AF447 wreckage found
safetypee: much obliged.
Were such an anomaly to have the capacity to muck up a pitch and power response ... 
The point is that ADC seems to get into many dark corners of modern systems, thus we might not be sure of what the effects of simultaneous ADC malfunction might be.
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FAA Proposes Airspeed-Sensor Fixes
FAA Proposes Airspeed-Sensor Fixes - WSJ.com
US aviation regulators are proposing mandatory fixes to potentially defective airspeed sensors on more than 1,000 regional jets, less than two weeks after investigators determined malfunctions of similar devices played a big role in the crash of an Air France jetliner over the Atlantic Ocean in 2009.
Released Wednesday, the Federal Aviation Administration's proposed directive wants U.S. airlines to replace a problematic part associated with several incidents of "airspeed mismatch" between captain and co-pilot instruments on a wide range of Bombardier regional jet models. The external sensors, called pitot tubes, can malfunction because they may "become partially or completely blocked by water" during or after flying through heavy rain, according to the agency.
The result may be erroneous airspeed and altitude indications, though an FAA spokesman didn't immediately know the number of such incidents on Bombardier jetliners.
The move follows a similar safety fix ordered by Canadian regulators last fall. It also piggybacks on a voluntary service bulletin in March -- as well as an earlier version the year before – both of which were issued by the aerospace unit of Canada's Bombardier Inc....
Released Wednesday, the Federal Aviation Administration's proposed directive wants U.S. airlines to replace a problematic part associated with several incidents of "airspeed mismatch" between captain and co-pilot instruments on a wide range of Bombardier regional jet models. The external sensors, called pitot tubes, can malfunction because they may "become partially or completely blocked by water" during or after flying through heavy rain, according to the agency.
The result may be erroneous airspeed and altitude indications, though an FAA spokesman didn't immediately know the number of such incidents on Bombardier jetliners.
The move follows a similar safety fix ordered by Canadian regulators last fall. It also piggybacks on a voluntary service bulletin in March -- as well as an earlier version the year before – both of which were issued by the aerospace unit of Canada's Bombardier Inc....
Could we move this thread to Good Housekeeping Magazine's website, maybe, or Rolling Stone's? It is of no more value on an aviation forum.
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Yup to Speedbird. Just blurking here. AB (and Boeing) pilots will get something constructive out of the final reports, and as a very old SLF I will be grateful. The rest is dross.
My days ended with dinosaur blood. Cannot relate to all this FBW stuff, but judging from you guys, it mostly works. Think back, you aulde guys, to what a handful a DC-4 could be in rough wx.
My days ended with dinosaur blood. Cannot relate to all this FBW stuff, but judging from you guys, it mostly works. Think back, you aulde guys, to what a handful a DC-4 could be in rough wx.
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Extract below from the BEA's report on the 2008 A320 Air New Zealand accident at Perpignan. Also an excerpt from the CVR transcript covering the last few minutes.
The BEA, on this occasion, seems to have concluded that the THS going to 'full up' made it impossible for the pilots to get out of the stall even with the sidestick fully forward; but that the pilots apparently simply didn't see the need to re-trim. It also says, rather poignantly, that they 'did not understand the behaviour of the aeroplane' - a point that is very clearly illustrated by the CVR transcript.
I wouldn't be at all surprised if the eventual report on AF447 says very similar things.
Full report available for download here.
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...a081127.en.pdf
The BEA, on this occasion, seems to have concluded that the THS going to 'full up' made it impossible for the pilots to get out of the stall even with the sidestick fully forward; but that the pilots apparently simply didn't see the need to re-trim. It also says, rather poignantly, that they 'did not understand the behaviour of the aeroplane' - a point that is very clearly illustrated by the CVR transcript.
I wouldn't be at all surprised if the eventual report on AF447 says very similar things.
Full report available for download here.
