpreted/construed as being of your own doing. Now I'm not a line pilot, but I don't mind admitting that that thought process would scare the bejeezus out of me if I were.

On the other hand, the flipside of accepting this possibility could be positive. By which I mean that if it were to become a central tenet of CRM that any pilot, no matter how skilled or experienced, may fall victim to irrational behaviour in the heat of the moment and - crucially - that this should neither reflect on their perceived piloting qualities nor necessarily be anything more than a one-off aberration (after all - anyone can have a "bad day at the office"), then I can't help but think it may go some way to erasing the stigma involved in having to take control in such circumstances - both on the part of the pilot who takes control and the pilot who has been relieved of control.

In some ways, this ingrained perception that pilots who made mistakes must have been in some way deficient was negated as far back as "Fate Is The Hunter". The only pilot in the book that Gann explicitly refers to as being incompetent and having obtained his position by deception is eventually found out and loses his career, but is not killed as a result of his incompetence. On the other hand, several pilots who Gann states were absolutely competent end up losing their lives regardless. It's a thought-provoking point.

Cool Guys

For any accident/incident/problem there is a root cause, and if that root cause is found and fixed the issue will be resolved and will not happen again. Aircraft accident investigation is particularly good at this. In some cases the root cause cannot be found so we investigate the contributory factors and the chain of events (effects) resulting from the original issue and we implement counter measures for these. Contributory factors can be minimised or eliminated and any effects can be minimised by introducing containment/redundancy/contingency measures into the system. Depending on the severity and nature of the issue this may be a legitimate, complete handling. The 787 battery issue is a contentious example of this. In the case of AF 477 the root cause of the PFs decision to pull rather than “do nothing” has not been identified however some contributory factors have been identified and some counter measures have been introduced.

Recently in this thread there has been 2 lines of discussions, one regarding the root cause and the other contributory factors. A couple of days ago some pilots were discussing contributory factors such as the user interface, PIO and cognitive bias. A poster then got on his high horse and demanded the root cause be found and a perfect solution implemented. Since then the root cause has been the topic of discussion. This is a valid topic but rather than allowing demands for a perfect solution to drown all else, in the absence of a root cause being found we can and must address these contributory factors. It is a very challenging task to find the root cause of a human decision during a time of stress. With our present level of understanding of the human mind it may take us 20 years to understand why the PF pulled rather than “did nothing”, we may never understand. However the contributory factors and effects can be identified and understood better. There can be many possible effects and contributory factors so a full handling can get quite complex.

The posts a couple of days ago were suggesting (from my understanding) the PF was overloaded due to PIO and the PNF was confused because he did not know what the PF was doing. This would appear to be one possible scenario which has tangible and more easily obtainable resolutions but it seems to have been discounted in the process of a quest to discover the root cause.

PJ2

Dozy, sorry, no, you're misunderstanding my statements. I'm not the expressing frustration in the least.

I'm characterizing a state of affairs and wondering, positing the question. [added] By far, these are areas, (the cognitive, the 'psychological'), of investigation/examination that would bear most fruit, so to speak. The frustration if there is any at all, is knowing that "more automation" may be the answer some arrive at and that is just a variation on a current theme and won't solve a thing. There is a basic level of complexity and speed in cockpits of transports that must be "married" to appropriate capacity, ability, motivation, propensity towards a disciplined mind and an abiding curiosity of those hired. None of these human qualities are decent partners with automation or more automation. Airline managements of the eighties made the fundamental mistake of assuming automation could be the third (or second) pilot and saw a huge financial benefit in terms of training and hiring, particularly when the "best-and-brightest" candidates as Sully put it, were no longer choosing commercial aviation as a profession. It's a huge story as I know you and many here already know.

AF447-type accidents are going to continue, (in fact, have continued), until this mistake and the turn towards such research and the resulting changes in design take hold of industry priorities.

The "fright" is part of aviation and part of the business. There are ways to work with it; it isn't a sword of Damocles, it is just a fact. But some pilots haven't read Gann and think because its comfortable and really safe that it's a nice office job. Seen it, flown with it - THAT is what scares me - not the possibility of losing it - I know SOPs and CRM work - used it, but the industry is changing. Re-read the last paragraph of the VF article. This is what it has become, and is what needs coming to terms with.

400drvr

Of course it can be stalled once the computers give up the ghost. It's still an airplane after all. 2 wings, 2 engines and all the other plane parts that make it fly.

PJ2

400drvr;

I posted the graphic below several years ago on one of the AF447 threads. It's from an early CBT, (ca. 1999) training presentation:

400drvr

Having never flown the Bus I would have to go with "B"

Thanks for the post. I updated my post with a link to an article in Octobers Vanity Fair that was well written and researched. A real eye opener.

