AF 447 Search to resume
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jcjeant, one thing that has struck me over the last nearly two years is now much raw sloppiness seems to be involved in this one flight and its aftermath. If I were stupidstitious I'd start mumbling about a jinxed plane or something. ATCs all over the flight's path were sloppy (in agreement with you on this point). It appears either Maintenance or the people in the cockpit were sloppy. It appears the investigators have been sloppy in their thinking from time to time. The only sloppy I mentioned we KNOW did not cause the accident is the sloppiness involved in finally locating the wreckage.
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bizman: "1. Airborne ACARS to transmit a simple short standardised "I-am-alive-and this is my gps position altitude and heading" message every say 5 or 10 minutes. If the traffic overhead is low, it could perhaps be done every minute."
It does. It would not have saved anybody to have the messages monitored at all times. (Although feeding them to a computer smart enough to detect anomalies such as missing messages and raise an alert might be useful for finding wreckage.)
It does. It would not have saved anybody to have the messages monitored at all times. (Although feeding them to a computer smart enough to detect anomalies such as missing messages and raise an alert might be useful for finding wreckage.)
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JD-EE
ACARS as an Alerter?
JD-EE
"It does. It would not have saved anybody to have the messages monitored at all times. (Although feeding them to a computer smart enough to detect anomalies such as missing messages and raise an alert might be useful for finding wreckage.)"
Exactly my point. Sole purpose would be to enable faster searches in event of a loss over water.
If it turns out that the DFDR/CVR data is irretrievable due corrosion or length of exposure at depth, we might have been very grateful for a smaller better defined search area earlier. I think the Industry has a lot to learn from the lessons of AF-447, in many areas. How much better we can learn them if we can retrieve the recorders earlier before exposure damage.
If ACARS is sending regular I-am-alive messages now, then its a doddle to add functionality to the ground computers to automatically look for and match the time stamp on received messages to alert after a preset time when no more I-am-alive messages are received.
Adding gps positon, heading and altitude to those messages could help considerably to locate the site earlier.
Cheers
JD-EE
"It does. It would not have saved anybody to have the messages monitored at all times. (Although feeding them to a computer smart enough to detect anomalies such as missing messages and raise an alert might be useful for finding wreckage.)"
Exactly my point. Sole purpose would be to enable faster searches in event of a loss over water.
If it turns out that the DFDR/CVR data is irretrievable due corrosion or length of exposure at depth, we might have been very grateful for a smaller better defined search area earlier. I think the Industry has a lot to learn from the lessons of AF-447, in many areas. How much better we can learn them if we can retrieve the recorders earlier before exposure damage.
If ACARS is sending regular I-am-alive messages now, then its a doddle to add functionality to the ground computers to automatically look for and match the time stamp on received messages to alert after a preset time when no more I-am-alive messages are received.
Adding gps positon, heading and altitude to those messages could help considerably to locate the site earlier.
Cheers
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Originally posted by PJ2 ...
... when no scent of something wrong is sensed by anyone, at that point.
... when no scent of something wrong is sensed by anyone, at that point.
But I will sit on the sidelines and await the official outcome like everyone else.
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Are we too critical of that first search?
It occurs to me that a search & RESCUE operation does not necessarily focus on the most likely location, but the most likely survivable location. Taking an extreme case, if someone were lost in a sea where survival in water that long was unlikely, then no matter how improbable it is, you would favour searching any islands first. In the case of AF 447, you would search in a manner that gave the best chance of quickly finding a large number of survivors, therefore ruling out any 'it fell like a stone at the LKP' and is now sitting at the bottom of the sea' scenarios.
Of course, once RESCUE is ruled out, most likely position then dictates the place and style/speed of search, but we must not be too critical of the initial response, it had a different purpose.
Of course, once RESCUE is ruled out, most likely position then dictates the place and style/speed of search, but we must not be too critical of the initial response, it had a different purpose.
Last edited by paull; 23rd Apr 2011 at 11:56. Reason: typo: now, not 'not'
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As with everything 'aviation' in my long time 'doing it', I now find myself again 'surprised' that with the technology existent in ACARS, with regular position reports, a system of 'Flight Watch' was not apparently present in AF - it may be that no operator does this? We can, I think, safely say that an earlier 'alert' to the crash would not have improved survivability, but in another scenario where a semi-successful forced landing/ditching took place it could well do. As suggested here, it is not difficult to pass or extract reports from the ACARS stream, and AF ops would not be particularly busy at that time of day. AF could well have known something was amiss far earlier, or at least have been alert to watch for the next pos report.
