AF447 wreckage found
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bubbers44
Not ok. Absolutely not ok. Of course they were expected to recover the a/c. They did not. Why, how, and what to do is an enormous undertaking. To downplay this UAS event, whether out of ignorance, arrogance, or agenda, is most unproductive. Serious issues are in play, from all directions. Simplistic accusations guard against an open mind.
Not ok. Absolutely not ok. Of course they were expected to recover the a/c. They did not. Why, how, and what to do is an enormous undertaking. To downplay this UAS event, whether out of ignorance, arrogance, or agenda, is most unproductive. Serious issues are in play, from all directions. Simplistic accusations guard against an open mind.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by FRying
Honestly, I really doubt I'd feel happy with an alarm screaming every single time I'd be doing the right thing and turning off every single time I'd be doing the wrong thing again. .
Honestly, I really doubt that this argument has any real base. Even though repeated over and over again.
These guys chose to completely ignore the "screaming" stall alarm continuously for over 50 seconds (Do you know how long that is?).
And suddenly they decide to pay attention to it? I seriously doubt that.
But ok, let assume they suddenly for whatever reason cared about the stall warning.
So, you assume, the PNF acted the following way:
- I move the stick foward....oooh, stall warning , bad!
- I move it back....ah, silence again, good!
Excuse me, with all due respect, but that is the 'naive ad hoc learning behaviour' of a 3 year old.
But not the reaction to expected from a higly qualified aviation professional. If you had not completely forgot all about basic aerodynamics, flight mechanics, etc., how can you really believe that pushing the nose down can get you into stall????
Quote:
Originally Posted by FRying
..Considering all that, it's all too easy to speak, all comfy in our couch two years and a zillion articles on the event later.
I really love this kind of argument.
Well, it wasn't actually rocket science, what was demanded from them that night. Most basic airmanship would have been sufficient.
And if that cannot be expected from pilots anymore, then it might really be better to "design them right out of the cockpit".
All right you've got a point. I partially agree. However I have that strange feeling the Airbus philosophy does get in the way of basic airmanship from time to time. I do not mean Airmanship does not apply to Airbus aircraft. What I mean is the way Airbus aircraft are designed, the way the interface, the interaction system was built does not help pilots being pilots on certain instances. This is the reason I posted a reminder about the fact "Airbus aircraft CANNOT stall. Period." (Yeah right...)
Now, sure, once the systems don't kick in in a way that should be leading to recovery, you should be reverting to basic airmanship, almost animal, which these guys did not do. Am I immune to such a lack of behavior myself ? I really have no clue.
Originally Posted by FRying
Honestly, I really doubt I'd feel happy with an alarm screaming every single time I'd be doing the right thing and turning off every single time I'd be doing the wrong thing again. .
Honestly, I really doubt that this argument has any real base. Even though repeated over and over again.
These guys chose to completely ignore the "screaming" stall alarm continuously for over 50 seconds (Do you know how long that is?).
And suddenly they decide to pay attention to it? I seriously doubt that.
But ok, let assume they suddenly for whatever reason cared about the stall warning.
So, you assume, the PNF acted the following way:
- I move the stick foward....oooh, stall warning , bad!
- I move it back....ah, silence again, good!
Excuse me, with all due respect, but that is the 'naive ad hoc learning behaviour' of a 3 year old.
But not the reaction to expected from a higly qualified aviation professional. If you had not completely forgot all about basic aerodynamics, flight mechanics, etc., how can you really believe that pushing the nose down can get you into stall????
Quote:
Originally Posted by FRying
..Considering all that, it's all too easy to speak, all comfy in our couch two years and a zillion articles on the event later.
I really love this kind of argument.
Well, it wasn't actually rocket science, what was demanded from them that night. Most basic airmanship would have been sufficient.
And if that cannot be expected from pilots anymore, then it might really be better to "design them right out of the cockpit".
All right you've got a point. I partially agree. However I have that strange feeling the Airbus philosophy does get in the way of basic airmanship from time to time. I do not mean Airmanship does not apply to Airbus aircraft. What I mean is the way Airbus aircraft are designed, the way the interface, the interaction system was built does not help pilots being pilots on certain instances. This is the reason I posted a reminder about the fact "Airbus aircraft CANNOT stall. Period." (Yeah right...)
