V1 question.
Westhawk
Enjoy the race!
First, I apologize for the unintended implication that the criminal case resulted from the overrun; it, indeed, was due to other certificate issues. Although, I would submit their casualness about certificate issues drove their casualness about flight ops. Rarely are well-managed, safe flight ops run by dysfunctional or criminal managements.
My point in that last paragraph was related, not to V1 concerns, but to the fact that most runways have very dangerous conditions in VERY close proximity to the EOR. Getting blasé about the possibility of an overrun can be very risky due to the terrain/structures within reach, even in a low speed overrun. I was at a Pacific island airport recently, 75' overrun, followed by a 40' dirt drop- off to the road below. Go off that edge, even at 15 knots, could be fatal.
Our overheated correspondent blows strong against CRM, too. Look at KBUR, were a headstrong captain failed to use the FO's valid concerns--a failure of CRM, not CRM causing an accident.
Lastly, yes, bigger planes, bigger numbers; the basic physics doesn't change, just the magnitudes. For the life of me, I don't understand pilots who get casual with W&B and trim settings. In the USAF, we periodically were given bad data to generate just the situation as at KSBA. Running the trim is often the only situation, but you really need to avoid the situation, in the first place. I had a pilot say, "8 degrees light, 9 degrees heavy", aviation has no room for such casualness.
All that said, as a result of this, and similar discussions, have been considering briefing the "unable to fly" response, especially when large amounts of excess runway exist. The other day at DXB, we had a field length of around 3,900' on 13,123', stopping anytime until actually airborne was reasonable. Every take-off plan in the C-5 included refusal speeds, which gave one an idea what was possible, but what good is a refusal of 170 knots when rotate was 122?
GF
Enjoy the race!
First, I apologize for the unintended implication that the criminal case resulted from the overrun; it, indeed, was due to other certificate issues. Although, I would submit their casualness about certificate issues drove their casualness about flight ops. Rarely are well-managed, safe flight ops run by dysfunctional or criminal managements.
My point in that last paragraph was related, not to V1 concerns, but to the fact that most runways have very dangerous conditions in VERY close proximity to the EOR. Getting blasé about the possibility of an overrun can be very risky due to the terrain/structures within reach, even in a low speed overrun. I was at a Pacific island airport recently, 75' overrun, followed by a 40' dirt drop- off to the road below. Go off that edge, even at 15 knots, could be fatal.
Our overheated correspondent blows strong against CRM, too. Look at KBUR, were a headstrong captain failed to use the FO's valid concerns--a failure of CRM, not CRM causing an accident.
Lastly, yes, bigger planes, bigger numbers; the basic physics doesn't change, just the magnitudes. For the life of me, I don't understand pilots who get casual with W&B and trim settings. In the USAF, we periodically were given bad data to generate just the situation as at KSBA. Running the trim is often the only situation, but you really need to avoid the situation, in the first place. I had a pilot say, "8 degrees light, 9 degrees heavy", aviation has no room for such casualness.
All that said, as a result of this, and similar discussions, have been considering briefing the "unable to fly" response, especially when large amounts of excess runway exist. The other day at DXB, we had a field length of around 3,900' on 13,123', stopping anytime until actually airborne was reasonable. Every take-off plan in the C-5 included refusal speeds, which gave one an idea what was possible, but what good is a refusal of 170 knots when rotate was 122?
GF
Last edited by galaxy flyer; 28th Aug 2011 at 12:42.
GF:
Wow, great race!
Vettel continues his domination by winning his 7th race in '11. Weber manages 2nd and Button makes a great drive to take the 3rd podium position. Hamilton crashed out again. Alonso struggled for 4th while Shumie makes an incredible drive from starting dead last to finish 5th just ahead of Rosberg.
Now what were we discussing? Oh, right!
"Dysfunctional and criminal managements".
Well put. My first 135 job was with a somewhat "shady" outfit you might say. Our operating philosophy as pilots was to do the right thing in spite of the company. The owner was just smart enough to stay out of our way and we actually ran a pretty clean op from our end considering. But a year was enough. The next 7 years were thankfully spent somewhat less stressfully in more robust safety cultures with better training, maintenance and standards.
