Mr Optimistic

Seat belts ? Was going to suggest perhaps unbuckling was in readiness to allow Capt to take place but on reflection seems odd the two seats were recovered with occupants if one was unbuckled. Hard injuries would probably show it if the autopsy looked.

Linktrained

It would appear that both PF and PNF may not have been scanning their instrument panels. When the Captain returned he was not briefed ( in time ) to take positive action.
A light showing that excessive trim had been selected, just might have served to prompt ONE of the three pilots that something was amiss, sooner.

The ISIS might well have been outside the visual scan of this PF. To me, it appears a wonderful piece of " Watch-making". It is all there, but too small to read in any turbulence.
Has it ever been used in anger from the right hand seat ? ( Try using it as the primary instrument ... on a Simulator, of course !)

All those years ago sometimes I would be left under the hood of a Link Trainer with instructions to make the instructor's Crab draw a picture of a hand, complete with index finger and thumb. This required accuracy of maintaining a straight course with precise turns at the right times. It was easier to do with a full panel and the rough air "off". Surely it should be possible to use this as an economical training device, if fitted with a side stick. And this SS could be arranged to have increasing sensitivity with altitude.

A few days ago we saw the required power settings for UAS. It would appear to be what the PNF had to look these up...
Just a very minor point... A whole block of figures may be easier to read if they are broken up with either a small space or a line, every four, five or six lines. The human eye is used to reading horizontal lines. A little turbulence could cause an error.

jcjeant

Hi,

I'm happy that at least two people read my message ...
Unfortunately those two people don't understand why I posted this message (certainly Lemurian)
I wanted to put the light on a discripancy between the two reports.
This is about the licences of the PF (and this is a important point)
Read again ... if you had not seen the PF licenses discripancy as reported by BEA
If this is an omission by the BEA (in the first report) .. this is a serious issue .. as the BEA is not a avertissement agency who promote beans or carrots .. with those reports but instead .. a agency who analyse a accident with a result of the loss of 228 lifes
What is true about the licenses ? ... the N°1 or the N°3 report ?
The minimum duty for the BEA is to be accurate with such informations easy to collect

takata

It was a speculation. Cockpit seats were recovered and they never gave further details about who was or wasn't seated. Hence, don't take it as a fact.

whenrealityhurts

Just read it was pilot error.

I am curious how long apologizing and making excuses for the pilots will continue here and elsewhere in the lack of realization and denial that keeping the rubber side down on an aircraft isn't that hard.

Reminds of the Concord crash...certainly they weren't overweight, certainly they didn't know they didn't continue with an engine fire...no way, not them...

Have a little back bone guys...people screw up. And yes, they might be your friends.

takata

Report #1 was 30 days after the crash, Nr.#3 is 25 months later. In between, they have completed what could have been lacking (few dates) at the time of the first one. Don't you think it's quite probable?
In fact, you would like to sell us that they have fabricated this pilot's licences to cover up Air France ass?
Why don't you try to explain us how you can be such a dedicated BEA or Air France or Airbus or (whatever) hater?
Something very personnal, obviously. Did you ever get yourself (or a close friend of you) a forged licence to show up? I've heard a fairly sad story about that.

HazelNuts39

I'm puzzled by something. I would like to know what significance it has and would welcome any comments: -

Page 114 (Annexe 4 - Paramètres longitudinaux):
The "Vitesse verticale selectée" starts to fluctuate at 2:10:17 and from 2:10:20 to 2:10:41 it is 5000 fpm, then changes to about 1300 fpm.

Page 93 (Annexe 1)
2 h 10 min 17 -- Altitude (ft): 34 976 -- Les FD 1 et 2 redeviennent disponibles ; les modes actifs sont HDG/ALT CRZ*. (...)
2 h 10 min 42 -- La vitesse verticale est de 1 900 ft/min et la vitesse verticale sélectée est de 1 300 ft/min.

safetypee

whenrealityhurts (#1064) “… it was pilot error. ...people screw up.”

I aspire to more modern views of human error, even those which suggest error is a meaningless term, and particularly unhelpful in accident investigation.
The industry, your friends, and even you, might benefit from an understanding of why the crew behaved as they did.

Focussing on error looks at negative aspects and fails to look for positive human contributions, and possibly why they were not employed.
We all make errors (variations in human performance); most are identified and corrected. It’s the ones that aren’t which can hurt; we need to know why they weren’t seen.
It’s not the error itself that is important, but consequences of the error, which more often depend on the culmination of many contributing factors.
Error is always tainted by hindsight, thus always a biased view.
Error directs attention to the individual the sharp end, which may overlook a chain of events or contributions from technical and organisational sources.

Aspects from all of the above are in this accident. However, because it is impossible to know precisely what the individuals thought at the time, any views we might have as to what was seen, understood, or reasoned, can only by supposition; but at least by determining such views it enables us an opportunity to learn.

Concluding ‘pilot error’ as a cause is like closing an investigation without benefit; like closing the mind without learning, and thus preventing opportunity to help avoid similar human responses in similar demanding situations.

jcjeant

Hi,

takata write:

No further details ?

