AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 1
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@ OK465
" [...] change your simulator manufacturer [...] the tech pilots/engineers your company sends [...] for factory acceptance testing.
, [...] your monitoring authorities"
I totaly agree with you !
" [...] change your simulator manufacturer [...] the tech pilots/engineers your company sends [...] for factory acceptance testing.
, [...] your monitoring authorities"I totaly agree with you !
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Hand Flying
You're not allowed to do that in RVSM.
Perhaps with a little planning, you can get your hand flying time in that way.
@ penko
Icepack;
Re, "Sim's are no use as they handle the same at 5000 ft as they do at 41000 ft. which actually i find criminal, as the authorities don't insist the algorithms being programed. "
Are you certain of this? There are areas in which simulators do not have data (behaviour at/during the stall, discussed in earlier threads and verified with CAE) but I would have thought that in Level D sims at least, aircraft behaviour at high altitudes vice low altitudes would have been easily reproduced and even required. Just one example..., one may pull hard on the controls, (here, the side stick), and may approach or even exceed the stall AoA in thinner air while at 5000ft that likely isn' t the case. I would think that would have to be reproduced accurately.
Re, "Sim's are no use as they handle the same at 5000 ft as they do at 41000 ft. which actually i find criminal, as the authorities don't insist the algorithms being programed. "
Are you certain of this? There are areas in which simulators do not have data (behaviour at/during the stall, discussed in earlier threads and verified with CAE) but I would have thought that in Level D sims at least, aircraft behaviour at high altitudes vice low altitudes would have been easily reproduced and even required. Just one example..., one may pull hard on the controls, (here, the side stick), and may approach or even exceed the stall AoA in thinner air while at 5000ft that likely isn' t the case. I would think that would have to be reproduced accurately.
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Sims are for checkrides. Not for high altitude training. We don't train for high altitude because it isn't required and most pilots can figure it out without a simulator. Most of us push forward in a stall so high altitude training isn't required.
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In 1991 the FAA published a list of requirements for Level A, B, C and D simulators.
The following extract on aerodynamic modeling implies the Level D simulator must replicate the airframe real-life performance through the full range of ALT and MACH values.
The following extract on aerodynamic modeling implies the Level D simulator must replicate the airframe real-life performance through the full range of ALT and MACH values.
AC 120-40B . Appendix 1 . 7/29/91 FAA
Level D Requirements (in part)
w. Aerodynamic modeling which, for airplanes issued an original type certificate after June 1980, includes low-altitude level flight ground effect, Mach effect at high altitude, effects of airframe icing, normal and reverse dynamic thrust effect on control surfaces, aeroelastic representations, and representations of non-linearities due to sideslip based on airplane flight test data provided by the manufacturer.
COMMENTS
Statement of Compliance. Tests required. See appendix 2, par. 4, for further information on ground effect. Mach effect, aeroelastic representations, and non-linearities due to sideslip are normally included in the simulator aerodynamic model, but the Statement of Compliance must address each of them. Separate tests for thrust effects and a Statement of Compliance and demonstration of icing effects are required.
Level D Requirements (in part)
w. Aerodynamic modeling which, for airplanes issued an original type certificate after June 1980, includes low-altitude level flight ground effect, Mach effect at high altitude, effects of airframe icing, normal and reverse dynamic thrust effect on control surfaces, aeroelastic representations, and representations of non-linearities due to sideslip based on airplane flight test data provided by the manufacturer.
COMMENTS
Statement of Compliance. Tests required. See appendix 2, par. 4, for further information on ground effect. Mach effect, aeroelastic representations, and non-linearities due to sideslip are normally included in the simulator aerodynamic model, but the Statement of Compliance must address each of them. Separate tests for thrust effects and a Statement of Compliance and demonstration of icing effects are required.
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Originally Posted by PJ2
Thought I'd say hi.
Originally Posted by PJ2
The roll is sensitive in Direct Law and, with mis-handling, (or more bluntly, ham-fistedness), prone to PIO but I hasten to add that it is readily controllable, (positive, not neutral stability). Letting go the stick would be a good first response to any PIO in roll,
It seems clear that he had not received training in manual flight at altitude in either Normal or Alt 2 law, but also, he had not been properly trained to recognize/avoid and stop a PIO. (Or a stall for that matter.
) How many present line pilots have received any formal training with regard to PIO causes and correction? There may be yet more lessons we need to take away from the AF447 accident.
That makes logical sense mm43, thank you.
Hello Machinbird.
From my recurrent training and experience in the A330 Level D sim, roll oscillations weren't difficult to control even if one kept at it (waggling the stick) for a period of time instead of freezing the stick/wheel and making one opposing input, (as Davies suggested in HtBJ) to halt the pattern.
