AF447 wreckage found
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So either (a) the crew were fixated on the "overspeed" scenario and maintained their "pull-up" input, ignoring the (intermittent) stall warnings (and pitch attitude?),
believing they were trying to recover from a dive,
This leaves
OR under pressure they "overlooked" that the degraded control mode/ sensor input problems no longer gave a safety protection that full back stick will not be allowed to stall the aircraft
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AF 447
As one whose very limited pilot hours were a long time ago, might I ask if any simulator time is spent on flying difficult manoeuvres on basic flying instruments, Gyro driven horizon, attitude indicator etc (presumably basic turn and bank is no longer there.
The ability to realise what was happening seems to have been a factor.
The ability to realise what was happening seems to have been a factor.
Yes, this is not a new occurrence for Airbus or Boeing.
I've done the unreliable airspeed training in the sim from 10,000' down to landing. There are a few things you need to think about ( obviously !! ) but it's manageable without any Airspeed indicators. Granted it was in a Sim, reasonably good wx and with no risk of dying ( my heart rate was relatively normal in the sim !!) but we did have a lot of bells and whistles going off for a while which proved a headache for the PM. My job wasn't overly difficult, fly the power and attitudes for the config etc.....
Every Pilot in my Airline did this as part of their 6 monthly recurrent training package.
I've done the unreliable airspeed training in the sim from 10,000' down to landing. There are a few things you need to think about ( obviously !! ) but it's manageable without any Airspeed indicators. Granted it was in a Sim, reasonably good wx and with no risk of dying ( my heart rate was relatively normal in the sim !!) but we did have a lot of bells and whistles going off for a while which proved a headache for the PM. My job wasn't overly difficult, fly the power and attitudes for the config etc.....
Every Pilot in my Airline did this as part of their 6 monthly recurrent training package.
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At 2 h 10 min 51 the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned in the TO/GA detent and the PF maintained nose-up inputs. The recorded angle of attack, of around 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning, continued to increase. The trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute and remained in the latter position until the end of the flight."
Is it normal for the stall warning to be triggered at 6 degrees ? To the uneducated this appears quite low. Wouldn't the stall AOA in clean config be around 13-15 degrees?
If the aircraft was still in Alternate Law as indicated by PNF is there anyway the automatics could trigger an uncommanded (by the pilots) THS nose-up change of 10 degrees?
Can anything be read into the rate of increase in nose up ? To the uneducated it appears relatively slow / deliberate ?
Is it normal for the stall warning to be triggered at 6 degrees ? To the uneducated this appears quite low. Wouldn't the stall AOA in clean config be around 13-15 degrees?
If the aircraft was still in Alternate Law as indicated by PNF is there anyway the automatics could trigger an uncommanded (by the pilots) THS nose-up change of 10 degrees?
Can anything be read into the rate of increase in nose up ? To the uneducated it appears relatively slow / deliberate ?
It seems to me the likeliest explanation is that the aircraft was still giving some powerful cues consistent with the erroneous interpretation. They must have been powerful cues because three men did not interpret a stall warning as meaning that the aircraft was about to enter a stall.
I suspect the scenario will become clearer once we know what pitch information the pilots were seeing.
Also, note that the speed information displayed to RH pilot is not recorded. The PF was in the RHS. The PF may therefore have been reacting to speed information different to that recorded.
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I think it is interesting to revisit the situation the Captain William Hagan on the BA 744 (LGW-NBO) in December 2000, who came onto the flight deck to find an intruder attacking his F/O and the very dangerous stall that the aircraft was in. Another four or five seconds he said, and the aircraft would have been on its back! Again it was at night with no horizon and credit must be given again to that F/O who saved the aircraft without overstressing it. I would say that was a worse predicament for the BA 747-436 than the AF A-330.
Incidentally I flew that 744 to PHX soon after the event with our new CEO, Rod Eddington, on board. My F/O was shocked to find there was still blood spattered on some of the instruments! Eddington told me that he had 'phoned the President of Boeing to congratulate them on building such a strong airplane.
Gentlemen, it is all down to airmanship. Reading the reports in the Press of Air France congratulating the heroic efforts and professionalism of the flight crew on AF 447, makes me think if you are going to tell a lie, you might as well tell a whopper.
In a similar situation on a 747-236, my instinct was not to raise the nose and put the aircraft even closer to coffin corner. The AF pilot(s) allowed the situation to deteriorate where the aircraft had almost no forward speed or momentum. How do you recover from that?
