RTO with right seat PF
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RTO with right seat PF
I would like to know your company policy/procedures during a RTO when the right seat is PF (either if the right seat is a CPT or a regular FO). Thanks
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The LH seat pilot holds the thrust levers at all times till V1. He's the one to decide whether to reject or not, and his call-out of STOPPING also means he has control.
If he's incapacitated, it's obvious of course who's in control. Cheers
If he's incapacitated, it's obvious of course who's in control. Cheers
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... the Cpt keep the hand on the throttle but also the FO can call STOP instead of just calling the malfunctions! Imagine a time sensitive scenario with a 150 (or greater V1), the last think you want to do is try to process other information except REJECT! Correct me if I'm wrong!
And what happened when you have a Cpt in training on the left seat and an IP on the right seat? Who is doing what and who is really responsible of what happen?
And what happened when you have a Cpt in training on the left seat and an IP on the right seat? Who is doing what and who is really responsible of what happen?
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Bumba, no way. It is the captain who decides. The right hand seat pilot, being F/O by status (and it does not matter if this is a TRI or LTC) remains a F/O in this scenario.
The person in the left seat should be trained accordingly BEFORE he enters the airplane left seat, thus he is captain and fully responsible.
I can only think of non-simulator training of having someone in the right seat assuming command and issue orders in such a situation.
The person in the left seat should be trained accordingly BEFORE he enters the airplane left seat, thus he is captain and fully responsible.
I can only think of non-simulator training of having someone in the right seat assuming command and issue orders in such a situation.
until V1
SOPs where I work: HP on TLs < V1, either pilot can call "STOP". HP closes TLs, monitors/overrides autobrakes; NHP selects reverse (and speedbrake if required). PIC takes control (if not HP) sometime between initial actions complete and aircraft coming to a halt.
Our SOPs: CP (LHS) calls and actions RTO whether PF or PM. FO (RHS) when PM calls the failure and then monitors the RTO, or when PF keeps the ac straight until CP takes control for the RTO. If the LHS is CP under trg, the same applies, though as LTC in the RHS I retain the right to call/action the RTO.
It's a good question of cockpit philosophy, though. We trust the FO to call 'Engine failure' etc and would respond with RTO, so why not allow him to call 'STOP'? We expect the FO to call the failure and then carry out the RTO if my ageing heart gives out at a critical moment, why not trust her with the full deal all the time? It would make transition to command smoother. In a previous (military) life, either pilot (and indeed the engineer I thnk) could call the RTO and whoever was PF would action it.
My 2 pennyworth - hope it helps
DH
It's a good question of cockpit philosophy, though. We trust the FO to call 'Engine failure' etc and would respond with RTO, so why not allow him to call 'STOP'? We expect the FO to call the failure and then carry out the RTO if my ageing heart gives out at a critical moment, why not trust her with the full deal all the time? It would make transition to command smoother. In a previous (military) life, either pilot (and indeed the engineer I thnk) could call the RTO and whoever was PF would action it.
My 2 pennyworth - hope it helps
DH
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rto
Many years ago this subject was debated by the Flight Operation section of the Flight Safety Foundation in Zurich. At lunch I sat next to the VP Ops of Swissair, so I asked him about their philosophy re a copilot rejecting a take off. It is not a problem with us he explained to the listening people "Swissair do not allow a copilot to conduct a take off". Stunned silence at the table, all too polite to comment !
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Yes It is a interesting scenario, especially when you test it at the sim. MTOW, rwy contaminated, balance field, hot temp (not such an impossible scenario!).
An other interesting scenario is when the PF is the left seat (PF-Cpt) and you obliged the right seat (PM-FO) to call just the malfunction! 8 times out of 10 the PM call the malfunction 5 kts prior V1 and the PF starts the reject 5 kts faster then V1 and we all know the final results.
How many seconds it takes to decode the malfunction, verbalizing what do you think it might be the problem, reaction time from the PF and actually starting the reject?