"Go off that edge, even at 15 knots, could be fatal."
Yeah, I saw that happen with my own eyes at KSMO once. They fried in the fire before we could get there. Idiot took off with the gust lock installed in his C-340 and unsuccessfully aborted from 100 plus knots. A drainage culvert at the end cleaned off the gear and opened the tanks. Exit speed was probably less than 40 kts. Really nice guy too, but dead all the same.
As to our friend of strong opinions, I don't know what to say. But you know what they say about opinions...
"For the life of me, I don't understand pilots who get casual with W&B and trim settings."
Yeah. Maybe a selection of NTSB reports should be required reading. Maybe you don't have to repeat the mistakes of the past to learn their lessons. Learning from your own experience is good. Adding the experience of those who came before is a learning multiplier. It bothers me that some pilots seem to think required training is enough learning. This aviation stuff encompasses allot more than any company will teach in a classroom or simulator. Put in a little extra work!
I got to ride up front in a Galaxy once. Just myself, one other space-A pax and the crew repositioning an empty C-5 from Travis AFB to MCAS El Toro on the last leg of my trip home from Germany on MAC flights. That big boy leaped off the runway like an empty Learjet! I'd guess the takeoff on their next leg from El Toro to Clark with a full load of Marines and all their stuff was pretty different. It still amazes me that these things actually fly! And I still don't quite understand how that one got piled up at Dover. I read the report years ago and think I understand the flight dynamics involved, but not the crew actions.
Best,
Wow, great race!
Vettel continues his domination by winning his 7th race in '11. Weber manages 2nd and Button makes a great drive to take the 3rd podium position. Hamilton crashed out again. Alonso struggled for 4th while Shumie makes an incredible drive from starting dead last to finish 5th just ahead of Rosberg.
Now what were we discussing? Oh, right!
"Dysfunctional and criminal managements".
Well put. My first 135 job was with a somewhat "shady" outfit you might say. Our operating philosophy as pilots was to do the right thing in spite of the company. The owner was just smart enough to stay out of our way and we actually ran a pretty clean op from our end considering. But a year was enough. The next 7 years were thankfully spent somewhat less stressfully in more robust safety cultures with better training, maintenance and standards.
"Go off that edge, even at 15 knots, could be fatal."
Yeah, I saw that happen with my own eyes at KSMO once. They fried in the fire before we could get there. Idiot took off with the gust lock installed in his C-340 and unsuccessfully aborted from 100 plus knots. A drainage culvert at the end cleaned off the gear and opened the tanks. Exit speed was probably less than 40 kts. Really nice guy too, but dead all the same.
As to our friend of strong opinions, I don't know what to say. But you know what they say about opinions...
"For the life of me, I don't understand pilots who get casual with W&B and trim settings."
Yeah. Maybe a selection of NTSB reports should be required reading. Maybe you don't have to repeat the mistakes of the past to learn their lessons. Learning from your own experience is good. Adding the experience of those who came before is a learning multiplier. It bothers me that some pilots seem to think required training is enough learning. This aviation stuff encompasses allot more than any company will teach in a classroom or simulator. Put in a little extra work!
I got to ride up front in a Galaxy once. Just myself, one other space-A pax and the crew repositioning an empty C-5 from Travis AFB to MCAS El Toro on the last leg of my trip home from Germany on MAC flights. That big boy leaped off the runway like an empty Learjet! I'd guess the takeoff on their next leg from El Toro to Clark with a full load of Marines and all their stuff was pretty different. It still amazes me that these things actually fly! And I still don't quite understand how that one got piled up at Dover. I read the report years ago and think I understand the flight dynamics involved, but not the crew actions.
Best,
west hawk
Yeah, I took off at Kaneohe Bay to Honolulu once with 28K on fuel, empty. One swoop to 9,000', idle, cleared visual; far different story above about 732K gross weight. Not a lot of power out of those 60's vintage GE hair driers. Many, many take-offs required the entire runway, standing take-off and every inch of runway. 0-120 knots was, typically between 33 and 39 seconds.
