AF 447 Thread No. 11
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 67
Posts: 1,777
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In the case of the previous UAS incidents involving Airbus widebodies, their remit only extended as far as the host nations would allow - and none of them demanded action over and above that which was being done prior to AF447.
These nine cases involve Thales AA probes.
Company Air France
Nation : France
Aircraft registered in France
BEA : French investigation agency
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: France - mostly
Age: 84
Posts: 1,682
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
CONF iture:
Thanks for your correction and other observations. You've convinced me that "Prend ça" is probably not referring to the ISIS.
V/S exceeded 6000 fpm at approximately 02:11:31 and the PF's remark about the vario was at 02:11:58.
Thanks for your correction and other observations. You've convinced me that "Prend ça" is probably not referring to the ISIS.
V/S exceeded 6000 fpm at approximately 02:11:31 and the PF's remark about the vario was at 02:11:58.
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 3rd Jul 2013 at 07:14. Reason: typo
Join Date: Sep 2009
Location: Around the World
Age: 74
Posts: 87
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From May 2008 to March 2009, nine incidents (UAS) of icing of the Pitot probes are recorded on the A340/A330 fleet of Air France.
AF 330/340 PHC logic had been modified since summer 2008 (p12-13, 16, 34)
Remember the A340 TANA flight event - august 2008 (ASR - FGNIH AF908 CDG - TNR - ALARME STALL ET PERTE DES INDICATIONS DE VITESSE SUR LES PFD).
Last edited by Jetdriver; 3rd Jul 2013 at 12:31.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From May 2008 to March 2009, nine incidents (UAS) of icing of the Pitot probes are recorded on the A340/A330 fleet of Air France.
These nine cases involve Thales AA probes.
Company Air France
Nation : France
Aircraft registered in France
BEA : French investigation agency
These nine cases involve Thales AA probes.
Company Air France
Nation : France
Aircraft registered in France
BEA : French investigation agency
@Neofit: No, it's probably not a coincidence, but it's a stretch to claim that there was anything nefarious to the change. Note that the document doesn't specify what the change was - perhaps a temperature boost, perhaps an extension to the amount of time the heat is cycled on.
That document (via electronic translation) reads to me like it has the fingerprints of the SNPL all over it, with the same old arguments against the Airbus FBW layout that they've been using since the '80s. It also implies early on that the BEA report lays responsibility for the accident with the crew, when in fact it does no such thing.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 3rd Jul 2013 at 17:02.
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 67
Posts: 1,777
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
UAS was considered a relatively minor problem by the industry as a whole.
Industry = profit
BEA -EASA = safety
The industry was playing her game ... what about the BEA and EASA
I'm certain that some questions about the BEA and EASA will popup at the trial .. and maybe it will be answers ..
Last edited by jcjeant; 3rd Jul 2013 at 16:18.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As far as I'm concerned accident investigation agencies are still part of the industry. What concerns me is why you're singling out the BEA when they are far from the only agency that encountered the problem.
Also, investigative agencies tend to have a more peripheral role in non-fatal incidents. It's the recommendations of agencies with a broader remit, such as EASA, that tend to carry the weight - and they in turn hash out solutions with the manufacturers and the airlines.
It's important not to lose sight of the fact that the UAS situation triggered by the pitot tubes was simply the initiating factor. Far more central to the case is the question of why crews were insufficiently trained to handle such a situation, and a proper investigation into human factors - namely how a qualified pilot could become so overwhelmed by the situation that they do precisely the wrong thing consistently from onset to impact.
Re: the legal proceedings - call me cynical, but if I want the truth then the last person I'd expect to get it from is a lawyer. In fact most of the misinformation and scuttlebutt regarding Airbus has originated from within the legal profession via the news media.
Also, investigative agencies tend to have a more peripheral role in non-fatal incidents. It's the recommendations of agencies with a broader remit, such as EASA, that tend to carry the weight - and they in turn hash out solutions with the manufacturers and the airlines.
It's important not to lose sight of the fact that the UAS situation triggered by the pitot tubes was simply the initiating factor. Far more central to the case is the question of why crews were insufficiently trained to handle such a situation, and a proper investigation into human factors - namely how a qualified pilot could become so overwhelmed by the situation that they do precisely the wrong thing consistently from onset to impact.
Re: the legal proceedings - call me cynical, but if I want the truth then the last person I'd expect to get it from is a lawyer. In fact most of the misinformation and scuttlebutt regarding Airbus has originated from within the legal profession via the news media.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 3rd Jul 2013 at 16:58.
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 67
Posts: 1,777
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It's important not to lose sight of the fact that the UAS situation triggered by the pitot tubes was simply the initiating factor. Far more central to the case is the question of why crews were insufficiently trained to handle such a situation, and a proper investigation into human factors - namely how a qualified pilot could become so overwhelmed by the situation that they do precisely the wrong thing consistently from onset to impact.
UAS was considered a relatively minor problem by the industry as a whole.
A extra training was put in force "after" the accident .. as contrary of the general idea .. the UAS is no more considered as a "minor problem"
Note that some had warn long before the AF447 case that a UAS was not a "minor problem"
Last edited by jcjeant; 3rd Jul 2013 at 20:17.
Originally Posted by Landflap
Good grief, tell us which joyous planet you live on !
Look, get back to proper, selected, pilot training & teach the guys & gals at the sharp end to FLY out of problems.
After more than 40 years so positive experience in Military planes , it is time to teach HUD flying in civilian airline world.