An other interesting scenario is when the PF is the left seat (PF-Cpt) and you obliged the right seat (PM-FO) to call just the malfunction! 8 times out of 10 the PM call the malfunction 5 kts prior V1 and the PF starts the reject 5 kts faster then V1 and we all know the final results.
How many seconds it takes to decode the malfunction, verbalizing what do you think it might be the problem, reaction time from the PF and actually starting the reject?
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Hi 169west,
It's pretty obvious when a wing engine fails - just by looking out of the window.
The TriStar had an engine fail light for No2 engine in your field of view (- just for that reason), which gave the crew a much quicker recognition time. If it was inop - there was a performance penalty.
It's pretty obvious when a wing engine fails - just by looking out of the window.
The TriStar had an engine fail light for No2 engine in your field of view (- just for that reason), which gave the crew a much quicker recognition time. If it was inop - there was a performance penalty.
It's pretty obvious when a wing engine fails - just by looking out of the window.
Never flown a three holer but I suspect the engine fail light is fitted because there is no yaw associated with a centre engine failing, normally the first sign that all is not well.
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This is getting interesting now.
I could call "Abort/Stop" as a flight engineer in the RAF and I know that at BA this was also the case at the time. I couldn't with all the civvy airlines I flew with.
The Embraer E-jets that I teach now have a system of EICAS message inhibit where messages are not allowed to be annunciated during certain phases of flight. The most critical phase being from 80 kts to 400ft. Almost all EICAS messages are inhibited at this time, including ENG 1 (2) FAIL.
This is because the message would add to the reaction time and distract the pilot from the proper actions. Rather like someone calling the failure would.
I could call "Abort/Stop" as a flight engineer in the RAF and I know that at BA this was also the case at the time. I couldn't with all the civvy airlines I flew with.
The Embraer E-jets that I teach now have a system of EICAS message inhibit where messages are not allowed to be annunciated during certain phases of flight. The most critical phase being from 80 kts to 400ft. Almost all EICAS messages are inhibited at this time, including ENG 1 (2) FAIL.
This is because the message would add to the reaction time and distract the pilot from the proper actions. Rather like someone calling the failure would.
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As a flight engineer with Kuwait Airways Corp on Comets, ANY crew member could call STOP up to 80kts for a failure-after 80kts, only the "Usual Suspects" (engine fire, failure or o/heat) to V1-(on the Britannia with British Eagle, the F/E applied the reverse as called for by the Captain). Back to the Comet-the Captain would select and apply R/T on both engines and apply brakes whilst the NHP deployed the speed brake. I guess type dictates who does what.
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In my previous company , if the F/O was PF , he kept the hands on the thrust lever until V1 and only him, not the Captain. It was SOP and the briefing included for which situations the F/O (PF) was allowed to call stop and reject the T/O. there were 5 items, engine-fire,failure, smoke in cockpit, blocked runway and loss of directional control.
If the captain was PF, the F/O could also call stop stop for those five items and with a fleet of 90 aircraft it seemed to work as it was trained in the sim.
I didn't make the rules I'm just saying how it was..!
Fly safe
If the captain was PF, the F/O could also call stop stop for those five items and with a fleet of 90 aircraft it seemed to work as it was trained in the sim.
I didn't make the rules I'm just saying how it was..!
Fly safe
8 times out of 10 the PM call the malfunction 5 kts prior V1 and the PF starts the reject 5 kts faster then V1 and we all know the final results.
How many seconds it takes to decode the malfunction, verbalizing what do you think it might be the problem, reaction time from the PF and actually starting the reject?
How many seconds it takes to decode the malfunction, verbalizing what do you think it might be the problem, reaction time from the PF and actually starting the reject?
Seems all too complicated. An SOP that gives the first officer full responsibility to initiate a rejected take off as PF if he considers it necessary, has serious implications legally and for flight safety. Is the captain merely an interested spectator while this happens? The legal eagles would love it.
Some operators have a touching faith in the ability of their first officers to make instant right decisions and if that means they have the authority to order the captain to reject a take off for whatever reason, so be it. It is a recipe for disaster caused by confusion about who is running the ship at the time a decision to reject is made and then action initiated.