Speaking of rejected take-offs, reducing your engine choices down to ONE doesn't make it much easier. Last F-100 RTU class, we were lectured by Vietnam vets on th dangers of high speed rejects. The plane took off at about 165 knots, had a drag chute and marginal brakes. The instructors emphasized the dangers and said taking most problems airborne was preferable.
WRT KDOV accident, dysfunctional leadership is in the background, an IP who shouldn't have been made one, poor CRM skills on the IP's part, resignation and fatigue all play role. But the man in the left seat shouldn't have been there and the two other pilots failed badly to correct the situation.
GF
Yeah, I took off at Kaneohe Bay to Honolulu once with 28K on fuel, empty. One swoop to 9,000', idle, cleared visual; far different story above about 732K gross weight. Not a lot of power out of those 60's vintage GE hair driers. Many, many take-offs required the entire runway, standing take-off and every inch of runway. 0-120 knots was, typically between 33 and 39 seconds.
Speaking of rejected take-offs, reducing your engine choices down to ONE doesn't make it much easier. Last F-100 RTU class, we were lectured by Vietnam vets on th dangers of high speed rejects. The plane took off at about 165 knots, had a drag chute and marginal brakes. The instructors emphasized the dangers and said taking most problems airborne was preferable.
WRT KDOV accident, dysfunctional leadership is in the background, an IP who shouldn't have been made one, poor CRM skills on the IP's part, resignation and fatigue all play role. But the man in the left seat shouldn't have been there and the two other pilots failed badly to correct the situation.
GF
Moderator
I suspect your vision of aviation being so chancy is relative to your ability to mitigate the risk
First, I see (scheduled and high end corporate) aviation as having a very high reliability (ie not all that "chancy" as you put it) - the daily successful total of operations provides evidence of that. Caveat - this is not to say that GA has an inherent lack of discipline and safe history - only that it covers a far wider range of activities wherein the less safe taint the statistics of the more safe.
Secondly, if one intends to pursue a strategy other than SOP (and this either can be in respect of managing emergencies or planning non-typical operations), one needs to be able to quantify the risk in order to mitigate it with a reasonable degree of confidence. The necessary safeguard with this approach is that the approval signoff has to be elevated to a level appropriate to the assessed risk - ie often the PIC is not the appropriate level to authorise the non-standard operation (for the planning situation).
In those cases where such quantification is either impractical or time does not permit adequate research
(a) the solution gets progressively closer to the "wing and a prayer" style of management
(b) the SOP approach remains, in all likelihood, the preferred option.
As one who works in a particular environment where "risk mitigation" is a routine buzz phrase, I see many instances of good intentions based on qualitative gut feelings - not quite what the paradigm intends to be the case but better than just winging things on the day.
First, I see (scheduled and high end corporate) aviation as having a very high reliability (ie not all that "chancy" as you put it) - the daily successful total of operations provides evidence of that. Caveat - this is not to say that GA has an inherent lack of discipline and safe history - only that it covers a far wider range of activities wherein the less safe taint the statistics of the more safe.
Secondly, if one intends to pursue a strategy other than SOP (and this either can be in respect of managing emergencies or planning non-typical operations), one needs to be able to quantify the risk in order to mitigate it with a reasonable degree of confidence. The necessary safeguard with this approach is that the approval signoff has to be elevated to a level appropriate to the assessed risk - ie often the PIC is not the appropriate level to authorise the non-standard operation (for the planning situation).
In those cases where such quantification is either impractical or time does not permit adequate research
(a) the solution gets progressively closer to the "wing and a prayer" style of management
(b) the SOP approach remains, in all likelihood, the preferred option.
As one who works in a particular environment where "risk mitigation" is a routine buzz phrase, I see many instances of good intentions based on qualitative gut feelings - not quite what the paradigm intends to be the case but better than just winging things on the day.
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JT - Well your in fine company....
You would have given your seats up like the first three 9/11 crews...
You would have gone through the fuel dump procedure, rather then get it down in Nova Scotia..