Now, sure, once the systems don't kick in in a way that should be leading to recovery, you should be reverting to basic airmanship, almost animal, which these guys did not do. Am I immune to such a lack of behavior myself ? I really have no clue.
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Anyway, the bottom line is :
- we know what would have saved them. We know what needs to be done and we know what we will do if we have to face a similar situation.
- This is a harsh recall that we need to stick by our basic airmanship, never being dictated our fate by technology. For that, hand flying MUST be kept alive and strong. Training should be oriented in such way that pilots will remain pilots, not just technology saavy monkeys.
- we know what would have saved them. We know what needs to be done and we know what we will do if we have to face a similar situation.
- This is a harsh recall that we need to stick by our basic airmanship, never being dictated our fate by technology. For that, hand flying MUST be kept alive and strong. Training should be oriented in such way that pilots will remain pilots, not just technology saavy monkeys.
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Anyway, the bottom line is :
- we know what would have saved them. We know what needs to be done and we know what we will do if we have to face a similar situation.
- This is a harsh recall that we need to stick by our basic airmanship, never being dictated our fate by technology. For that, hand flying MUST be kept alive and strong. Training should be oriented in such way that pilots will remain pilots, not just technology saavy monkeys.
- we know what would have saved them. We know what needs to be done and we know what we will do if we have to face a similar situation.
- This is a harsh recall that we need to stick by our basic airmanship, never being dictated our fate by technology. For that, hand flying MUST be kept alive and strong. Training should be oriented in such way that pilots will remain pilots, not just technology saavy monkeys.
Latest edition of Flight International issue 9-15 August. Page 5 includes the editorial under the title of Comment. The headline is A Harsh Lesson: practice makes perfect. It goes on to say:
“Publication of the Air France 447 CVR transcript has confirmed the crew failed to regain control of the aircraft because they did not understand what was happening.
With shocking clarity, the transcript has revealed the extent of their confusion. It was total. So was it the pilots’ fault? That is far too simplistic. If three qualified pilots do not perform to specification, before blaming them, study their training. The accident investigator, the BEA, has already said the two co-pilots in charge of the aircraft had never been trained for manual flying and stall recovery at the edge of the Airbus A330’s flight envelope. That is what got them into trouble – but when they had four minutes to get out of it, so why couldn’t they? The answer lies in the fact that this is not the only recent example of a crew failing to recover control after losing it. In fact, there have been six other fatal loss-of-control accidents in serviceable airliners since 2000, and they have killed nearly 1000 people.
Flying manually on instruments requires a sophisticated cognitive skill, and today’s high level of automation ensure that pilots never get the practice, so the skill atrophies. Worse still, recurrent training requirements do not recognise that the flying task has changed.
The villains of the piece are the regulators who have failed to update recurrent training requirements.”
My thoughts: Some responsibility lies with the aircraft manufacturers who have always been aware that automation dependency was bound to happen eventually. Regulators won't move unless they see a manufacturer's comment in the FCOM that if nothing else acknowledges the need for operators to ensure crews keep current on manual pure flying skills in the simulator. On the other hand operators are reluctant to make quantum changes to their simulator training syllabus until forced by the regulator.
The solution to the whole subject is really quite simple and that is significantly more training accent on pure flying skills using the simulator - not just a couple of ILS hand flown with FD and autothrottle engaged. If simulator time is already limited due to regulatory box ticking, then simply make the time available by shaving LOFT. And have crews hand fly fifty percent of each simulator period whether type rating or recurrent training.
“Publication of the Air France 447 CVR transcript has confirmed the crew failed to regain control of the aircraft because they did not understand what was happening.
With shocking clarity, the transcript has revealed the extent of their confusion. It was total. So was it the pilots’ fault? That is far too simplistic. If three qualified pilots do not perform to specification, before blaming them, study their training. The accident investigator, the BEA, has already said the two co-pilots in charge of the aircraft had never been trained for manual flying and stall recovery at the edge of the Airbus A330’s flight envelope. That is what got them into trouble – but when they had four minutes to get out of it, so why couldn’t they? The answer lies in the fact that this is not the only recent example of a crew failing to recover control after losing it. In fact, there have been six other fatal loss-of-control accidents in serviceable airliners since 2000, and they have killed nearly 1000 people.