Gyrolasers have proved their liability in Space navigation too... It is great time to fly with inertial informations as basic information
PFD as spare
Civilian pilots are still using the very old concepts to fly without visibility or transitioning instrument/visual leading to crashes by bad piloting AND management.
How do you impress it upon aircraft commanders that leaving the flight deck for a snooze as you are entering one of the most dangerous weather zones on the planet may not be the best idea?
How do you ensure that every possible fault scenario has been thoroughly anticipated so that proper procedures and training can be put in place to allow pilots to deal with them effectively and safely?
What can you put in place to give relatively inexperienced pilots enough reserve in the tank so that when a challenging situation is presented, their actions aren't detrimental to the result?
b) train pilots so they are competent even when low houred.
What do you think real world does?
These are all very complex questions that don't offer simple solutions.
So in other words, while we'd all like to think it can't happen again
For all that we have advanced in aviation equipment, procedures and training, predicitive engineering is still an infant in this game.
Why do airlines think it is OK to use less and less experienced pilots?
For example; the sort of pilot who has no experience of "real" aircraft, say turbo prop twins, that they think it is reasonable to hold full back stick/yoke in a stall situation
It is always going to be a work in progress, and (certainly in my lifetime) never likely to eliminate error or failure.
First and fore most you can't name ONE accident that experience wouldn't have prevented and does on a daily basis.
So much for the experience being panacea for all flying ills.
Over and over, we see a plane go down and say 'he should have done that' and it's the same old thing, over and over. If they had hired a pilot and not a checklist reader, buddy or a pal, everyone would be alive.
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: United States
Posts: 14
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My question was not looking for someone to blame for AF447, but trying to analyze the root causes of that crash as they would apply towards the future of aviation, that will have hundreds of passengers flying one-pilot, then no-pilot craft.
AF447 involved a plane that did not correctly represent it's state of having failed airspeed sensors followed by the deep stall to the pilots. The airline never trained it's pilots to recognize and address such a scenario, and the pilots never correctly deciphered the contradictory information at their disposal.
While blame can be attributed to the Airplane manufacturer, the airline, and the crew, blame should not be viewed as something to react against (unless you are a lawyer) as much as it should be freely discussed and used as a stepping stone to prepare for the future, which will undoubtedly see unmanned airliners giving us better reliability and cheaper flights.
AF447 involved a plane that did not correctly represent it's state of having failed airspeed sensors followed by the deep stall to the pilots. The airline never trained it's pilots to recognize and address such a scenario, and the pilots never correctly deciphered the contradictory information at their disposal.
While blame can be attributed to the Airplane manufacturer, the airline, and the crew, blame should not be viewed as something to react against (unless you are a lawyer) as much as it should be freely discussed and used as a stepping stone to prepare for the future, which will undoubtedly see unmanned airliners giving us better reliability and cheaper flights.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: what U.S. calls ´old Europe´
Posts: 941
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
While blame can be attributed to the Airplane manufacturer, the airline, and the crew, blame should not be viewed as something to react against (unless you are a lawyer) as much as it should be freely discussed and used as a stepping stone to prepare for the future, which will undoubtedly see unmanned airliners giving us better reliability and cheaper flights.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The airline never trained it's pilots to recognize and address such a scenario
...the future, which will undoubtedly see unmanned airliners giving us better reliability and cheaper flights.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: what U.S. calls ´old Europe´
Posts: 941
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The airline never trained it's pilots to recognize and address such a scenario
Check the previous threads - a UAS procedure was part of the documentation supplied to airlines.
Check the previous threads - a UAS procedure was part of the documentation supplied to airlines.
So was the UAS procedure part of the crew training at AF?
Did that particular crew went through UAS procedure training?
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: West of Offa's dyke
Age: 88
Posts: 476
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So was the procedure supplied, or were the pilots trained or both? You might very well both be right. Just having a new procedure in the books does not mean that the pilots know (and understand!) it.
So was the UAS procedure part of the crew training at AF?
Did that particular crew went through UAS procedure training?
So was the UAS procedure part of the crew training at AF?
Did that particular crew went through UAS procedure training?
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: W of 30W
Posts: 1,916
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by AZR
Hard fact.
Full data to the families.
Guess.
(based on a very vague word: "ça"/"that", BTW)
(based on a very vague word: "ça"/"that", BTW)
The same way, you and the BEA are not interested in the Wiring ACARS MSG.
You may repeat it at lenght (which you do, lately), but without adding hard facts and/or logical patterns, I doubt many will change their mind to embrace your view.
If AZR had been a close friend of mine and on that flight deck, I know where my priority would go before blindly accepting his condemnation, get the full data, go to the hard facts.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The problem is, the more I look at the document purported to be on behalf of the families, the more it looks like your standard SNPL hatchet job, and I have to wonder if the SNPL have loaned the group their legal team for their own purposes.
They're not interested in the truth, they are interested in maximising the potential for civil action against those with the biggest pockets (namely Airbus and AF). The SNPL take great pleasure in smearing Airbus at any opportunity, so there's a degree of mutual interest there...
They're not interested in the truth, they are interested in maximising the potential for civil action against those with the biggest pockets (namely Airbus and AF). The SNPL take great pleasure in smearing Airbus at any opportunity, so there's a degree of mutual interest there...
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If it's a diversion, then why does the document diverge into talk of conventional controls (with regard to stick-shaker), and erroneously claim that the BEA report puts the responsibility for the accident with the crew (which it does not)?