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AF 447 Thread No. 11

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AF 447 Thread No. 11

Old 17th Nov 2013, 20:17
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Thanks, JT. Was wondering how we got that except is does concern the alpha "protections" and such.

Glad to see a few that "believe" in a decent AoA indication that could have the "limit" AoA clearly marked for the pilot. The ones I flew really helped on approaches. You could compare the alpha with the calculated approach speed for your weight and configuration. Simple procedure and helped a lot on short fields and such.

Ditto for a basic HUD. I do not understand the "HUD resistance" here by several heavy pilots that seem to tolerate MFD's that are crowded with data and tapes and.... From my time in two great jets with HUD's, I truly believe the AF pilots would have seen what was coming before they went thru the stall envelope. Especially so if an AoA indication was there "hooked" to the flight path vector. And remember that the flight path vector is independent of any air data, so frozen or stuck aero sensors are non-players.

Such inexpensive displays that "help" pilots at low cost and not millions of lines of code and..... And still thinking about Asiana in this regard.
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Old 17th Nov 2013, 21:13
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A33Zab,

Thanks for correcting me.

Last edited by HazelNuts39; 17th Nov 2013 at 21:41.
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Old 18th Nov 2013, 04:41
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As a matter of fact, our pioneer FBW system did not have a stall or AoA warning.

We had a "slow speed" warning based on aero data if below 120 knots with gear up. Otherwise nothing. The limiters ( called "protections" by the 'bus community) were active for AoA all the time if weight off wheels. In short, we could "pull" as much as we wanted, but the FBW system limited our max AoA depending on configuration. Didn't care about airspeed if gear up or WoW switch not compressed.

I never worried about ":floors" or "protect" or any of that. Just flew like we used to when the Earth was still cooling and everything worked out, except it was very hard to stall.
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Old 18th Nov 2013, 06:59
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gums said : " Ditto for a basic HUD. I do not understand the "HUD resistance" here "

I already gave the link but it seems ppruners did not search it. The text is from the MIT about the HUD presented par the courageous French test pilot and test engineer, professor at Ecole Supérieure d'Aéronautique Gilbert KLOPFSTEIN†
Originally Posted by MIT 1972
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Charles Stark Draper Laboratory

MEMORANDUM

TO: Distribution FROM: Dunbar. C. Collins DATE: 20 october 1972 SUBJECT: Demonstration of the French Thomson - CSF, All Weather Approach and Landing Monitor (TC-121) Heads Up Display

On September 25, 1972 a technical presentation and flight demonstration of the subject system was given to interested MIT personnel by Mr. G. Klopfstein, Engineer in Chief of a technical mission from Ecole Nationale Superieure De L'Aeronautique of France.

The mission crew has been demonstrating the system in a French Nord 262 twin-engine turbo prop for the past month to pilots/engineers of USAF, FAA,NASA, Pan American, and the like.

MIT attendees were:

J. Nevins* C. Collins* (Pilot A) I. Johnson* J. Dunbar* (Pilot B) M. Connelly* J. Allen* G. Edmonds* B. DeWolf* A. Chavlagon J. Sciegienny N. Polner I. Levin

*Participated in flight demonstration

Technical Presentation (approx. 1 1/2 hours): Mr. Klopfstein discussed the systems design philosophy, derived the desired display parameters and generally described the system’s hardware elements, performance capabilities and operating techniques. Unfortunately, time did not permit a detailed technical description or discuss ion of system performance. Mr. Klopfstein promised that this data would be transmitted to us. When it is it will be circulated to the interested parties.

This system presents a novel solution to the problem of displaying to a pilot, in a simple manner, all the necessary para* meters for achieving trajectory control without exceeding the aircraft operational constraints.

It was shown that relatively few parameters, i.e., flight path angle, angle of attack and energy margin indication can provide more useful information than many parameters normally displayed (pitch attitude, rate of climb, RPM, power ratio, airspeed, etc.).

The advantages cited were simplicity and reliability which provide ease of training, safety during emergencies, improved cruise flight control and marked improvement in landing performances, i.e., a reduction in landing point dispersion from 600 meters to 60 meters in evaluation flights by a French test group.