Regarding suggestions that 'serious' events had begun well before 0200, have we not established that the Captain was not in the flight deck at this time? I don't know about other Captains, but I would have been.
Regarding suggestions that 'serious' events had begun well before 0200, have we not established that the Captain was not in the flight deck at this time? I don't know about other Captains, but I would have been.
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BOAC
Have to agree. Confidence in your F/O (s) is one thing, but going to sleep as the a/c approaches the ITCZ quite another.
I'm sure the F/Os were competent, but I think most Capt's would like to be on the F/D and most companies would expect them to be, during flight through this sort of adverse weather.
I wonder, if he had stayed up front, whether his greater experience might have saved the day. Maybe we'll find out soon but it's probably too intangible a parameter to be revealed by data.
Personally, I rarely even go for a pee. But then, I'm not a longhaul guy.
Have to agree. Confidence in your F/O (s) is one thing, but going to sleep as the a/c approaches the ITCZ quite another.
I'm sure the F/Os were competent, but I think most Capt's would like to be on the F/D and most companies would expect them to be, during flight through this sort of adverse weather.
I wonder, if he had stayed up front, whether his greater experience might have saved the day. Maybe we'll find out soon but it's probably too intangible a parameter to be revealed by data.
Personally, I rarely even go for a pee. But then, I'm not a longhaul guy.
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http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flig...data/AF447.txt
AF459 track data is every 10 seconds, 100 times more precise, must be from a flight computer download.
http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flig...data/AF459.txt
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I am alive
I believe this sort of thing will become standard with the proposed Gate to gate technology where computers will control al phases of flight
Flight plans will be gone
primary radar will be gone.
EUROCONTROL - Gate to Gate
Flight plans will be gone
primary radar will be gone.
EUROCONTROL - Gate to Gate
If we get data off the CVR, then I have a strong suspicion we are going to find long periods of silence leading up to the loss of control.
Falling asleep on the job is not the same "black and white" process we normally experience each night. When we fall asleep normally, there is a gradual but one way transition from awake to asleep, and once asleep you stay asleep. This is because your brain is not sending contradictory signals to stay awake.
When falling asleep while trying to stay awake, the process is usually a lot more chaotic. Brief microsleeps and long periods of being "half-asleep" (where you are technically awake but have very low levels of awareness and responsiveness) are interrupted by sudden periods of wakefulness as you catch yourself falling asleep. Critically, judgement is severely impaired during this process and the individual has very limited insight into their state of mind.
During this process however, it is quite possible for some intermittent purposeful activity to take place. A driver will navigate a corner in the road. A pilot might try and make a radio call. Sooner or later however, a microsleep will coincide with a bend in the road.....
I believe this process explains the failure to divert around weather, and also some of the communication inconsistencies. However the flight continued to proceed uneventfully as far as the Captain (? sleeping in the rest area), the CC and the pax were concerned. Suddenly something major happened (? initiated by pitot tubes freezing, ? weather related upset), and it all turned to s.....
Its not just pilots. ATC also.
Fourth ATC Sleeping Incident At Reno | AVIATION WEEK
On the surface, it is staggering that in 2011 commercial flights can land at the nations capitol with ATC asleep at the screen. Given the recent spate of sleeping ATC in US, I wonder if a similar problem is not the explanation for the apparent staggering failures of ATC that were responsible for the passage of AF447.
If this is the explanation, we need to look at the system issues rather than point the finger at the individuals concerned. Humans are not bad working through the night when the job involves either manual work, unpredictability, or continuous cognitive processing. Police officers on patrol or a cab driver in a busy metro area looking for a fare are not likely to go to sleep. It is more a problem with routine activities (such as long distance driving), or where the job require oversight and monitoring in case of an unexpected (and unlikely) problem.
Falling asleep on the job is not the same "black and white" process we normally experience each night. When we fall asleep normally, there is a gradual but one way transition from awake to asleep, and once asleep you stay asleep. This is because your brain is not sending contradictory signals to stay awake.
When falling asleep while trying to stay awake, the process is usually a lot more chaotic. Brief microsleeps and long periods of being "half-asleep" (where you are technically awake but have very low levels of awareness and responsiveness) are interrupted by sudden periods of wakefulness as you catch yourself falling asleep. Critically, judgement is severely impaired during this process and the individual has very limited insight into their state of mind.
