AF447 wreckage found
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Early Airbus controversies recalled
When the Airbus A-320 was still in planning stages, I remember a presentation in a conference on aviation psychology relating all the combinations of circumstances software code writers had to consider, such as what warnings to inhibit on takeoff when they could be a nuisance, etc., which presentations were appropriate and when, and which might not be.
The speaker said there were many combinations of events the software could not anticipate, that it would be impossible to write software for unforeseen events, and that doubtless the software itself would probably cause some problems.
Add to that the reticence of some pilot unions (was one Air France's?) about the "fly by wire" concept at the outset, with no mechanical controls whatsoever,and it seems this recent nightmare situation is an example of expressed fears of just such unknowns.
All this speculation is premature. As many have said, it seems really more a matter of "there but for the grace..." etc.
It all makes the QANTAS A-380's crew's performance, augmented by the extra pilots who were all busy, just that much more remarkable.
The speaker said there were many combinations of events the software could not anticipate, that it would be impossible to write software for unforeseen events, and that doubtless the software itself would probably cause some problems.
Add to that the reticence of some pilot unions (was one Air France's?) about the "fly by wire" concept at the outset, with no mechanical controls whatsoever,and it seems this recent nightmare situation is an example of expressed fears of just such unknowns.
All this speculation is premature. As many have said, it seems really more a matter of "there but for the grace..." etc.
It all makes the QANTAS A-380's crew's performance, augmented by the extra pilots who were all busy, just that much more remarkable.
If there is one piece of unambiguous information this crew could have used to save their lives it is a display of AOA.
It is nothing short of negligent that this information is easily read on the flight recorder after the crash but was not accessible to the crew.
AOA information is available on every jet transport, it should be displayed constantly, at least on each EADI and additionally on a dedicated, independently powered standby instrument.
It is nothing short of negligent that this information is easily read on the flight recorder after the crash but was not accessible to the crew.
AOA information is available on every jet transport, it should be displayed constantly, at least on each EADI and additionally on a dedicated, independently powered standby instrument.
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I whose screwed up mind can a life be worth more or less depending on how long the descent was and when in that process they all died?
64 New York University Law Review 1989 Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death
You will see in the reference that the extra damages are intended to have a deterrent effect.
I'm not a lawyer, so please don't shoot the messenger.
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@Greybeard
We didn't have ISIS on the A332 but on the A333 and the A343. I don't know if AF had the same ISIS, but ours only displayed the following datas:
The ISIS system displays the following information:
- Attitude
- Airspeed and mach
- Altitude
- Barometric pressure
- LS function
- Bugs
(OM B A343 - Vol 1 / OM B A333 - Vol 1)
Therefore no VS indication on the ISIS.
What is max displayed on AI EFIS?
The ISIS system displays the following information:
- Attitude
- Airspeed and mach
- Altitude
- Barometric pressure
- LS function
- Bugs
(OM B A343 - Vol 1 / OM B A333 - Vol 1)
Therefore no VS indication on the ISIS.
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It is nothing short of negligent that this information is easily read on the flight recorder after the crash but was not accessible to the crew.
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It would be sickening to know that, in those dire moments, the single most important parameter, while present and available to the system, wasn't displayed because the customer had't ordered the software feature to do so.
They didn't need an AOA display on their PFD to fly the Aircraft.
I'm getting sick of repeating myself but here goes again.
This is not a new event
Let me say it again
This is not a new event
It's happened before and ALL OPERATORS HAVE PUBLISHED PROCEDURES FROM AIRBUS TO COPE WITH THE PROBLEM OF UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED.
These procedures detail what you can expect to hear and see during the event. They detail explicitly what to do.
Most competent Airline Pilots would have read about this problem, been shown the problem in the Simulator and hopefully bothered to have a think about what they would do if faced by the same event. I know I've put a lot of thought into it and so should have the AF crew.
Ok, so now we are clear.
I'm getting sick of repeating myself but here goes again.
This is not a new event
Let me say it again
This is not a new event
It's happened before and ALL OPERATORS HAVE PUBLISHED PROCEDURES FROM AIRBUS TO COPE WITH THE PROBLEM OF UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED.
These procedures detail what you can expect to hear and see during the event. They detail explicitly what to do.
Most competent Airline Pilots would have read about this problem, been shown the problem in the Simulator and hopefully bothered to have a think about what they would do if faced by the same event. I know I've put a lot of thought into it and so should have the AF crew.