The fact that Air Caraibe pilots demonstrated the appropriate airmanship in two similar scenarios, shows that basic flying skills are lacking at AF. How can you otherwise explain landing an A-340 half way down the runway in a thunderstorm at YYZ and expecting to stop, the heavy landing at CCS, the taxying incident at JFK and even the loss of the Concorde may have been a different result, if BA procedures had been followed as well as maintenance. Maintenance of course, regarding the pitot tubes (changed by Air Caraibe following their upsets) is again a factor in an AF crash.
Air France needs to go through a flight safety audit similar to Korean Airlines, who since that have not suffered a hull loss.
Incidentally I flew that 744 to PHX soon after the event with our new CEO, Rod Eddington, on board. My F/O was shocked to find there was still blood spattered on some of the instruments! Eddington told me that he had 'phoned the President of Boeing to congratulate them on building such a strong airplane.
Gentlemen, it is all down to airmanship. Reading the reports in the Press of Air France congratulating the heroic efforts and professionalism of the flight crew on AF 447, makes me think if you are going to tell a lie, you might as well tell a whopper.
In a similar situation on a 747-236, my instinct was not to raise the nose and put the aircraft even closer to coffin corner. The AF pilot(s) allowed the situation to deteriorate where the aircraft had almost no forward speed or momentum. How do you recover from that?
The fact that Air Caraibe pilots demonstrated the appropriate airmanship in two similar scenarios, shows that basic flying skills are lacking at AF. How can you otherwise explain landing an A-340 half way down the runway in a thunderstorm at YYZ and expecting to stop, the heavy landing at CCS, the taxying incident at JFK and even the loss of the Concorde may have been a different result, if BA procedures had been followed as well as maintenance. Maintenance of course, regarding the pitot tubes (changed by Air Caraibe following their upsets) is again a factor in an AF crash.
Air France needs to go through a flight safety audit similar to Korean Airlines, who since that have not suffered a hull loss.
Last edited by Count Niemantznarr; 28th May 2011 at 12:14.
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Power PLUS attitude = Performance
On my A330-300, set 2.5 nose up and 78% N1 for S + L flight at most weights.
You should also know what sound levels to expect in the cockpit from the Airspeed in cruise.
If you think that you might indeed be too slow then set CLB detent and lower the nose to 0, wait till the noise level returns to near normal then set it back to 2.5 and 78%.
All the while checking the GPS groudspeed from the FM to use as a gross error check whilst flying the Aircraft as smoothly as possible until I exit the area and hopefully all returns to normal.
Anytime I approach an area of suspect wx I cannot avoid I try to do 4 things:
1/ sit the cabin crew down, 2/ check the current GS and listen to the noise
levels, 3/ note the current attitude and N1 to achieve current speed and finally 4/ brief the FO on all of the above just incase all hell breaks loose.
I've done this for the last 10 years or so. Why did I consciously do this? Because our Airline has had it's share of Iced up Pitot static systems causing overspeed and stall warnings On the 744, 777 and A330 types where the crew did what I suggest above ( ie: fly the damn plane on Attitude and N1 ) to a successful outcome.
On my A330-300, set 2.5 nose up and 78% N1 for S + L flight at most weights.
You should also know what sound levels to expect in the cockpit from the Airspeed in cruise.
If you think that you might indeed be too slow then set CLB detent and lower the nose to 0, wait till the noise level returns to near normal then set it back to 2.5 and 78%.
All the while checking the GPS groudspeed from the FM to use as a gross error check whilst flying the Aircraft as smoothly as possible until I exit the area and hopefully all returns to normal.
Anytime I approach an area of suspect wx I cannot avoid I try to do 4 things:
1/ sit the cabin crew down, 2/ check the current GS and listen to the noise
levels, 3/ note the current attitude and N1 to achieve current speed and finally 4/ brief the FO on all of the above just incase all hell breaks loose.
I've done this for the last 10 years or so. Why did I consciously do this? Because our Airline has had it's share of Iced up Pitot static systems causing overspeed and stall warnings On the 744, 777 and A330 types where the crew did what I suggest above ( ie: fly the damn plane on Attitude and N1 ) to a successful outcome.
That sounds like the missing procedure, and hopefully one that will be thought hereafter!
As I said above this scenario is not new unfortunately. There are now quite a few documented cases around the world with Boeing and Airbus operators. Enough incidents that Boeing and Airbus have for some time now included checklists in their QRH's and also recommended all crew be exposed to it in the Sim during their recurrent training cycles.
