AF447 wreckage found

[TJHarwood]

DozyWannabe

I think the Wingman was referring to "revolutionary" in the narrow context of the control columns, as the SSs would have been revolutionary to any pilot (even an A300 pilot) entering the flight deck of a new A320! As Boeing are still using control columns in the 21st century, even on FBW aircraft such as the B777, might it be to reflect pilot mindsets......?

With the benefit of hindsight, would it have been better for all manufacturers to use the same control column system whilst jointly addressing the Stony Point "stick shaker"/stall issues? We now have nearly half the industry using a different system, with flaws appearing.

AF447 stands out. The loss of Capt Warner was a test flight, with all that entails, and no more indicates an A330 fault than the RR engines FOHE issues indicates a B777 fault. The Air Afrique A330 loss is the least of Libya's priorities, so no satisfactory investigation is assured.

AF447 is critical so, unless pilots are better trained at high altitude manual flight, and with all the additional cost that entails, the pitot tubes and ADIRUs had better be damn reliable!

[Welsh Wingman]

DozyWannabe

Thanks for your comments. A few points:

(1) Definitely one for the human factors experts, but unlikely PNF grasped just how far back/NU the PF's inputs were. Not relevant if CRM is perfect, but there already seems on these threads to be a certain amount of consensus on CRM shortcomings to a differing degree....

(2) As TJHarwood has alluded to, and as someone who "lived" during my early piloting years by my AoA indicator, best not to get me started on the design philosophy that resulted in a stall alarm being repeatedly switched off when the aircraft remained ......... in a stall (however far outside of the designed flight envelope).

(3) I wasn't thinking in terms of the A300, although there were revolutionary aspects, but more in the context of what Lockheed, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas were producing. A different "philosophy".

(4) In this world of aviation deregulation, more than ever, there needs to be a global (i.e. especially USA/EU) regulatory response. No airline will take an expensive lead. AF, for example, had 3 hull losses (2 with heavy fatalities) in a decade, but retains a loyal customer base. It has got to be extreme for an (insured) airline before corporate reputation dictates huge costs on a root and branch training and manual flight expertise revamp.....

Additional costs will have to come down as a level playing field, or it is just about hopeless.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by TJHarwood

As Boeing are still using control columns in the 21st century, even on FBW aircraft such as the B777, might it be to reflect pilot mindsets......?

I'm sure I read on here earlier that the original B777 design used sidesticks, but the launch customer's (UA) pilot's union objected - certainly not representative of pilots as a whole!

With the benefit of hindsight, would it have been better for all manufacturers to use the same control column system whilst jointly addressing the Stony Point "stick shaker"/stall issues? We now have nearly half the industry using a different system, with flaws appearing.

Originally Posted by infrequentflyer789

The most interesting link posted on these threads (more than once)
was the Nasa study of A vs B control systems for CFIT escape. Covering sidestick, laws protections the lot. Result:

• the pilots overwhelmingly thought B was the better system
• the actual outcome was that the A system saved your ass more often

So which set of designers got it right ? Not easy.

Sums it up for me.

AF447 is critical so, unless pilots are better trained at high altitude manual flight, and with all the additional cost that entails, the pitot tubes and ADIRUs had better be damn reliable!

Colour me cynical, but I'd be surprised if most airlines couldn't purchase a small airfield hangar and a bunch of trainers (jet and prop) for a fraction of the CEO's annual bonus!

Anyways, I'm spent for now - later.

[Welsh Wingman]

DozyWannabe

Touch wood, but CFIT is not the killer it once was (if still too frequent).

LOC has been the real concern in recent years.......

[Lyman]

And one very good reason is the 320/family CFIT escape solution. I am a big fan!

[Jazz Hands]

This quote from Joe Sutter popped up on a blog yesterday:

Airplanes are supposed to do what the pilot tells them not the other way around. The difference between Boeing and Airbus is the Airbus tells the pilot what to do. That's wrong! The pilot should tell the plane what to do. And you can tell those Airbus people I said that. What are they going to do to me anyway? I'm ninety years old.

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

@ Jazz Hands:

1/ Your link appears broken. Too many stars, it seems

2/ I'll ask his messenger, as Mr Joe Sutter seems out of reach:
- Where exactly did the Airbus A330 of AF447 tell the pilot what to do?
- Where exactly the Airbus A330 of AF447 did not do what its pilot asked for?