You would have continued with a fire light on the Concorde..
You would have sat up there on the phone messing with the trim while jack screw got worse and worse and worse...
Your 'I don't think, I do what I am told' approach to aviation is a credit to all the airline chief pilots who have specifically culled any independent reasoning ability out of it's ranks.
You would have given your seats up like the first three 9/11 crews...
You would have gone through the fuel dump procedure, rather then get it down in Nova Scotia..
You would have continued with a fire light on the Concorde..
You would have sat up there on the phone messing with the trim while jack screw got worse and worse and worse...
Your 'I don't think, I do what I am told' approach to aviation is a credit to all the airline chief pilots who have specifically culled any independent reasoning ability out of it's ranks.
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@whenrealityhurts
I rarely comment on posts such as yours but I can't help myself this time.
Your ignorance regarding the underlying principles of safe aircraft operation are on public display with your last post.
The examples that you have cited in support of your position spits on the memory of the air crew and the passengers that died without offering any positive aspect for your case.
The gratuitous insult that you offer only serves to denigrate yourself and any positive effect (however slight) your posts may have had.
If you really do have the experience that you cite and are actually employed I trust that I never have the misfortune to fly with you as I would be in fear for my life.
I rarely comment on posts such as yours but I can't help myself this time.
Your ignorance regarding the underlying principles of safe aircraft operation are on public display with your last post.
The examples that you have cited in support of your position spits on the memory of the air crew and the passengers that died without offering any positive aspect for your case.
The gratuitous insult that you offer only serves to denigrate yourself and any positive effect (however slight) your posts may have had.
If you really do have the experience that you cite and are actually employed I trust that I never have the misfortune to fly with you as I would be in fear for my life.
WRH
You really should read those accident reports; not the press reports. You have simplified the chain of events to fit your "point of view", untroubled by real knowledge though it maybe.
All four planes on 9/11 we forcibly taken, not the first three. Flight 93's passengers tried to recover the plane and crashed in the ensuing battle. The hijackers just didn't walk in and ask for the planes and the crews gave their planes to them. To say otherwise is to display your total lack of knowledge of history.
GF
You really should read those accident reports; not the press reports. You have simplified the chain of events to fit your "point of view", untroubled by real knowledge though it maybe.
All four planes on 9/11 we forcibly taken, not the first three. Flight 93's passengers tried to recover the plane and crashed in the ensuing battle. The hijackers just didn't walk in and ask for the planes and the crews gave their planes to them. To say otherwise is to display your total lack of knowledge of history.
GF
Sometimes even poorly presented and what many would consider to be extreme points of view contain elements of truth hidden beneath the hyperbole and histrionics. I'll attempt to find some nuggets of wisdom in WRH's last post.
You would have given your seats up like the first three 9/11 crews...
Galaxy Flyer addressed this point already, but I'll add that while government and airline policy directives promoted "cooperation" with hijackers right up until that day, not every airline pilot planned to "blindly" comply. Even so, none of these crews had any reason to suspect the hijackers ultimate intent at the time the airplanes were taken. Prior to that, most hijackings were perceived to be for the purpose of hostage taking for some form of ransom. This perception was apparently a key element of the terrorist's plan. Had these crews known what their ultimate plan was, well let's just say they might have reacted differently. They would now.
I find the question asked to be an irrelevancy and a poorly selected example case to use in an argument apparently intended to promote pilot discretion and critical thinking during an abnormal event. Not much wisdom here.
You would have gone through the fuel dump procedure, rather then get it down in Nova Scotia..
Who knows? We weren't there and we're not sure what information would have been available to us if we were. But I'm reasonably sure that in-flight fires and electrical shorts are something most pilots would consider a higher priority than meeting landing weight limitations. Then and now.
This accident does drive home the point that proper prioritization of objectives is a command function. I think it always was.
You would have continued with a fire light on the Concorde..
I don't know enough about the details of what the flightcrew knew at what time to say. But in this airplane especially, a high speed abort from above V1 with failed tires and fuel pouring out doesn't seem likely to have produced a better result.
Again. maybe not the most applicable case to cite.