Flying manually on instruments requires a sophisticated cognitive skill, and today’s high level of automation ensure that pilots never get the practice, so the skill atrophies. Worse still, recurrent training requirements do not recognise that the flying task has changed.
The villains of the piece are the regulators who have failed to update recurrent training requirements.”
My thoughts: Some responsibility lies with the aircraft manufacturers who have always been aware that automation dependency was bound to happen eventually. Regulators won't move unless they see a manufacturer's comment in the FCOM that if nothing else acknowledges the need for operators to ensure crews keep current on manual pure flying skills in the simulator. On the other hand operators are reluctant to make quantum changes to their simulator training syllabus until forced by the regulator.
The solution to the whole subject is really quite simple and that is significantly more training accent on pure flying skills using the simulator - not just a couple of ILS hand flown with FD and autothrottle engaged. If simulator time is already limited due to regulatory box ticking, then simply make the time available by shaving LOFT. And have crews hand fly fifty percent of each simulator period whether type rating or recurrent training.
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"Another problem concerns the new automatic systems which are coming into service with newer aircraft and being added to older aircraft.
"Flightcrews become more reliant on the functioning of sophisticated avionics system, and their associated automation to fly the airplane. This is increasingly so as the reliability of such equipment improves. Basic control of the aircraft and supervision of the flight’s progress by instrument indications diminish as other more pressing tasks in the cockpit attract attention because of the overreliance on such automatic equipment.
"Pilots’ testimony indicated that dependence on the reliability and capability of the autopilot is actually greater than anticipated in its early design and its certification. This is particularly true in the cruise phase of flight."
I'll let you chaps work out how long ago that was written.
"Flightcrews become more reliant on the functioning of sophisticated avionics system, and their associated automation to fly the airplane. This is increasingly so as the reliability of such equipment improves. Basic control of the aircraft and supervision of the flight’s progress by instrument indications diminish as other more pressing tasks in the cockpit attract attention because of the overreliance on such automatic equipment.
"Pilots’ testimony indicated that dependence on the reliability and capability of the autopilot is actually greater than anticipated in its early design and its certification. This is particularly true in the cruise phase of flight."
I'll let you chaps work out how long ago that was written.
Originally Posted by Rob21
when the a/c reaches it's max ops ceiling it will, very gently, loose some altitude and go up again, and then gently will loose some altitude again and then will go up again until all passengers are sick. Maybe the pilot will get sick too...
Reason I've used "almost every aeroplane" instead of "every aeroplane" is because overpowered designs with low limiting mach might get one into mach buffet region during climb, however, DP Davies assures us that those were out of commission by 1970.
I've always claimed that best remembered procedures are those pilots understand reasons behind them and likely outcomes of their application.
Originally Posted by airtren
If you read the BEA Report it states clearly that the PF and PNF had no Stall Approach, or Stall at High altitude training.
Is that enough?
Is that enough?
Originally Posted by Drake the outlaw, as quoted by Richard Bach
The inspector is responsible, and you are innocent. All you have to do is let your airplane be destroyed in these mountains because you are not required to know how to survive in any land you fly over. Everyone else is responsible, you are just the guy who does the dying. Is that it?
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Insurance
The only way operators will change their training policy is by pressure of insurance companies.
I am a retired helicopter pilot and I fly a light twin airplane. I remember that insurance companies "gave" reduced premiums to operators sending their pilots to recurrent training at the factory Training Academy.
I hope AF 447's accident will be an "eye opener" for insurance companies. They have more power than regulators. If they "feel" that flight crews need more training, they have the power to put "pressure" on operators.
But if, on the other hand, this accident fell on the "acceptable percentage" of loss, nothing will change.
Very stupid of them if they won't put pressure on operators to increase SIM training time.
Training is never too much, just ask the pilots if they think they are getting enough SIM time.
Twice a year is ridiculous. IMHO, as a/c get more complex automation, flight crews need more training. Not less.
Complexity and automation are here to increase safety, not to reduce pilot training. This is a huge mistake, and AF 447 is another clear proof of that.
Back in the 70's my aerobatics instructor used to say: "modern aircraft have very modern failures..."