During this process however, it is quite possible for some intermittent purposeful activity to take place. A driver will navigate a corner in the road. A pilot might try and make a radio call. Sooner or later however, a microsleep will coincide with a bend in the road.....
I believe this process explains the failure to divert around weather, and also some of the communication inconsistencies. However the flight continued to proceed uneventfully as far as the Captain (? sleeping in the rest area), the CC and the pax were concerned. Suddenly something major happened (? initiated by pitot tubes freezing, ? weather related upset), and it all turned to s.....
Its not just pilots. ATC also.
Fourth ATC Sleeping Incident At Reno | AVIATION WEEK
On the surface, it is staggering that in 2011 commercial flights can land at the nations capitol with ATC asleep at the screen. Given the recent spate of sleeping ATC in US, I wonder if a similar problem is not the explanation for the apparent staggering failures of ATC that were responsible for the passage of AF447.
If this is the explanation, we need to look at the system issues rather than point the finger at the individuals concerned. Humans are not bad working through the night when the job involves either manual work, unpredictability, or continuous cognitive processing. Police officers on patrol or a cab driver in a busy metro area looking for a fare are not likely to go to sleep. It is more a problem with routine activities (such as long distance driving), or where the job require oversight and monitoring in case of an unexpected (and unlikely) problem.
slats11
The implication of what you write automatically equates a quiet CVR with falling asleep.
CVRs in cruise often have long periods of silence.
let's not start writing analysis of symptom-cause without all the facts
If we get data off the CVR, then I have a strong suspicion we are going to find long periods of silence leading up to the loss of control.
Falling asleep on the job is not the same "black and white" process we normally experience each night. .......
Falling asleep on the job is not the same "black and white" process we normally experience each night. .......
CVRs in cruise often have long periods of silence.
let's not start writing analysis of symptom-cause without all the facts
The implication of what you write automatically equates a quiet CVR with falling asleep.
CVRs in cruise often have long periods of silence.
CVRs in cruise often have long periods of silence.
I believe the best explanation is one that incorporates all of the following:
1. Some inconsistencies in radio communications leading up to the crash, and no aircraft heard anything from AF447.
2. Apparent decision not to divert around weather (everyone else that night decided to divert)
3. Captain apparently not up front. Question for the pilots here. Would recognition of worse than normal weather ahead and the requirement to make an active decision about this (ie to either initiate a significant diversion or not to divert) generally warrant a call to the Captain if he was taking his rest break?
4. Subsequent sudden and catastrophic loss of control - for a number of possible reasons. But it was sudden and catastrophic. No radio calls. No signs of preparation for an emergency. CC not in their seats.the bridge
Much of the discussion on this thread starts at number 4. There are very likely to have been significant factors already in play well before 4.
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Originally Posted by slats
3. Captain apparently not up front. Question for the pilots here. Would recognition of worse than normal weather ahead and the requirement to make an active decision about this (ie to either initiate a significant diversion or not to divert) generally warrant a call to the Captain if he was taking his rest break?
Are you sure about CC not being in their seats ? Of the 9(?) CC, how many have been recovered ? You would think that the flight experienced some progressive roughness before 'whatever happened' so wouldn't everyone be seated ?
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Flightwatch
BOAC said
It should be admitted here that the "Flightwatch" that one are referring to, is in France the CCO or, in English, the OCC (Operations Coordination Centre). Other airlines use term "Operations" for the same duty. You call them at any time and they tell you the ins and outs of their flights. Flightwatch means, I would say, in French "Contrôle des vols" or "surveillance des vol". These expressions are not used simply because it would be too long to say and, may be also, a little bit pompous or "m'as-tu-vu" (show-off) in our language. There is also a Law in France that forbids the use of English terms in official and public domains called Law Jacques Toubon. (aka Loi Jacques Allgood...)
Busy or not busy is the question. We don't have the workload of the man/woman in charge of the 447. Was the 447 the only flight under his/her responsibility? Very unlikely but it may be clarified later on. As a matter of fact how the AFR CCO structure works is a mistery.
The AFR CCO started to worry about the lack of informations from the 447 after the AF559 crew contacted them by ACARS (0418z), indicating that the radio contact was lost with flight 447. They send an ACARS message at 0424 to the 447. It was shortly after DAKAR requested the AF559 to contact the 447. (04 11 53/ 04 20 27z, BEA report).