Manual control with this system is reported to be as accurate as automatic control in all weather conditions in cruise, landing or taxi operations.

Some points resolved in the presentation were:

1. The primary inputs for trajectory control and energy management can be provided by a vertical gyro for pitch angle, a local angle of attack sensor (linear relationship to true a) and vehicle X, Z axis accelerometers. These are the elements of the CV91 visual guidance display. Fig. 1 shows the CV91 “black box”. The system reportedly sells for approx. $10 000. The VOR-Localizer capture function requires additional ILS inputs, radio altitude, heading and roll angle which are embodied in the TC121 display.

2. The system is self corrective for headwind component during final landing approach but a curved flight path trajectory results. This may be avoided by manual compensation (holding velocity vector up - runway for headwind) or by setting a console control to the value of the reported wind to bias the velocity vector marker.

3. Pilot induced oscillations are minimized in that flight path angle response to pitch inputs is a smooth first order curve.

4. The angle of attack display provides much better lift control than that achieved through an airspeed display. Angle of attack is measured more accurately than airspeed and also eye discrimination of 1/20° can be attained with the collimated display.

5. Minimum landing point dispersion and consistent touch-down velocity is best achieved with a two-slope trajectory, one of 2 –3° and a final of 0,6 –1.0°.

Operations oriented descriptions of the TC 121 and CV9l are contained in the Thomson - CSF brochures available from J. Nevins, Ext. 8-1347. Selected excerpts from these brochures are attached. A written transcript of the technical presentation has been promised to MIT.

Flight Demonstration (approx. 1 1/2 hours): Two flights were made to enable the MIT pilots to evaluate the system and to provide a TV monitor of the TC12l pilots display for a number of observers. A 20minute warm-up/alignment of the inertial system was required prior to the first flight and a 1 to 2 minute hold for realignment during the ramp stop, engines running, between flights. The inertial system used for this demonstration is also used in French fighter aircraft and is classified.

Cockpit configuration of the system displays included:

a. A linear scale instrument, located in the cockpit, which displayed flight path angle and potential flight path angle markers against a calibrated pitch scale. (fig. 3)

b. A co-pilot station, glare shield mounted CV 91 visual guidance display (Fig. 3, shown in retracted position).

The CV 91 is used to facilitate visual approach on runways without glide path facilities.

Symbology:

The flight path marker is manually set to a desired flight path angle by means of a selector switch on the center console. There were no angle calibrations on the display, nor horizon. The size of the cross is a reference value.

c. A pilot station, overhead-mounted, all weather TC 121 Heads Up Display. This station was off limits to guest pilots due to possible collision of HEAD and HUD.

The procedure followed was to demonstrate the bas ic concepts of the system on the linear instrument and then to familiarize each pilot with the control-display response of the CV 91 from the co-pilot' s seat.

The pilot varied power, lowered flaps, dropped the gear and simulated engine failure to demonstrate ease of energy management. In each case the lowering of gp marker supplied a simple, natural cue for response. i.e. increase power if available or lower g marker by pitching down until g and gp are aligned. The MIT pilots easily established climbs and descents at selected angles and adjusted power accordingly for energy equilibrium (T = D).

Although overshoot of power settings was noted on the display the changes in configuration and trajectory were accomplished with little airspeed variation (1 to 2 knots).

Pilot induced oscillations appeared minimal.

Control of velocity vector was simple and positive. Angle of attack control by power management was also exercised and found to be easily performed. The use of the velocity vector as an aiming device was also demonstrated during a descent through clouds by pointing it at a hole, and following through. The same principle can be applied in mountainous terrain.

An ILS approach and landing on Runway 11 was demonstrated by the pilot. Surface wind was approx. 240/15 Kt. Subsequent landings by MIT pilots were made on Runway 29.

The primary pilot tasks were:

1. Accomplish turn on to final approach

2. Establish glide path by holding velocity vector on the runway threshold (glide-path pre-set to 2 ½° )

3. Make heading corrections to align flight path with runway center line (strictly visual) .

4. Adjust power to approx. align gp and velocity vector,

5. Keep angle of attack within reasonable limits.

6. Cut power fully at pilots command (approx. 60 ft. altitude) and flare by pitching up to align velocity vector with far end of runway.