Ok, so now we are clear.
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Air Caraibes Atlantique memo details pitot icing incidents
An Air France air safety message to its pilots last November talks of six related incidents on A330/A340s resulting in incorrect airspeed indications, numerous warning messages, and sometimes configuration alerts.
It urges pilots to be vigilant at high altitude when icing and turbulence are encountered, and to fly the aircraft gently if they take manual control.
It urges pilots to be vigilant at high altitude when icing and turbulence are encountered, and to fly the aircraft gently if they take manual control.
Air Caraibes Airbus A330 memo
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Ok, so now we are clear.
however, every indicator other than the AoA gives you secondary information with respect to a stall condition. In a dire situation like this with a tsunami of information, warning, system errors, failing systems, unreliable systems etc rolling over your head, it can be very hard to correctly interpret secondary information. Having the root cause shown to you would shortcut through the cognitive dissonance and help gain correct situational awareness.
An experienced crew would know for their a/c:--
1/ what pitch attitude they must fly AND WHAT IS NOT NORMAL
2/ what thrust setting they must fly AND WHAT IS NOT NORMAL
3/ What noise levels constitute "normal" for their cruise speed
4/ That it is simply not possible to climb 3,000 feet at heavy weights at high altitude quickly ( 7000 fpm apparently ) without Stalling the damn plane
5/ That if they entered the area at a normal speed and power settings then all they had to do was keep the pitch attitude somewhere around 2 deg nose up ( lower wouldn't matter too much, but higher does ) and the thrust around 78 to 80% N1 and they would be ok.
6/ keep the wings level and BE SMOOTH ON THE SIDESTICK.
1/ what pitch attitude they must fly AND WHAT IS NOT NORMAL
2/ what thrust setting they must fly AND WHAT IS NOT NORMAL
3/ What noise levels constitute "normal" for their cruise speed
4/ That it is simply not possible to climb 3,000 feet at heavy weights at high altitude quickly ( 7000 fpm apparently ) without Stalling the damn plane
5/ That if they entered the area at a normal speed and power settings then all they had to do was keep the pitch attitude somewhere around 2 deg nose up ( lower wouldn't matter too much, but higher does ) and the thrust around 78 to 80% N1 and they would be ok.
6/ keep the wings level and BE SMOOTH ON THE SIDESTICK.
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1. A/c enters cloud with high concentration of super-cooled droplets.
2. Faulty pitot ices over on PF side "freezing" dynamic pressure sent to ADC.
3. Sudden convective event induces a climb reducing static pressure to ADC.
4. PF responds to perceived Mmo excedence with stick back.
5. Static pressure reduces causing airspeed increase.
6. Auto-trim blindly complies with pilot input increasing nose up towards maximum.
7. Repeat steps 4 to 6 until stall....
8. Stall warning stops but comes back on if PF does the right thing.
9. Software has turned off auto trim with stab trim stuck 13 deg up.
10. Software has turned off the bird, just when it would has improved S.A.
11. Checkmate to the software....
In all error chains there's always a bit of man + a bit of machine. But once this kicked off, the man didn't really stand a chance, now did he?
2. Faulty pitot ices over on PF side "freezing" dynamic pressure sent to ADC.
3. Sudden convective event induces a climb reducing static pressure to ADC.
4. PF responds to perceived Mmo excedence with stick back.
5. Static pressure reduces causing airspeed increase.
6. Auto-trim blindly complies with pilot input increasing nose up towards maximum.
7. Repeat steps 4 to 6 until stall....
8. Stall warning stops but comes back on if PF does the right thing.
9. Software has turned off auto trim with stab trim stuck 13 deg up.
10. Software has turned off the bird, just when it would has improved S.A.
11. Checkmate to the software....
In all error chains there's always a bit of man + a bit of machine. But once this kicked off, the man didn't really stand a chance, now did he?
Last edited by Pininstauld; 30th May 2011 at 08:02.
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Hi,
I disagree ...
You can't be so affirmative.
Methink the AF447 case is enough to understand that some pilots or aircraft under certain condition need a AOA display.
So ... the solution is to go to the most safe side and have a AOA display
And also needed a stall alarm who sound with no interrupt when aircraft is in stall condition
Save lifes first .. with experienced or inexperienced pilot is a noble task
Foolproof .. as always.