I am a retired helicopter pilot and I fly a light twin airplane. I remember that insurance companies "gave" reduced premiums to operators sending their pilots to recurrent training at the factory Training Academy.
I hope AF 447's accident will be an "eye opener" for insurance companies. They have more power than regulators. If they "feel" that flight crews need more training, they have the power to put "pressure" on operators.
But if, on the other hand, this accident fell on the "acceptable percentage" of loss, nothing will change.
Very stupid of them if they won't put pressure on operators to increase SIM training time.
Training is never too much, just ask the pilots if they think they are getting enough SIM time.
Twice a year is ridiculous. IMHO, as a/c get more complex automation, flight crews need more training. Not less.
Complexity and automation are here to increase safety, not to reduce pilot training. This is a huge mistake, and AF 447 is another clear proof of that.
Back in the 70's my aerobatics instructor used to say: "modern aircraft have very modern failures..."
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"Another problem concerns the new automatic systems which are coming into service with newer aircraft and being added to older aircraft.
"Flightcrews become more reliant on the functioning of sophisticated avionics system, and their associated automation to fly the airplane. This is increasingly so as the reliability of such equipment improves. Basic control of the aircraft and supervision of the flight’s progress by instrument indications diminish as other more pressing tasks in the cockpit attract attention because of the overreliance on such automatic equipment.
"Pilots’ testimony indicated that dependence on the reliability and capability of the autopilot is actually greater than anticipated in its early design and its certification. This is particularly true in the cruise phase of flight."
I'll let you chaps work out how long ago that was written.
"Flightcrews become more reliant on the functioning of sophisticated avionics system, and their associated automation to fly the airplane. This is increasingly so as the reliability of such equipment improves. Basic control of the aircraft and supervision of the flight’s progress by instrument indications diminish as other more pressing tasks in the cockpit attract attention because of the overreliance on such automatic equipment.
"Pilots’ testimony indicated that dependence on the reliability and capability of the autopilot is actually greater than anticipated in its early design and its certification. This is particularly true in the cruise phase of flight."
I'll let you chaps work out how long ago that was written.
Those words come from an NTSB report dated 14 June 1973. The subject is the crash, on the preceding 29 December, of Eastern Airlines Flight 401 in the Florida Everglades. That was the L-1011 aboard which the entire crew was busy troubleshooting an indicator light problem while the airplane - with the autopilot inadvertantly disengaged - spiralled slowly down into the swamp.
http://n631s.********.com/2009/10/au...mplacency.html
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Hi, just one quick question (Ï´m sure it has been touched before but looking into the endless pages...) so if anyone could please briefly clarify:
Which technical event/failure made the aircraft´s Normal Law go to Alternate? In the report it only says AP disconnect and then the mode changes. But AP diconnection is surely not enough for reverting to Alternate Law right?
Thanks a lot,
Which technical event/failure made the aircraft´s Normal Law go to Alternate? In the report it only says AP disconnect and then the mode changes. But AP diconnection is surely not enough for reverting to Alternate Law right?
Thanks a lot,
With regard to deficiencies in training, I can appreciate that the initial handling of the aircraft left much to be desired (assuming a climb was not intended) but once stalled the handling wouldn't have been anything like nominal so 'normal' training wouldn't have been much use would it ? The thing I struggle with is how the concept of a stall was outside their conceptual universe. That is pretty fundamental and nothing to do with practicing handling skills or incremental training. Sympathy for the captain though as without knowledge of the earlier climb excursion he was bowled a pretty short ball.
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Grâce au BSPN d’ALTER (note précédente page 2) nous savons donc qu’à la demande d’Airbus, le CEV a réalisé un vol dans les conditions de décrochage où l’A330 s’est trouvé et que les pilotes d’essais n’ont réussi à s’en sortir in extremis … qu’en coupant les 2 réacteurs !
D’ailleurs, lors de la conférence de presse du BEA le 29 juillet, JP Troadec a affirmé en réponse à une question dans la salle « Avant le décrochage, oui, bien sûr, la situation était rattrapable » ce qui signifie qu’après, elle ne l’était plus.