You would have sat up there on the phone messing with the trim while jack screw got worse and worse and worse...
This one I can find some agreement with in large part. No I would not. Not then, now or ever. But then I am an experienced mechanic in addition to to my piloting background. I've worked on similar stab trim systems and know/knew what this set of symptoms imply. The company mx controllers and others in the company should have too. While the flightcrew thought they were doing the right thing, there was information to the contrary readily available to the mx dept. This information was NOT made available to the crew. For those willing to spend many hours researching this whole affair, the full story is a stinging indictment of a company cost savings plan gone wrong and a series of what I believe to be reprehensible management actions.
Considering what the crew could have reasonably be expected to know and do given their qualification as pilots, the blame rests squarely on the company. Though some individuals like myself had knowledge beyond the scope of what might normally be expected of flightcrew, that does not serve as an indictment of this crew's following of the direction provided to them by their company, who they might well have reasonably believed knew more than they.
Overall, another poor example even though there is some truth in the argument.
Your 'I don't think, I do what I am told' approach to aviation is a credit to all the airline chief pilots who have specifically culled any independent reasoning ability out of it's ranks.
Do I detect a slight hint of contempt for authority figures here?
Well that's understandable. Particularly in today's aviation business environment. Still, it's not an attitude one wants to become widely known for. Perhaps many pilots have made a conscious decision that it's better to question authority more quietly, in a way that doesn't needlessly expose them to unwanted managerial scrutiny. Seems kinda spineless? Such is life in the modern corporate machine. Get used to it, cuz it's here to stay. But that doesn't mean one has to do something they know to be wrong. In real conditions of duress, you may find your fellow pilots to be less sheeplike than you seem to believe. However I have to opine that one would be well advised to reserve acting contrary to SOP or accepted policy for situations where the "accepted" or conventional action is either clearly inappropriate or inapplicable to the circumstances. None of the above examples clearly pass the test. Maybe a better example?
So bringing this back to the subject rejecting a takeoff after having accelerated beyond V1.
Of course we can think of circumstances when the potential consequences of aborting beyond V1 might be preferable to the consequences of continuing the takeoff. Under a "system approach" to the problem, statistical analysis will be a large component of any policy promulgated by airlines, manufacturers or regulators. As the commander of an airplane, your obligation is to do whatever is necessary to preserve the safety of your flight. It may come to pass that doing so requires a departure from regs, policies or established procedures. If so, your every move might later come into question. If you're wrong there may be consequences of a professional, legal or mortal nature. This is what you accept every time you sit down in the cockpit. Rules, procedures and policies define the framework for your operations. It is recognized that operating outside the framework may become necessary under certain circumstances. Better make sure you're right when you do.
Just wanted to let you know: We're all counting on you!
You would have given your seats up like the first three 9/11 crews...
Galaxy Flyer addressed this point already, but I'll add that while government and airline policy directives promoted "cooperation" with hijackers right up until that day, not every airline pilot planned to "blindly" comply. Even so, none of these crews had any reason to suspect the hijackers ultimate intent at the time the airplanes were taken. Prior to that, most hijackings were perceived to be for the purpose of hostage taking for some form of ransom. This perception was apparently a key element of the terrorist's plan. Had these crews known what their ultimate plan was, well let's just say they might have reacted differently. They would now.
I find the question asked to be an irrelevancy and a poorly selected example case to use in an argument apparently intended to promote pilot discretion and critical thinking during an abnormal event. Not much wisdom here.
You would have gone through the fuel dump procedure, rather then get it down in Nova Scotia..
Who knows? We weren't there and we're not sure what information would have been available to us if we were. But I'm reasonably sure that in-flight fires and electrical shorts are something most pilots would consider a higher priority than meeting landing weight limitations. Then and now.
This accident does drive home the point that proper prioritization of objectives is a command function. I think it always was.
You would have continued with a fire light on the Concorde..
I don't know enough about the details of what the flightcrew knew at what time to say. But in this airplane especially, a high speed abort from above V1 with failed tires and fuel pouring out doesn't seem likely to have produced a better result.
