AF447 wreckage found
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Apparently their pitot tubes froze up because of faulty probes that hadn't been replaced yet
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greybeard, I am afraid you have the issues of SBs wrong many SB providers put things such as mandatory or alert on the SB however this is irrelevent as only a national aviation authority can mandate an SB, ALL SBs are optional when they are mandated by an authority they become ADs and off course have to be carried out. You are however correct in the statement that some come free of charge and others cost.
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JCviggen,
I agree the pitots froze, and that whilst the newer ones recommended in the 2007 Bulletin should have been better, there is no guarantee they would not have iced up too.
For me the questions are
"In the light of the catalogue of previous unreliable airspeed occurrences, should Airbus/the regulator have mandated the upgrade, rather than as an advisory", and
"Should Air France have implemented the upgrade, on at least one pitot per aircraft, more swiftly?"
I agree the pitots froze, and that whilst the newer ones recommended in the 2007 Bulletin should have been better, there is no guarantee they would not have iced up too.
For me the questions are
"In the light of the catalogue of previous unreliable airspeed occurrences, should Airbus/the regulator have mandated the upgrade, rather than as an advisory", and
"Should Air France have implemented the upgrade, on at least one pitot per aircraft, more swiftly?"
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Roseland
"allowing flight plans to be filed where the advertised destination is an alternate'"
If you are referring to reclearance/redispatch procedures, they are allowed because they require fuel reserves in accordance with the airline's policy to be available at all times.
In other words the flight should arrive at 'advertised' destination with enough fuel for holding and diversion to alternate, if needs be.
If you are referring to reclearance/redispatch procedures, they are allowed because they require fuel reserves in accordance with the airline's policy to be available at all times.
In other words the flight should arrive at 'advertised' destination with enough fuel for holding and diversion to alternate, if needs be.
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oldchina,
I'm clearly missing something here. If what you say is correct, and I am sure it is, then why file a plan where the intended destination is listed as an alternate?
I'm clearly missing something here. If what you say is correct, and I am sure it is, then why file a plan where the intended destination is listed as an alternate?
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I, a mear slf have a question 
The sidestick was hard left and back for 30 seconds.
Would this input have been as likely to occur if they had a yoke in front of them ?
I wonder if there is a sensory perception penalty for having the primary control out of the direct line of the pilots sight ?
The sidestick was hard left and back for 30 seconds.
Would this input have been as likely to occur if they had a yoke in front of them ?
I wonder if there is a sensory perception penalty for having the primary control out of the direct line of the pilots sight ?
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Roseland - you have me confused now. What is this about "why file a plan where the intended destination is listed as an alternate?". Destination was CDG. The alternate was ORY. Can you explain your query please?
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WanganuiLad,
I think there are two questions here:
Would the PF been more aware of the inputs he was making, and
Would the PNF and Captain have noticed the inputs more quickly had it been a yoke rather than a sidestick.
A third question could be "would the crew have noticed the yokes creeping forwards to offset the HS trim as the pitots iced?" prior to AP disconnect.
I think there are two questions here:
Would the PF been more aware of the inputs he was making, and
Would the PNF and Captain have noticed the inputs more quickly had it been a yoke rather than a sidestick.
A third question could be "would the crew have noticed the yokes creeping forwards to offset the HS trim as the pitots iced?" prior to AP disconnect.
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BOAC,
You're right (of course!).
The first BEA Report lists Paris ORLY as the alternate, not CDG.
Must be my age - I still think "Paris, must be Orly!"
Apologies to all for the confusion!
You're right (of course!).
The first BEA Report lists Paris ORLY as the alternate, not CDG.
Must be my age - I still think "Paris, must be Orly!"
Apologies to all for the confusion!
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Roseland
The answer lies in the en-route contingency fuel (typically 3% of planned trip fuel) which has to be loaded as reserve together with fuel for holding at destination and diversion to alternate.
A first flight plan is filed with e.g. Bordeaux as "destination" and anywhere suitable as alternate. Could be Toulouse, could be CDG.
When getting close to BOD, if the 3% contingency has been consumed you land at BOD.
If, as is usual, most of the 3% has not been used, you file a second flight plan from this redispatch point to CDG.
Fuel for holding at CDG and diversion to ORY is still required but contingency fuel is now only 3% of the planned burnoff from reclearance point to CDG (very little). Very very common and perfectly legal.
A first flight plan is filed with e.g. Bordeaux as "destination" and anywhere suitable as alternate. Could be Toulouse, could be CDG.
When getting close to BOD, if the 3% contingency has been consumed you land at BOD.
If, as is usual, most of the 3% has not been used, you file a second flight plan from this redispatch point to CDG.
