AF 447 Thread No. 6
Brief off topic:
Way in the past, on a day we were flying the local DC-9, they gave us a recorder box with a microphone on a long cord attached.
The purpose was to sample cockpit noise levels.
On taxi out the guy in the right seat gave me a sly grin, opened his sliding window and hung the microphone outside.
When we got to the runway we got one of those "no delay please, keep it rolling, traffic 2 mile final" clearances to go. He quickly closed his window and off we went.
The banging noise on the right side of the fuselage prompted an "Oh $%#" from him and some momentary concern for the right engine, but it stopped after the flaps were up. Engine fine.
We figured the mic was gone, and we had a whole flight to come up with a story. However after we landed, he opened his window and reeled the still attached mic back in.
The folks who analyzed the recording were somehow unable to see the humorous aspect of this.
Be careful what you hang out.
(The F-4 had a yaw string for a time but it only served to scare you at high AOA so it was removed.)
Back to JC's hamsterwheel.
Way in the past, on a day we were flying the local DC-9, they gave us a recorder box with a microphone on a long cord attached.
The purpose was to sample cockpit noise levels.
On taxi out the guy in the right seat gave me a sly grin, opened his sliding window and hung the microphone outside.
When we got to the runway we got one of those "no delay please, keep it rolling, traffic 2 mile final" clearances to go. He quickly closed his window and off we went.
The banging noise on the right side of the fuselage prompted an "Oh $%#" from him and some momentary concern for the right engine, but it stopped after the flaps were up. Engine fine.
We figured the mic was gone, and we had a whole flight to come up with a story. However after we landed, he opened his window and reeled the still attached mic back in.
The folks who analyzed the recording were somehow unable to see the humorous aspect of this.
Be careful what you hang out.
(The F-4 had a yaw string for a time but it only served to scare you at high AOA so it was removed.)
Back to JC's hamsterwheel.
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I think what's happened is that, as the geek squad (sorry guys and gals) began to be the ones setting up airplanes, the old guard/pilot crowd had to defer to them regarding training requirements.... The geek squad then inundated them with a whole bunch of "if then else" and logic flow style training, and the piloting was forgotten.
This tragic accident has likely(hopefully!) served as a catalyst to correct that.
This tragic accident has likely(hopefully!) served as a catalyst to correct that.
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Grity,
I liked your picture (happy memories), but just to be precise, as noted by gums ... "AoA string" would be more appropriate.
I liked your picture (happy memories), but just to be precise, as noted by gums ... "AoA string" would be more appropriate.
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 28th Aug 2011 at 20:28.
Originally Posted by BOAC
PJ - the problem with your suggestion is that it does not cover all bases, in that with a total baro data failure one could see a crew 'floundering' for a pitch attitude, whereas 5 is SAFE, will not cause a stall from steady cruise and will then give time to enter the trouble shooting phase with pitch/power from the QRH.
Originally Posted by gums
I am disturbed by some here that believe you can handle an emergency situation or an "upset" ( love that term, and cracks me up and guess it really means "WTF?, over") by following rote, memorized procedures for more than a few seconds.
Originally Posted by gums
Make no mistake, great cockpit displays and unambiguous caution/warning indications are extremely important. I don't believe the AF447 crew had such.
Originally Posted by gums
the sucker will settle into a decent stall and not spin due to great yaw control laws
Originally Posted by gums
I also want to take exploit this post to challenge one contributor that asserts the best way to stop on a slick runway is to watch the speed indications on the gauges. (...) Ain't no gauge invented except a HUD with a good flight path vector that is still working with weight-on-wheels that shows you that you are sliding off the runway. You look out the windshield and feel your skid. Simply holding a heading won't help.
You might find interesting that in my regular airline life, I have absolutely no need to look down to see any of those aforementioned parameters. They are all nicely and neatly presented in front of me on Flight Dynamics (TM) Head-up Guidance System. Inertial deceleration. Air data derived deceleration. GPS groundspeed. Inertial flightpath vector. Runway remaining in low visibility roll-out mode.
I find all of those a bit more reliable and precise than my own nether regions, sir.
