AF447 wreckage found
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That Telegraph report doesn't give any more information than the BEA released days ago. There are French reports with more alleged CVR information, but it's hardly blockbusting stuff.
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A pilot flying any type a/c knows he must avoid problems, simply because some problems he might not be able to solve. One of these problems is weather. A pilot is a "problem avoider". And he can do this with only a knob turn.
As I understand, AF447's captain chose to not deviate from weather. He knew ITCZ was very active that night, but chose to straight cross it anyway. Was the flight running late? Strong headwind?
We will never know why he chose not to deviate, but this bad judgment together wiht bad timing on deciding to take his rest, led him to a huge problem. Iced pitots, UAS, autopilot disconnect, a/c descending stalled inside a Cb. When the captain made it back to the cockpit, he was presented with a huge, yet avoidable problem.
A simple knob turn, deviate and then go to sleep.
As I understand, AF447's captain chose to not deviate from weather. He knew ITCZ was very active that night, but chose to straight cross it anyway. Was the flight running late? Strong headwind?
We will never know why he chose not to deviate, but this bad judgment together wiht bad timing on deciding to take his rest, led him to a huge problem. Iced pitots, UAS, autopilot disconnect, a/c descending stalled inside a Cb. When the captain made it back to the cockpit, he was presented with a huge, yet avoidable problem.
A simple knob turn, deviate and then go to sleep.
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Yes but it is not the captains fault that the stall horn inhibits below 60 kias, and therefore he doesnt recognize the situation, specially when he was taking his reglamentary rest. And it is not his fault that the bea omits concerns about this from their report.
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Yes but it is not the captains fault that the stall horn inhibits below 60 kias
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Perhaps, because a stall horn isn't present when the Capt. comes in, and the two pilots are not rightly afraid of its meaning. They do not speak the stall language, they are flying an airplane that can do anything they think to help, and other things.
Perhaps when Strall goes, a packet of smelly cat poop ex[plodes in the cockpit, so no ojne can not know their danger of dying. Stall is the language you will all be soon dead, nothing else matters but to re3sume flying. Unles you have this deathwish.
Hard to ignore, this Stall warn, and there is not such thing 'spulios'.
Perhaps when Strall goes, a packet of smelly cat poop ex[plodes in the cockpit, so no ojne can not know their danger of dying. Stall is the language you will all be soon dead, nothing else matters but to re3sume flying. Unles you have this deathwish.
Hard to ignore, this Stall warn, and there is not such thing 'spulios'.
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Consequently, she was decelerating. Next, thrust levers were not unlocked before about 15 seconds after autothrust disconnection, while she first climbed, then still at 84%.
When levers were unlocked, PF manually applied 100% N1, for about another 15 seconds, before reducing thrust when PNF asked him to go down...
When levers were unlocked, PF manually applied 100% N1, for about another 15 seconds, before reducing thrust when PNF asked him to go down...
Nope!
Sorry disagree.
The PF didn't apply the appropriate procedure which was "THR LVR... MOVE" he instead disconnected using the disconnect push-buttons and because the thrust levers were in the climb detent the thrust increased immediately to climb thrust.
Later he realises his mistake... "we are in climb" and reduces thrust manually.
Had he wanted to climb he would have left it alone.
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Quote:
Yes but it is not the captains fault that the stall horn inhibits below 60 kias
No, but whose fault is it that the captain doesn't get told that the stall warning has been blaring in the cockpit for nearly a solid minute?
Yes but it is not the captains fault that the stall horn inhibits below 60 kias
No, but whose fault is it that the captain doesn't get told that the stall warning has been blaring in the cockpit for nearly a solid minute?
stall-warning, pf-pnf, etc
Well,
does anybody "needs" a stall warning? we should be trained not to be even closse to it, by various "indications".
i have seen in person one of capt Haynes (sorry if i misspelled) lectures on his experinece during the dc10 crash in sioux city.
it is/was an eyeopener.
you see somebody doing something that does not look right and you take it over, with the consequense now you are in worse shape!
pnf should be as it means; pilot-NOT-flying, in other companies called "pilot-MONITORING" and thats what he should have been doing.
i remember the 757 crash which static-ports were taped-over due to cleaning..............
i used it during recurrent training just to train/demonstrate the crew the effects and to keep them (hopefully) interested in studying previously occured incidents/accidents.
its sad to see another perfectly-good-aircraft got crashed (buffalo, amsterdam etc etc).