Again. maybe not the most applicable case to cite.
You would have sat up there on the phone messing with the trim while jack screw got worse and worse and worse...
This one I can find some agreement with in large part. No I would not. Not then, now or ever. But then I am an experienced mechanic in addition to to my piloting background. I've worked on similar stab trim systems and know/knew what this set of symptoms imply. The company mx controllers and others in the company should have too. While the flightcrew thought they were doing the right thing, there was information to the contrary readily available to the mx dept. This information was NOT made available to the crew. For those willing to spend many hours researching this whole affair, the full story is a stinging indictment of a company cost savings plan gone wrong and a series of what I believe to be reprehensible management actions.
Considering what the crew could have reasonably be expected to know and do given their qualification as pilots, the blame rests squarely on the company. Though some individuals like myself had knowledge beyond the scope of what might normally be expected of flightcrew, that does not serve as an indictment of this crew's following of the direction provided to them by their company, who they might well have reasonably believed knew more than they.
Overall, another poor example even though there is some truth in the argument.
Your 'I don't think, I do what I am told' approach to aviation is a credit to all the airline chief pilots who have specifically culled any independent reasoning ability out of it's ranks.
Do I detect a slight hint of contempt for authority figures here?
Well that's understandable. Particularly in today's aviation business environment. Still, it's not an attitude one wants to become widely known for. Perhaps many pilots have made a conscious decision that it's better to question authority more quietly, in a way that doesn't needlessly expose them to unwanted managerial scrutiny. Seems kinda spineless? Such is life in the modern corporate machine. Get used to it, cuz it's here to stay. But that doesn't mean one has to do something they know to be wrong. In real conditions of duress, you may find your fellow pilots to be less sheeplike than you seem to believe. However I have to opine that one would be well advised to reserve acting contrary to SOP or accepted policy for situations where the "accepted" or conventional action is either clearly inappropriate or inapplicable to the circumstances. None of the above examples clearly pass the test. Maybe a better example?
So bringing this back to the subject rejecting a takeoff after having accelerated beyond V1.
Of course we can think of circumstances when the potential consequences of aborting beyond V1 might be preferable to the consequences of continuing the takeoff. Under a "system approach" to the problem, statistical analysis will be a large component of any policy promulgated by airlines, manufacturers or regulators. As the commander of an airplane, your obligation is to do whatever is necessary to preserve the safety of your flight. It may come to pass that doing so requires a departure from regs, policies or established procedures. If so, your every move might later come into question. If you're wrong there may be consequences of a professional, legal or mortal nature. This is what you accept every time you sit down in the cockpit. Rules, procedures and policies define the framework for your operations. It is recognized that operating outside the framework may become necessary under certain circumstances. Better make sure you're right when you do.
Just wanted to let you know: We're all counting on you!
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Reminds of playing football...the coach gives you a play...you call a different one...you throw a touchdown pass..
One coach is mad...another is glad you got the win...
I follow the line of thinking that if I put points on the board...you can whine all you want about how I am a cowboy...the Prom queen is coming home with me. Results count in this business, not how many buddies you keep happy. Not everyone sees it that way though.
Sully put an airbus into the river...it was either that or hit the side of a building...he gets points for no loss of life...if he had been able to do a u turn, dead stick back to his departed field successfully everyone would have whined about how he could have killed everyone..despite saving the plane as well as people.
Seems the gold standard these days is to what is expected, but if you do a little more your reviled for it. I guess it's ok to be good, just not that good.
One coach is mad...another is glad you got the win...
I follow the line of thinking that if I put points on the board...you can whine all you want about how I am a cowboy...the Prom queen is coming home with me. Results count in this business, not how many buddies you keep happy. Not everyone sees it that way though.
Sully put an airbus into the river...it was either that or hit the side of a building...he gets points for no loss of life...if he had been able to do a u turn, dead stick back to his departed field successfully everyone would have whined about how he could have killed everyone..despite saving the plane as well as people.
Seems the gold standard these days is to what is expected, but if you do a little more your reviled for it. I guess it's ok to be good, just not that good.