Such side-to-side action (there is a graph on one of the threads showing the exact input/pathway of the stick), on the stick does not lead to a pitch-up although a change in pitch attitude may incidently occur and if so it, pitch, is very controllable.
The airplane is sensitive but not that sensitive so as to lose control either in pitch or roll. Such "inadvertent" inputs are not, and were not "dramatic". They lead neither easily nor rapidly to a continuous pitch up to the stall nor would such sensitivities keep it there, at a 16deg pitch attitude.
That there was PIO there is little doubt but it is efficiently controllable and does not lead to a loss of control without other factors intervening in pilot awareness and recovery efforts. Up until the continuous NU inputs and the rapid loss of energy and perhaps even near the apogee, the data does not indicate a complete (irrecoverable) loss of control.
Having flown many other types, I strongly suspect this is the same with other transport aircraft such as the B767, B777 and so on. The Airborne Express DC8 accident has been mentioned numerous times.
Hello Machinbird.
From my recurrent training and experience in the A330 Level D sim, roll oscillations weren't difficult to control even if one kept at it (waggling the stick) for a period of time instead of freezing the stick/wheel and making one opposing input, (as Davies suggested in HtBJ) to halt the pattern.
Such side-to-side action (there is a graph on one of the threads showing the exact input/pathway of the stick), on the stick does not lead to a pitch-up although a change in pitch attitude may incidently occur and if so it, pitch, is very controllable.
The airplane is sensitive but not that sensitive so as to lose control either in pitch or roll. Such "inadvertent" inputs are not, and were not "dramatic". They lead neither easily nor rapidly to a continuous pitch up to the stall nor would such sensitivities keep it there, at a 16deg pitch attitude.
That there was PIO there is little doubt but it is efficiently controllable and does not lead to a loss of control without other factors intervening in pilot awareness and recovery efforts. Up until the continuous NU inputs and the rapid loss of energy and perhaps even near the apogee, the data does not indicate a complete (irrecoverable) loss of control.
Having flown many other types, I strongly suspect this is the same with other transport aircraft such as the B767, B777 and so on. The Airborne Express DC8 accident has been mentioned numerous times.
Last edited by PJ2; 30th Jan 2012 at 07:47.
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Similarities to N827AX
Hi,
The Airborne Express DC8 accident has been mentioned numerous times.
That there was PIO there is little doubt...
Probabily contributing to the behavior of PF that constantly tried to "feel" the plane applying large inputs. In a complex "flying System" designed for smooth and careful SS inputs in a very difficult environment (inside and outside the cockpit)
The Airborne Express DC8 accident has been mentioned numerous times.
That there was PIO there is little doubt...
Probabily contributing to the behavior of PF that constantly tried to "feel" the plane applying large inputs. In a complex "flying System" designed for smooth and careful SS inputs in a very difficult environment (inside and outside the cockpit)
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The apps training site linked in the previous post led me to this fascinating article on the topic of upset training.
AeroSafety World: Guidelines in Upset Recovery Training | APS Emergency Maneuver Training
A thorough reading of it gives me utter sympathy for the pilots of AF447, who clearly were not properly trained to get out of that situation. The recovery protocols previously taught were described as "outmoded."
AeroSafety World: Guidelines in Upset Recovery Training | APS Emergency Maneuver Training
A thorough reading of it gives me utter sympathy for the pilots of AF447, who clearly were not properly trained to get out of that situation. The recovery protocols previously taught were described as "outmoded."
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Triple redundant subheated AS probes prone to fail SIMULTANEOUSLY
were not properly trained
Or simply NOT TRAINED at all for the situation.
Remember the 30+ UAS previous incidents.
Murphy law never fail and frequently we are warned in advance.
Airbus SAS had opportunity to tackle the serious issue with the aircraft operators.
And in the end, again, PILOT ERROR very probably will be the conclusion.
Or simply NOT TRAINED at all for the situation.
Remember the 30+ UAS previous incidents.
Murphy law never fail and frequently we are warned in advance.
Airbus SAS had opportunity to tackle the serious issue with the aircraft operators.
And in the end, again, PILOT ERROR very probably will be the conclusion.
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Originally Posted by PJ2
From my recurrent training and experience in the A330 Level D sim, roll oscillations weren't difficult to control even if one kept at it (waggling the stick) for a period of time instead of freezing the stick/wheel and making one opposing input, (as Davies suggested in HtBJ) to halt the pattern.
Such side-to-side action (there is a graph on one of the threads showing the exact input/pathway of the stick), on the stick does not lead to a pitch-up although a change in pitch attitude may incidently occur and if so it, pitch, is very controllable.