Why SAL did not launched, at least an INCERFA after 0506z is a great interrogation to me. No radio contact, no RADAR contact but nothing is done.
.../..., I now find myself again 'surprised' that with the technology existent in ACARS, with regular position reports, a system of 'Flight Watch' was not apparently present in AF - it may be that no operator does this? We can, I think, safely say that an earlier 'alert' to the crash would not have improved survivability, but in another scenario where a semi-successful forced landing/ditching took place it could well do. As suggested here, it is not difficult to pass or extract reports from the ACARS stream, and AF ops would not be particularly busy at that time of day. AF could well have known something was amiss far earlier, or at least have been alert to watch for the next pos report.
Busy or not busy is the question. We don't have the workload of the man/woman in charge of the 447. Was the 447 the only flight under his/her responsibility? Very unlikely but it may be clarified later on. As a matter of fact how the AFR CCO structure works is a mistery.
The AFR CCO started to worry about the lack of informations from the 447 after the AF559 crew contacted them by ACARS (0418z), indicating that the radio contact was lost with flight 447. They send an ACARS message at 0424 to the 447. It was shortly after DAKAR requested the AF559 to contact the 447. (04 11 53/ 04 20 27z, BEA report).
Why SAL did not launched, at least an INCERFA after 0506z is a great interrogation to me. No radio contact, no RADAR contact but nothing is done.
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ACARS... I think we can read too much into this. 1 type, in 1 airline, with 1 ACARS service provider / type, happens to provide some interesting messages. In the absence of anything else, these have proved useful to Investigators.
That's a long step from "mandating" a standard across all airlines / types a data stream and protocol that is used for "flight monitoring". For starters, not all types/airlines will use Satcom for ACARS, and it is not cheap. I work for a large UK company, and one of our LH types only has ACARS via VHF (or did when I flew it). If the ACARS is in VHF comms, then so generally will the crew...
For those using the various ACARS systems, they frequently go to standby, or someone retunes / uses VHF3 etc. To call out the full SAR system for a mid ocean rescue everytime the ACARS / Satcom goes on the blink will keep them well occupied
Accidents / incidents such as this are relatively rare, and the cost of uploading effectively FDR type information via satellite will not be trivial across the whole world's fleets. Far rarer will be the occasion it makes 1 jot of difference to survivability.
Knowing "what" downed this A330 is of interest to pPrune readers, and also to AF, Airbus and the families. But is it (or will it turn out to be?) so necessary as to enforce FDR data uploads? The cost and delay of the search is significant, but I suspect small compared to implementing such systems.
That's a long step from "mandating" a standard across all airlines / types a data stream and protocol that is used for "flight monitoring". For starters, not all types/airlines will use Satcom for ACARS, and it is not cheap. I work for a large UK company, and one of our LH types only has ACARS via VHF (or did when I flew it). If the ACARS is in VHF comms, then so generally will the crew...
For those using the various ACARS systems, they frequently go to standby, or someone retunes / uses VHF3 etc. To call out the full SAR system for a mid ocean rescue everytime the ACARS / Satcom goes on the blink will keep them well occupied
Accidents / incidents such as this are relatively rare, and the cost of uploading effectively FDR type information via satellite will not be trivial across the whole world's fleets. Far rarer will be the occasion it makes 1 jot of difference to survivability.
Knowing "what" downed this A330 is of interest to pPrune readers, and also to AF, Airbus and the families. But is it (or will it turn out to be?) so necessary as to enforce FDR data uploads? The cost and delay of the search is significant, but I suspect small compared to implementing such systems.
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I think you have run slightly amok, there, NoD - I guess it's the heat
I was basically referring to AF who HAVE the 'data stream' as you put it with position (was it every 10 mins?) and it would be very simple to use this in an Ops Flightwatch system.
As to its 'value' - since it is already in use, what is the cost if it enables one recovery of living souls?
Wash my mouth with soap and water if you thought I was suggesting BA should spend some money on it. Indeed, not even a suggestion that ALL LROPS airlines should HAVE to do it, just an idea.
I was basically referring to AF who HAVE the 'data stream' as you put it with position (was it every 10 mins?) and it would be very simple to use this in an Ops Flightwatch system.
As to its 'value' - since it is already in use, what is the cost if it enables one recovery of living souls?
Wash my mouth with soap and water if you thought I was suggesting BA should spend some money on it. Indeed, not even a suggestion that ALL LROPS airlines should HAVE to do it, just an idea.
