UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL

[gulab100]

NOTAM Trees

Firstly, I am truly sorry that you have lost two colleagues in this incident. A tragic loss.

Secondly, I'd like to say that I'm no pilot but a long time visitor to your forum. Therefore please forgive me for wading in to your professional arena.

The reason to felt to respond to this thread is that the thread inadvertently strayed in to my profession; that being Trees.

I am perplexed to read that the Airport Authority in this incident had undertaken tree height reduction works at the property belonging to Mrs Benson (top of the ridge).

We refer to trees in my industry as Self Optimising Mechanical Structures. The key bit in that is the Self Optimising. That is what trees do. You knock 15 feet out the top of a tree, the tree will Self Optimise and react through re-growth (there are very few exceptions). Depending on the species, the tree can be back up to that height within just a few years. on occasion a lot less.

So why undertake this type of works on trees that are clearly a long term issue and are listed and catalogued for NOTAM purposes. For me, if that 15 feet is going to make an approach 'safe', there is something wrong. It's only another 15 or so feet to the roof ridge of the house!

Again in our industry we use the phrase Right Tree In the Right Place. Therefore, if these trees are such a deal breaker for an approach on to this runway, don't prune the top out. Prune an inch off the bottom and re-plant three new ones out of the approach path.

Even if these works were justified to allow a increased visual on the PAPI/runway lights, it's still not a solution with any longevity. Tree out.

[slowjet]

Capt Bloggs ; And there we have it. Nicely set-up, programmed & followed with great satisfaction.But what if you didn't programme quite as precisely as you should have done. Follow your little track pointer, VS pointer, magenta line straight into the hill. From B737 to B757, we still suffered big map shifts. Yet, the children persisted in following the map. I was instrumental in insisting as part of the SOP that for NP approaches, the handling pilot would always HAVE to be in raw data. Another Company insisted on "building" the Vertical profile for the clever little map displays . Lovely little Vert pointer looked very like a ILS GP and when incorrectly built or missing a few height restraints I noticed many pilots fly the map,fly the profile & bust a height restraint. Again, I got that company to change and ALL NP approaches were flown by the handling pilot in raw data. Landflap, far from offering nonsense, as you so politely suggest, appears to me, and other veterens still around to share experience, to offer complete and utter professional common sense.

[Capn Bloggs]

Capt Bloggs ; And there we have it. Nicely set-up, programmed & followed with great satisfaction.But what if you didn't programme quite as precisely as you should have done.

Slowjet, I never even remotely suggested that this or any other NPA should be "programmed" ie built by the pilots. "Build Your Own" approaches are banned here for good reason.

I'm sure the tech-heads tried to have a field-day with the gizmos when they first came out, and good on you for introducing rules to stop them. To suggest, however, that I would contenance anything of the sort is wrong. get it out of the database or do it with raw data. Simple.

I was merely responding to the claim that "modern technology has made NPAs a recipe for disaster."

[kenneth house]

Originally Posted by thermostat

... crossing baskn at 2300 ft 4.7 nm from the threshold, TDZ = 644 ft (2300 - 644 = 1656 feet to loose). If we divide the heigh by the distance we get a grad of 1656 down for each nm forward.

Small nit, should be 350 down for each nm ?

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by Kenneth H
and the software takes action based upon the dominant mode to throttle back the engines and begin a very steep descent.

- I think you missed this in post #741?

"- can you explain what mode might do this? "

[kenneth house]

1.3 nm

After looking at MM43's chart and the graphs and earthviews, etc. it appears that they made contact with trees almost exactly 1.3 nm before the TH.

This seems a strange coincidence with the 1.3 nm distance from the TH to the I-BXO LOC.

Would the approach database have this entry as a + or - value to reaching TH from the FAF that the AP or AT would use as a command input for flight path? Who programs the database?

What are the functions of the AP and AT when operating separately and when operating at the same time? During simultaneous operation which of these controllers is the dominant? Is it a master-slave with only one issuing commands, or might they both be trying to close the loop for their respective objectives.

My view is from a premise that the pilots did not fly this plane down into the ground, but that the computer did. There is the human interface and command data input, the software and controllers, and the hardware actuators to be considered. Maybe it is an unreasonable assumption?

[A Squared]

Originally Posted by Kenneth House

This seems a strange coincidence with the 1.3 nm distance from the TH to the I-BXO LOC.

You're grasping for reasons which don't exist. If the accident was due to confusion about DME readout and distance to the threshold, the accident would have taken place 1.3 nm *past* the threshold, right adjacent to the DME antenna. As has been pointed out several times before, interpreting the DME as distance to the threshold would have placed them higher, not lower. Alternately, if they were looking at an FMS displayed distance to the threshold, and thinking it was DME, 1.3 would be interpreted as being over the threshold, so the scenario would necessarily include a crew deciding to descend at the MAP instead of executing the missed approach, which is a bit implausible.

[kenneth house]

Originally Posted by A Squared

... Alternately, if they were looking at an FMS displayed distance to the threshold, and thinking it was DME, 1.3 would be interpreted as being over the threshold, so the scenario would necessarily include a crew deciding to descend at the MAP instead of executing the missed approach, which is a bit implausible.

Would it be plausible in the above situation, that, thinking they were nearly at the MAP over the TH they might descend to the bottom of the clouds to look for the runway before doing the missed approach? Maybe this would explain the sink rate warning and the runway in sight call. If it is obviously implausible, then it can be ruled out.

[A Squared]

Would it be plausible in the above situation, that, thinking they were nearly at the MAP over the TH they might descend to the bottom of the clouds to look for the runway before doing the missed approach?