7. Maintain direction and velocity vector aim point until touchdown.

First approach (pilot B) was flared too early and touchdown was attempted by the standard method of “feeling for the runway”. The touch-and-go landing was completed by the pilot.

Two More approaches were made with the CV 91 used for both glide path and flare. Both touchdowns were smooth with landing point as targeted.

Pilot A then made 4 approaches and landings with consistently good results.

The system really facilitates the visual approach - there is no unnecessary jockeying of controls or preoccupation with altitude, airspeed, rate of descent, power setting, etc.

The aircraft was very stable.

Crosswind was no problem.

The CV 91 display brightness was adequate for the variations in background encountered, mainly cloudy with fair to poor visibility. Brightness is adjustable. The field of view, a 90 mm pupil, seemed adequate. There was no vibration and no appreciable obstruction of forward view.

The format is simple and easy to interpret.

Although we would have preferred to fly the TC l2l display to view the more complete symbology, we feel that the CV 91 flight adequately demonstrated the basic concepts.

It is suggested that altitude below 1000 feet be displayed digitally in 10s of feet similar to the flight path angle display on the TC121.

In summary, the system offers a number of advantages. It provides an on-board capability for making precision (visual) approaches to non-instrumental landing sites. It provides flight performance cues which do not exist in the ordinary flight director attitude displays. It has particular value for off-nominal flight conditions, i.e. in the event of an engine failure the pilot has the cues to enable him to immediately assume the proper pitch attitude which will result in the best engine-out climb speed. It may have great value in application to the military tactical environment in a forward area where a minimum amount of navigational and landing aids would be available, It certainly is an excellent prototype flight test tool.

Distribution

Attendees plus R. Duffy H. Hagan N. Sears H. Trueblood D. Fraser P. Felleman Prof. T. Sheridan Prof. P. Whitaker Prof. R. Curry
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Old 18th Nov 2013, 10:59
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@ventus45

What I found shocked me.
What exactly shocked you?
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Old 18th Nov 2013, 19:48
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HUDs

Boeing 737-800 ILS HUD Landing


I believe this is the BAE System's HUD. Although the camera is shaky, the HUD contains all the seemingly important instrument information (nearly 60 pieces of information is presented) while looking out the windscreen. The symbology pretty much matches the heads down primary display. Alaska Airlines, and some Southwest and American 737s have HUDs, but maybe not all aircraft are equipped.
HUDs are standard equipment on the Boeing 787s, both LH and RH seats.
As I understand it, the idea is for the PF to look through the center of the HUD and fly the flight path symbol, but incorporate the side displays in his periphery vision as to how they maybe changing.
I am not sure an installed HUD would have been the answer at the KSFO Asiana landing without an operating ILS system, but a VMC approach mode might be available on the HUD, but flight path only indication.
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Old 18th Nov 2013, 20:13
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Brit, Oz, NZ? (they all sound the same to me )....

But in any case whoever it is has opted for the AOA display.
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Old 18th Nov 2013, 20:30
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OK465,

They are all US airlines.
Alaska Airlines were very proactive on HUDs because of the weather conditions (poor visibility) experienced on their routes among other reasons.
You noticed the AoA display!
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Old 18th Nov 2013, 20:44
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Listen again.

Notice the flashing AIII....the mode they eventually reverted to is the default IMC mode, lowest mode level, and is the same mode that would be in use during visual VMC approaches or NPAs, though without necessarily the ILS capture they have.

Something's not tuned or selected compatibly with AIII moding.
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Old 18th Nov 2013, 20:59
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HN39
The whole issue is somewhat trivial compared to the need to avoid getting to an AoA of 42,5 degrees in the first place.
Seems to be a wetware issue, not a hardware issue, nor a software issue.

