UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL
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In your mind these accidents are essentially equivalent?
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Originally Posted by A Squared
You can't imagine that there is any meaningful difference between hitting
rising terrain terrain on final on a non-precision approach when visibility is
limited by it being night and possibly by other meteorological conditions, and stalling into the (flat sea-level) ground, in broad daylight, on a beautiful clear day when there's not a cloud for 100 miles and nothing but a light breeze?
In your mind these accidents are essentially equivalent?
That in itself seems to be enough of a potential root cause in terms of training, following FCTMs and SOPs, etc these days of increasing reliance on automation and reduced emphasis (generally speaking, don't know about UPS) on having/maintaining fundamental skills & airmanship.
Time will tell, and hopefully the investigation results will illuminate us all.
Come on A squared. The allegation is that the Koreans were sledged almost immediately for stacking their aircraft because they were incompetent where there has been no such hint of that about the Birmingham prang.
Err, yes they are. Without prejudging the causes, both crews were put in, or put themselves in, situations that they messed up big-time. While you try to differentiate between the two, a simple old LOC approach to an MDA then a PAPI should have been a walk in the park for a well-trained, current domestic USA freight crew just like a nice-day visual on to SFO 28L should also have been a walk in the park. Neither ended up that way. Teldor's point is that the sledging has been one-way so far.
In your mind these accidents are essentially equivalent?
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Originally Posted by Me
In your mind these accidents are essentially equivalent?
Well, really not a lot more to be said then, other than to note that a person who is unwilling to concede the obvious is probably driven more by ideology than rationality. I've found that discussions which such are usually fruitless.
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Maybe not equivalent (and entirely different operational scenarios and operating philosophies), but commonalities might include be failure to adequately monitor altitude (at relevant distances from airfield/landing RWY) and/or descent rate, which if done would appropriately should have then triggered other appropriate action?
As regards the difference in the nature of the commentary here surrounding the two incidents; at this point, we really do not know what led to the UPS airplane being at that particular location and altitude. The possibilities range from, at one extreme, some sort of erroneous indication which caused the crew to believe that there were above either MDA or VGSI, to at the other extreme, they just sat there not paying attention to things as they descended thru MDA and the PAPI. At this point, we really don't know where the truth lies along that continuum. By contrast, it appears we do know with a fair amount of certainty that the Asiana crew did in fact just sit there as a normally functioning airspeed indicator displayed a lower and lower airspeed, the PAPI turned progressively redder, and the runway moved further and further up in their windshield until they were darn near looking *up* at it, before anyone thought the take action.
Last edited by A Squared; 5th Sep 2013 at 17:32.
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there are known problems in flying...the art , repeat art of flying demands that we know where the traps are.
before I learned to fly, and that was over 38 years ago, ALPA requested that all jet airports have ILS apchs.
The Birmingham crash probably could have been avoided with a better runway and clear area and a full ILS.
The Asiana crash , even if it had the ILS, probably would still happened as the basic requirement of sufficent airspeed was not present.
there...I've said it...any non precision apch in real conditions is more dangerous than a normal ILS apch.
All pilots should learn the traps, memorize them, know the chain of errors (hell with swiss cheese...except on a sandwich)and when they think they are going down the same garden path...get the hell out of there.
before I learned to fly, and that was over 38 years ago, ALPA requested that all jet airports have ILS apchs.
The Birmingham crash probably could have been avoided with a better runway and clear area and a full ILS.
The Asiana crash , even if it had the ILS, probably would still happened as the basic requirement of sufficent airspeed was not present.
there...I've said it...any non precision apch in real conditions is more dangerous than a normal ILS apch.
All pilots should learn the traps, memorize them, know the chain of errors (hell with swiss cheese...except on a sandwich)and when they think they are going down the same garden path...get the hell out of there.
flarepilot;
Re, "there...I've said it...any non precision apch in real conditions is more dangerous than a normal ILS apch."
It's a known fact of aviation and the accident statistics have proven it over and over. One can also see this occuring in FOQA data - non-precision approaches are generally less stabilized.
The great value in this thread has been the wide discussion between those who know their stuff, about RNAV/GNSS and LOC(BC) approach requirements, legalities, traps and techniques as well as personal experiences. Such a discussion cannot but help others who will inevitably face similar circumstances at some point in their career. If I'm somewhat confused by the mix of RNAV & LOC approach techniques and requirements then others must be as well.