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Regarding the flight of LH507, which appears in the first interim report, and has since 'disappeared'.
The first interim report states that LH507 preceded AF447 by "about 20 minutes" at FL 350, and describes the experience of LH507:
(TASIL is 119 NM from ORARO.)
As AF447 had estimated ORARO at 02h00, this would indicate LH507 passed ORARO at around 01h40.
The last communication from AF447 to ATLANTICO was at 01h35.43, when they thanked ATLANTICO for the SELCAL test. Assuming they went to SELCAL mode immediately following that acknowledgment, they would not have heard communications, if any, between LH507 and ATLANTICO on its deviation between ORARO and TASIL. Whether there was any communication between ATLANTICO and LH507 prior to 0135 regarding weather ahead (and which might have been overheard by AF447) will have to await a future BEA report.
Presumably future BEA reports will also have timestamps for communications between ATLANTICO and the flights following AF447 as they deviated on approaching the mesoscale convective complex north of ORARO, and give some indication when these flight crews began evasive action. And if the CVR is both recovered and readable, their actions can be compared to what happened in the cockpit as AF447 encountered this complex and proceeded to penetrate it.
_____________
Aside from valuable lessons learned for application to future searches, any fingerpointing on the timing and adequacy of the initial search for AF447 will only begin in earnest if the recorders are recovered, but are unreadable because they have been in the water too long.
_____________
Mr. Optimistic, if I recall correctly, three CC seats were recovered. None appeared to have been occupied at the time of impact. That probably meant at least one of the CC was not in his or her seat.
The first interim report states that LH507 preceded AF447 by "about 20 minutes" at FL 350, and describes the experience of LH507:
The crew reported that it flew at the upper limit of the cloud layer and then in the clouds in the region of ORARO. In this zone they saw green echoes on the radar on their path, which they avoided by changing their route by about ten nautical miles to the west. While flying through this zone, which took about fifteen minutes, they felt moderate turbulence and did not observe any lightning. They lowered their speed to the speed recommended in turbulent zones. They saw bright St Elmo’s fire on the windshield on the left-hand side.
As AF447 had estimated ORARO at 02h00, this would indicate LH507 passed ORARO at around 01h40.
The last communication from AF447 to ATLANTICO was at 01h35.43, when they thanked ATLANTICO for the SELCAL test. Assuming they went to SELCAL mode immediately following that acknowledgment, they would not have heard communications, if any, between LH507 and ATLANTICO on its deviation between ORARO and TASIL. Whether there was any communication between ATLANTICO and LH507 prior to 0135 regarding weather ahead (and which might have been overheard by AF447) will have to await a future BEA report.
Presumably future BEA reports will also have timestamps for communications between ATLANTICO and the flights following AF447 as they deviated on approaching the mesoscale convective complex north of ORARO, and give some indication when these flight crews began evasive action. And if the CVR is both recovered and readable, their actions can be compared to what happened in the cockpit as AF447 encountered this complex and proceeded to penetrate it.
_____________
Aside from valuable lessons learned for application to future searches, any fingerpointing on the timing and adequacy of the initial search for AF447 will only begin in earnest if the recorders are recovered, but are unreadable because they have been in the water too long.
_____________
Mr. Optimistic, if I recall correctly, three CC seats were recovered. None appeared to have been occupied at the time of impact. That probably meant at least one of the CC was not in his or her seat.
Are you sure about CC not being in their seats ? Of the 9(?) CC, how many have been recovered ? You would think that the flight experienced some progressive roughness before 'whatever happened' so wouldn't everyone be seated ?
Amongst the debris recovered were a set of 2 CC seats. Pretty much intact. Empty. And harnesses retracted / unbuckled.
I did the math a while back. From memory, they recovered 4/9 CC, 1 Captain, and 45/216 pax. So they recovered a disproportionately high percentage of the CC. Sure, this could be due to chance. But there are two factors which should lead to finding more pax than CC
a) CC are secured in more substantial harnesses than pax (shoulder straps in addition to lap belt)
b) Without being disrespectful, CC are likely to be closer to their ideal weight than the average pax (younger and thinner). Hence the average pax would be more likely to float than the average CC.
So if everyone was the same pre-crash (ie belted in), you would expect to find an excess of pax. Instead we have the opposite. This makes me think that loss of control was sudden, some people were already strapped in anyway (mostly pax and hence not recovered), and the CC were mostly recovered as not strapped in.