Interim report N°3 page 41

So at least they give details about the state of the seat belts
This is not so important to know if the pilots were remaining in their seat .. as we know who was seated when airplane was flying ..
It's (speculation) almost certain that the PF was not retrieved in his seat .. (no secured seat belts)

About the CV's .. you know that BEA will collect the CV's and not parts from there or there ...
The CV is complete when collected and it was certainly not interest from Air France or other authorized agencies to give incomplete CV with a lack of mention of a important thing as a license .... !!
Nothing personnal .. I just read the reports of the BEA ...
Anyone who read it will find those differences ...

takata

Remonte ! remonte! remonte! remonte!
If you native language is french you know certainly that is not concerning something on the panel
He tell just to climb again .. to take more altitude
or maybe he is indeed encouraging the aircraft (he speak to the aircraft - irrational) and this if true show a certain state of intense stress or panic.

takata

I was talking about the recovered bodies in relation to the recovered seats. Saying that any cockpit seat was recovered with its occupant "strapped" is a pure speculation. There was certainly no official comment about that.

About the licences, you may believe in whatever conspiracy you want. Very few people around here, me excluded, still bother about your daily rants anymore.

jcjeant

Hi,

I don't bother who read or not my or your messages ... that's not important.

takata

You get me right. Note that I changed the grammar above as I thought (afterall) that this sentence didn't make a lot of sense previously.

Lemurian

jcj,
You're way out of your league and your agenda becomes tiring.
So, you're disputing the fact that the first report didn't mention the ATPL qual of the second copilot ?
Big deal ! At Air France, all pilots pass their ALTP, plus long range nav before their first long haul aircraft type-rating.
Not mentioning that licence is an oversight.

DJ77

HN39, It appears that each time the FDs become available again and engage in HDG/VS mode the selected V/S in the FCU window resets to the instantaneous V/S.

EDIT: "Vitesse verticale sélectée" = Selected V/S = target vertical speed for AFS in HDG / VS mode, normally adjustable by a knob on the FCU.

grity

that is the line I ask for, but sorry I dont understand what it mean .......

takata

How would he know that the aircraft is going down beside looking at the variomètre? Everybody in the cockpit seems to have been totally focused on it and this is certainly understandable.
So yes, it may be addressed to the gauge (figurative), hence the aircraft, hence not the PF. Seriously, would you have any doubt about their stress level with such a high sinking rate with so few altitude left?
Such kind of talk to the machine is pretty common on CVRs.

There is another passage with a possible double meaning:
- 2 h 11 min 06 "(…) il vient ou pas"
a) ... is he comming or not? (the captain)
b) ... is she doing it or not? (the aircraft related to imputs applied)
I'm closer to the second sense.

takata

Hi HazelNuts39,
It might be related to ISIS, "barometric pressure selected" (see #2 below, 1.34.25) but I'll look at other possibilities.
About your previous "pseudo-flight curves" k-energy study, no matter what BOAC could think about it, it looks that you were very very close to the real data. Very good job indeed.

ISIS Altitude:

HazelNuts39

Hi Takata,

Txs for yr kind reply. Do I note correctly from the picture of the ISIS that it doesn't show a 'variom`etre'?

takata

Right, lol. It is a target fixation about ISIS recordings because I thought that V/S could be derived from it. Forget it.
"V/S selected" p.114, right? It looks to be related with Flight Guidance. I'm looking at it.

PJ2

HN39;
La vitesse verticale refers to the Vertical Speed indicator on the PFD. The IVSI, (Inertial Vertical Speed Indicator) on the right indicates climbing at a rate of 800fpm.



The la vitesse verticale sélectée refers to the Vertical Speed Selector knob located on the FCU, (Flight Control Unit), shown below. The VS shows a selected rate of "2500"fpm.

This knob also sets the FPA, (Flight Path Angle), when the HDG-VS/TRK-FPA button is toggled to "TRK/FPA".

For these FCU controls to have any effect on the aircraft, the autopilot must be engaged.

Just to acknowledge, DJ77 describes the function in his post above, and mentioned correctly that the VS resets instantaneously if the FDs become available.

The difference referred to here (1900fpm, vice 1300fpm) merely refers to the difference between the indication on the PFD, and the VS setting in the FCU window. I'm unsure why it is mentioned in the report except perhaps to indicate that the FDs were at that moment, functioning.

ADD EDIT after examing page 114:

There is an "ADR" and "IR" vertical speed selection I see. The Vertical Speed has two components which work together to provide the most accurate VSI - a barometric component and an inertial component. The parameter is showing the switching between the two.

I made a cursory examination of what was occurring in the data at the time the Vertical Speed indication switched from IR to ADR and it appears to be the point at which the stall had fully developed, at 02:11:47 or so; a number of other parameters change significantly at this point as well. The THS had reached its maximum setting, the thrust levers were momentarily closed to idle and the engine N1s reduced, (but not to Idle), and the stall warning was inhibited for reasons with which we are now familiar.