The airplane is sensitive but not that sensitive so as to lose control either in pitch or roll. Such "inadvertent" inputs are not, and were not "dramatic". They lead neither easily nor rapidly to a continuous pitch up to the stall nor would such sensitivities keep it there, at a 16deg pitch attitude.
That there was PIO there is little doubt but it is efficiently controllable and does not lead to a loss of control without other factors intervening in pilot awareness and recovery efforts. Up until the continuous NU inputs and the rapid loss of energy and perhaps even near the apogee, the data does not indicate a complete (irrecoverable) loss of control.
Such side-to-side action (there is a graph on one of the threads showing the exact input/pathway of the stick), on the stick does not lead to a pitch-up although a change in pitch attitude may incidently occur and if so it, pitch, is very controllable.
The airplane is sensitive but not that sensitive so as to lose control either in pitch or roll. Such "inadvertent" inputs are not, and were not "dramatic". They lead neither easily nor rapidly to a continuous pitch up to the stall nor would such sensitivities keep it there, at a 16deg pitch attitude.
That there was PIO there is little doubt but it is efficiently controllable and does not lead to a loss of control without other factors intervening in pilot awareness and recovery efforts. Up until the continuous NU inputs and the rapid loss of energy and perhaps even near the apogee, the data does not indicate a complete (irrecoverable) loss of control.
Originally Posted by Aviation Safety And Pilot Control
Pilot-in-the-Loop, Moving-Base and In-Flight Simulation
Historical Perspectives.
Because moving-base simulators have the capability of emulating motion, at least to a limited extent, they would appear to be more powerful tools for assessing APC susceptibility than fixed-base
simulators. However, the utility of these devices has also been called into question. Figure 5-1 compares a group of four simulators used in NASA's investigation of the Shuttle PIO incident alluded to earlier. 59 The Flight Simulator for Advanced Aircraft was a moving-base simulator (no longer in existence) capable of large lateral translations. The Vertical Motion Simulator is capable of large vertical translations. The Total In-Flight Simulator is a highly modified C-131 transport. In the Shuttle APC investigation, PIO susceptibility ratings (using the PIO rating scale shown in Figure 5-2) were obtained on the moving-base and in-flight simulators for various tasks (see Figures 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5). With its ability to provide high fidelity visual and motion cues, the Total In-Flight Simulator provided PIO ratings that more closely reflected those of the actual Shuttle vehicle in normal landings, with and without lateral offsets. By artificially increasing the task difficulty, the moving-base simulators exhibited some improvement in predicting APCs.
A general conclusion about these simulators is that, once an APC tendency has been observed in flight, it is possible to construct a piloting task that will exhibit the same tendencies in ground-based simulation. In addition,as simulator fidelity increases (e.g., moving versus fixed-base, in-flight versus ground-based), APC tendencies noted in flight can be reproduced with piloting tasks that are more realistic. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as simulated piloting tasks become more realistic, simulation results are more likely to influence the program personnel responsible for allocating resources to investigate and alleviate potential APC problems.
Historical Perspectives.
Because moving-base simulators have the capability of emulating motion, at least to a limited extent, they would appear to be more powerful tools for assessing APC susceptibility than fixed-base
simulators. However, the utility of these devices has also been called into question. Figure 5-1 compares a group of four simulators used in NASA's investigation of the Shuttle PIO incident alluded to earlier. 59 The Flight Simulator for Advanced Aircraft was a moving-base simulator (no longer in existence) capable of large lateral translations. The Vertical Motion Simulator is capable of large vertical translations. The Total In-Flight Simulator is a highly modified C-131 transport. In the Shuttle APC investigation, PIO susceptibility ratings (using the PIO rating scale shown in Figure 5-2) were obtained on the moving-base and in-flight simulators for various tasks (see Figures 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5). With its ability to provide high fidelity visual and motion cues, the Total In-Flight Simulator provided PIO ratings that more closely reflected those of the actual Shuttle vehicle in normal landings, with and without lateral offsets. By artificially increasing the task difficulty, the moving-base simulators exhibited some improvement in predicting APCs.
A general conclusion about these simulators is that, once an APC tendency has been observed in flight, it is possible to construct a piloting task that will exhibit the same tendencies in ground-based simulation. In addition,as simulator fidelity increases (e.g., moving versus fixed-base, in-flight versus ground-based), APC tendencies noted in flight can be reproduced with piloting tasks that are more realistic. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as simulated piloting tasks become more realistic, simulation results are more likely to influence the program personnel responsible for allocating resources to investigate and alleviate potential APC problems.