One trap I can recall on the DC9 (which had only 1 DME and the 1:3 mental calculation to aid non-precision descents), is the use of DME which is not co-located with the threshold. We became very good and very fast at using the whiz-wheel* for timing and descent rates to MDA, (the +50ft. requirement is a relatively recent change, made ostensibly because pilots were being failed on their PPC/IFR rides for descending below the MDA on a go-around...)
I think this was a rushed, straight-in approach by a crew who quite possibly were at their circadian low point, into rolling, monotone terrain dimly lit only by twilight, a very challenging set of circumstances. As indicated on the chart, the ILS DME was 1.3nm beyond the threshold so part of the examination will take a look at this as part of investigating how the distance-vs.-altitude descent was calculated and handled.
*"whiz-wheel" - plastic, round slideruley thingy often found in the breast pocket of a pilot or less often in a "leather" pouch in a "brain bag" - the device was equipped with "analog scales" upon which could be done manual calculations of remarkable variation and accuracy. The "other side" of the device modelled "trignometric functions" for actual (real-time) wind "calculations" so that the pilot might track between points with some accuracy. One could find true airspeed, density altitude, do pressure-pattern flying and even find distance and track between two points of latitude and longituded when flying the Atlantic and Pacific, verifying what the Doppler and/or the Loran were telling the pilot. The device, manufactured by the historical map-maker Jeppesen and known as a "CR2" and for those who's eyes were challenged, the "CR3" were humourously known as "computers" at the time.
Re, "there...I've said it...any non precision apch in real conditions is more dangerous than a normal ILS apch."
It's a known fact of aviation and the accident statistics have proven it over and over. One can also see this occuring in FOQA data - non-precision approaches are generally less stabilized.
The great value in this thread has been the wide discussion between those who know their stuff, about RNAV/GNSS and LOC(BC) approach requirements, legalities, traps and techniques as well as personal experiences. Such a discussion cannot but help others who will inevitably face similar circumstances at some point in their career. If I'm somewhat confused by the mix of RNAV & LOC approach techniques and requirements then others must be as well.
One trap I can recall on the DC9 (which had only 1 DME and the 1:3 mental calculation to aid non-precision descents), is the use of DME which is not co-located with the threshold. We became very good and very fast at using the whiz-wheel* for timing and descent rates to MDA, (the +50ft. requirement is a relatively recent change, made ostensibly because pilots were being failed on their PPC/IFR rides for descending below the MDA on a go-around...)
I think this was a rushed, straight-in approach by a crew who quite possibly were at their circadian low point, into rolling, monotone terrain dimly lit only by twilight, a very challenging set of circumstances. As indicated on the chart, the ILS DME was 1.3nm beyond the threshold so part of the examination will take a look at this as part of investigating how the distance-vs.-altitude descent was calculated and handled.
*"whiz-wheel" - plastic, round slideruley thingy often found in the breast pocket of a pilot or less often in a "leather" pouch in a "brain bag" - the device was equipped with "analog scales" upon which could be done manual calculations of remarkable variation and accuracy. The "other side" of the device modelled "trignometric functions" for actual (real-time) wind "calculations" so that the pilot might track between points with some accuracy. One could find true airspeed, density altitude, do pressure-pattern flying and even find distance and track between two points of latitude and longituded when flying the Atlantic and Pacific, verifying what the Doppler and/or the Loran were telling the pilot. The device, manufactured by the historical map-maker Jeppesen and known as a "CR2" and for those who's eyes were challenged, the "CR3" were humourously known as "computers" at the time.
Last edited by PJ2; 5th Sep 2013 at 17:22.
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*"whiz-wheel" - plastic, round slideruley thingy often found in the breast pocket of a pilot or less often in a "leather" pouch in a "brain bag" - the device was equipped with "analog scales" upon which could be done manual calculations of remarkable variation and accuracy. The "other side" of the device modelled "trignometric functions" for actual (real-time) wind "calculations" so that the pilot might track between points with some accuracy. One could find true airspeed, density altitude, do pressure-pattern flying and even find distance and track between two points of latitude and longituded when flying the Atlantic and Pacific, verifying what the Doppler and/or the Loran were telling the pilot. The device, manufactured by the historical map-maker Jeppesen and known as a "CR2" and for those who's eyes were challenged, the "CR3" were humourously known as "computers" at the time.
