AF447 wreckage found
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Hi,
If you read the BEA note .. you will know even the engines on idle .. they don't recover ....
Am I missing something, or was this aircraft unrecoverable until the throttle was closed?
At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said "I don’t have any more indications", and the PNF said "we have
no valid indications". At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the
engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In
the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the
stall warning sounded again.
At 2 h 13 min 32, the PF said "we’re going to arrive at level one hundred". About fifteen seconds
later, simultaneous inputs by both pilots on the sidesticks were recorded and the PF said "go
ahead you have the controls".
The angle of attack, when it was valid, always remained above 35 degrees.
The recordings stopped at 2 h 14 min 28. The last recorded values were a vertical speed of
-10,912 ft/min, a ground speed of 107 kt, pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, roll angle of
5.3 degrees left and a magnetic heading of 270 degrees.
no valid indications". At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the
engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In
the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the
stall warning sounded again.
At 2 h 13 min 32, the PF said "we’re going to arrive at level one hundred". About fifteen seconds
later, simultaneous inputs by both pilots on the sidesticks were recorded and the PF said "go
ahead you have the controls".
The angle of attack, when it was valid, always remained above 35 degrees.
The recordings stopped at 2 h 14 min 28. The last recorded values were a vertical speed of
-10,912 ft/min, a ground speed of 107 kt, pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, roll angle of
5.3 degrees left and a magnetic heading of 270 degrees.
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Thanks for that jcjeant .. I did note in the BEA report that there was no hint of recovery ("reducing AoA plus valid speeds") until they'd selected idle thrust.
Perhaps they were fooled by the stall warning coming back?
They hit the ocean with an AoA of 69.3 degrees (trajectory 53.1 degrees + 16.2 degrees nose up) so any recovery had obviously ceased.
Edit: I note they turned onto a heading of 270 in their descent, anybody notice whether they turned upwind or not?
Perhaps they were fooled by the stall warning coming back?
They hit the ocean with an AoA of 69.3 degrees (trajectory 53.1 degrees + 16.2 degrees nose up) so any recovery had obviously ceased.
Edit: I note they turned onto a heading of 270 in their descent, anybody notice whether they turned upwind or not?
Last edited by EGMA; 21st Jun 2011 at 04:26.
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I note they turned onto a heading of 270 in their descent, anybody notice whether they turned upwind or not?
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Turning upwind or downwind in an Airbus doesn't matter because the computer knows how to handle it because the aircraft is drifting in a mass of air. The new technology has made the airbus such an amazing aircraft.
What barit1 says with regards to the turn is of some significance.
One way to be wing-rocking in a turn to the right with a left roll input on a yoke or SS, even in a heavy swept-wing jet transport with spoilers augmenting the ailerons, is to be stalled.
In addition, that final 60 or so degrees everyone is calling AOA is an angle anchored by a GROUNDSPEED. That final calculated earth referenced FPA is independent of air mass movement. This will only be aero AOA if the air mass is not moving. If the air mass is moving, one-half knot of headwind WILL effectively decrease the actual aero AOA some small amount, just as one-half knot of tailwind will increase it.
True, it's still a bunch of AOA.
One way to be wing-rocking in a turn to the right with a left roll input on a yoke or SS, even in a heavy swept-wing jet transport with spoilers augmenting the ailerons, is to be stalled.
In addition, that final 60 or so degrees everyone is calling AOA is an angle anchored by a GROUNDSPEED. That final calculated earth referenced FPA is independent of air mass movement. This will only be aero AOA if the air mass is not moving. If the air mass is moving, one-half knot of headwind WILL effectively decrease the actual aero AOA some small amount, just as one-half knot of tailwind will increase it.
True, it's still a bunch of AOA.
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In addition, that final 60 or so degrees everyone is calling AOA is an angle anchored by a GROUNDSPEED. That final calculated earth referenced FPA is independent of air mass movement. This will only be aero AOA if the air mass is not moving. If the air mass is moving, one-half knot of headwind WILL effectively decrease the actual aero AOA some small amount, just as one-half knot of tailwind will increase it.
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Originally Posted by Barit1
...and what was the rate of turn,
Another possibility, academically speaking...