[DozyWannabe]

@Jazz Hands, AZR,

Joe Sutter is enough of a legend that he's perfectly entitled to his opinion, even if it betrays his misunderstanding of how a competitor's product works. Hell, if I made it to 90 I'd be inclined to be as opinionated as I liked whenever I liked, even if I knew I was talking horlicks!

[Lyman]

The stuff of urban legend.....

One goal of urban legends is to entertain, and the other is to distract. Comedy has to be generic, or not enough people 'get' it.

So from an internet comet comes further misunderstanding. "Tell the PILOT what to do?" Well, Yeah. By doing it without him/her noticed, warned; by stealth/surprise (ready for flash bang, here)

Bottom line is this, probably. As the a/c "gives it back" it "hangs on". It is not a "secret", for it is published and trained. It is counter intuitive, however, and ultimately leads to disaster, along with other "eccentrics".

POV? Yep. Maybe PJ2 was right, Maybe "Human Factors" is the landscape for the discussion. Although the problem ultimately, is a design that requires a degradation of human skills, and a deeper reliance on Technology that to some extent doesn't allow for an everpresent design consideration. BTW, This "Technology" was new when I was using an APPLE e2.

ROTE learning ending up requiring ROTE handling. There was a fourth "pilot" aboard, and we neglect that influence at our great risk.

Some "one" decided Autotrim was an excellent fallback in recovery from Unusual Attitude(s), and that STALL warning could (should) be defeated at low (!) speed. PILOT ERROR I'm saying, ennabled by a remote command from another time, and another place. What a deadly Intrusion!

So, Yeah. Next time, can we have APPLE?

[TJHarwood]

AZR

"Where exactly did the Airbus A330 of AF447 tell the pilot what to do?"

As BOAC, Lyman and Wingman have alluded to, and wp no doubt to your primary contention that the pilots weren't listening to the A330 telling them that it was stalled(!), the A330 repeatedly told the pilots it was no longer stalled (and at a critical point for stall recovery at FLT 350 as the CDB re-entered the cockpit).........

Lyman

"Although the problem ultimately, is a design that requires a degradation of human skills"

I think that is going a little far, even if there is considerable concern expressed as to what has happened in practice over the past 30 years. There is nothing in the underlying design philosophy itself to preclude pilots from honing their flying skills on light aircraft, line flying by-hand within the flight protection envelope or spending additional time in the simulator. I liked the Wingman's description of Airbus (and the B777 and B787, hence not Boeing v Airbus?) as "airmanship plus", of which the late great David Davies (his fellow countryman) let alone Gordon Corps would approve, which conveys the need for standard flying skills plus additional skills. The problem is far far wider than Toulouse......

PJ2 - any thoughts?

[infrequentflyer789]

Originally Posted by AlphaZuluRomeo

@ Jazz Hands:

1/ Your link appears broken. Too many stars, it seems

2/ I'll ask his messenger, as Mr Joe Sutter seems out of reach:
- Where exactly did the Airbus A330 of AF447 tell the pilot what to do?
- Where exactly the Airbus A330 of AF447 did not do what its pilot asked for?

I'll bite:

a) I don't think they turned FD off did they ? Maybe it told them to climb ?

b) [easier] The pilot definitely, forcefully and persistently told the a/c to climb, meanwhile the stupid a/c ignored him and continued to fall out of the sky. Presumably if you tell a Boeing to climb out of a stall, it does just that.

Did I win ?

[TJHarwood]

IF789/AZR/Lyman

Three A320 hull losses between 1988 and 1992, essentially because the flight crew and the aircraft were on a different "wavelength" i.e. unfamiliarity issues.

Notice any similarities between the Air Inter flight crew's discomfort with having to suddenly make a non-precision landing at Strasbourg and the AF447 F/Os discomfort at having to take manual control at FLT350 (no visual aid, not even moonlight)?

AF447 is so depressing because it is 17 years later, and we have another total disconnect between a flight crew and their aircraft.

Simulator (AB speak) - learn to fly (typerating) direct law, progress to alternate law, round-off with normal law? Gate to gate, every time. All sides of the industry implicated, not just manufacturers or a specific manufacturer (SS/feedback issues notwithstanding vis-a-vis AB).

Commercial pressures? Non fici facio, vera prae ceteris - as Davies would say. Get it sorted. Thanks to automation, properly used, there has never been so little excuse for an air crash.....