does anybody "needs" a stall warning? we should be trained not to be even closse to it, by various "indications".
i have seen in person one of capt Haynes (sorry if i misspelled) lectures on his experinece during the dc10 crash in sioux city.
it is/was an eyeopener.
you see somebody doing something that does not look right and you take it over, with the consequense now you are in worse shape!
pnf should be as it means; pilot-NOT-flying, in other companies called "pilot-MONITORING" and thats what he should have been doing.
i remember the 757 crash which static-ports were taped-over due to cleaning..............
i used it during recurrent training just to train/demonstrate the crew the effects and to keep them (hopefully) interested in studying previously occured incidents/accidents.
its sad to see another perfectly-good-aircraft got crashed (buffalo, amsterdam etc etc).
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Originally Posted by Man Flex
The PF didn't apply the appropriate procedure which was "THR LVR... MOVE" he instead disconnected using the disconnect push-buttons and because the thrust levers were in the climb detent the thrust increased immediately to climb thrust.
Using the disconnect push-buttons would not do anything as A/THR is already disconnected.
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Quoting Man Flex:-
Not sure that I follow that, Man Flex? Up to now it's been my understanding that, with autothrust operating, 'Climb' is the 'default setting' for cruise flight, and the next setting down is 'Idle'? Surely they wouldn't have been using the 'next-up' setting - 'Max. Continuous' - in normal cruise?
Quoting CONFiture:-
Just from reading, that's the correct procedure, as far as I know - except that, once the autothrust has signed off, I'd expect that the pilots are supposed to use the throttle levers 'normally' - that is, move them forward or back to adjust the power, presumably by reference to the N1 gauges? Again as I understand it, in the absence of the autothrust, just using the 'Climb' detent could have been either too much for the situation or insufficient to maintain level flight?
That raises another point. We know that, in response to the stall warning, the PF carried out the prescribed drill at that time; that is, applied TO/GA power. But at some later time - typically, the BEA doesn't tell us when - the levers appear to have been pulled right back to the 'Idle' detent.
I'd appreciate some guidance from those who know. Obviously - now that the 'stall avoidance' procedure has been revised - we know that TO/GA power was probably too much. But it seems to me, as a mere amateur pilot - mostly with no engines at all! - that while 'TO/GA' was very probably too much, 'Idle' (which I understand is only 55% power, virtually none in a jet) might very well not have been enough (given that by that time the aircraft was genuinely in a deep stall) to give them any reasonable chance of regaining flying speed?
I DO hope that, even though they can't actually be trained in 'stall recovery' in a real aeroplane, Airbus pilots are at least taught to use the throttles in a conventional way if the autothrust is off; that is (I presume) to follow the power gauges, NOT just use the detents?
"Also very telling is the autothrust disconnect, the realisation that climb thrust has been inadvertantly applied and then the subsequent reduction in thrust.
"The PF didn't want to climb otherwise he would have remained in climb thrust."
"The PF didn't want to climb otherwise he would have remained in climb thrust."
Quoting CONFiture:-
I would think he did MOVE the THR LVRs, fast enough that it's not showing on the thrust lever FDR trace. A quick move out of the CLB detent and back into it.
That raises another point. We know that, in response to the stall warning, the PF carried out the prescribed drill at that time; that is, applied TO/GA power. But at some later time - typically, the BEA doesn't tell us when - the levers appear to have been pulled right back to the 'Idle' detent.
I'd appreciate some guidance from those who know. Obviously - now that the 'stall avoidance' procedure has been revised - we know that TO/GA power was probably too much. But it seems to me, as a mere amateur pilot - mostly with no engines at all! - that while 'TO/GA' was very probably too much, 'Idle' (which I understand is only 55% power, virtually none in a jet) might very well not have been enough (given that by that time the aircraft was genuinely in a deep stall) to give them any reasonable chance of regaining flying speed?
I DO hope that, even though they can't actually be trained in 'stall recovery' in a real aeroplane, Airbus pilots are at least taught to use the throttles in a conventional way if the autothrust is off; that is (I presume) to follow the power gauges, NOT just use the detents?
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Apologies - to the BEA AND for the double post:
The relevant BEA appendix in the latest report does give the power settings. 'Rough copy' says:-
2.10.47 33%
2.10.56 TOGA
2.11.43 MCT
2.11.56 TOGA
2.11.51 TOGA
2,12.07 CLB
2.12.33 TOGA
2,13.48 CLB
2.14.09 IDLE
2.14.18 TOGA
They do indeed appear to have used the detents all the way down - with just the one exception at the beginning.