Some years ago, an Australian airline using DC9's had a policy of the first officer as PF retaining control of the thrust levers on take off. Shortly before V1 on a limiting length runway, the F/O saw birds ahead and aborted the take off before the captain could say a thing. There was nothing wrong with the aircraft but it blew tyres and had red hot brakes when it departed the far threshold into the over-run.
The company quickly changed the policy directing that in future the captain would retain control of the throttles for take off and be entirely responsible for the decision to reject or continue. As PNF the first officer could call a malfunction during take off and the captain could choose whether to stop or continue depending on his own assessment of the problem. To this day, it is my understanding that no Australian operator authorises the first officer to call "Stop" as a direction to the captain. This makes a clear-cut policy of command responsibilty.
In a similar vein some years ago a UK registered 737 operator was responsible for training Australian crews to take over the operation within Australia. The Australian CAA noted the UK operator required the captain to flare and land with both hands on the control column while at the same time the F/O was given the responsibility for applying reverse thrust. During a rejected take off by the captain, the same SOP required the F/O to be responsible for reverse thrust in the abort.
The Australian regulator made it clear it did not approve of this splitting of responsibility saying it could lead to confusion especially on a slippery runway where modulation of reverse thrust in a crosswind may require instant action.
The Regulator maintained it was normal Boeing recommended procedure for the landing pilot to apply his own reverse as necessary and that a rejected take off required the captain to take over control and handle his own reverse as necessary.
Some operators have a touching faith in the ability of their first officers to make instant right decisions and if that means they have the authority to order the captain to reject a take off for whatever reason, so be it. It is a recipe for disaster caused by confusion about who is running the ship at the time a decision to reject is made and then action initiated.
Some years ago, an Australian airline using DC9's had a policy of the first officer as PF retaining control of the thrust levers on take off. Shortly before V1 on a limiting length runway, the F/O saw birds ahead and aborted the take off before the captain could say a thing. There was nothing wrong with the aircraft but it blew tyres and had red hot brakes when it departed the far threshold into the over-run.
The company quickly changed the policy directing that in future the captain would retain control of the throttles for take off and be entirely responsible for the decision to reject or continue. As PNF the first officer could call a malfunction during take off and the captain could choose whether to stop or continue depending on his own assessment of the problem. To this day, it is my understanding that no Australian operator authorises the first officer to call "Stop" as a direction to the captain. This makes a clear-cut policy of command responsibilty.
In a similar vein some years ago a UK registered 737 operator was responsible for training Australian crews to take over the operation within Australia. The Australian CAA noted the UK operator required the captain to flare and land with both hands on the control column while at the same time the F/O was given the responsibility for applying reverse thrust. During a rejected take off by the captain, the same SOP required the F/O to be responsible for reverse thrust in the abort.
The Australian regulator made it clear it did not approve of this splitting of responsibility saying it could lead to confusion especially on a slippery runway where modulation of reverse thrust in a crosswind may require instant action.
The Regulator maintained it was normal Boeing recommended procedure for the landing pilot to apply his own reverse as necessary and that a rejected take off required the captain to take over control and handle his own reverse as necessary.
Seems all too complicated. An SOP that gives the first officer full responsibility to initiate a rejected take off as PF if he considers it necessary, has serious implications legally and for flight safety. Is the captain merely an interested spectator while this happens? The legal eagles would love it.
Some operators have a touching faith in the ability of their first officers to make instant right decisions and if that means they have the authority to order the captain to reject a take off for whatever reason, so be it. It is a recipe for disaster caused by confusion about who is running the ship at the time a decision to reject is made and then action initiated.
I don't think there is a "right" or "wrong" way of handling RTOs in terms of PIC/FO duties - if it works for your airline, your crews and your regulator, then fine.
What might be a long-term problem is (as a company) treating your first officers as lower forms of life who are incapable of making important decisions or handling the aircraft properly. When they eventually become a captain, where will all the reasoning and skills miraculously come from? One day not worthy, the next standing in judgement...
It does seem to be SOP in a large number of airlines who have no legal problem with it.