[lomapaseo]

Three A320 hull losses between 1988 and 1992, essentially because the flight crew and the aircraft were on a different "wavelength" i.e. unfamiliarity issues

Reminds me of planning a driving vacation in the UK where I would have to adapt to driving with the gear shift on my left and round-abouts that go the wrong way for my skill base..

Do I adapt ?

Take my chances at a higher accident rate while learning to adapt

call for a change of driving regs and car design in the UK?

or simply stick to driving only familar cars?

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by TJHarwood

Three A320 hull losses between 1988 and 1992, essentially because the flight crew and the aircraft were on a different "wavelength" i.e. unfamiliarity issues.

And Airbus changed their training and the FMC interface accordingly.

Notice any similarities between the Air Inter flight crew's discomfort with having to suddenly make a non-precision landing at Strasbourg and the AF447 F/Os discomfort at having to take manual control at FLT350 (no visual aid, not even moonlight)?

Not really - for a start the AF447 PF doesn't make any reference to discomfort until the roll oscillations start - there's no evidence that he's aware he's doing the wrong thing.

Secondly, while the main technical revision to come from the Strasbourg crash was making the Honeywell FMC display the difference between V/S and FPA select in a more obvious way (by the simple addition of illuminating two zeros to the right of the indicator in V/S mode), the background of the two incidents couldn't be any more different, particularly with regard to human factors. Air Inter dealt exclusively in very short flights with very quick turnarounds - very different to Air France's long-haul operations where the possibility of making up lost time is much easier. This is important because Air Inter in the '80s was placed in direct competition with SNCF's new TGV rail service and therefore the penalties for not making schedule were potentially severe.

In the case of the Strasbourg accident, both the Captain and F/O were experienced pilots, but both had less than 100 hours on the A320 - something which would not be allowed today. When Approach control told the Air Inter Captain that he could not use his preferred approach and would have to land on the reciprocal runway, the report says that his tone of voice on the CVR becomes increasingly agitated, possibly due to a combination of frustration at not making schedule and uneasiness with the fact he'd be making an NPA at night for the first time on this type.

Then we have the fact that ATC gave the crew an incorrect vector, putting them off-course laterally, the aforementioned bad interface design making it possible for them to set a 3300 ft/min descent rate as opposed to a FPA of 3.3 degrees and for the worst bit of luck, a random pocket of turbulence causing the A320 to descend even more rapidly.

What this adds up to was that the situation in the flight deck was tense, but they weren't aware of how severe their situation was until they were a few feet away from the mountain. Compare this to the AF447 case where they were well aware they had problems almost as soon as the PF began overcontrolling, but they did not or could not formulate or action a plan to correctly resolve the situation.

The other big difference is the fact that the Strasbourg A320 was in autoflight almost all the way down to the ground, whereas all evidence indicates that the AF447 A330 was manually controlled into trouble.

AF447 is so depressing because it is 17 years later, and we have another total disconnect between a flight crew and their aircraft.

I'd argue that the more pressing worry in the case of AF447 is the flight crew's disconnect from *each other*. They could see what the aircraft was doing and so unlike the Strasbourg crew they were not "behind the aircraft" as such except for one critical detail, and that was that the aircraft was stalled.

the A330 repeatedly told the pilots it was no longer stalled (and at a critical point for stall recovery at FLT 350 as the CDB re-entered the cockpit)

To be fair to the aircraft, it did tell them it was approaching stall, and then that it was stalled, for nearly a minute before the readings caused the stall warning to trip out. Why did they not respond accordingly, whether the Captain was there or not? Why did neither of the F/O's mention to the Captain that they'd had a minute of stall warning prior to his arrival?

I'm not saying that the stall warning logic doesn't need an overhaul, because it clearly does, but ultimately the warning was there and continued long enough for someone to take notice and do something about it (to say nothing of the oscillating bank angle, rollercoaster pitch changes and the rapidly unwinding altimeter)?

Commercial pressures? Non fici facio, vera prae ceteris - as Davies would say. Get it sorted. Thanks to automation, properly used, there has never been so little excuse for an air crash.....

Emphasis mine, and therein lies the rub!