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...a081127.en.pdf
The aeroplane rapidly regained speed under the dual effect of the increase in thrust and the pitch-down attitude. Under the combined effect of the thrust
increase , the increasing speed and the horizontal stabilizer still at the pitch-up
stop, the aeroplane was subject to pitch-up moment that the Captain could
not manage to counter, even with the sidestick at the nose-down stop. The
exchanges between the pilots at this time show that they did not understand
the behaviour of the aeroplane. In particular, the aeroplane’s lack of reaction
to the nose-down control input did not draw their attention to the position of
the horizontal stabilizer and the loss of the auto-trim function.
The aeroplane attitude increased sharply and its speed dropped to the point
that rendered it practically uncontrollable, the flight control surfaces becoming
ineffective due to the low speed and the high angle of attack. The aeroplane
stalled again, this time irrecoverably, bearing in mind the aeroplane’s altitude
and without any crew inputs on the trim wheel and the thrust levers.
The loss of control was thus caused by a thrust increase performed with a
full pitch-up horizontal stabilizer position. This position and the engine
thrust made pitch down control impossible. It should be noted that the PF
made no inputs on the horizontal stabilizer nor reduced the thrust and that
the PNF did not intervene.
increase , the increasing speed and the horizontal stabilizer still at the pitch-up
stop, the aeroplane was subject to pitch-up moment that the Captain could
not manage to counter, even with the sidestick at the nose-down stop. The
exchanges between the pilots at this time show that they did not understand
the behaviour of the aeroplane. In particular, the aeroplane’s lack of reaction
to the nose-down control input did not draw their attention to the position of
the horizontal stabilizer and the loss of the auto-trim function.
The aeroplane attitude increased sharply and its speed dropped to the point
that rendered it practically uncontrollable, the flight control surfaces becoming
ineffective due to the low speed and the high angle of attack. The aeroplane
stalled again, this time irrecoverably, bearing in mind the aeroplane’s altitude
and without any crew inputs on the trim wheel and the thrust levers.
The loss of control was thus caused by a thrust increase performed with a
full pitch-up horizontal stabilizer position. This position and the engine
thrust made pitch down control impossible. It should be noted that the PF
made no inputs on the horizontal stabilizer nor reduced the thrust and that
the PNF did not intervene.
15 h 44 min 46 Okay here we go
15 h 44 min 49 Und ich sag ihr jetzt dass wir im Moment in Dreitausend bleiben
The weight is fifty four
And I say now to her that we are maintaining three thousand at the moment
15 h 44 min 51 Golf X-ray Lima triple eight
Tango can you speed reduce speed again
15 h 44 min 56 We are reducing
15 h 44 min 57 Triple click
15 h 44 min 58 ��We are still reducing the speed Golf X-ray Lima triple eight Tango (*)
15 h 45 min 03 (*) I will say when the trim stops
The word “stops” is stronger than the rest of the phrase
15 h 45 min 05 SV: Stall ( x13)
Cricket (stall warning)
15 h 45 min 06 Stop ! Noise similar to thrust levers being moved forward to the stop
15 h 45 min 13 (oh oh oh)
15 h 45 min 18 (…)
15 h 45 min 19 End of stall warning
15 h 45 min 20 Single chime
15 h 45 min 24 Ich nehm die Speed noch mal hoch ja?
(I increase speed ) Yeah?
15 h 45 min 26 Ja it's pitching up all the time
15 h 45 min 27 (…) Stick forward (*)
15 h 45 min 29 Pitching up
15 h 45 min 30
15 h 45 min 31 It’s (*) alpha floor we’re in manual Single chime
15 h 45 min 33 It's pitching up this (…)
15 h 45 min 34 Kriegst du das geregelt? Are you able to handle this?