The relevant BEA appendix in the latest report does give the power settings. 'Rough copy' says:-
2.10.47 33%
2.10.56 TOGA
2.11.43 MCT
2.11.56 TOGA
2.11.51 TOGA
2,12.07 CLB
2.12.33 TOGA
2,13.48 CLB
2.14.09 IDLE
2.14.18 TOGA
They do indeed appear to have used the detents all the way down - with just the one exception at the beginning.
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Simple question to those who fly A330:
At 2:10:23 the thrust lock mode was "de-activated".
If the autothrust was already disengaged, how does one then de-activate the thrust lock?
Is there a button to push, or can it only be done by manually moving the thrust levers?
At 2:10:23 the thrust lock mode was "de-activated".
If the autothrust was already disengaged, how does one then de-activate the thrust lock?
Is there a button to push, or can it only be done by manually moving the thrust levers?
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THR/LVR in CLB detent
Originally Posted by RWA
Just from reading, that's the correct procedure, as far as I know - except that, once the autothrust has signed off, I'd expect that the pilots are supposed to use the throttle levers 'normally' - that is, move them forward or back to adjust the power, presumably by reference to the N1 gauges? Again as I understand it, in the absence of the autothrust, just using the 'Climb' detent could have been either too much for the situation or insufficient to maintain level flight?
- To move the thrust levers in the CLB detent is part of the drill for UAS.
- At FL350 with no A/THR the output is absolutely the same whatever the thrust levers position from CLB to MCT to TOGA.
Originally Posted by JH
Is there a button to push, or can it only be done by manually moving the thrust levers?
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Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
Quote:
It was all meant to shout: If humans are on the flight-deck, they MUST be able to fly the aircraft. Really fly it. Oh, and be allowed to fly it.
Your words in gods ear!
The reality is that whenever the automatics are no longer capable of handling, due to invalid signals they need, they throw the aircraft back at the human.
- Perfect - It will be him screwing up finally.
Good for statistics and engineers.
It was all meant to shout: If humans are on the flight-deck, they MUST be able to fly the aircraft. Really fly it. Oh, and be allowed to fly it.
Your words in gods ear!
The reality is that whenever the automatics are no longer capable of handling, due to invalid signals they need, they throw the aircraft back at the human.
- Perfect - It will be him screwing up finally.
Good for statistics and engineers.
There is a serious misconception repeated on this forum (as well as elsewhere) that pilots are reduced to be system monitors and all that nonsense. Simply monitoring would be much more comfortably done from the ground. Those guys/gals in front are there for a reason. They are there to command the thing and to handle all the situations which might arise. Not monitor - command!
I already wrote a bit about that in one earlier post: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post6582987
What's worrying is that aforemntioned misconception is taken as truth by some pilots flying those birds...
Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
Second reality is that even when the automatics switch off autopilot and autothrust, it can still intervene with pilot inputs, through automatic protections, and therefore limit his authority.
Why on earth? ?
It had detected itself incapable of handling the aircraft, but still messes with controls.
Isn't that a paradoxon?
Why on earth? ?
It had detected itself incapable of handling the aircraft, but still messes with controls.
Isn't that a paradoxon?
AP is completely different system than flight control computers. AP works on completely different abstraction level. AP directs airplane through the air. Flight control computers translate commands given to the plane into flight controls. So there is nothing paradoxical nor even strange that one function might work wile the other could not. For example partial loss of airdata does not prevent G-load-demand driving of control surfaces while it prevents automatic directing of the bird (i.e. AutoPiloting).
Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
I am not entirely against automation and technology to improve safety. But the implemented systems must work flawlessly.
Otherwise I don't need them.
So before introducing even more protections, please fix the technology that's already on board.
Otherwise I don't need them.
So before introducing even more protections, please fix the technology that's already on board.
Computers (and generally artificial devices, i.e. tools) are better (often significantly) than humans in many areas. Smart humans will take advantage of that and let the computers do the stuff they're good at while keeping doing stuff computers are bad at or even completely incapable of.
Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
Concerning statistics, lots of contributors just love those, I am still missing a serious one about automation induced pilot errors. This would give a clearer picture than the one containing just plain pilot error. Not that it would excuse any such error, eliminating those should be just as noble a cause, but it would point back at the magic automatics that benefit from too big a confidence and a lack of genuine criticism, as it would mean responsibility (meaning doe) from you who I mean.