However, during my A320 days, we had no HGS and crew coordination during tricky landings was even more important than nowadays, when it's bloomingly high. It was expected that PF would keep an eye on the world outside, trying to keep the aeroplane on the centerline so PNF would keep head down and monitor spoiler deployment, reverser operation and deceleration. We believed that one's sense of deceleration is not to be trusted, especially when one is struggling to maintain the control so we task shared. I don't think we were wrong.
Body rates
No problem, Clandestino.
I have been having a problem expressing myself lately.
Still want folks to know that the human "body rates" can help for the first second when something unusual happens. Also, you cannot depend upon gauges when you have to make very quick control inputs flying a few feet on the wing of your leader. Besides, you can't do much except take an occasional glance at the HUD or ADI to let you know you have not been in a sustained bank or whatever.
The HUD's I flew quit showing the aircraft vector once weight-on-wheels switch was activated. I agree that the speed indication is very important once you know/feel that you are slowing down. But I never needed to look at the speed "thermometer" in the first second I tapped the brakes on an icy runway. Most of my early birds did not have an "inertial" groundspeed indication, and the pneumatic pitot reading went to zero around 40 knots.
Same observation as far as skid is concerned. I'll take my butt for the first half a second, then depend upon my eyeballs to keep tracking down the centerline. And BTW, when I landed the Viper with that leading edge flap up, the flight path marker was almost useless ( I musta had 15 degrees of yaw), so I flew the ILS gauges even tho I broke outta the overcast about 1200 or so feet AGL. I simply tracked my butt down the centerline until "impact", heh heh. Next guy to try it almost pranged, as I had not yet briefed all the pilots on the 'technique". Additionally, the preferred technique ( actually "mandatory") was to land in a crab when crosswinds were high. The aileron-rudder interconnect cut out with weight-on-wheels, so trying to land "wing low" in a slip resulted in a huge yaw moment upon touchdown. Not good, to say the least, and another instructor tried it one day when messing around.
My view of the 'bus rudder is not that the FBW system has a "spin resistance" feature as we had in the Viper once our AoA was above 30 degrees. Seems to me that the basic yaw damper function and a great directional stability that is inherent in the jet's design did the trick. i would also postulate that spoilers could have compensated for adverse yaw once the crew got into uncharted territory.
I agree that the true "upset" was not loss of the pitot system or A/P disconnect. We are in the same "zone" in that regard.
The stall warning that seems to be audible in the cockpit of AF447 still puzzles me. I am not sure if the crew ignored it due to the unreliable airspeed or what. A mystery to me as well as many here.
Finally, I am overjoyed that commercial jets are finally getting good HUD's. The Shuttle didn't get one until just before Challenger, or even about the same time. My 'nam roomie was the lead astronaut for the Shuttle's HUD, and had to overcome some resistance from Crippen, Young and others of the "old guard". I was a techno-geek, and used the HUD more than most in the old days. The "inertial" vertical velocity" was especially handy, and later HUD's had inertial ground speed. Still had an easy cross-check with the steam gauges, plus the AoA indexers on each side of the HUD ( ask 'bird and RF4 and others that flew Navy jets).
I have been having a problem expressing myself lately.
Still want folks to know that the human "body rates" can help for the first second when something unusual happens. Also, you cannot depend upon gauges when you have to make very quick control inputs flying a few feet on the wing of your leader. Besides, you can't do much except take an occasional glance at the HUD or ADI to let you know you have not been in a sustained bank or whatever.
The HUD's I flew quit showing the aircraft vector once weight-on-wheels switch was activated. I agree that the speed indication is very important once you know/feel that you are slowing down. But I never needed to look at the speed "thermometer" in the first second I tapped the brakes on an icy runway. Most of my early birds did not have an "inertial" groundspeed indication, and the pneumatic pitot reading went to zero around 40 knots.