15 h 45 min 35 Nee No
15 h 45 min 36 Gear up SV: Stall (12 times)
15 h 45 min 37 Gear up Cricket (stall warning)
15 h 45 min 39 Gear up Gear up
15 h 45 min 40 (*)
15 h 45 min 42 (…)
15 h 45 min 44 (…)
15 h 45 min 45
15 h 45 min 47
15 h 45 min 48
Golf X-ray Lima triple eight
Tango contact tower one one eight decimal three bye
End of stall warning
Single chime
15 h 45 min 54 What’s wrong here
15 h 45 min 55 Flaps up
15 h 45 min 57 (*)
15 h 45 min 58 Flaps up
15 h 46 min 00 End of stall warning
15 h 46 min 00,5(*)
Continuous repetitive chime
15 h 46 min 02 Speedbrakes
15 h 46 min 02,5 End of CRC
15 h 46 min 03 C chord (Altitude alert)
15 h 46 min 04
SV: (*) terrain terrain
15 h 46 min 05 (…) (…)
15 h 46 min 06
15 h 46 min 07 End of recording
15 h 44 min 49 Und ich sag ihr jetzt dass wir im Moment in Dreitausend bleiben
The weight is fifty four
And I say now to her that we are maintaining three thousand at the moment
15 h 44 min 51 Golf X-ray Lima triple eight
Tango can you speed reduce speed again
15 h 44 min 56 We are reducing
15 h 44 min 57 Triple click
15 h 44 min 58 ��We are still reducing the speed Golf X-ray Lima triple eight Tango (*)
15 h 45 min 03 (*) I will say when the trim stops
The word “stops” is stronger than the rest of the phrase
15 h 45 min 05 SV: Stall ( x13)
Cricket (stall warning)
15 h 45 min 06 Stop ! Noise similar to thrust levers being moved forward to the stop
15 h 45 min 13 (oh oh oh)
15 h 45 min 18 (…)
15 h 45 min 19 End of stall warning
15 h 45 min 20 Single chime
15 h 45 min 24 Ich nehm die Speed noch mal hoch ja?
(I increase speed ) Yeah?
15 h 45 min 26 Ja it's pitching up all the time
15 h 45 min 27 (…) Stick forward (*)
15 h 45 min 29 Pitching up
15 h 45 min 30
15 h 45 min 31 It’s (*) alpha floor we’re in manual Single chime
15 h 45 min 33 It's pitching up this (…)
15 h 45 min 34 Kriegst du das geregelt? Are you able to handle this?
15 h 45 min 35 Nee No
15 h 45 min 36 Gear up SV: Stall (12 times)
15 h 45 min 37 Gear up Cricket (stall warning)
15 h 45 min 39 Gear up Gear up
15 h 45 min 40 (*)
15 h 45 min 42 (…)
15 h 45 min 44 (…)
15 h 45 min 45
15 h 45 min 47
15 h 45 min 48
Golf X-ray Lima triple eight
Tango contact tower one one eight decimal three bye
End of stall warning
Single chime
15 h 45 min 54 What’s wrong here
15 h 45 min 55 Flaps up
15 h 45 min 57 (*)
15 h 45 min 58 Flaps up
15 h 46 min 00 End of stall warning
15 h 46 min 00,5(*)
Continuous repetitive chime
15 h 46 min 02 Speedbrakes
15 h 46 min 02,5 End of CRC
15 h 46 min 03 C chord (Altitude alert)
15 h 46 min 04
SV: (*) terrain terrain
15 h 46 min 05 (…) (…)
15 h 46 min 06
15 h 46 min 07 End of recording
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Also, the Perpignan A320 was, I think, being piloted by very highly experienced Type Rating Examiner; the guys who really know their aircraft inside out.
I agree with the assessment above, something not good about THS's that trim themselves full or nearly full NU and then remain there when it might be appropriate for them to auto-nose down to help overwhelmed pilots in the heat of battle with FBW systems..... not to mention stall warnings that shut down at slow speeds, then warn again as airspeed increases... brilliant.
I am not a fan of autotrim in the 777 either.
I agree with the assessment above, something not good about THS's that trim themselves full or nearly full NU and then remain there when it might be appropriate for them to auto-nose down to help overwhelmed pilots in the heat of battle with FBW systems..... not to mention stall warnings that shut down at slow speeds, then warn again as airspeed increases... brilliant.
I am not a fan of autotrim in the 777 either.