Fuel for holding at CDG and diversion to ORY is still required but contingency fuel is now only 3% of the planned burnoff from reclearance point to CDG (very little). Very very common and perfectly legal.
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oldchina quoting Roseland
Must admit, oldchina, that aspect bugs me more than any other part of tihs business. Unless we are expected to believe that the two duty pilots said nothing between 'We've lost the speeds' and 'no indications' -and, further, that the captain said nothing at ALL during his two minutes on the flight deck - it seems obvious that the BEA is suppressing (or, one could say, concealing) information that would probably go a long way towards identifying the primary cause(s) of the accident.
In this connection, it's possibly relevant to quote some passages from the report and CVR transcript for the A320, flown by XL Airways pilots, that crashed off Perpignan in 2008. Those pilots definitely acted unwisely, to say the least - they decided to test the 'low speed protections' at only 3,000 feet, in landing configuration - but the report and transcript clearly shows that, as in the case of AF 447, the THS went to 'full up' and stayed there - and the pilots were just plain unable to get the nose down:-
You can read the whole report on here if you like:-
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...a081127.en.pdf
Sorry for the long quote - but I thought about cutting out 'irrelevant parts' but finally concluded that just about ALL of it is possibly relevant.
One question for Airbus pilots. We all know that Airbus throttles don't have servos - so they just stay in their detents, they don't move in response to thrust changes by the autothrust. Are there servos on the trimwheels - or do they also just remain in the 'normal position' whatever the systems tell the THS actually to do?
And, if the latter is so, what means do the pilots have of finding out what position the THS is actually in at any given time?
It is unknown whether the decision not to detour further away was due in part to a fuel constraint".
Well, unknown to you and I certainly, but I bet the answer comes out on the CVR, and is known to the BEA.
Well, unknown to you and I certainly, but I bet the answer comes out on the CVR, and is known to the BEA.
In this connection, it's possibly relevant to quote some passages from the report and CVR transcript for the A320, flown by XL Airways pilots, that crashed off Perpignan in 2008. Those pilots definitely acted unwisely, to say the least - they decided to test the 'low speed protections' at only 3,000 feet, in landing configuration - but the report and transcript clearly shows that, as in the case of AF 447, the THS went to 'full up' and stayed there - and the pilots were just plain unable to get the nose down:-
When the stall warning sounded, the Captain reacted by placing the thrust levers in the TO/GA detent and by pitching the aeroplane down, in accordance with procedures. The nose-down input was not however sufficient for the automatic compensation system to vary the position of the horizontal stabilizer, which had been progressively deflected to the pitch-up stop by this system during the deceleration. The Captain controlled a left roll movement, caused by the stall. The aeroplane’s high angle of attack and the roll movements generated asymmetry, and a speed variation between ADR 1 and 2 appeared. This increasing divergence caused a rejection of the three ADRs by the FAC then the ELAC. The flight control system then passed into direct law. It is likely that the crew did not notice this due to the emergency situation and the aural stall warning that covered the warning of a change of flight control laws. The Air New Zealand pilot, by saying “alpha floor, we’re in manual” likely considered that the alpha floor function had triggered and that in fact the autopilot had disconnected.
15 h 44 min 46 Okay here we go
15 h 44 min 49 Und ich sag ihr jetzt dass wir im Moment in Dreitausend bleiben
The weight is fifty four
And I say now to her that we are maintaining three thousand at the moment
15 h 44 min 51 Golf X-ray Lima triple eight
Tango can you speed reduce speed again
15 h 44 min 56 We are reducing
15 h 44 min 57 Triple click
15 h 44 min 58 ��We are still reducing the speed Golf X-ray Lima triple eight Tango (*)
15 h 45 min 03 (*) I will say when the trim stops
The word “stops” is stronger than the rest of the phrase
15 h 45 min 05 SV: Stall ( x13)
Cricket (stall warning)
15 h 45 min 06 Stop ! Noise similar to thrust levers being moved forward to the stop
15 h 45 min 13 (oh oh oh)
15 h 45 min 18 (…)
15 h 45 min 19 End of stall warning
15 h 45 min 20 Single chime
15 h 45 min 24 Ich nehm die Speed noch mal hoch ja?
(I increase speed ) Yeah?
15 h 45 min 26 Ja it's pitching up all the time
15 h 45 min 27 (…) Stick forward (*)
15 h 45 min 29 Pitching up
15 h 45 min 30
15 h 45 min 31 It’s (*) alpha floor we’re in manual Single chime
15 h 45 min 33 It's pitching up this (…)
15 h 45 min 34 Kriegst du das geregelt? Are you able to handle this?