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I know what an E-6B is, in fact I have a partial one on my extremely cool Citizen(R) Navihawk(R) Blue Angels Edition ginormous pilot watch, but I've never heard of a CR-2 or a CR-3. They sound scary.
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I've never heard of a CR-2 or a CR-3. They sound scary.
While we're waiting for further from the NTSB...
On any computing machine,"36" (inner scale) against the groundspeed (outer), find distance (eg., FAF to MAP or threshold) on the outer, read number of seconds on the inner. 36:140 = 90:3.5...thirty-six against 140kts is 90 seconds for three-and-half nautical miles.
For rough rate of descent, (point to point, say, FAF altitude to MDA or MAP altitude), put that number of seconds, (here, '90'), against the height to lose, (say, 1100') and read the rate of descent against the "60" index, (760fpm).
Obviously as with every indication and calculation one has to do a reasonableness check!, and some adjustments and accomodations have to be made, (the 50' thing, which FAF alt & MDA to use, etc), but the method can produce the same numbers as on the Jepp charts.
On the trig side of the CR machine, the "TAS" index can be placed against the groundspeed and one can read the rate of descent for a particular descent path...TAS index against "140", read the rate of descent for a "3deg" descent path against '3' on the "SIN" (inner) scale, which is 760fpm, (the black part of the scale reads "COS"). The SIN scale can also be used to read crosswind component...TAS at the windspeed, xwind component at the offset degrees...30kts, 25deg diff between heading and wind direction is 15kt xwind...etc.
This will all be old-hat to many, but not to everyone. It is sufficiently precise to do the job, (and did until microprocessors came along a few years ago...) and can even be part of the non-precision briefing just as a check on things.
On any computing machine,"36" (inner scale) against the groundspeed (outer), find distance (eg., FAF to MAP or threshold) on the outer, read number of seconds on the inner. 36:140 = 90:3.5...thirty-six against 140kts is 90 seconds for three-and-half nautical miles.
For rough rate of descent, (point to point, say, FAF altitude to MDA or MAP altitude), put that number of seconds, (here, '90'), against the height to lose, (say, 1100') and read the rate of descent against the "60" index, (760fpm).
Obviously as with every indication and calculation one has to do a reasonableness check!, and some adjustments and accomodations have to be made, (the 50' thing, which FAF alt & MDA to use, etc), but the method can produce the same numbers as on the Jepp charts.
On the trig side of the CR machine, the "TAS" index can be placed against the groundspeed and one can read the rate of descent for a particular descent path...TAS index against "140", read the rate of descent for a "3deg" descent path against '3' on the "SIN" (inner) scale, which is 760fpm, (the black part of the scale reads "COS"). The SIN scale can also be used to read crosswind component...TAS at the windspeed, xwind component at the offset degrees...30kts, 25deg diff between heading and wind direction is 15kt xwind...etc.
This will all be old-hat to many, but not to everyone. It is sufficiently precise to do the job, (and did until microprocessors came along a few years ago...) and can even be part of the non-precision briefing just as a check on things.
Interesting discussion on timing on NPAs. Never, in 27 years of jet NPAs have I ever used timing to get to the MDA on-slope. In the brief, we'd agree on a DME distance/Altitude scale (with adjustment for the position of the DME 
). True stabilised approaches/CDAs in the early 80s.
If there was no DME available, we'd simply comply with the chart altitude limits and steam on in at MDA until either we got Visual (circle if necessary) or got to the aid and did a go-around.
). True stabilised approaches/CDAs in the early 80s.If there was no DME available, we'd simply comply with the chart altitude limits and steam on in at MDA until either we got Visual (circle if necessary) or got to the aid and did a go-around.
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Back in the day, I used a number of tricks to back off an MDA and timing to make a visual descent point.
I would explain how easy it was and how well it worked...plus using 5 times your groundspeed for a descent rate from the visual descent point to make the runway.
Indeed JEPP even published VDPs
But since the world now has every gadget in the world, why should I tell you.
But it worked great...a simple, very simple formula to reduce timing to the MAP to find a VDP...
oh, back then we flew the plane too. and the jets went faster cuz gas was cheaper.