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Not exactly the case. The flight crew were two XL line pilots asked to do an Alpha Protections test without full knowledge of how the aircraft would behave as it approached the stall. The test should have been carried out at above FL100 but commercial pressure resulted in the test being undertaken without ATC knowledge while being vectored on approach at about FL030. The third seat was occupied by the AirNZ check pilot tasked with overseeing the end of lease handover by XL to AirNZ.
A full read of the report will reveal all.
A full read of the report will reveal all.
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A lot of interesting reading and theories.
A quick and incomplete look at some stall accidents still bothers me.
Birgenair 757 stalled due to pitot problems and the pilots not proficient enough to recover, although the aircraft would have permitted. Reasons known and uncontested.
Cali AA 757 stalled due to the non self retracting speedbrakes and the pilots not realizing it. The aircraft would have permitted recovery. Reasons known and uncontested.
330 testflight in Toulouse stalled due to pilot mishandling leading to an unrecoverable stall. Two experienced pilots. Still some debate if the aircraft would have been able to save, still debates about the electronics/protections handling.
320 Perpignan stalled due to THS behavior. Normal pilots. Still some debate about the recovery possibility or not.
Qantas Perth. Aircraft apparently didn't obey pilot orders, recovery succeeded. Still debating about the real reason of the electronic/protections behavior.
AF 447. Enormous debate about the THS, crew performance. Unsure if the aircraft was recoverable.
The troubling questions are still looming, and they are all on AB.
Boeings might fail just as much, but it seems that they would be more easily recoverable in upsets. I can't dismiss the ugly feeling that in upsets the possibilities in AB are less and it would take almost IT trained astronauts to be able to realize and apply the multiple tasks, switchings or many and different procedures to recover.
Airbus needs to clean up their act. Even Joe bloggs like me should be able to apply and memorize a simple and uncomplicated task for upset recovery.
At the moment this seems unrealistic. Therefore all debates are basically futile, because any finding will lead to the perpetual "they should have known" which seems almost impossible.
A quick and incomplete look at some stall accidents still bothers me.
Birgenair 757 stalled due to pitot problems and the pilots not proficient enough to recover, although the aircraft would have permitted. Reasons known and uncontested.
Cali AA 757 stalled due to the non self retracting speedbrakes and the pilots not realizing it. The aircraft would have permitted recovery. Reasons known and uncontested.
330 testflight in Toulouse stalled due to pilot mishandling leading to an unrecoverable stall. Two experienced pilots. Still some debate if the aircraft would have been able to save, still debates about the electronics/protections handling.
320 Perpignan stalled due to THS behavior. Normal pilots. Still some debate about the recovery possibility or not.
Qantas Perth. Aircraft apparently didn't obey pilot orders, recovery succeeded. Still debating about the real reason of the electronic/protections behavior.
AF 447. Enormous debate about the THS, crew performance. Unsure if the aircraft was recoverable.
The troubling questions are still looming, and they are all on AB.
Boeings might fail just as much, but it seems that they would be more easily recoverable in upsets. I can't dismiss the ugly feeling that in upsets the possibilities in AB are less and it would take almost IT trained astronauts to be able to realize and apply the multiple tasks, switchings or many and different procedures to recover.
Airbus needs to clean up their act. Even Joe bloggs like me should be able to apply and memorize a simple and uncomplicated task for upset recovery.
At the moment this seems unrealistic. Therefore all debates are basically futile, because any finding will lead to the perpetual "they should have known" which seems almost impossible.
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Gretchenfrage
Where did you get this misinformation from? if it is the crash I think you were talking about they were simulating and engine failure and the due to a problem with Alt* the aircraft lost too much speed, they had almost recovered but did not have enough height. The Alt* programme was subsequently changed. More of a Vmca problem.
Again misinformation! The THS was a contributing factor, the pilots incorrectly carried out the low speed check at too low an altitude and without following the Flt Test procedure. A recovery could have been possible if the correct actions were taken / correct procedures followed.