Same observation as far as skid is concerned. I'll take my butt for the first half a second, then depend upon my eyeballs to keep tracking down the centerline. And BTW, when I landed the Viper with that leading edge flap up, the flight path marker was almost useless ( I musta had 15 degrees of yaw), so I flew the ILS gauges even tho I broke outta the overcast about 1200 or so feet AGL. I simply tracked my butt down the centerline until "impact", heh heh. Next guy to try it almost pranged, as I had not yet briefed all the pilots on the 'technique". Additionally, the preferred technique ( actually "mandatory") was to land in a crab when crosswinds were high. The aileron-rudder interconnect cut out with weight-on-wheels, so trying to land "wing low" in a slip resulted in a huge yaw moment upon touchdown. Not good, to say the least, and another instructor tried it one day when messing around.
My view of the 'bus rudder is not that the FBW system has a "spin resistance" feature as we had in the Viper once our AoA was above 30 degrees. Seems to me that the basic yaw damper function and a great directional stability that is inherent in the jet's design did the trick. i would also postulate that spoilers could have compensated for adverse yaw once the crew got into uncharted territory.
I agree that the true "upset" was not loss of the pitot system or A/P disconnect. We are in the same "zone" in that regard.
The stall warning that seems to be audible in the cockpit of AF447 still puzzles me. I am not sure if the crew ignored it due to the unreliable airspeed or what. A mystery to me as well as many here.
Finally, I am overjoyed that commercial jets are finally getting good HUD's. The Shuttle didn't get one until just before Challenger, or even about the same time. My 'nam roomie was the lead astronaut for the Shuttle's HUD, and had to overcome some resistance from Crippen, Young and others of the "old guard". I was a techno-geek, and used the HUD more than most in the old days. The "inertial" vertical velocity" was especially handy, and later HUD's had inertial ground speed. Still had an easy cross-check with the steam gauges, plus the AoA indexers on each side of the HUD ( ask 'bird and RF4 and others that flew Navy jets).
If someone who knows has the time and patience, could they explain what actions would be necessary for the crew to get the AP back and what dynamic state the a/c must be in for the AP to capture control ? Reason for asking is that before the 'details' became known I rather expected to find the crew heads-down dealing with the computers but this seems not to have been any sort of factor.
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LW_50 :
According to the documents I've got, inhibition of A/P is not necessarily the case as a result of Alternate Law latching, in fact the only control law where the manuals specifically state A/P is unavailable is Direct. However, the A/P disconnect in this case was due to ADR disagree. If I recall correctly, it was possible in some cases to re-engage A/P once stability was restored, but according to the Flight article below, EASA are mandating a change to inhibit A/P for as long as ADR disagree is active. They don't say if this behaviour should be latched.
A330/340 change to inhibit autopilot if airspeed unreliable
It's curious in a way, because it appears the AF447 crew did not try to re-engage A/P, but maybe as part of the simulator testing they've discovered anomalous behaviour if you try.
According to the documents I've got, inhibition of A/P is not necessarily the case as a result of Alternate Law latching, in fact the only control law where the manuals specifically state A/P is unavailable is Direct. However, the A/P disconnect in this case was due to ADR disagree. If I recall correctly, it was possible in some cases to re-engage A/P once stability was restored, but according to the Flight article below, EASA are mandating a change to inhibit A/P for as long as ADR disagree is active. They don't say if this behaviour should be latched.
A330/340 change to inhibit autopilot if airspeed unreliable
It's curious in a way, because it appears the AF447 crew did not try to re-engage A/P, but maybe as part of the simulator testing they've discovered anomalous behaviour if you try.
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Human cognitive limitations
Clandestino posted:
A little exercise for those that are interested.
Go back a page or two and read one of the more technical posts - say by Owain, while doing that try to recite a well known child's rhyme to yourself at the same time have someone read a paragraph of different text for you to to write down. You will find that you cannot do all of these - in fact if you concentrate on the reading YOU WILL NOT EVEN HEAR the person talking to you.
This is not selective deafness - it is because the human brain has a limited number of cognitive channels and they can only handle ONE input at a time. So aural verbal, visual verbal and speaking verbal activities all use the same single verbal cognitive channel. (see the work of Christopher Wickens).
Some people can if trained and practiced rapidly switch between various verbal inputs and outputs - but if something important happens on one input they WILL NOT HEAR the others.