Thread drift.........This maybe more proof that employing low time inexperienced crews is just plain dumb, Airline managers trying to save money please take note.
There is no substitute for experience, full stop end of story
Thread drift.........This maybe more proof that employing low time inexperienced crews is just plain dumb, Airline managers trying to save money please take note.
There is no substitute for experience, full stop end of story
As expected reading the last few pages, the usual crowd of perfect pilots comes on to disparage those pilots who were imperfect, the only difference between the perfect pilots and the rest are that the perfect pilots strut around here like a bunch of cockerels, the imperfect pilots are out there facing the real world scenarios...
Anyway that aside, to me what was said and the actions of the PF, with no real dissent from either of the other two imperfect pilots who were there, indicate that something either in the instrumentation or the plane's response to inputs was diametrically opposed to what the crew expected to see or experience. Unless you perfect pilots believe that all three highly trained pilots on the flight deck on that dark night were so grossly incompetent that they could not follow basic airmanship as a matter of course, then there must be some factor(s) that the data recorders have not been able to provide and which may never be known.
As for the dogmatic statements by some perfect pilots above that the crew shouldn't have flown into the storm or flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the sea, your comments are beneath contempt, not only for their insensitivity but also for their gross simplification of a situation that you in reality know absolutely nothing about.
Anyway that aside, to me what was said and the actions of the PF, with no real dissent from either of the other two imperfect pilots who were there, indicate that something either in the instrumentation or the plane's response to inputs was diametrically opposed to what the crew expected to see or experience. Unless you perfect pilots believe that all three highly trained pilots on the flight deck on that dark night were so grossly incompetent that they could not follow basic airmanship as a matter of course, then there must be some factor(s) that the data recorders have not been able to provide and which may never be known.
As for the dogmatic statements by some perfect pilots above that the crew shouldn't have flown into the storm or flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the sea, your comments are beneath contempt, not only for their insensitivity but also for their gross simplification of a situation that you in reality know absolutely nothing about.
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An interesting read, forget technology and stall recovery techniques, I believe beyond the system failure the cause to this accident runs deeper. Whenever we go into a degraded mode the assumption made is that the pilots have the skill recency to deal with the problem. My view is that modern EFIS systems have led to pilots forgeting to scan their instruments. Their focus is on the MCP/FCU and the FMAs not the attitude or performance instruments. Even on the approach rather than looking at the speed many pilots just trust the autothrust to maintain it.
Retaining basic instrument skills is easy even with a low tech PC flight simulator but few people do it unless they are going for an interview. Until this issue is addressed, events such as this will continue albeit infrequently.
Power + Attitude does equal performance but first you have to look at the instruments.
Retaining basic instrument skills is easy even with a low tech PC flight simulator but few people do it unless they are going for an interview. Until this issue is addressed, events such as this will continue albeit infrequently.
Power + Attitude does equal performance but first you have to look at the instruments.
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No AoA indication?
The key question here is - 'did the pilots have enough information to realise they were stalled, pitched up, throttles closed, and recover'?
I am surprised that in all this discussion (including that of the thoughtful Shadow) putting forward idea that the pilots didn't know what the AoA is, nobody has mentioned the backup AI (about 6 inches to the right of the captains MFD)? Was it really not noticed by 3 experienced pilots that the there was a huge difference between PFD and backup AI, which would have indicated a big pitch up, and yes (as mentioned by another poster) - no noise in the flight deck? Isn't this why the backup instruments are there? Or am I missing something (only a humble PPL/IR)?
Obviously there's a fundamental difference between AoA and attitude (ie the vertical speed of the air) but I am trying to think of a conceivable Wx scenario that would deliver up to 40 degrees pitch up on the AI with closed throttles for an extended period, and not indicate a stall.
nitpicker330 - yes! Power+Attitude=Performance. They had power - they had a backup AI. They also had, I presume, an 'alternate air' feed (like my Mooney!) which would have got the altimeters working again, at least the backup ... There was a lack of training and/or airmanship here, probably a huge dollop of denial (surely EVERYTHING can't have gone wrong!), though it looks as if Airbus need to seriously look at some kind of mechanism to warn the pilots if the computer lacks confidence in it's view of the world (due to inconsistent inputs) and advise the pilots to check the backup instruments.
We have all been trained and examined in the effects of icing in the instrumentation. It seems amazing that 3 experienced pilots wouldn't have guessed something was up, especially IR onwards.
All in all, I am concerned that it can't be as portayed as those 3 guys should have figured out what was happening.