Jury still out on that one, as the equipment tested correctly and there were other factors.
There is no enormous debate about the THS, it behaved correctly and if the correct actions had been taken I am sure the A/C would have been recoverable.
What an amazing statement to make! Perhaps you are not an average Joe Bloggs!
330 testflight in Toulouse stalled due to pilot mishandling leading to an unrecoverable stall. Two experienced pilots. Still some debate if the aircraft would have been able to save, still debates about the electronics/protections handling.
320 Perpignan stalled due to THS behavior. Normal pilots. Still some debate about the recovery possibility or not.
Qantas Perth. Aircraft apparently didn't obey pilot orders, recovery succeeded. Still debating about the real reason of the electronic/protections behavior.
AF 447. Enormous debate about the THS, crew performance. Unsure if the aircraft was recoverable.
Airbus needs to clean up their act. Even Joe bloggs like me should be able to apply and memorize a simple and uncomplicated task for upset recovery.
At the moment this seems unrealistic. Therefore all debates are basically futile, because any finding will lead to the perpetual "they should have known" which seems almost impossible.
At the moment this seems unrealistic. Therefore all debates are basically futile, because any finding will lead to the perpetual "they should have known" which seems almost impossible.
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Finally, some useful and relevant discussion on this thread during these last two pages.
The Perpignan Accident may well explain why the crew were unable to recover flight AF447.
However it doesn't explain the F/O's actions in response to the unreliable airpseed.
Was it...
A) He was applying (inappropriately) his memory items practised recently in the sim?
B) An attempt to "regain" altitude apparently lost during the event?
C) An attempt to climb above the weather they were experiencing i.e. turbulence, hail, st elmo's fire?
The Perpignan Accident may well explain why the crew were unable to recover flight AF447.
However it doesn't explain the F/O's actions in response to the unreliable airpseed.
Was it...
A) He was applying (inappropriately) his memory items practised recently in the sim?
B) An attempt to "regain" altitude apparently lost during the event?
C) An attempt to climb above the weather they were experiencing i.e. turbulence, hail, st elmo's fire?
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@SKS777Flyer
the 777 only auto trims for config changes as you know. It doesn't speed trim which is still a manual input.
May I ask why you are not a fan of this trim setup?
The only thing I have with the system is that there is no trim wheel so you are not very aware of what position the stab is at.
I think the THS has played a massive part in this incident but there is not enough information to deduce exactly what happened. A lack of visual cues I've always had issues with. It relies on an active scan (even in cruise) which as we all know is not something a human being is very good at in states of low physical demand. Combine that with a lack of training (cost/sim limitations) in unusual situation and we can see the holes in the cheese lining up.
Having had TAT probe icing in the cruise (without knowing what to look for!!) we thought it was static around the EECs that was causing the EPR indications and all Perf calcs in the FMC to blank (Also A/T disconnect) therefore never did the QRH drill.
Lesson learned...
the 777 only auto trims for config changes as you know. It doesn't speed trim which is still a manual input.
May I ask why you are not a fan of this trim setup?
The only thing I have with the system is that there is no trim wheel so you are not very aware of what position the stab is at.
I think the THS has played a massive part in this incident but there is not enough information to deduce exactly what happened. A lack of visual cues I've always had issues with. It relies on an active scan (even in cruise) which as we all know is not something a human being is very good at in states of low physical demand. Combine that with a lack of training (cost/sim limitations) in unusual situation and we can see the holes in the cheese lining up.
Having had TAT probe icing in the cruise (without knowing what to look for!!) we thought it was static around the EECs that was causing the EPR indications and all Perf calcs in the FMC to blank (Also A/T disconnect) therefore never did the QRH drill.
Lesson learned...
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The Duh in Aerodynamics
An airliner on departure, climb, cruise, descent, approach and landing is like a symphony orchestra, with all the components working in concert. The conductor can be the FMS, Fright Management System, or the aircraft commander.
It's all seamless and symphonic until a component hits a sour note. Then you really see the contribution of the other components and what is driving them.