Think about how many times when you are driving and there are complex lane changes and road signs... that you may have had to ask a passenger to repeat themselves.
The reason that 'steam gauges with needles' seem to be easier to read is that they are a spatial cognitive load and form patterns that can be recognized without much cognitive effort. All the glass cockpit tapes with numbers and the ECAM require visual verbal analysis; and no-one can read one thing and fully understand it while saying something else and listening and comprehending something else again. The human brain cannot do it so will just 'drop' any input that is the overload - it is perfectly possible that the pilots literally did not hear the stall warning as their verbal processing cognitive channel was already overloaded. A stick shaker or other haptic input, like someone tapping you on the shoulder when you are busy, can have an immediate attention getting effect that a voice alarm or flashing words may not.
One of the aspects I expect the BEA Human Factors investigators to look at is the cognitive workload that the ECAM and failure messages put on the pilots. Especially the aspect of overloading particular cognitive channels. Perhaps every potential emergency scenario should be subject to what is called a 'cognitive walk-through' that actually assesses the cognitive loads and identifies likely overloads.
Older pilots may well have followed a rather older but repeatedly successful dictum - disregarding all the cacophony - aviate (i.e. pitch and power), navigate, then communicate.
It mightn't pass the sim check ride - but it may have had a better outcome in the real world.
I am sorry sir, but ambiguity of "STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL" aural warning is lost upon me but it is for BEA HF group to discover why crew went selectively deaf on stall warning. Granted, stickshaker and big red flashing "STALL" in the middle of PFD or as separate light somewhere on glareshield might have helped a bit but questions remain: why did the RH pilot pulled the aeroplane in the stall in the first place? Why didn't the LH pilots survival instinct kick in?
Go back a page or two and read one of the more technical posts - say by Owain, while doing that try to recite a well known child's rhyme to yourself at the same time have someone read a paragraph of different text for you to to write down. You will find that you cannot do all of these - in fact if you concentrate on the reading YOU WILL NOT EVEN HEAR the person talking to you.
This is not selective deafness - it is because the human brain has a limited number of cognitive channels and they can only handle ONE input at a time. So aural verbal, visual verbal and speaking verbal activities all use the same single verbal cognitive channel. (see the work of Christopher Wickens).
Some people can if trained and practiced rapidly switch between various verbal inputs and outputs - but if something important happens on one input they WILL NOT HEAR the others.
Think about how many times when you are driving and there are complex lane changes and road signs... that you may have had to ask a passenger to repeat themselves.
The reason that 'steam gauges with needles' seem to be easier to read is that they are a spatial cognitive load and form patterns that can be recognized without much cognitive effort. All the glass cockpit tapes with numbers and the ECAM require visual verbal analysis; and no-one can read one thing and fully understand it while saying something else and listening and comprehending something else again. The human brain cannot do it so will just 'drop' any input that is the overload - it is perfectly possible that the pilots literally did not hear the stall warning as their verbal processing cognitive channel was already overloaded. A stick shaker or other haptic input, like someone tapping you on the shoulder when you are busy, can have an immediate attention getting effect that a voice alarm or flashing words may not.
One of the aspects I expect the BEA Human Factors investigators to look at is the cognitive workload that the ECAM and failure messages put on the pilots. Especially the aspect of overloading particular cognitive channels. Perhaps every potential emergency scenario should be subject to what is called a 'cognitive walk-through' that actually assesses the cognitive loads and identifies likely overloads.
Older pilots may well have followed a rather older but repeatedly successful dictum - disregarding all the cacophony - aviate (i.e. pitch and power), navigate, then communicate.
It mightn't pass the sim check ride - but it may have had a better outcome in the real world.
Ian W, interesting post. I read somewhere that Vietnam war pilots could get saturated with aural inputs and sometimes failed to hear an important tone or alarm such as incoming missile...
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One of the aspects I expect the BEA Human Factors investigators to look at is the cognitive workload that the ECAM and failure messages put on the pilots. Especially the aspect of overloading particular cognitive channels. Perhaps every potential emergency scenario should be subject to what is called a 'cognitive walk-through' that actually assesses the cognitive loads and identifies likely overloads.