Résumons le contexte du crash :
· Un équipement défectueux, les sondes Pitot AA, qui ne fonctionne pas sans restriction dans tout le domaine de vol de l’A330 et que l’EASA et Airbus feront disparaître en urgence après le crash du 1er juin 2009
· Un constructeur, Airbus, qui se débarrasse du problème en demandant aux pilotes de s’accommoder de ce défaut par l’application d’une procédure
· Une procédure, mise en place pour éviter que l’avion ne sorte de son domaine de vol, qui est inefficace (dixit Airbus en octobre 2008)
· Des normes de certification des sondes Pitot que tous savent obsolètes et que l’EASA modifiera en urgence après l’accident
· Un organisme de prévention, le BEA, qui estime que les, pourtant nombreux, événements liés au blocage des sondes Pitot sont des incidents sans importance
· Une administration, la DGAC, qui refuse de publier la consigne opérationnelle adéquate que l’OCV juge nécessaire
· Une compagnie, Air France, qui ne prend pas les mesures adaptées à sa « grande inquiétude » devant les incidents qui se succèdent
· Un avion de transport de passagers, l’A330, dûment certifié et réputé pour ne pas pouvoir décrocher, mais qui, en fait, ne doit pas se trouver en situation de décrochage car il ne peut pas en sortir
Et pour finir, un équipage qui aurait dû, à lui tout seul, effacer toutes les négligences ou carences décrites ci-dessus...
D’ailleurs, lors de la conférence de presse du BEA le 29 juillet, JP Troadec a affirmé en réponse à une question dans la salle « Avant le décrochage, oui, bien sûr, la situation était rattrapable » ce qui signifie qu’après, elle ne l’était plus.
Résumons le contexte du crash :
· Un équipement défectueux, les sondes Pitot AA, qui ne fonctionne pas sans restriction dans tout le domaine de vol de l’A330 et que l’EASA et Airbus feront disparaître en urgence après le crash du 1er juin 2009
· Un constructeur, Airbus, qui se débarrasse du problème en demandant aux pilotes de s’accommoder de ce défaut par l’application d’une procédure
· Une procédure, mise en place pour éviter que l’avion ne sorte de son domaine de vol, qui est inefficace (dixit Airbus en octobre 2008)
· Des normes de certification des sondes Pitot que tous savent obsolètes et que l’EASA modifiera en urgence après l’accident
· Un organisme de prévention, le BEA, qui estime que les, pourtant nombreux, événements liés au blocage des sondes Pitot sont des incidents sans importance
· Une administration, la DGAC, qui refuse de publier la consigne opérationnelle adéquate que l’OCV juge nécessaire
· Une compagnie, Air France, qui ne prend pas les mesures adaptées à sa « grande inquiétude » devant les incidents qui se succèdent
· Un avion de transport de passagers, l’A330, dûment certifié et réputé pour ne pas pouvoir décrocher, mais qui, en fait, ne doit pas se trouver en situation de décrochage car il ne peut pas en sortir
Et pour finir, un équipage qui aurait dû, à lui tout seul, effacer toutes les négligences ou carences décrites ci-dessus...
With ALTER BSPN so we know that at the request of Airbus, the CEV has made a flight in stall conditions when the A330 was found and test pilots have managed to get out last minute ... that by cutting the two reactors!
Moreover, during the press conference on July 29 BEA, JP Troadec said in response to a question "Before dropping out, yes, of course, the situation was recoverable" which means that after, it was no longer.
Summarize the context of the crash:
• A faulty equipment, pitot probes AA, which does not work without restriction throughout the flight envelope of the A330 and the Airbus and EASA will eliminate emergency after the crash on 1 June 2009
• A manufacturer, Airbus, which gets rid of the problem by requiring pilots to put up with this defect by applying a procedure
• A procedure in place to prevent the aircraft from leaving its flight envelope, which is inefficient (according to Airbus in October 2008)
· On the certification standards of the Pitot probes obsolete and everyone knows that EASA will change after the accident emergency
• A prevention agency, BEA, who believes that, despite numerous events related to the blocking of the Pitot probes incidents are not important
• A administration, the DGAC, which refuses to publish the proper operational directive that VCA deems necessary
• A company, Air France, which does not take measures appropriate to its "great concern" to the incidents which follow
• A passenger plane, the A330, duly certified and known for not being able to stall, but in fact should not be in a position to stall because it can not get out
And finally, a crew that should have been, by itself, remove all deficiencies or omissions described above ...