Regards

alf5071h

PJ, #548 “we must explain things” … and the other questions.
This is a normal human desire; however, if we are unable to describe the overall operational system due to its complexity (man, machine, and environment), nor define the interactions, we will always face an uncertain future.
In these terms AF447 is unexplainable. Self-satisfaction will find whatever we choose to look for (root cause), we only fix what we find, thus avoiding repetition of the last accident, but providing little benefit for avoiding other accidents.

At best we must continue to ask questions, particularly by considering the widest range of possible contributions. In an accident there are many contributory items (at that time, in that situation) all are required, yet the absence of any one could prevent it. Thus our thoughts about potential contributions provide opportunity for safety activity.
Some considerations relating to AF447 :-

Loss of Airspeed (LoA) simulator training; did the FOs handle the aircraft during this session or was it a Capt only exercise? Did the LoA simulation degrade the control laws?

Are FOs given opportunity to decide on a course of action for avoiding weather, or is this always deferred to the Capt? Not a CRM view of a Capt stating a course of action and then seeking FO confirmation, but mentoring – “look at this situation, what would you do”, then discuss the reasoning and judgement, thereby learning and exercising skills of thought.

There are several new safety initiatives which could supplement current safety activities.
Amalberti requires that we must avoid ‘the big one’, but without great detail of how to. He also notes that continuing improvements in the current safety methods must avoid upsetting the delicate balance and creating ‘new’ accidents; yet many recent accidents could have been created – automation, reduced training, commercial pressure, SOP culture.
‘Resilience’ provides some practical suggestions; a continuous process of adapting to changing situations with an alternative view of human performance. Although Resilience does not provide a solution (it cannot – as above), it does stress the need for activity – safety is what is done. By continuing to ask questions, reviewing normal operations we might find indicators as to why accidents have occurred, but of greater importance aspects which can be improved to avoid the next (big) one.

The flight operational side of our industry shows signs of lagging in these activities compared with Eurocontrol, or are we too constrained – regulatory or self inflicted.
‘Systems Thinking for Safety’.

G0ULI

Consider the driver of a modern, very up market car fitted with all the latest driver aids and stability assistance, cruising along an Autobahn at high speed in a rainstorm. The car has differential braking to all four wheels, distributed drive to all four wheels, rear wheel steering assistance and an electronic front wheel steering system.

The car turns into a bend, the inside wheels are braked slightly, the rear wheels turn in and the driver's steering input is harsh enough to cause the front wheels to start to lose traction, so the engine power is reduced and the sensitivity of the steering input reduced. The car continues around the bend, apparently completely in command of the driver, who notices nothing out of the ordinary.

[AF447 flying in moderate turbulence on autopilot]

On a straight stretch of motorway the car ploughs through some deep puddles and again the electronic stability controls activate to make this a non event for the driver. However due to a faulty seal or a design fault, some water enters the electronics compartment housing the stability systems.

[AF447 hits heavy icing conditions, ice starts to block pitot tubes]

At the next bend in the road, the driver turns the steering wheel and water sloshes up onto part of the circuit boards causing a fault condition. All stability controls are disabled and the car reverts to direct response to the accelerator, brakes and steering.

A light comes on the dashboard to warn the driver as the car starts to veer off course to the side of the road. The driver jerks the steering wheel and floors the accelerator to try and kick the back end of the car around. Perhaps it swings too far, so opposite lock is applied. That doesn't work, so the driver then brakes in a panic, causing all four wheels to lock, whereupon the car aquaplanes and fishtails or spins down the road into a crash barrier.

Drivers involved in aquaplaning and black ice accidents nearly all report feeling the vehicle accelerating as the skid begins. This is actually caused by a feeling of acceleration as braking force is lost, rather than any real increase in speed.

[AF447 Controls revert to alternate law (effectively direct input) and fail to protect the aircraft from stalling. The control column is held back to maintain altitude and reduce speed as the pilot flying seems convinced the aircraft is overspeeding. This feeling may have been induced by the extra noise of ice crystals hitting the aircraft giving a false audible impression that the aircraft was flying faster than normal.]

Now a highly experienced driver would have known to feather the throttle to keep the wheels spinning and to gently steer around the bend and maintain control of the vehicle until they could stop or sort out the situation. They might go wide around the bend, but they would probably avoid an accident.

High level automation in cars makes mediocre drivers feel like world class racing drivers by covering for their limitations. When all that assistance is suddenly removed, accidents happen.

In the case of AF447 a situation occured where a pilot with relatively limited experience was suddenly required to respond to a situation and gross control inputs were made in the same way that an inexperienced driver might respond to a sudden skid. Under normal circumstances, the aircraft would have modified the control inputs to maintain safe flight. Under alternate law, these safety measures were severely degraded or absent.

There were many other contributory factors, but this might help explain the initial actions of the pilot flying. It isn't necessary to seek out some complicated psychological reason for these responses. They are just normal human reactions to a sudden shock.

Unfortunately, once control is lost of either a car or an aircraft, it is very difficult for anyone other than the most experienced driver or pilot to retrieve the situation and only then by intervention at the earliest possible stage.