It's basic to conventional airplane dynamics, as taught in Langewieche's "Stick and Rudder" and hundreds of other instructional manuals:
Pitch controls airspeed.
Power controls altitude.
The A330 Flight test accident in 1994 uncovered the flaw in Airbus logic. The plane was on autopilot in Altitude Capture mode when the pilot pulled the power on one engine. The AP responded to lack of power by pulling the pitch up to over 30 degrees. Instead, it should have kept the pitch at desired speed, and told the pilot, "We can't do that."
The TK951 B737 approach accident at AMS in 2007 revealed the same flaw. An undetected erroneous input to the A/T caused it to go to Flight Idle. The autopilot tried to stay on Glideslope by pulling the nose up and trimming to lower speed to make up for lack of power. Instead, it should have kept the desired speed, and let the plane sink below glidepath. If the pilot hadn't caught that, he would have heard, "TOO LOW! GLIDESLOPE." Firewalling the throttles would have stopped the sink, and not have caused such a pitchup, as the elevator would still have been trimmed for the correct speed. The pilot could have intentionally traded some airspeed for altitude, and without fighting full aft trim.
How does this apply to 447? We'll see. Trying to control altitude with pitch is a loser, regardless.
It's all seamless and symphonic until a component hits a sour note. Then you really see the contribution of the other components and what is driving them.
It's basic to conventional airplane dynamics, as taught in Langewieche's "Stick and Rudder" and hundreds of other instructional manuals:
Pitch controls airspeed.
Power controls altitude.
The A330 Flight test accident in 1994 uncovered the flaw in Airbus logic. The plane was on autopilot in Altitude Capture mode when the pilot pulled the power on one engine. The AP responded to lack of power by pulling the pitch up to over 30 degrees. Instead, it should have kept the pitch at desired speed, and told the pilot, "We can't do that."
The TK951 B737 approach accident at AMS in 2007 revealed the same flaw. An undetected erroneous input to the A/T caused it to go to Flight Idle. The autopilot tried to stay on Glideslope by pulling the nose up and trimming to lower speed to make up for lack of power. Instead, it should have kept the desired speed, and let the plane sink below glidepath. If the pilot hadn't caught that, he would have heard, "TOO LOW! GLIDESLOPE." Firewalling the throttles would have stopped the sink, and not have caused such a pitchup, as the elevator would still have been trimmed for the correct speed. The pilot could have intentionally traded some airspeed for altitude, and without fighting full aft trim.
How does this apply to 447? We'll see. Trying to control altitude with pitch is a loser, regardless.
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Hi,
Just a tought ... but for me if the tests were conducted at the altitude of 35.000 feet ... the result of Perpignan will be the same than AF447
I don't see that altitude will change the fate of the Perpignan event.
The scenario was set to finish in the sea .. from any altitude over the one of the day.
And indeed the pilots were very experimented on type.
Again .. the hours on type are not a reference for "experience" ... as seen in many accidents.
The memory items were innapropriate (reason why AF changed it after the AF447 crash and sended all their "experienced" pilots to the sim for play again the scenario)
The test should have been carried out at above FL100
I don't see that altitude will change the fate of the Perpignan event.
The scenario was set to finish in the sea .. from any altitude over the one of the day.
And indeed the pilots were very experimented on type.
Again .. the hours on type are not a reference for "experience" ... as seen in many accidents.
A) He was applying (inappropriately) his memory items practised recently in the sim?
Last edited by jcjeant; 11th Jun 2011 at 11:35.
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It's basic to conventional airplane dynamics, ......
Pitch controls airspeed.
Power controls altitude.
Pitch controls airspeed.
Power controls altitude.
Are you serious?...
We are talking about jets here, it's the other way 'round
(And that makes it adamantly clear: you never flew one)
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Quote:
It's basic to conventional airplane dynamics, ......
Pitch controls airspeed.
Power controls altitude.
I DON'T BELIEVE THIS..
Are you serious?...