It is possible that the fairly slow heading change to the right is due more to a very gradual yaw to the right rather than behavior typical to an un-stalled coordinated turn with its bank angle and associated load factor and resultant turn rate. It is possible at very high AOA for a left roll input to create this situation.
The roughly 2 degrees per second rate, while not imperceptible, would probably not have a noticeable “feel” to it and would probably have had to have been observed on a heading reference scale, especially if masked by a post-stall wing-rock. It’s also possible that the yaw, though favoring the direction opposite the roll input, could be inconsistent in rate, i.e. “stops & starts” in the descending geometric plane.
If the bank was oscillatory in the stall, the 2 or so degrees/sec could have been an average over the roughly 135+ seconds then. Any period of unloading would have stopped this temporarily also. (Roll direction consistent with the roll input is also a good indication that you are actually unloaded.)
In some swept-wing aircraft with ailerons only, this “aileron drag” can occur at AOA’s even prior to the stall and results in some magnitude of yaw opposite to the direction of applied aileron, slowing the roll rate, or stopping it altogether, or in extreme cases causing opposite roll. This is not a spin, just progressive yaw. Manual application of rudder, with neutral or minimal aileron, is used at very high AOA’s in these kinds of aircraft.
ARI’s & spoilers augmenting ailerons prevent this to any noticeable extent pre-stall in large jets. FBW aircraft in a full up FBW mode are far less prone to this anyway, but post-stall with essentially direct control of the aileron surfaces can produce this in the big jets to varying degrees also.
It is possible that the fairly slow heading change to the right is due more to a very gradual yaw to the right rather than behavior typical to an un-stalled coordinated turn with its bank angle and associated load factor and resultant turn rate. It is possible at very high AOA for a left roll input to create this situation.
The roughly 2 degrees per second rate, while not imperceptible, would probably not have a noticeable “feel” to it and would probably have had to have been observed on a heading reference scale, especially if masked by a post-stall wing-rock. It’s also possible that the yaw, though favoring the direction opposite the roll input, could be inconsistent in rate, i.e. “stops & starts” in the descending geometric plane.
If the bank was oscillatory in the stall, the 2 or so degrees/sec could have been an average over the roughly 135+ seconds then. Any period of unloading would have stopped this temporarily also. (Roll direction consistent with the roll input is also a good indication that you are actually unloaded.)
In some swept-wing aircraft with ailerons only, this “aileron drag” can occur at AOA’s even prior to the stall and results in some magnitude of yaw opposite to the direction of applied aileron, slowing the roll rate, or stopping it altogether, or in extreme cases causing opposite roll. This is not a spin, just progressive yaw. Manual application of rudder, with neutral or minimal aileron, is used at very high AOA’s in these kinds of aircraft.
ARI’s & spoilers augmenting ailerons prevent this to any noticeable extent pre-stall in large jets. FBW aircraft in a full up FBW mode are far less prone to this anyway, but post-stall with essentially direct control of the aileron surfaces can produce this in the big jets to varying degrees also.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Have I perchance missed another report from BEA after the 27 May? It is just that you lot are talking about rates of turn and the Tech Log about hairy bats, and I wondered wtf?
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should they wait to discover the wreck?
Hi,
Google translation...
Source:
Les dossiers noirs du transport aérien
Google translation...
AF 447: should they wait to discover the wreck?
Thanks to its computers and the protections they develop a new generation Airbus (Fly-By-Wire) does not "pick up" not in control law for normal flight. It is a major selling point for the builder who believes that pilot training is not necessary in this area (Pierre BAUD, vice president of Airbus Industrie, 1998).
In case of dropout, no action to perform from memory. The technical crew of an Airbus must refer to an additional procedure described in a document located in a trunk-lid opening near the driver. This procedure is necessary to apply the maximum thrust (TOGA) and simultaneously reduce the pitch.
For years (since 1998) that the aviation community knows that this procedure is dangerous *. The thrust of the engines beneath the wings may, in certain circumstances, generate a couple very important to pitch hard to counter. We must change and cause drivers to implement it. In 1999, William Wainwright, Chief Test Pilot Airbus Industrie reaffirms yet: "There Is No Need for this type of continuation training [upset recovery] is protected fly-by-wire aircraft."