15 h 45 min 35 Nee No
15 h 45 min 36 Gear up SV: Stall (12 times)
15 h 45 min 37 Gear up Cricket (stall warning)
15 h 45 min 39 Gear up Gear up
15 h 45 min 40 (*)
15 h 45 min 42 (…)
15 h 45 min 44 (…)
15 h 45 min 45
15 h 45 min 47
15 h 44 min 46 Okay here we go
15 h 44 min 49 Und ich sag ihr jetzt dass wir im Moment in Dreitausend bleiben
The weight is fifty four
And I say now to her that we are maintaining three thousand at the moment
15 h 44 min 51 Golf X-ray Lima triple eight
Tango can you speed reduce speed again
15 h 44 min 56 We are reducing
15 h 44 min 57 Triple click
15 h 44 min 58 ��We are still reducing the speed Golf X-ray Lima triple eight Tango (*)
15 h 45 min 03 (*) I will say when the trim stops
The word “stops” is stronger than the rest of the phrase
15 h 45 min 05 SV: Stall ( x13)
Cricket (stall warning)
15 h 45 min 06 Stop ! Noise similar to thrust levers being moved forward to the stop
15 h 45 min 13 (oh oh oh)
15 h 45 min 18 (…)
15 h 45 min 19 End of stall warning
15 h 45 min 20 Single chime
15 h 45 min 24 Ich nehm die Speed noch mal hoch ja?
(I increase speed ) Yeah?
15 h 45 min 26 Ja it's pitching up all the time
15 h 45 min 27 (…) Stick forward (*)
15 h 45 min 29 Pitching up
15 h 45 min 30
15 h 45 min 31 It’s (*) alpha floor we’re in manual Single chime
15 h 45 min 33 It's pitching up this (…)
15 h 45 min 34 Kriegst du das geregelt? Are you able to handle this?
15 h 45 min 35 Nee No
15 h 45 min 36 Gear up SV: Stall (12 times)
15 h 45 min 37 Gear up Cricket (stall warning)
15 h 45 min 39 Gear up Gear up
15 h 45 min 40 (*)
15 h 45 min 42 (…)
15 h 45 min 44 (…)
15 h 45 min 45
15 h 45 min 47
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...a081127.en.pdf
Sorry for the long quote - but I thought about cutting out 'irrelevant parts' but finally concluded that just about ALL of it is possibly relevant.
One question for Airbus pilots. We all know that Airbus throttles don't have servos - so they just stay in their detents, they don't move in response to thrust changes by the autothrust. Are there servos on the trimwheels - or do they also just remain in the 'normal position' whatever the systems tell the THS actually to do?
And, if the latter is so, what means do the pilots have of finding out what position the THS is actually in at any given time?
For wanganuilad
Depends on how well the attitude indicator was integrated into the PF's scan pattern, not control "position" so much.
EDIT: I have a hard time believing that "hard left and back" for thirty seconds is the accurate translation of what the pilot's input was. I don't think it would take 30 seconds of "hard" input to get the nose up to 16 degrees. My two cents.
First off, if this pilot was trained in type (hey, he was!) the where the stick is located is a non-issue. You adapt to where it fits into your hands during type training. A counter to that is "How often did he hand fly in Alt Law?" That is a good question irrespective of sidestick or yoke location.
To more directly answer your question ...
Viper pilots (F-16) seem to have managed to work around this small problem of stick not twixt the legs about thirty years. (see also posts about FBW by a poster "gums" on the Tech log discussions).
http://t2.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:A...Y-r2DDLPbkAsU1
Their Naval Brethren, Hornet (F-18) pilots have an FBW control stick remaining in the customary position, twixt the legs.
Either convention seems to work well enough once you've been trained on the aircraft. I have an old friend, retired now, who flew F-18's in the Navy, and flew F-16Ns as an aggressor pilot. He managed to adapt to both.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...18_Cockpit.JPG
If you are a pilot, you don't often look at the stick while you are flying. You sense it's position with the tactile sensations of your hands. You typically "feel the stick" and "look" at its influence via the nose attitude and / or bank you induce with it.
Given that these pilots were in the dark and in the clouds (or in and out of clouds) they'd "see" what their stick was doing by their primary scan instrument, the attitude indicator. (Artificial Horizon, which indicates pitch and roll). Given the FBW characteristics of the stick on the A330, even if both stick were in between the pilots' legs, rather than on one side or the other, the deflection wouldn't be all that visibly apparent the way it is with a traditional yoke.
I, a mear slf have a question 
The sidestick was hard left and back for 30 seconds.