I think you're definitely on to something with your second and third sentences there, but I'd like to see what you think about an alternative theory/explanation that I posted on the R&N thread. The particular links are below.
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post6665388 (1)
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post6665478 (2)
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post6665527 (3)
The meat of the theory is in the third one, but the first two provide background notes as I was working through it. The first in particular lists data points in the interim report that I hadn't put together before.
In a nutshell, I'm not convinced that the ECAM messages provided that much of a distraction, except initially - the PNF calls out the most important ones at any rate. Disregard the PF for now, and focus on the PNF - he's clearly getting jumpy as soon as the PF takes manual control, but because of the informal handover, he doesn't know his boundaries of authority, so he summons the Captain to clarify. The stall warning goes off shortly afterwards and after approx. 50 seconds of letting the PF handle the aircraft, the PNF has had enough and takes control. The inputs he makes are correct, but not enough - a couple of seconds later the PF takes control back unannounced (i.e the PNF still thinks he has control) and starts pulling the nose up again. A second or two after that, the stall warning stops, with both the PNF and the PF thinking they have control. The PNF's inputs were correct (lower the nose, stabilise roll), but again - not enough. Did he think he had resolved the problem with the end of stall warning? Complicating matters even further is the arrival of the Captain - 2 seconds before the SW stops, when the PNF presumably turns round to talk to him, and as such he loses all focus on the flight controls and the PF is still pulling back.
I'm not sure if human/machine cognitive overload is the problem here so much as the level of pressure and stress on the PNF. For all my opinion's worth as a layman with an interest, could it be the human/human interface that is causing the issue?
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Iain W
There are many examples of 'operatives' of machinery with 'steam gauges' ignoring them with disastrous consequences. The idea that a spatial cognitive load would work better than a visual verbal stimulus is not actually correct. We possess the ability to filter these out as well. The same goes for a stick shaker which given how the PF reacted might have been just as useless as all the other warnings. Recognising the actuality and responding appropriately is the key to dealing with a situation. This involves knowing your machine and good training. The latter aspect is vital in overcoming the psychological shock (and shock is the operative factor here) of a sudden unexpected event. A chain of command could have helped here and more decisive action by the PNF. DozyWannabee raises an important point about human/human interface. Once again we have to ask is AF's flight deck management procedure inadequate?
There are many examples of 'operatives' of machinery with 'steam gauges' ignoring them with disastrous consequences. The idea that a spatial cognitive load would work better than a visual verbal stimulus is not actually correct. We possess the ability to filter these out as well. The same goes for a stick shaker which given how the PF reacted might have been just as useless as all the other warnings. Recognising the actuality and responding appropriately is the key to dealing with a situation. This involves knowing your machine and good training. The latter aspect is vital in overcoming the psychological shock (and shock is the operative factor here) of a sudden unexpected event. A chain of command could have helped here and more decisive action by the PNF. DozyWannabee raises an important point about human/human interface. Once again we have to ask is AF's flight deck management procedure inadequate?
Dozy...
RE:
IanW's comments and yours are not mutually exclusive. Both factors were at play here and I believe, in terms of "cause", the final report will reflect and expand upon the points expressed in IanW's excellent post, as well as your insightful observations re the PNF /PF interactions. (Just because you're a "layman" in terms of piloting, doesn't mean you have this wrong.)
RE:
I'm not sure if human/machine cognitive overload is the problem here so much as the level of pressure and stress on the PNF. For all my opinion's worth as a layman with an interest, could it be the human/human interface that is causing the issue?
IanW's comments and yours are not mutually exclusive. Both factors were at play here and I believe, in terms of "cause", the final report will reflect and expand upon the points expressed in IanW's excellent post, as well as your insightful observations re the PNF /PF interactions. (Just because you're a "layman" in terms of piloting, doesn't mean you have this wrong.)