I would explain how easy it was and how well it worked...plus using 5 times your groundspeed for a descent rate from the visual descent point to make the runway.
Indeed JEPP even published VDPs
But since the world now has every gadget in the world, why should I tell you.
But it worked great...a simple, very simple formula to reduce timing to the MAP to find a VDP...
oh, back then we flew the plane too. and the jets went faster cuz gas was cheaper.
OK465;
In my view the transition isn't maligned in discussions on basic techniques. That, and the bottom line, 'knowing your aircraft', a principle with which I strongly agree, are both reinforced in these discussions.
The A320/A330/A340 have superb LNAV/VNAV modes and performed ADF/VOR/LOC(BC)/LOC Only and RNAV approaches beautifully and reliably when flown with full comprehension of the system and the aircraft. For those without that kind of equipment, anything and any knowledge that contributes to enhanced situational awareness which reduces the risk of NPAs is not maligning technical change but ensuring correct, good use of available technology including 'the basics'.
Those who wish for the good old DC3/DC8/DC9 days and dismiss automation as a 'wrong turn', wishing for the standard 'T' instrument arrangement are the ones doing the maligning because the notion of "just tools in the kit" can't be differentiated from "the magic (and economics) of automation".
When you have airlines putting in their published SOPs that, "It is anticipated that the autopilot will be engaged immediately after takeoff and disconnected on the landing roll", it is the air carrier's management that is misunderstanding and therefore maligning automation's true utility.
It has taken a quarter of a century for this industry to acknowledge what we as pilots said regarding automation when the A320 first came out - that continued ability to hand-fly and remain "in-touch" with the machine is an absolute requirement. That principle has not been served well, as we both know.
Given the changing nature of accidents since the 60's and 70's, my own view is that perhaps others may, but I don't really consider the present sidebar discussion "maligning" the current technical transition.
There's the maligned ongoing technological transition period underway, as usual.
The bottom line being....it will come down to 'knowing your aircraft'....the current one, not the one folks flew 30 years ago.
The bottom line being....it will come down to 'knowing your aircraft'....the current one, not the one folks flew 30 years ago.
The A320/A330/A340 have superb LNAV/VNAV modes and performed ADF/VOR/LOC(BC)/LOC Only and RNAV approaches beautifully and reliably when flown with full comprehension of the system and the aircraft. For those without that kind of equipment, anything and any knowledge that contributes to enhanced situational awareness which reduces the risk of NPAs is not maligning technical change but ensuring correct, good use of available technology including 'the basics'.
Those who wish for the good old DC3/DC8/DC9 days and dismiss automation as a 'wrong turn', wishing for the standard 'T' instrument arrangement are the ones doing the maligning because the notion of "just tools in the kit" can't be differentiated from "the magic (and economics) of automation".
When you have airlines putting in their published SOPs that, "It is anticipated that the autopilot will be engaged immediately after takeoff and disconnected on the landing roll", it is the air carrier's management that is misunderstanding and therefore maligning automation's true utility.
It has taken a quarter of a century for this industry to acknowledge what we as pilots said regarding automation when the A320 first came out - that continued ability to hand-fly and remain "in-touch" with the machine is an absolute requirement. That principle has not been served well, as we both know.
Given the changing nature of accidents since the 60's and 70's, my own view is that perhaps others may, but I don't really consider the present sidebar discussion "maligning" the current technical transition.
Last edited by PJ2; 6th Sep 2013 at 07:10.
Well said, PJ2, as usual.
I want to clarify that I have been telling what we did in the past. I am quite happy that my current steed does auto-NPAs as well as the rest, but I also keep current in the old ways in case the box has a fit.
I also believe that timed descents/calculated VS are not the best way to do NPAs if you do not have VNAV, but, horses for courses, there are a few ways to skin a cat.
I doubt it; GS capture would mean speed with thrust, not pitch, which appears to be their undoing.
I want to clarify that I have been telling what we did in the past. I am quite happy that my current steed does auto-NPAs as well as the rest, but I also keep current in the old ways in case the box has a fit.
I also believe that timed descents/calculated VS are not the best way to do NPAs if you do not have VNAV, but, horses for courses, there are a few ways to skin a cat.
The Asiana crash , even if it had the ILS, probably would still happened as the basic requirement of sufficent airspeed was not present.