November 27, 2008: an A 320 crashes near Perpignan killing seven people. When checking the operation of the protections in effect, dropping the alarm goes off, the captain applied the current procedure by increasing the engine thrust (TOGA). It follows a couple nose-very important that the pilot can not overcome. The A 320 wins and struck the sea Conclusion: This procedure is wrong, it must be changed.
6 months later, another aircraft type Airbus Fly-By-Wire picks up and hit the ocean ...
June 1, 2009: Flight 447 crashes in the middle of the Atlantic killing 228 people. In his progress report No. 1, the BEA said in the "facts" that the A 330 "appears to have struck the surface of the water line of flight, with a strong vertical acceleration. "In its interim report # 2, the BEA confirms that" the aircraft struck the water surface with a trim, low angle and with a significant vertical velocity. "
In its "Investigation Update" of May 27, 2011, the BEA said that the last values recorded by the FDR is "a plate of 16.2 degrees nose up, a roll of 5.3 degrees left and a vertical speed of - 10 912 ft / min. "
The similarity between the deductions from BEA after the crash and the elements of FDR issued in May 2011 suggests that the BEA and Airbus knew very quickly, as most close observers, that the F-330 A GZCP had won some seconds after the last known position (LKP). The BEA does not make the decision to search the wreckage near the LKP ... at the beginning of 2011. Why?
Should we wait?
* Work of the "Working Group" established by the FAA in 1996 on a recommendation from the NTSB
Thanks to its computers and the protections they develop a new generation Airbus (Fly-By-Wire) does not "pick up" not in control law for normal flight. It is a major selling point for the builder who believes that pilot training is not necessary in this area (Pierre BAUD, vice president of Airbus Industrie, 1998).
In case of dropout, no action to perform from memory. The technical crew of an Airbus must refer to an additional procedure described in a document located in a trunk-lid opening near the driver. This procedure is necessary to apply the maximum thrust (TOGA) and simultaneously reduce the pitch.
For years (since 1998) that the aviation community knows that this procedure is dangerous *. The thrust of the engines beneath the wings may, in certain circumstances, generate a couple very important to pitch hard to counter. We must change and cause drivers to implement it. In 1999, William Wainwright, Chief Test Pilot Airbus Industrie reaffirms yet: "There Is No Need for this type of continuation training [upset recovery] is protected fly-by-wire aircraft."
November 27, 2008: an A 320 crashes near Perpignan killing seven people. When checking the operation of the protections in effect, dropping the alarm goes off, the captain applied the current procedure by increasing the engine thrust (TOGA). It follows a couple nose-very important that the pilot can not overcome. The A 320 wins and struck the sea Conclusion: This procedure is wrong, it must be changed.
6 months later, another aircraft type Airbus Fly-By-Wire picks up and hit the ocean ...
June 1, 2009: Flight 447 crashes in the middle of the Atlantic killing 228 people. In his progress report No. 1, the BEA said in the "facts" that the A 330 "appears to have struck the surface of the water line of flight, with a strong vertical acceleration. "In its interim report # 2, the BEA confirms that" the aircraft struck the water surface with a trim, low angle and with a significant vertical velocity. "
In its "Investigation Update" of May 27, 2011, the BEA said that the last values recorded by the FDR is "a plate of 16.2 degrees nose up, a roll of 5.3 degrees left and a vertical speed of - 10 912 ft / min. "
The similarity between the deductions from BEA after the crash and the elements of FDR issued in May 2011 suggests that the BEA and Airbus knew very quickly, as most close observers, that the F-330 A GZCP had won some seconds after the last known position (LKP). The BEA does not make the decision to search the wreckage near the LKP ... at the beginning of 2011. Why?
Should we wait?
* Work of the "Working Group" established by the FAA in 1996 on a recommendation from the NTSB
Les dossiers noirs du transport aérien
jcjeant, if the intent was not to find it, then they'd keep on not finding it, even though "they knew where it was." Simple. They'd still be "looking" and not finding it, today.
I do not find your dragging the conspiracy theory into the conversation, yet again, to be useful. The search kept on until successful ... with better equipment, and better techniques.