This might make it easier for non pilots to understand how the initial situation arose. The initial panic and unexpected responses from the aircraft also served to disorientate other crew members to the extent that identification of the problem and recovery was delayed until it was too late.

It is a situation that could happen to any one of us, particularly in a modern car.

PJ2

400drvr;

Re (b), QED.

This point regarding loss of protections including stall protection was stressed over and over again throughout the three courses I had on the Airbus A320, A340 & A330. Flight in the Alternate Laws was taught and practised. Both the A340 & A330 simulators were sensitive in roll but moreso, I am told by those who have flown it in Alternate law, than the airplane.

The VF article link has been posted earlier, above. Good article.

DozyWannabe

Apologies if that is the case...

It's definitely a possibility, but it would appear that in at least one case, the thought process is going the other way. Remember this thread from a few months back? :
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...sics-a350.html

I'd say the "brain drain" and the rise of MBAs in lieu of long-time airline experience in management really only took hold in the late '80s and early '90s. In day to day terms the state-of-the-art in FMS and automation hasn't really altered a great deal since the advent of the B757 and B767 in the late '70s/early '80s (and yes, I know Airbus pioneered a lot of it with the A300 in the early to mid-'70s, but as I understand things it was the then-new Boeing types which really cemented it as part of the norm). I think that when modern FMS/automation systems were introduced, it was still at a time when the builders assumed at least some airline management could be trusted to be sensible. Of course, with the drain in airline management experience towards the end of the decade, it could be reasonably argued that the monkeys had been given the keys to the banana plantation - and if the example of the "basics" push from Airbus is a sign of how things are going to go, then there's some hope that the balance will go some way to being redressed.

Sure - however I would caution folks to beware the allure of the rose-tinted spectacles when looking at the past. In particular, blind pew's book contains some truly eye-popping examples of cadets being rushed onto the line before they were ready in the midst of a long-running industrial dispute. And this was at a well-known British airline back in the late '60s and early '70s, a period which quite a few of the old guard consider to be a golden time if reading stuff on here is anything to go by.

It's no secret that remuneration and benefits for pilots have been eroded considerably over the last few decades, but this is true of pretty much any profession (excluding banking and management) anyone would care to name. And with airline travel becoming such a commonplace thing, the truth is that what the airlines offer prospective pilots is a job with built-in expectations of unsociable hours, long periods away from home and family - and a pay packet which compares unfavourably to that of the branch manager in the local bank.

Of course - the point I was trying to make being that recognition of startle effect should be trained as part of CRM with a "no harm, no foul" understanding on the part of both parties. By which I mean pilots like Robert and the F/Os on the Birgenair and West Caribbean flights should not have to first consider the potential risk to their careers before being empowered to take remedial action.

I agree with the sentiment, but feel compelled to point out that the computers did not "give up the ghost" during the crucial phases* of this accident. The computers in fact functioned correctly and transitioned to a control configuration which gave the pilots increased control authority while maintaining as many normally-functioning systems as possible. As I've said before, the switch to Alternate Law is essentially only doing what the Flight Engineer would do on older types in the event of a component or partial system failure.

* - The ACARS readout indicates a transitory failure of PRIM 1 and SEC 1 very late in the sequence, but the DFDR data indicates that this didn't affect the behaviour of the aircraft or the system as a whole

@G0ULI - I'm afraid I'm going to have to pick a few holes in your car analogy. For one thing, even most of the current state-of-the-art driving aids only serve to alert the driver to potential hazards. Self-driving cars are still barely out of the experimental phase, and being at the controls of a self-driving car can be the only logical equivalent of the kind of automation experienced at the controls of an airliner in cruise.

The loss of traction control (which is a driving aid - not automation) could kinda/sorta be used as an illustrative example but for one salient fact - namely that a driver used to traction control who suddenly loses it is used to driving with the traction control on, and would therefore experience the loss as a deviation from the norm in terms of handling. However, *neither of the F/Os on that flight deck had ever received any training or experience in high-level manual handling at all* - and there was therefore no experienced "norm" from which the handling could deviate.

Also, the only manual handling experience they did have would have been on takeoff and approach/landing (i.e. at low level) where - I believe - the Normal Law roll rate is greater than it would be at high altitudes anyway.

Debatable. If the graphs in Fig. 64 of the report are accurate, then there was no immediate danger of departure from controlled flight and thus no "sudden [requirement]" to start manipulating the controls (though admittedly it would take some degree of nerve to cover and observe only).

The interesting psychology isn't really applicable to the initial shock response - it has more to do with issues arising later in the sequence, particularly the PF's repeated (and silent) use of sidestick priority to take control away from the PNF (even having verbally handed over a few seconds prior) and the PNF's gradually increasing self-doubt over his interpretation of the situation which was - initially, at least - correct.

Again, inaccurate. F/O Robert was trying to analyse the situation and appeared to be some way to figuring things out, but was likely distracted by Bonin's inputs making the situation worse.