Also true, and not just for an A330.
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Old 18th Nov 2013, 21:26
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OK465,
You are correct .
I thinking the AIII mode flashes when it is available but not selected. I also think in the video they switched to the IMC mode to reduce clutter.
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Old 18th Nov 2013, 22:09
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Thanks for the graphics, Turbine.

As with modifications of the military HUD symbology, I feel they are trying to portray too much info, and some will be overwhelmed by trying to keep up with all the stuff. So I prefer "de-clutter" options and a simple glance at basic gauges as part of the cross check.

I include a video that has lessons for the Asiana crew. If you don't have Quicktime, there are free viewers out there. So download and view at your leisure. The incident was "severe" structural problem, so I flew a very high approach speed ( about 30-40 knots above normal) and made a shallow approach to avoid a normal "flare". I didn't get slow like Asiana, but we shared too low of an approach angle and it almost bit me. But using a bit of power I corrected at the end and made it to the end of the runway. In that configuration you lose roll authority if getting slow and/or pulling back for touchdown. So actually seeing your "impact" point with the velocity vector can really help. just looking thru the windshield might not be enuff.

Reason for the approach is this:



Video is here, and note last 30 seconds of the approach.

http://www.sluf.org/warbirds/lef-landing.m4v

Confirmed user and believer of the HUD.
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Old 18th Nov 2013, 23:36
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Recognising Attitude

Quotes from Clandestino (Nov 15), replying to my post of Oct 25 -

(1) "I'm sorry Chris, if my caustic style caused you to believe I was going for a cheap shot here. To make my position clear: I do not find any of the theories that there was anything remotely rational in CM2's action and it was just misunderstanding and misapplication on his part plausible. He meant just to return to altitude? He busted it by a couple of thousand feet."

It's not your position I took issue with (on the contrary) - merely your misinterpretation of mine. My suggestion of an initial "knee-jerk" reaction implies, by definition, an absence of rationality. Explanation is not justification.

(2) "Again: issue with AF447 is not the pilot unable to handfly the aeroplane; it was pilot unable to understand the situation, implication of his actions and pretty precisely handflying just the wrong way..."

So he handflew in the wrong way, but not because he was unable to handfly? He knew that he wanted to maintain altitude but felt it necessary to keep pulling back on the stick to achieve such?

(3) "Nothing of it can be prevented by practising eye-to-hand coordination in friendly skies."

I could not disagree more. All that needed to be done in AF447 was to keep the wings level, and MAINTAIN a suitable pitch attitude and thrust for high-altitude cruise. If you are accustomed to monitoring and understanding your a/c in all flight phases, you may learn ball-park figures even without ever disengaging the AP. But there are at least two snags to that as a policy.

Firstly, you will not learn the very gentleness of any corrections that need to be made on the side-stick if you unexpectedly find yourself without the AP at high altitude. (Rather like driving a car at over 200 kph.) Secondly, human nature means that hands-on practice concentrates the mind in a way that mere observation does not. (The seat-of-the pants sensation when you over-control the stick concentrates it even more.)

The ball-park figures for PITCH attitude in different flight phases soon sink in, particularly if you turn off the FD, crew workload permitting. That's why you need to do it in your "friendly skies". The numbers may be something very roughly like the following, but you will soon learn them for your particular Airbus:
Cruise = +2.5; Step-climb on schedule (initially) = +4 (~1200ft/min); Descent at idle (initially) = -1; Low altitude Hold (level) at about Green-Dot speed = +5; Level flight Flaps 1 "S" speed (i.e., slats only) = +8; 3-degree glide-slope at the same speed and config = ...?

(4) "Also this kind of reaction is very rare and trying to present AF447 as typical of the current state of affairs is misinformed at the best."

Well, I agree that the three main L.O.C. cases we have been discussing the last few months have involved different pilot reactions to problems in the cruise, but all have been seriously deficient:
A340 AIRPROX - no sidestick action for about 17 seconds during an FBW-induced, undesired zoom-climb;
AF447 - consistent back-stick causing a zoom-climb until and after the a/c entered a super stall;
AF A340 (Serious Incident, 2011) - inappropriate back-stick, causing AP to disengage, and initiating a zoom-climb that exceeded +2G twice, stalling the a/c.