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At what point pilots should become responsible (plus the plane, cargo and innocent passengers) for a potentially life and death inherent condition of their chosen careers? At what point is being a pilot a routine and mundane (meaning: common; ordinary; banal; unimaginative) truck driving job (no disrespect to truck driving mind you)? Assuming a pilot gets training to avoid stalls during takeoffs and landings, how long before they should start wondering what to do when a stall happens during cruising altitude? When does a pilot should realize that he/she is front row in case something goes terribly wrong?
If we pick a class of 50 pupils and they all pass finals, are we really believing that all fifty came out equally? With absolutely the same level of knowledge and understanding? Do we close the school if we find out that the truth is less than fifty?
Why did the captain of the AF447 asked the younger copilot if his papers as a pilot were on the system that night?
If we pick a class of 50 pupils and they all pass finals, are we really believing that all fifty came out equally? With absolutely the same level of knowledge and understanding? Do we close the school if we find out that the truth is less than fifty?
Why did the captain of the AF447 asked the younger copilot if his papers as a pilot were on the system that night?
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Why did the captain of the AF447 asked the younger copilot if his papers as a pilot were on the system that night?
Even the Taxi in UK have this on their car :
Why not put same label for the pilots license on the aircraft door ?
So the passengers (and incidentally the crew) will know who is in charge aboard
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Why did the captain of the AF447 asked the younger copilot if his papers as a pilot were on the system that night?
Dubois never flew with Bonin before and it appears the Captain was not impressed with the copilot performance during the first four hours of the flight. Bonin kept nagging the Captain to go higher to avoid the storm by going over it even when the instrument showed 36,000' was the Max at the time only. Due to weight still. Also, ATC communications with Senegal for any altitude change request was not available due to the distance (temp black out). But 1,000' higher wouldn't had done a lot of difference anyhow.
When Robert sat on the left seat the first thing he did was to adjust the weather radar which looks to me, Dubois conducted the flight in a straight line to Bordeaux kind of set of mind. Dubois had Cape Verde, Canary Islands, Portugal and Spain to choose from to compensate for any lack of fuel in the worst case scenario. Better to be late than to be dead, right? That night little things started adding up fast.
Bad all around it.
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VGCM66
False ....
In the first BEA report you can read: (Page 15/128)
Dubois know Bonin (and Robert)
Never tell never
Dubois never flew with Bonin before and it appears the Captain was not impressed with the copilot performance during the first four hours of the flight
In the first BEA report you can read: (Page 15/128)
From the current state of the information gathered, it is not possible
to determine the composition of the flight crew on duty at the time of the event.
Note: the crew left Paris on Thursday 28 May 2009 in the morning and arrived in Rio de janeiro in the evening of the same day.
to determine the composition of the flight crew on duty at the time of the event.
Note: the crew left Paris on Thursday 28 May 2009 in the morning and arrived in Rio de janeiro in the evening of the same day.
Never tell never
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The sentence should have read:
"It looks like Dubois never flew with Bonin before and it appears the Captain was not..."
as per my intention when I wrote it. One flight in or even round trip wouldn't have been enough. Just reading between the lines of the report as everybody else. Good catch though, thanks. BTW, Dubois could have known Robert at any rate but I didn't get the same impression with Bonin while reading the report. Maybe they all did knew each other from before. Probably also the flight into Brazil was in day light, big difference.
"It looks like Dubois never flew with Bonin before and it appears the Captain was not..."
as per my intention when I wrote it. One flight in or even round trip wouldn't have been enough. Just reading between the lines of the report as everybody else. Good catch though, thanks. BTW, Dubois could have known Robert at any rate but I didn't get the same impression with Bonin while reading the report. Maybe they all did knew each other from before. Probably also the flight into Brazil was in day light, big difference.
Last edited by VGCM66; 7th Feb 2012 at 05:04.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Something seems to be badly amiss with AF rostering etc if a Captain does not know before he leaves Paris/Rio what his crew qualifications for 'rest relief' are? What if the co-pilot had said 'No I am not qualified' as they passed FL350 off the coast?
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I am not sure that this is really a Flight rostering issue. Are Air France not obliged by law to inform the Captain of a departing flight of the full qualifications of the other subordinates flying with him in as part of his flight team.
The point raised above is absolutely frightening, the Captain should have all these details available to him prior to briefing his Flight Crew on their flying duties on the forthcoming leg of their flight.
Reference the question that was asked of Bonin on the flight deck. It would have been a far more appropriate question to be asked at the pre-flight briefing in Rio de Janeiro.
The point raised above is absolutely frightening, the Captain should have all these details available to him prior to briefing his Flight Crew on their flying duties on the forthcoming leg of their flight.
Reference the question that was asked of Bonin on the flight deck. It would have been a far more appropriate question to be asked at the pre-flight briefing in Rio de Janeiro.