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Quoting Sebaska:-
Apologies, Seb, can't resist quoting a BBC radio witticism that I heard many years ago. A 'voice' supposedly coming on to the airliner's PA and telling the passengers that they were flying on the world's very first fully-automated passenger flight. That there were no pilots up front, that the only airline personnel on board were the cabin crew.
I recall that the radio sketch ended with the guy saying, "Please do not be alarmed. All the systems involved have been exhaustively tested over many years of development - and we can give you all a positive guarantee that nothing can possibly go wrong.......go wrong.....go wrong.....go wrong........"
"FBW aircraft is significantly less the number of earlier crashes caused by pilot error."
Apologies, Seb, can't resist quoting a BBC radio witticism that I heard many years ago. A 'voice' supposedly coming on to the airliner's PA and telling the passengers that they were flying on the world's very first fully-automated passenger flight. That there were no pilots up front, that the only airline personnel on board were the cabin crew.
I recall that the radio sketch ended with the guy saying, "Please do not be alarmed. All the systems involved have been exhaustively tested over many years of development - and we can give you all a positive guarantee that nothing can possibly go wrong.......go wrong.....go wrong.....go wrong........"
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rwa Yes, it is the twilight zone, then?
Commercial travel is so safe it is boring. That makes an accident stick out in dramatic invitation for taking sides.
This discussion is two years old, and before that, and by the grace of God, the 777 at Heathrow. Some lazy ice arrived at the inlet tyoo late to kill all on Board.
What is on the surface is interesting, and seems to have been well shepherd into perfect corrals.
Today in this country, one thousand peoplle will die in auto accidents. Because this is a large place, the slaughter will appear dilute, and less important than 228 falling out the sky two years ago.
Tomorrow, only five hundred could die in autos, but these vehicles would be more expense, and the roads extremely more costly.
The tragic and heartbreak is when the possible prevention is from humans.
Operator Error? Likely. but by the time the other causes have come to the reports, people will be looking at different things.
Sometimes Air Travel is not the bargain we think, most other times, it is.
It is not this Stabiliser, nor the young pilot, nor the conveyance. It is our desire to skirt the basics, the Physics, to please ourselves and the Bank. Please to not cut these margins so fine, Paris will be there next week.
Commercial travel is so safe it is boring. That makes an accident stick out in dramatic invitation for taking sides.
This discussion is two years old, and before that, and by the grace of God, the 777 at Heathrow. Some lazy ice arrived at the inlet tyoo late to kill all on Board.
What is on the surface is interesting, and seems to have been well shepherd into perfect corrals.
Today in this country, one thousand peoplle will die in auto accidents. Because this is a large place, the slaughter will appear dilute, and less important than 228 falling out the sky two years ago.
Tomorrow, only five hundred could die in autos, but these vehicles would be more expense, and the roads extremely more costly.
The tragic and heartbreak is when the possible prevention is from humans.
Operator Error? Likely. but by the time the other causes have come to the reports, people will be looking at different things.
Sometimes Air Travel is not the bargain we think, most other times, it is.
It is not this Stabiliser, nor the young pilot, nor the conveyance. It is our desire to skirt the basics, the Physics, to please ourselves and the Bank. Please to not cut these margins so fine, Paris will be there next week.
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ENG THRUST LOCKED
Originally Posted by Jazz Hands
At 2:10:23 the thrust lock mode was "de-activated".
If the autothrust was already disengaged, how does one then de-activate the thrust lock?
Is there a button to push, or can it only be done by manually moving the thrust levers?
If the autothrust was already disengaged, how does one then de-activate the thrust lock?
Is there a button to push, or can it only be done by manually moving the thrust levers?
In our case, it means that AUTOTHRUST disconnection was due to a system fault and not to any pilot action (like using the disconnect pb, or setting levers to IDLE).