(5) "...both AF447 and AA965 are subsets of the same archetype of accidents: pilots who find themselves on unfamiliar territory, are unable to recognize where they are and how to return to normal..."

Quite. And, as you imply, this is not a problem unique to Airbuses, nor even to fly-by-wire.

Last edited by Chris Scott; 19th Nov 2013 at 11:17. Reason: Title added
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Old 19th Nov 2013, 04:05
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Pilots without jet experience have to undergo ELT MCC as part of Airbus type rating where Absolute raw data flying without ATHR, AP, FD, FPV is taught.It includes executing SIDs,Arrivals,Approach and landings. Out of eight sessions 6 are to be flown manually. So 447 pilots were not strangers to raw data flying.
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Old 19th Nov 2013, 10:48
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Hello vilas,

That's good news as far as it goes. But if hand flying raw-data - with and without FPV, and with and without A/THR - is limited to your first jet conversion - which is a very intensive experience, covering a bewilderingly wide sylabus of unfamiliar exercises and new technical concepts - the learning curve you climbed during those six sessions will fade away unless your airline sanctions the disengagement of different combinations of automatics at suitable times during revenue flights. Frankly, simulator time is now so expensive that it would be unrealistic to expect airlines to schedule it during recurrents - unless it was combined with other failure exercises.

During the first few years as a copilot you slowly adapt to the demands of the routine chores, and much of what was covered in the conversion is gradually forgotten. That is particularly unfortunate if you happen to be on long-haul, and lucky to get your one landing a month. Six-monthly checks are formalised, and the areas to be covered in the next programme are promulgated in advance for study and discussion. Apart from the mandatory items, such as rejected T/O and EFTO, the exercises tend to revolve around the complexities of systems failures. In the LOFT exercises, use of automatics during problem-solving tends (rightly) to be emphasised. There is little or no "fat" in the simulator schedule to permit ad-hoc flying practice for youngsters (or the oldies).

In line operations, the selective withdrawal of automatics I'm advocating is done at the captain's discretion, and with prior agreement. It should not be done at times when PNF workload is already high, which of course is more likely when one of the pilots is relatively inexperienced. It would not be programmed, formalised, or recorded; just regarded as a routine interlude of enjoyable self-development for the PF.

My perception is that the above is frowned upon in many airlines.

PS
What the is "ELT MCC"? Too much jargon, vilas! Jargon is what professionals use when they are trying to withhold understanding from lay people, and impress newbees...

Last edited by Chris Scott; 19th Nov 2013 at 12:10. Reason: PS added.
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Old 19th Nov 2013, 11:12
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I mentioned before that UAS procedure was/is not given due recognition as a likely scenario. Even now it is more of Demo during type rating and rarely practiced thereafter. In 447 they did not apply correct procedure. Regular practice of raw data no doubt will increase confidence but ignorance of UAS procedure may not save the situation.
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Old 19th Nov 2013, 11:36
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vilas,

I think PJ2 illustrated here some time ago that the Airbus UAS procedure was confusing; even potentially misleading. One hopes it has now been clarified.

Pilots need to understand better the basic mechanics of how their a/c fly. I'm not talking about complex aerodynamics. For example, if you pitch your a/c up 5 degrees in the cruise, it will soon start to climb at that angle (before it slows down appreciably). That's about 4000 ft/min initially. Do youngsters realise things like that nowadays?

Last edited by Chris Scott; 19th Nov 2013 at 12:09. Reason: Last 2 sentences added.
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Old 19th Nov 2013, 11:49
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That's exactly what is taught in Entree Level/MCC training. Thrust attitude thumb rules for climb cruise descent and configuration changes are given. Differrent manuevres are practiced and finally approach/GAs are practiced.
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Old 19th Nov 2013, 12:13
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And how is this useful practice and instruction to be consolidated?
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Old 19th Nov 2013, 17:13
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Originally Posted by Chris Scott
During the first few years as a copilot you slowly adapt to the demands of the routine chores, and much of what was covered in the conversion is gradually forgotten. That is particularly unfortunate if you happen to be on long-haul, and lucky to get your one landing a month. Six-monthly checks are formalised, and the areas to be covered in the next programme are promulgated in advance for study and discussion. Apart from the mandatory items, such as rejected T/O and EFTO, the exercises tend to revolve around the complexities of systems failures. In the LOFT exercises, use of automatics during problem-solving tends (rightly) to be emphasised. There is little or no "fat" in the simulator schedule to permit ad-hoc flying practice for youngsters (or the oldies).
Very well said, Chris.