They didn't need an AOA display on their PFD to fly the Aircraft.
You can't be so affirmative.
Methink the AF447 case is enough to understand that some pilots or aircraft under certain condition need a AOA display.
So ... the solution is to go to the most safe side and have a AOA display
And also needed a stall alarm who sound with no interrupt when aircraft is in stall condition
Save lifes first .. with experienced or inexperienced pilot is a noble task
Foolproof .. as always.
Was in 2006
By Joelle Barthe
Flight Operations Engineer
Quote:
6 Conclusion
An unreliable speed situatio may be difficult to identify, due to the multiple scenarios that can lead to it. Therefore, training is a key element: indeed the flight crew's ability to rapid detected the abnormal situation, and to correctely handle it, is cricial.
In case of any doubt, the pilot should apply the pitch/thrust memory items, and then refer to the QRH to safely fly the aircraft, and to positively determine the faulty source(s) before eliminating it (them).
In addition, to further assit the pilot in detecting the failure and safely fly the aircraft, Airbus has developed the BUSS, which provides a safe flying range indication.
Finaly, to reduze the probally of experiencing unreliable speed situations, on-ground actions, such as comprehensive maintenance and through pre-flight exterior inspection, should be stressed.
By Joelle Barthe
Flight Operations Engineer
Quote:
6 Conclusion
An unreliable speed situatio may be difficult to identify, due to the multiple scenarios that can lead to it. Therefore, training is a key element: indeed the flight crew's ability to rapid detected the abnormal situation, and to correctely handle it, is cricial.
In case of any doubt, the pilot should apply the pitch/thrust memory items, and then refer to the QRH to safely fly the aircraft, and to positively determine the faulty source(s) before eliminating it (them).
In addition, to further assit the pilot in detecting the failure and safely fly the aircraft, Airbus has developed the BUSS, which provides a safe flying range indication.
Finaly, to reduze the probally of experiencing unreliable speed situations, on-ground actions, such as comprehensive maintenance and through pre-flight exterior inspection, should be stressed.
well I think it reasonable to expect that this crew might have ignored that piece of information ( AOA display ) just like they ignored 3 fully serviceable BIG ATTITUDE INDICATORS right in front of their noses.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Absolutely with nitpcker. Until the BEA tell us WHY the aircraft was climbed so rapidly we are all 'groping in the dark'
- which bit and why please?
Originally Posted by aston
This scenario doesn't work in alternate law
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Mainstream media coverage
TO ME IT IS WAY TOO EARLY TO SPECULATE ON A PROBABLE CAUSE BECAUSE ALL OF THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE BASED ON DATA THAT IS SELECTIVELY RELEASED. TOO MANY ISSUES ARE YET TO BE RESOLVED.
Pilot control versus Computer control. Flight into hazardous conditions. Simulator training. Pilot qualifications.
Too many questions. No conclusions.
Way too early for the public to be involved in hip-shot resolutions.
Pilot control versus Computer control. Flight into hazardous conditions. Simulator training. Pilot qualifications.
Too many questions. No conclusions.
Way too early for the public to be involved in hip-shot resolutions.
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A side comment about AOA indication, valuable info for such operation:
a. It can be measured directly with a vane, but is subject to icing.
b. It can be calculated from INS measurements, generally it is the difference between flight path angle and fuselege pitch attitude.
Its absence was not a factor. A pilot can see the altitude dropping rapidly and the nose pointing up, which is sufficient information to deduct a very high AOA. A push of the sidestick forward would have been enough.
What to me is unacceptable, is an aircraft changing its response to my flight control inputs, due to some laws switching to and fro. In an ideal world it could be regarded advanced, but in the given circumstances it makes the pilot a deputy assistant to the autoflight system, as opposed to the pilot in command.
a. It can be measured directly with a vane, but is subject to icing.
b. It can be calculated from INS measurements, generally it is the difference between flight path angle and fuselege pitch attitude.
Its absence was not a factor. A pilot can see the altitude dropping rapidly and the nose pointing up, which is sufficient information to deduct a very high AOA. A push of the sidestick forward would have been enough.
What to me is unacceptable, is an aircraft changing its response to my flight control inputs, due to some laws switching to and fro. In an ideal world it could be regarded advanced, but in the given circumstances it makes the pilot a deputy assistant to the autoflight system, as opposed to the pilot in command.