I wouldn't consider it very likely that they would have intentionally descended below MDA in clouds.

[Desert185]

mm43:

That is actually a federal document that was cancelled and updated with:

AC 150/5340-30G - Design and Installation Details for Airport Visual

The state needs to update their website and have a method etablished for only publishing current information. The bureacracy invites opening a "can of worms" by publishing another agency's document and assuming it will never change.

Imagine government health care...oh oh...wait a minute...

[Landflap]

Capt Bloggs ; are you secretly a misplaced journalist ? You completely misquote. You say, that I said, " Modern technology has made NPA's a recipe for disaster". Er, no, I never said that. Go back & re-read my post. What I suggested was that in older aircraft, many pilots delighted in using the newer technological thinking in making the aircraft do what it was never intended. I am with Slowjet on this. I too suffered huge map shifts where radio updating was poor or impossible. Yet, I too witnessed guys very happy with staying on the map ! I don't rely on old technology, on it's own, either. I have approached airfields, in the old days, served only with a croaky old NDB where the RMI needle pointed at a CB. We went somewhere else & awaited CAVOK. My point was that as new technology came along, full situational awareness was achieved by NOT relying on the magenta line. I accept that these days, Satnav, GPS etc has made NPA's a piece of cake. But, I would not RELY on it. Certainly not in a A300 which is what, I believe, we are talking about ?Oh, and, silly boy, we never "built approaches" either ! We did, sometimes "build" vertical profiles which I thought was a recipe for disaster & never did it myself. Bloggs, here is the thing. Read carefully & stop misquoting............now there's a good chap. Stay safe old bean !

[Capn Bloggs]

Nice spray from an old codger, Landflap. Here's the thing, Landflap. My second "quote" was abbreviated, I admit (the overall message being the same), but my first reply (which you have not addressed, or cannot see the difference between a wobbly NPA caused by map shift and the help how modern technology I quoted helps the pilot) still stands:

Originally Posted by Landflap

Trying to make modern technology work in a NON-PRECISION environment has always been a recipe for disaster.

Originally Posted by Bloggs

Nonsense. NPAs are easier than ever, even if you don't have VNAV. Track diamonds, Track Selectors instead of only Heading Select, FPA (can be precisely set to eg 3.28°), Vertical Speed that can be set to the 10ft/min, Autothrottles, big navigation displays showing you and the PM where you are for orientation...

Not to mention, in some countries, Distance/Altitude scales on the charts which remove all of the profile guesswork...

Let me be more clear: I never mentioned map shift, or "build you own" approaches (which, incidentally includes mucking about with the vertical profile as well as putting in your own LNAV path). You are talking about then; I'm talking about now. With no FMS assistance, NPAs are easier now because of the technology available. It does work, and works very well to reduce workload.

Re map shift, I very much doubt whether any authority would allow NPAs to be flown today in non-GPS augmented aeroplanes without stringent monitoring of the raw data, if at all.

[flarepilot]

HAS the NtSB RELEASED FACTUAL DATA AS TO KNOW IF THE PLANE WAS MAKING THE loc/DME APCH OR THE RNAV APCH?

I think all the gadgets in the world really don't make for a better approach than a loc/dme (except of course a real, full ILS)

[A Squared]

My understanding is that they were in the LOC approach, although this thread has been going on for long enough that I don't recall exactly where that info cam from.

[tubby linton]

The NTSB said that the aircraft was flying the LOC approach.

[GlobalNav]

"Re map shift, I very much doubt whether any authority would allow NPAs to be flown today in non-GPS augmented aeroplanes without stringent monitoring of the raw data, if at all."

I don't know about other countries, but the FAA allows an NPA such as BHM LOC 18 the be flown by non-GPS augmented airplanes 365 days of the year, weather and wind permitting.

[BOAC]

I don't know about other countries, but the FAA allows an NPA such as BHM LOC 18 the be flown by non-GPS augmented airplanes 365 days of the year, weather and wind permitting.

- in RNAV without 'raw data'?

[aterpster]

GlobalNav:

I don't know about other countries, but the FAA allows an NPA such as BHM LOC 18 the be flown by non-GPS augmented airplanes 365 days of the year, weather and wind permitting.

Indeed they do. But, more and more they are requiring the VGSI be in sight at night prior to leaving MDA. It's all about obstacles in the FAA-defined visual segment.

[GlobalNav]

Perhaps I misunderstood the original question. All I meant was that GPS or not, RNAV or not, the pilot is required to fly the published procedure, meeting all of the altitude restrictions and other requirements depicted. And of course, in the visual segment the crew is required to comply with 91.175(c) for descent and operation below DH/MDA, as applicable.

For now, we know from the NTSB, citing CVR evidence, that the crew, Captain flying, were using the LOC 18. Until further NTSB revelations from the available data, we are left to wonder why they were so low as they were, below the nominal 3.2 degree vertical path indicated by the PAPI and why they apparently had such a high vertical velocity to generate a "Sink Rate" alert 7 seconds prior to CVR sound of impact.

[flarepilot]

if they were flying the loc/dme apch, why has there been so much mention of RNAV and everything else, GPS etc.

it seems to me that you level off at MDA and either see the runway or not...if not , go around

if you do, you must be aware of visual miscues and constantly cross check everything.

I am sure everyone remembers the L1011 crash in the everglades(everyone occupied with the landing gear position light), I've mentioned it...but if everyone is looking for the runway and no one is minding the instruments, you can fall for a big trap.