Moreover, during the press conference on July 29 BEA, JP Troadec said in response to a question "Before dropping out, yes, of course, the situation was recoverable" which means that after, it was no longer.
Summarize the context of the crash:
• A faulty equipment, pitot probes AA, which does not work without restriction throughout the flight envelope of the A330 and the Airbus and EASA will eliminate emergency after the crash on 1 June 2009
• A manufacturer, Airbus, which gets rid of the problem by requiring pilots to put up with this defect by applying a procedure
• A procedure in place to prevent the aircraft from leaving its flight envelope, which is inefficient (according to Airbus in October 2008)
· On the certification standards of the Pitot probes obsolete and everyone knows that EASA will change after the accident emergency
• A prevention agency, BEA, who believes that, despite numerous events related to the blocking of the Pitot probes incidents are not important
• A administration, the DGAC, which refuses to publish the proper operational directive that VCA deems necessary
• A company, Air France, which does not take measures appropriate to its "great concern" to the incidents which follow
• A passenger plane, the A330, duly certified and known for not being able to stall, but in fact should not be in a position to stall because it can not get out
And finally, a crew that should have been, by itself, remove all deficiencies or omissions described above ...
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2 h 12 min 04
2 h 12 min 07
Les aérofreins sont commandés et
déployés.
J’ai l’impression qu’on
a une vitesse de fou
non qu’est-ce que vous
en pensez ?
2 h 12 min 07
Les aérofreins sont commandés et
déployés.
J’ai l’impression qu’on
a une vitesse de fou
non qu’est-ce que vous
en pensez ?
2 h 12 min 04
2 h 12 min 07
The airbrakes are controlled and
deployed.
I have the impression
that we have some
crazy speed no what do
you think?
2 h 12 min 07
The airbrakes are controlled and
deployed.
I have the impression
that we have some
crazy speed no what do
you think?
He has heard or seen anything ?
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jcjeant
Someone has already suggested they were hearing extraordinary aerodynamic noise.
Who, after all, has any experience of the wind noise inside an A330 when it's mostly horizontal but going down at 10000 ft/min?
This crew was not up to the job in so many ways, but I'll forgive them this.
Who, after all, has any experience of the wind noise inside an A330 when it's mostly horizontal but going down at 10000 ft/min?
This crew was not up to the job in so many ways, but I'll forgive them this.
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Someone has already suggested they were hearing extraordinary aerodynamic noise.
Who, after all, has any experience of the wind noise inside an A330 when it's mostly horizontal but going down at 10000 ft/min?
This crew was not up to the job in so many ways, but I'll forgive them this.
Who, after all, has any experience of the wind noise inside an A330 when it's mostly horizontal but going down at 10000 ft/min?
This crew was not up to the job in so many ways, but I'll forgive them this.
If the instrumentation did present the information accurately but the crew had not be trained to determine it, then it was an operational problem -- not the crew.
I find it hard to believe that the crew were so deficient -- and if they were, the 'blame' should rest with those who selected them, trained them and signed them off as fit.
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oldchina. At times at VS approaching 15k fpm. Now that's nearly 180 mph, and with an AoA such as it was, well, in a wood frame house with a class five Tornado outside witnesses describe "one hundred locomotives".
Yes, it was noisy. And Bumpy, and unsussable, imho. So can we agree that after the intial accelerations to 10k VS (post Stall), this situation is immune to the snotty remarks re: crew?
One mile/moccasins.......
Yes, it was noisy. And Bumpy, and unsussable, imho. So can we agree that after the intial accelerations to 10k VS (post Stall), this situation is immune to the snotty remarks re: crew?
One mile/moccasins.......
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http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR73-14.pdf
Also relevant to the yoke-vs-sidestick debate, since the theory is that yoke was in the way and inadvertent pressure disengaged the autos... and no one noticed despite all the lovely old fashioned feedback...
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I stayed current on hand flying by hand flying. That is the only way you can do it and not just 30 minutes in a sim. I practiced using standby instruments only and not looking at the standard panel. If you rely totally on automation, good luck with your career. If you are very lucky it might work but don't count on it. If the stall warning ever goes off just nudge the nose down and add a little power like you did in the Cessna 150. We learned that in lesson 3 remember?