Consequently, thrust will remain locked at its last setting which is unrelated with THRUST LEVERS actual position: at cruise at FL350, with turbulence, thrust could be anywhere between IDLE thrust and CL thrust = (MIN-MAX range: this is autothrust range of operation when active and engaged - MCT is only used in case of one engine failure). Hence, when A/THR disconnect, actual Thrust doesn't change (increase to CLB if actually set below this level), it is locked.
b) What caused the loss of A/THR was both FMGS (auto flight system) faulting due to their IAS monitoring function (A/THR fault is recorded at 0210:08, three seconds after A/P OFF at 0210:05).
c) Unlocking THRUST action is only manual by moving the levers. If one re-engage them where they already were set (CL detent), like in our case, DFDR record won't show any change of detent setting: they were set off CL detent, moved and engaged back in CL detent. Nonetheless, DFDR will record the manual action of Unlocking the Thrust and the total duration of the "THR LOCK" period before crew reaction (about 15 seconds).
During this period (0210:08-0210:23), thrust was locked at N1% 83.
@ FL350, standard settings for pitch/thrust should have been adjusted to:
Mach .80 ; GW > 190 t ; pitch = 3.5°
Mach .80 (260 kt) ; 200 t > GW < 210 t = 91.9 > N1% < 93.1
@ FL370:
Mach .80 ; 200 t > GW < 210 t = 94.3 > N1% < 95.9
And, of course, there is no N1 value for above levels.
Consequently, she was starting to climb up to FL380, at an high V/S and pitch rate (close to take off), without initialy enough thrust to maintain FL250 in level flight (as she was decelerating just prior this sequence started). It took about 25 seconds to manually increase N1 up to 104% while she had already bleeded a good deal of her speed in between.
Last edited by takata; 10th Aug 2011 at 15:44.
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A very subtle language thing, but I think important.
The Thrust is NOT LOCKED. AB says so, but it is not "LOCKED".
It is "retained". If anyone thinks words don't matter, consider, "MOVE THROTTLE". "CYCLE LEVERS". Left in last position, "VALUE".
It is politics and Philosophy, not an accurate description of Throttle avail.
The AB is NOT pilot friendly in many ways, even in subtle ways that start an argument. It has an "ATTITUDE".
"LOCKED", in an emergency, with impaired conditions, means "DON'T TOUCH". If you think ergo and linguistics are not life and death, think again.
The Thrust is NOT LOCKED. AB says so, but it is not "LOCKED".
It is "retained". If anyone thinks words don't matter, consider, "MOVE THROTTLE". "CYCLE LEVERS". Left in last position, "VALUE".
It is politics and Philosophy, not an accurate description of Throttle avail.
The AB is NOT pilot friendly in many ways, even in subtle ways that start an argument. It has an "ATTITUDE".
"LOCKED", in an emergency, with impaired conditions, means "DON'T TOUCH". If you think ergo and linguistics are not life and death, think again.
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Quoting CON fiture:-
'at FL350 with no A/THR the output is absolutely the same whatever the thrust levers position from CLB to MCT to TOGA.'
Sincerely hope that I've misunderstood, CON fiture?
You appear to be saying that, due to a total lack of logic in the Airbus auto-throttle controls, the unfortunate AF447 pilots spent most of their last three minutes on this Earth pissing about with throttle settings like CLB, MCT, TOGA, and whatever - but that ALL of those settings simply resulted in no change at ALL in the actual power generated by the engines - which remained at TO/GA?
As a law graduate, on the face of it, I'd say that if that's even halfway true, it provides adequate evidence for the designers of any such systems (AND their parent companies) to face manslaughter charges, at the very least?
Almost can't believe that any designers could generate systems which were THAT stupid?
'at FL350 with no A/THR the output is absolutely the same whatever the thrust levers position from CLB to MCT to TOGA.'
Sincerely hope that I've misunderstood, CON fiture?
You appear to be saying that, due to a total lack of logic in the Airbus auto-throttle controls, the unfortunate AF447 pilots spent most of their last three minutes on this Earth pissing about with throttle settings like CLB, MCT, TOGA, and whatever - but that ALL of those settings simply resulted in no change at ALL in the actual power generated by the engines - which remained at TO/GA?
As a law graduate, on the face of it, I'd say that if that's even halfway true, it provides adequate evidence for the designers of any such systems (AND their parent companies) to face manslaughter charges, at the very least?
Almost can't believe that any designers could generate systems which were THAT stupid?
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but that ALL of those settings simply resulted in no change at ALL in the actual power generated by the engines - which remained at TO/GA?
Not true, RWA.
Page 113 of the interim report shows the engine power commanded by the crew (N1 Command), and the resulting engine thrust generated (N1 Actual).
The thrust is clearly not staying at TO/GA, but following the power level set by the pilots.
From CONfiture's post, I think he was specifically referring to the maximum power available during high-altitude cruise.