Would this input have been as likely to occur if they had a yoke in front of them?
The sidestick was hard left and back for 30 seconds.
Would this input have been as likely to occur if they had a yoke in front of them?
EDIT: I have a hard time believing that "hard left and back" for thirty seconds is the accurate translation of what the pilot's input was. I don't think it would take 30 seconds of "hard" input to get the nose up to 16 degrees. My two cents.
I wonder if there is a sensory perception penalty for having the primary control out of the direct line of the pilots sight ?
To more directly answer your question ...
Viper pilots (F-16) seem to have managed to work around this small problem of stick not twixt the legs about thirty years. (see also posts about FBW by a poster "gums" on the Tech log discussions).
http://t2.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:A...Y-r2DDLPbkAsU1
Their Naval Brethren, Hornet (F-18) pilots have an FBW control stick remaining in the customary position, twixt the legs.
Either convention seems to work well enough once you've been trained on the aircraft. I have an old friend, retired now, who flew F-18's in the Navy, and flew F-16Ns as an aggressor pilot. He managed to adapt to both.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...18_Cockpit.JPG
If you are a pilot, you don't often look at the stick while you are flying. You sense it's position with the tactile sensations of your hands. You typically "feel the stick" and "look" at its influence via the nose attitude and / or bank you induce with it.
Given that these pilots were in the dark and in the clouds (or in and out of clouds) they'd "see" what their stick was doing by their primary scan instrument, the attitude indicator. (Artificial Horizon, which indicates pitch and roll). Given the FBW characteristics of the stick on the A330, even if both stick were in between the pilots' legs, rather than on one side or the other, the deflection wouldn't be all that visibly apparent the way it is with a traditional yoke.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 5th Jul 2011 at 16:05.
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Fuel for holding at CDG and diversion to ORY is still required but contingency fuel is now only 3% of the planned burnoff from reclearance point to CDG (very little). Very very common and perfectly legal.
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Hi,
Unlikely as the throttles .. the trim wheels are moving (but no noise as usual on other types) when trim auto move
This is an indent (indication of deflection angle) on their side
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45465...ml#post6554443
whatever the systems tell the THS actually to do
This is an indent (indication of deflection angle) on their side
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45465...ml#post6554443
Last edited by jcjeant; 5th Jul 2011 at 20:53.
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Quoting jcjeant:-
Many thanks, jcjeant, especially for the link to the very clear photograph. So information on the THS position was readily available to the pilots throughout?
As mentioned, exactly the same thing appears to have happened off Perpignan. The BEA, in that report, specifically states that none of the pilots touched the trimwheel.
One sentence in the Perpignan report troubles me a great deal, though:-
When the stall warning sounded, the Captain reacted by placing the thrust levers in the TO/GA detent and by pitching the aeroplane down, in accordance with procedures. The nose-down input was not however sufficient for the automatic compensation system to vary the position of the horizontal stabilizer, which had been progressively deflected to the pitch-up stop by this system during the deceleration.
Can you shed any light on the 'automatic compensation system' to which the BEA refers? Many people on here have been assuming that the AF447 THS went to 'full up' because of noseup inputs by the PF. But the THS at Perpignan appears to have gone to 'full up' (and stayed there) even though the pilot in that case was applying nosedown commands throughout?
Worth mentioning too that the AF447 pilot, according to the BEA, also applied nosedown commands while they were still above 10,000 feet; but, as at Perpignan, the THS stayed at 'full up.'
So what exactly are those automatic systems designed to 'compensate' for?
I think many of us consider it likely that the pilots were at first confused as to whether the aeroplane was in a stall or a dive. Is it possible that the 'systems' were ALSO confused?
the trim wheels are moving (but no noise as usual on other types) when trim auto move
This is an indent (indication of deflection angle) on their side
This is an indent (indication of deflection angle) on their side
As mentioned, exactly the same thing appears to have happened off Perpignan. The BEA, in that report, specifically states that none of the pilots touched the trimwheel.
One sentence in the Perpignan report troubles me a great deal, though:-
When the stall warning sounded, the Captain reacted by placing the thrust levers in the TO/GA detent and by pitching the aeroplane down, in accordance with procedures. The nose-down input was not however sufficient for the automatic compensation system to vary the position of the horizontal stabilizer, which had been progressively deflected to the pitch-up stop by this system during the deceleration.
Can you shed any light on the 'automatic compensation system' to which the BEA refers? Many people on here have been assuming that the AF447 THS went to 'full up' because of noseup inputs by the PF. But the THS at Perpignan appears to have gone to 'full up' (and stayed there) even though the pilot in that case was applying nosedown commands throughout?