Originally Posted by Chris Scott
In line operations, the selective withdrawal of automatics I'm advocating is done at the captain's discretion, and with prior agreement. It should not be done at times when PNF workload is already high, which of course is more likely when one of the pilots is relatively inexperienced. It would not be programmed, formalised, or recorded; just regarded as a routine interlude of enjoyable self-development for the PF.

My perception is that the above is frowned upon in many airlines.
Even better-said!!

And I think that there are primarily 2 reasons for what we see today.

First – airlines are in the business of making money – and, as almost anyone can understand, training does not make money … it only costs – and those costs are both direct (instructor salaries, salaries of students, equipment and facilities costs, etc.) and indirect (loss of line flying – which is the only source of income, transportation costs of moving the “students” into and back home from the training site, costs of per diem, lodging, etc.).

Second – airlines are loathe to provide more training than is required by the regulations. Why? Certainly cost is a significant driver, but I’m of the opinion that conducting training beyond what is required by rule could be seen by some as management recognition, or at least suspicion, of the existence of a sub-par capability, attitude, or ability on the part of existing crewmembers. So, simply by having regulatory required standards, lessens the willingness of some to continue to provide training beyond that required by rules. Some airlines in the US have adopted training under what has been described by the regulators as a voluntary program which has a unique characteristic … and that characteristic is taking advantage of building a training program with “alternative” training goals, “alternative” standards, and uses “alternative” training equipment, which can be extended to “alternatively approved” intervals. Personally, I think this situation is one that has resulted in airlines being able to save significant amounts of money, prompting the appropriate industry training managers to go to great lengths to compliment the regulatory authority for such “forward thinking” … which, of course, does not hurt the professional aspirations of those few regulatory officials ultimately responsible for such authorizations. The problem is, as I see it – and I’m not alone - is that having multiple sets of “alternative” standards applicable to “alternative” programs, each using “alternative” equipment, to complete “alternative” task assignments, on “alternative” recurrent schedules results in a “drifting away” from standardized expectations of performance and capabilities of these crewmembers, particularly pilots … all based on the economic value being contributed to the airline bottom line.

I am not about to apologize for believing it appropriate that airlines pay their employees a just wage for the skills and abilities they must possess and demonstrate; that airlines should provide their employees frequent and meaningful training, both initially and on an appropriate recurring basis – using equipment and facilities that are appropriate for the tasks that must be accomplished; that airlines should provide equipment and facilities to provide transportation services to those who choose to use this particular method of transportation; that airlines should charge those who use those services a fee that will provide an adequate income to meet expenses AND meet whatever profit margin they deem appropriate. It simply cannot be expected that the employees, or the skills of those employees, should be expected to be sacrificed for competitive advantage over other similarly situated competitors. Of all of these components, the only ones that should be governed by rules and regulations are those of competency and capability – and they should be equally applied to all who choose to participate in this industry. To me, this means that the regulatory authority should require that all participants have, and be able to regularly demonstrate, that the required capabilities and competencies are, indeed, addressed and that each appropriate person has satisfactory knowledge and experience to regularly and correctly exhibit those competencies and capabilities whenever and where ever called upon to do so. Clearly, this cannot be done through the authorization of individually approved deviations from established standards – particularly when those specifics (and any differences) are maintained as “confidential.” The requirement should be – no MUST be – a single set of demonstrable proficiency standards, using demonstrably appropriate equipment, for all who are depended upon to execute the duties and responsibilities of appropriate crewmembers (both cockpit and cabin) involved in delivering these services to the traveling public. If the regulatory authority should NOT do these things … I wonder why it is that a regulatory authority is involved at all.
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