I am surprised that in all this discussion (including that of the thoughtful Shadow) putting forward idea that the pilots didn't know what the AoA is, nobody has mentioned the backup AI (about 6 inches to the right of the captains MFD)? Was it really not noticed by 3 experienced pilots that the there was a huge difference between PFD and backup AI, which would have indicated a big pitch up, and yes (as mentioned by another poster) - no noise in the flight deck? Isn't this why the backup instruments are there? Or am I missing something (only a humble PPL/IR)?
Obviously there's a fundamental difference between AoA and attitude (ie the vertical speed of the air) but I am trying to think of a conceivable Wx scenario that would deliver up to 40 degrees pitch up on the AI with closed throttles for an extended period, and not indicate a stall.
nitpicker330 - yes! Power+Attitude=Performance. They had power - they had a backup AI. They also had, I presume, an 'alternate air' feed (like my Mooney!) which would have got the altimeters working again, at least the backup ... There was a lack of training and/or airmanship here, probably a huge dollop of denial (surely EVERYTHING can't have gone wrong!), though it looks as if Airbus need to seriously look at some kind of mechanism to warn the pilots if the computer lacks confidence in it's view of the world (due to inconsistent inputs) and advise the pilots to check the backup instruments.
We have all been trained and examined in the effects of icing in the instrumentation. It seems amazing that 3 experienced pilots wouldn't have guessed something was up, especially IR onwards.
All in all, I am concerned that it can't be as portayed as those 3 guys should have figured out what was happening.
Retaining basic instrument skills is easy even with a low tech PC flight simulator but few people do it unless they are going for an interview. Until this issue is addressed, events such as this will continue albeit infrequently.
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Capt was away from the cockpit resting!
Whenever flying as multiple/augmented crew, my company schedules 2 captains & 1 F/O (this was gotten forcefully accepted by our pilots' association and the captains). So at all times you have 1 capt on the flight deck and somestimes 2 capts whilst the F/O is on a break. In the relaxed cockpit crew scheduling regime at AF and possibly other reputable carriers as well they put 2 F/Os in a 3 member set. Considering enroute WX forecasts and/or actual WX returns the Capt on AF 447 should have retained his seat and reclined it for rest. I can't understand how any responsible capt would prefer his allotted rest over safety of operation especially if that rest meant being away from the flight deck. Sheer negligence I'd say. AF and other companies that allow crew rest periods need to urgently review their scheduling policy and advise their crew to exercise sound judgement and discretion for rest periods considering segments of bad enroute WX. I always thought that one takes adequate rest prior to assuming duty and layover time is best spent and meant to arrive fresh for duty. I hope and am sure that the final report will adequately address the question of this capt, his rest break, and absence from the cockpit.
Yes but it's not only the Pilots that need to do this.
The onus should also be on the operators to 1/ recruit the appropriately experienced crews and 2/ ensure they retain their Piloting skills through targeted appropriate training packages throughout their career insisting they maintain basic instrument skills and know how to fly raw data ( this is not encouraged at all, indeed it is frowned apron now days )
The onus should also be on the operators to 1/ recruit the appropriately experienced crews and 2/ ensure they retain their Piloting skills through targeted appropriate training packages throughout their career insisting they maintain basic instrument skills and know how to fly raw data ( this is not encouraged at all, indeed it is frowned apron now days )
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I have a question:
the news media has described the 3 minute drop into the ocean as having been 'horrifying' for the passengers. However, if indeed the pilots didn't even realize that the plane was stalled and was descending so quickly, could it be that the passengers were completely unaware of anything being wrong during their final minutes?
You can only feel a fall during the initial acceleration. And surely if the pilots could feel that 10 000fpm decent then they would know they must be stalling and stop the nose up attitude inputs.
the news media has described the 3 minute drop into the ocean as having been 'horrifying' for the passengers. However, if indeed the pilots didn't even realize that the plane was stalled and was descending so quickly, could it be that the passengers were completely unaware of anything being wrong during their final minutes?
You can only feel a fall during the initial acceleration. And surely if the pilots could feel that 10 000fpm decent then they would know they must be stalling and stop the nose up attitude inputs.
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Hi,
I think they were so busy that if you would ask them their names they would not have been able to respond
Could someone explain to me why there was no distress call in 3 minutes ?
Fatal flaw...... It's my understanding the ALL the Attitude indicators where fully functioning all of the time throughout. It was only Airspeed that gave incorrect indications via iced up Pitot tubes screwing the 3 ADM's.