[ Addition : Air Inter's usual practice, because of the unique way they used their aircraft, was to frequently bat their Caravelles around at 300KIAS+ below 10,000ft (sometimes considerably below!), which tended to play havoc with the GPWS hardware available at the time, and for this reason they received a special dispensation to not have GPWS fitted to their A320s, despite incoming regulations requiring it. Shortly after the accident, GPWS became mandatory and was retrofitted to their fleet. ]

[Welsh Wingman]

lomapaseo / TJHarwood

Re: incremental change.

Weight dictated FBW on any SST, with the Concorde's famous rams's horn control columns and "feedback". Built by the predecessors of Airbus.

CONCORDE SST : FLIGHT SYSTEMS

Love the analogy (don't you realise we mainly build roundabouts to stress American tourists, particularly if they are not from Utah....?!) Do Ford/Chrysler/General Motors, when they sell cars in the UK, either:

(1) move the steering wheel to the right of the gear shift; or

(2) abolish the steering wheel in favour of side sticks without (artificial) feedback?

Incremental, even when it involves a bit of a leap....

The serious point, when Airbus embraced automation ahead of Boeing (not instead of Boeing - see B777 onwards), is that there were various options.

Some fast jet pilots were familiar with sticks (side or otherwise). Most civil airline pilots were not.

SSs and the absence of "feedback" were not critical to the automation drive, and don't let anyone tell you otherwise - see Concorde/A300. It was a decision on one aspect of automation.

[Lyman]

Captain Harwood,

The degradation of skills I see is not limited to direct neglect, nor would it be. A "Thick through Disuse" type thing, to where the skills are vestigial, if any remain at all. A great deal of hype re: the platform, at the expense of Laissez faire, le Pilotage?

Now that would be acceptable, should the numbers firm up a sound reason for allowing skills to atrophy. There are none, as you aptly show, 447 is a sad example of a precious penalty for allowing a "blind spot"?

One small addition, the market will not support levels of auto didactic skill, the investment will be ignored, and the entry level, de minimus, will prevail. Thus it actually is a direct degradation, though in this case, market driven.

There is one additional disincentive to "hiring" the self taught (self invested) man/woman: "That one Clive, looks like a troublemaker, to me!"

[DozyWannabe]

@Welsh Wingman - I think a more appropriate analogy would be :

"When we went from horse-drawn carts to motor vehicles, did we attach ropes to the front axles and steer with that (because after all, that's what people are used to), or did we design something more appropriate for the technology?"

and later

"When we went from gigantic steering wheels required for the leverage to move worm-gears, via rack and pinion, to power steering, did we keep the wheels artificially large (because, after all, that's what people were used to), or did we design something more appropriate for the technology?"

If we're to believe the earlier poster, Boeing only retained the yoke under pressure from a single pilot's union (the one that belonged to their launch customer). There has been no unequivocal evidence that the SS/feedback issue has ever played a role in any recent LOC incident (not least because several of them involved yoke-equipped airliners). This argument feels like a cul-de-sac to me, and I think it's a shame we're having it again.

[PS. WW - I'm sure you know which type the sidestick concept was originally tested on, right? ]

[Welsh Wingman]

DozyWannabe / TJHarwood

I don't wish to be accused of putting words into TJHarwood's mouth, but I interpreted his comparison between the crashes as limited to the similarities between the instant discomfort of the PF upon losing his automation. I don't think that was a happy cockpit from the A/P disconnect, and the roll oscillations weren't long in coming....

DozyWannabe - but you raise a point that TJHarwood appears to have overlooked i.e. PNF "nagging". Wasn't the PNF in 1992 concerned about the PF's positional shortcomings (sadly horizontal, not vertical) in much the same way as the AF447 PNF was concerned about the PF's inputs and the climb? Good point re: disconnect between pilots on both occasions.

And whatever one think about an AoA indicator or BUSS as an option, I think we can all agree that a GPWS should never be optional (whatever SNCF's TGV competition).

Human factors, and that must focus on the interface and training. Automation, properly used i.e. "airmanship plus".

[ChristiaanJ]

Originally Posted by DozyWannabe

PS. WW - I'm sure you know which type the sidestick concept was originally tested on, right? ]

The exact answer to that quiz question is of course "F-WTSB".
Without asking Google, I'm not sure whether the original 'joystick' idea dates back to the Viper (F-16) or to the early Atari video game consoles...... i.e., what inspired what?

[flydive1]

The wright flyer used a side stick