Worth mentioning too that the AF447 pilot, according to the BEA, also applied nosedown commands while they were still above 10,000 feet; but, as at Perpignan, the THS stayed at 'full up.'
So what exactly are those automatic systems designed to 'compensate' for?
I think many of us consider it likely that the pilots were at first confused as to whether the aeroplane was in a stall or a dive. Is it possible that the 'systems' were ALSO confused?
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Hi,
You will find answers in the BEA report (english)
Read it again (completely)
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...la081127ea.pdf
You will find answers in the BEA report (english)
Read it again (completely)
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...la081127ea.pdf
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jcjeant, I HAVE read it fully...........
I was particularly struck by its mention of the THS misbehaviour - which contains almost the same words as the more recent AF 447 report:-
If there is anything else in the report that explains why the THS did this, other than the passage I quoted (which refers to an 'automatic compensation system') I must have missed it? Please point me to the passage you mean?
The strong implication of the BEA's Note is that the AF 447 pilot's noseup inputs caused the THS to go 'full up' and stay there for good; even though, in the latter part of the descent, he was applying nosedown inputs. But equally, the THS at Perpignan did exactly the same thing (went full up) even though the pilot in that case was applying only nosedown inputs.
Which strongly suggests that the THS was, for some reason, 'acting on its own account' rather than reacting to the sidestick inputs?
Anyway, as requested, please 'point me' towards the explanations you reckon are contained in the Perpignan report?
I was particularly struck by its mention of the THS misbehaviour - which contains almost the same words as the more recent AF 447 report:-
Between 15 h 44 min 30 and 15 h 45 min 05, the stabiliser moved from -4.4° to -11.2° corresponding to the electric pitch-up stop. It stayed in this position until the end of the recording.
The strong implication of the BEA's Note is that the AF 447 pilot's noseup inputs caused the THS to go 'full up' and stay there for good; even though, in the latter part of the descent, he was applying nosedown inputs. But equally, the THS at Perpignan did exactly the same thing (went full up) even though the pilot in that case was applying only nosedown inputs.
Which strongly suggests that the THS was, for some reason, 'acting on its own account' rather than reacting to the sidestick inputs?
Anyway, as requested, please 'point me' towards the explanations you reckon are contained in the Perpignan report?
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Hi,
For me (from the report .. check the laws where was the plane) the auto trim was no more auto for many time ... the plane going in direct law ... no more auto trim ... and also few seconds before crash he was in alternate law .... but with the gear down (no more auto trim)
They never actuated manualy (as in the AF447 case) the trim ... they forget it ...
My two cents
For me (from the report .. check the laws where was the plane) the auto trim was no more auto for many time ... the plane going in direct law ... no more auto trim ... and also few seconds before crash he was in alternate law .... but with the gear down (no more auto trim)
They never actuated manualy (as in the AF447 case) the trim ... they forget it ...
My two cents
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RWA
You need to read it again and also read up on the flight control laws, there was NO THS "misbehaviour". The A/C behaved as it was meant to. The unusual attitude training coves the fact that the THS may be in a position other than optiminal and "manual" pitch trim may be required. The PFD also has a "use manual pitch trim" message in amber.
In Perpignan they unfortunately did not follow the correct flight test schedule and paid the ultimate price, it is beter to be late in this life than early in the next.
Unfortunately there is NOT enough information about AF 447 to fully see what happened but the THS moved under the pilots direction due to sidestick input. There are also a few comments about the bank being uncommanded. Possibly not as it is surprising the number of pilots that whilst doing the pre-flight control check are unable to just move the elevators or just move the ailerons without making an "uncommanded" input on the other controls. It is regarded as "What's the problem", well that can lead to poor control discipline and could "possibly" have been the initial cause of the roll/bank that needed to be corrected.
You need to read it again and also read up on the flight control laws, there was NO THS "misbehaviour". The A/C behaved as it was meant to. The unusual attitude training coves the fact that the THS may be in a position other than optiminal and "manual" pitch trim may be required. The PFD also has a "use manual pitch trim" message in amber.
In Perpignan they unfortunately did not follow the correct flight test schedule and paid the ultimate price, it is beter to be late in this life than early in the next.
Unfortunately there is NOT enough information about AF 447 to fully see what happened but the THS moved under the pilots direction due to sidestick input. There are also a few comments about the bank being uncommanded. Possibly not as it is surprising the number of pilots that whilst doing the pre-flight control check are unable to just move the elevators or just move the ailerons without making an "uncommanded" input on the other controls. It is regarded as "What's the problem", well that can lead to poor control discipline and could "possibly" have been the initial cause of the roll/bank that needed to be corrected.