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HN, AoA- or side- or pitch-string a correct name is not vitalli for a 20" wool-fathom
how exact will it work outside the side window of an A330??
between 2 and 3 deg is my expectation,
so mayby it is not exact enough to deside if AoA is 4 or 5 deg, but il will react very fast every time and for sure even with slow speed (<<60kn) and you can absolute shure distinguish between highspeed and stall,
it is so easy to check out, I hope that we find a jet-captain for a honest try
how exact will it work outside the side window of an A330??
between 2 and 3 deg is my expectation,
so mayby it is not exact enough to deside if AoA is 4 or 5 deg, but il will react very fast every time and for sure even with slow speed (<<60kn) and you can absolute shure distinguish between highspeed and stall,
it is so easy to check out, I hope that we find a jet-captain for a honest try
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Hi DozzyWannabe & IanW,
I agree with both your posts and believe it points to another couple of holes in the cheese lining up.
The auditory overload of ALT Alert, ECAM Dings, "Read ECAM" etc. possibly led to the mental exclusion of "Stall Stall". They simply didn't hear it. In a previous post (512), I mentioned another crew who didn't hear "Dual Input" for over 90 seconds.
Both pilots are provided with the FD/AP modes on their PFDs so they can monitor what the AP/FD is attempting to do - yet when manual flying without the FD, PNF has absolutely no idea what input PF is making (due Side Stick design) or what he is aiming for. PNF probably did not realise how much over controlling input was being made by PF.
I agree with both your posts and believe it points to another couple of holes in the cheese lining up.
The auditory overload of ALT Alert, ECAM Dings, "Read ECAM" etc. possibly led to the mental exclusion of "Stall Stall". They simply didn't hear it. In a previous post (512), I mentioned another crew who didn't hear "Dual Input" for over 90 seconds.
Both pilots are provided with the FD/AP modes on their PFDs so they can monitor what the AP/FD is attempting to do - yet when manual flying without the FD, PNF has absolutely no idea what input PF is making (due Side Stick design) or what he is aiming for. PNF probably did not realise how much over controlling input was being made by PF.
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Chu Chu and others - this is an interesting
This is where pilots may become obsolete. Computers doing it right can recover from singularly amazing upsets. Sure, this is a model. And with enough power you can fly a lawnmower and control it. This one is a DARPA project. So I suspect the cheats have been turned off. Only the Collins adaptive technology remains to save the plane.
Sufficient data existed on AF447. The meatware failed. It failed partly because data needed was not present in the cockpit in a form the pilots appreciated. It failed partly because the pilots were not trained to fly the plane in unusual configuration where dial-a-flight didn't work and most of the "protections" had vanished. Nor were they encouraged to practice flying the plane. Finally the software design did not permit or make feasible flying in a simulated ALT2 environment for practice.
If the airlines are not going to train pilots and provide pilots with all the equipment that might be needed when going gets tough and instruments are all you have, I for one would not want to fly the plane under those circumstances even given the otherwise sterling flight safety records they have.
This is where pilots may become obsolete. Computers doing it right can recover from singularly amazing upsets. Sure, this is a model. And with enough power you can fly a lawnmower and control it. This one is a DARPA project. So I suspect the cheats have been turned off. Only the Collins adaptive technology remains to save the plane.
Sufficient data existed on AF447. The meatware failed. It failed partly because data needed was not present in the cockpit in a form the pilots appreciated. It failed partly because the pilots were not trained to fly the plane in unusual configuration where dial-a-flight didn't work and most of the "protections" had vanished. Nor were they encouraged to practice flying the plane. Finally the software design did not permit or make feasible flying in a simulated ALT2 environment for practice.
If the airlines are not going to train pilots and provide pilots with all the equipment that might be needed when going gets tough and instruments are all you have, I for one would not want to fly the plane under those circumstances even given the otherwise sterling flight safety records they have.
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ChristiaanJ, know in context was "has the data present for use". The data certainly was present on the plane. It equally certainly was not adequately presented to the crew.
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Dozy, in light of Ian's fine presentation, a repeat performance indicating that the noise here obscured his message the first time, perhaps icons would be better than words. I suspect an image of a plane hanging by its nose to indicate stall might get some attention.
Only a small fraction kidding.
Only a small fraction kidding.