In other words, "they don't want it found" was proved a bankrupt argument as soon as "they" found it.
I do not find your dragging the conspiracy theory into the conversation, yet again, to be useful. The search kept on until successful ... with better equipment, and better techniques.
In other words, "they don't want it found" was proved a bankrupt argument as soon as "they" found it.
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Hi,
I take note of your argument ... but the word conspiracy is misleading .. I prefer cover up (it's completely different)
BTW .. this question is not answered ......
I take note of your argument ... but the word conspiracy is misleading .. I prefer cover up (it's completely different)
BTW .. this question is not answered ......
The similarity between the deductions from BEA after the crash and the elements of FDR issued in May 2011 suggests that the BEA and Airbus knew very quickly, as most close observers, that the F-330 A GZCP had won some seconds after the last known position (LKP). The BEA does not make the decision to search the wreckage near the LKP ... only at the beginning of 2011. Why?
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jcjeant,
The inadequacy of the search on June 1 has already been discussed; your cover-up idea adds nothing.
The Brazilian Air Force and the French Navy overflew the impact point on June 1. The French-registered ship Douce France searched the area of the LKP on June 1. Neither the ship nor the overflights saw any sign of AFF447 having crashed where it crashed.
There has yet to be an explanation for why the search on June 1 failed so miserably. Hopefully, the BEA, or the French government, or the government of Brazil will explain why this is so.
What would you have done after you receive the reports from the search planes and ship on June 1 that nothing was found near the LKP? Would you keep returning to that area day after day because you believe that's where it must be, or would you send your limited number of planes and ships searching in other areas?
As it was, it was a passing merchant ship sailing way north of the LKP that discovered the floating wreckage, and not the governments who were searching.
The inadequacy of the search on June 1 has already been discussed; your cover-up idea adds nothing.
The Brazilian Air Force and the French Navy overflew the impact point on June 1. The French-registered ship Douce France searched the area of the LKP on June 1. Neither the ship nor the overflights saw any sign of AFF447 having crashed where it crashed.
There has yet to be an explanation for why the search on June 1 failed so miserably. Hopefully, the BEA, or the French government, or the government of Brazil will explain why this is so.
What would you have done after you receive the reports from the search planes and ship on June 1 that nothing was found near the LKP? Would you keep returning to that area day after day because you believe that's where it must be, or would you send your limited number of planes and ships searching in other areas?
As it was, it was a passing merchant ship sailing way north of the LKP that discovered the floating wreckage, and not the governments who were searching.
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These, and many other questions, will never be answered, because all AF 447-related threads on PPRuNe live in a parallel universum where they are, thanks to posters like you, doomed to repeat the same questions over and over again. 
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Hi,
You neglect to keep in mind the ACARS and the first report of the BEA
Those are not pointing fingers to search long way from LKP
And what was the result of those discussions .... ??
So .. WHY BEA with this knowledge go make search far away from LKP ? (phase 2 and 3)
Even here in the first days of those knowledges .. informed people were convinced with .. or a deep stall or a spin ..
Do a airplane cover long distance in such situation ?
In all former catastrophes implying a stall or spin not recovered .. airplanes were discovered near the location of the upset.
What would you have done after you receive the reports from the search planes and ship on June 1 that nothing was found near the LKP? Would you keep returning to that area day after day because you believe that's where it must be, or would you send your limited number of planes and ships searching in other areas?
As it was, it was a passing merchant ship sailing way north of the LKP that discovered the floating wreckage, and not the governments who were searching.
Those are not pointing fingers to search long way from LKP
The inadequacy of the search on June 1 has already been discussed
So .. WHY BEA with this knowledge go make search far away from LKP ? (phase 2 and 3)
Even here in the first days of those knowledges .. informed people were convinced with .. or a deep stall or a spin ..
Do a airplane cover long distance in such situation ?
In all former catastrophes implying a stall or spin not recovered .. airplanes were discovered near the location of the upset.
Last edited by jcjeant; 22nd Jun 2011 at 23:50.
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Hi,
I take note of your non argument
Now can you answer at the question
Why ?
You are a broken record, jcjeant,.and adds nothing but the same predictable noise.
Enough already!
Enough already!
Now can you answer at the question
Why ?