We are talking about jets here, it's the other way 'round
(And that makes it adamantly clear: you never flew one)
It's basic to conventional airplane dynamics, ......
Pitch controls airspeed.
Power controls altitude.
I DON'T BELIEVE THIS..
Are you serious?...
We are talking about jets here, it's the other way 'round
(And that makes it adamantly clear: you never flew one)
After more than 1600 posts here, where the main preoccupation was to understand why the AF447 PF didn't lower the nose of its A330 to reduce AoA and therefore to increase "speed", it seems pretty clear that not always "power" is enough to regain speed...
Last edited by aguadalte; 11th Jun 2011 at 16:31. Reason: add "to increase" speed (for better understanding)
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golfyahnkeesierra makes it plain why modern "airmen" sometimes know nothing about airmanship. Just because his electric airplane's power levers stay in the climb detent, he thinks "You pull back to go up and push forward to go down."
I'd rather fly with Wolfgang Langeweische (or his son William, which I have done) than GYS.
I'd rather fly with Wolfgang Langeweische (or his son William, which I have done) than GYS.
Last edited by stepwilk; 11th Jun 2011 at 16:21.
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Pearpignan
Golf X-ray Lima triple eight
Tango contact tower one one eight decimal three bye
End of stall warning
Single chime
15 h 45 min 54 What’s wrong here
15 h 45 min 55 Flaps up
15 h 45 min 57 (*)
15 h 45 min 58 Flaps up
15 h 46 min 00 End of stall warning
15 h 46 min 00,5(*)
Continuous repetitive chime
15 h 46 min 02 Speedbrakes
15 h 46 min 02,5 End of CRC
15 h 46 min 03 C chord (Altitude alert)
15 h 46 min 04
SV: (*) terrain terrain
15 h 46 min 05 (…) (…)
15 h 46 min 06
15 h 46 min 07 End of recording
Someone unstalled the a/c. Unfortunately, it was pointed at the Ocean. Either the pilots started the Drill too low? (or not). Or the a/c would not allow NU? (what do the g traces say?). Both?
Golf X-ray Lima triple eight
Tango contact tower one one eight decimal three bye
End of stall warning
Single chime
15 h 45 min 54 What’s wrong here
15 h 45 min 55 Flaps up
15 h 45 min 57 (*)
15 h 45 min 58 Flaps up
15 h 46 min 00 End of stall warning
15 h 46 min 00,5(*)
Continuous repetitive chime
15 h 46 min 02 Speedbrakes
15 h 46 min 02,5 End of CRC
15 h 46 min 03 C chord (Altitude alert)
15 h 46 min 04
SV: (*) terrain terrain
15 h 46 min 05 (…) (…)
15 h 46 min 06
15 h 46 min 07 End of recording
Someone unstalled the a/c. Unfortunately, it was pointed at the Ocean. Either the pilots started the Drill too low? (or not). Or the a/c would not allow NU? (what do the g traces say?). Both?
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GYS
I presume you are a Flight Sim wannabee if you don't understand how we can control airspeed with pitch (which you do everyday on an airliner, well any aircraft, in both climb and descent) 
Quote:
It's basic to conventional airplane dynamics, ......
Pitch controls airspeed.
Power controls altitude.
I DON'T BELIEVE THIS..
Are you serious?...
We are talking about jets here, it's the other way 'round
It's basic to conventional airplane dynamics, ......
Pitch controls airspeed.
Power controls altitude.
I DON'T BELIEVE THIS..
Are you serious?...
We are talking about jets here, it's the other way 'round
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: Italy
Age: 64
Posts: 3
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I am an aircraft engineer with nearly two decades of experience in the industry. I am not a pilot. What I find SHOCKING is that many professional pilots in this thread disagree so strongly on such basic issues as flight dynamics or what a variation of throttle will do to you in level flight. This is really scary. I know quite a lot about airframe design as well as flight control system design having done both for many years. But this thread is proving that as automation proceeds flying IS going to become more and more dangerous. And if that were not enough, they've now started to make airplanes from plastic!