AF 447 Search to resume
In the months since this crash, thousands of people have died from wrong drug ingestion and other highly preventable accidents. Let's put our money to work where it'll pay dividends.
It is up to each of us to do the best we can in our own field of endeavour.
Aviation can be made even safer by learning why each accident occurs, and every reasonable measure should be taken to continue that process.
Le Monde article?
Le Monde had an article yesterday saying that the same thing had happened to another AF Rio-Paris flight on 29th November, but that since the pitot didn't freeze, the pilots were able to recover. That's about all it says. I was hoping to find more info on this thread - anyone know about this?
Link is here:
Un vol Rio-Paris rencontre les mêmes difficultés que l'avion qui s'est écrasé en juin - LeMonde.fr
n5296s
Link is here:
Un vol Rio-Paris rencontre les mêmes difficultés que l'avion qui s'est écrasé en juin - LeMonde.fr
n5296s
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curious statement about dropping 5,000FT (i dont get whats curious about it though)
Air France jet plunges 5,000ft in same spot as doomed flight from Brazil
Air accident experts have launched an investigation into why an Air France jet dropped 5,000 feet last month at the precise spot where an airliner plunged into the Atlantic in June, killing 228 people.
By Henry Samuel in Paris
Published: 12:58PM GMT 10 Dec 2009
Brazilian Navy divers recovering a huge part of the rudder of the Air France A330 that plunged in to the Atlantic in June 2009 Photo: AFP/GETTY IMAGES
They believe it may provide clues as to what caused flight AF447 to fall out of the sky on June 1 en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris.
Bodies and wreckage were found but the crucial black boxes are still missing.
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Bodies of Air France flight 447 victims show no signs of mid-air explosion
Air France crash: Brazilian ship recovers three more bodies
Air France crash: plane's fin recovered
Air France plane: little hope left for survivors
Flight AF445, which replaced the ill-fated AF447, took off from Rio on Nov 29 at 5.20pm universal time and hit massive turbulence four hours later.
Air France said in a statement that the pilots "carried out a normal descent to avoid a zone of severe turbulence and to reach a less turbulent flight level".
According to French media reports, the pilots issued a mayday message while carrying out the manoeuvre as they were unable to receive air traffic authorisation for the procedure.
But instead of descending by the 300 ft that is standard procedure to avoid turbulence, the plane plunged from 33,000 feet to 28,000 feet – a drop of 5,000 feet, according to the newspaper Le Figaro.
One passenger recounted in a blog how the plane "was no longer under control", and said that cabin crew were panic-stricken. There were no reported injuries.
The incident took place around 10 nautical miles from where AF447 is thought to have gone down, in an area known as "le pot au noir", or murky cauldron, due to the frequency of tropical storms there.
Both planes came from the same Airbus A330 family and were on night flights.
Investigators believe that faulty air speed sensors may have played a role in causing the June crash. Since then all such "pitot tubes" have been changed on Air France planes. The speed sensors on AF445, however, showed no signs of malfunctioning.
France's air accident investigation bureau, the BEA, said: "The flight data could provide us with new information. We cannot pass up [looking into] such a coincidence."
The BEA is due to provide an update on the investigation into the AF447 crash next week, and the search for the AF447 black boxes is due to resume in February.
Air accident experts have launched an investigation into why an Air France jet dropped 5,000 feet last month at the precise spot where an airliner plunged into the Atlantic in June, killing 228 people.
By Henry Samuel in Paris
Published: 12:58PM GMT 10 Dec 2009
Brazilian Navy divers recovering a huge part of the rudder of the Air France A330 that plunged in to the Atlantic in June 2009 Photo: AFP/GETTY IMAGES
They believe it may provide clues as to what caused flight AF447 to fall out of the sky on June 1 en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris.
Bodies and wreckage were found but the crucial black boxes are still missing.
Related Articles
Full story of the horror on board Flight 447
Bodies of Air France flight 447 victims show no signs of mid-air explosion
Air France crash: Brazilian ship recovers three more bodies
Air France crash: plane's fin recovered
Air France plane: little hope left for survivors
Flight AF445, which replaced the ill-fated AF447, took off from Rio on Nov 29 at 5.20pm universal time and hit massive turbulence four hours later.
Air France said in a statement that the pilots "carried out a normal descent to avoid a zone of severe turbulence and to reach a less turbulent flight level".
According to French media reports, the pilots issued a mayday message while carrying out the manoeuvre as they were unable to receive air traffic authorisation for the procedure.
But instead of descending by the 300 ft that is standard procedure to avoid turbulence, the plane plunged from 33,000 feet to 28,000 feet – a drop of 5,000 feet, according to the newspaper Le Figaro.
One passenger recounted in a blog how the plane "was no longer under control", and said that cabin crew were panic-stricken. There were no reported injuries.
The incident took place around 10 nautical miles from where AF447 is thought to have gone down, in an area known as "le pot au noir", or murky cauldron, due to the frequency of tropical storms there.
Both planes came from the same Airbus A330 family and were on night flights.
Investigators believe that faulty air speed sensors may have played a role in causing the June crash. Since then all such "pitot tubes" have been changed on Air France planes. The speed sensors on AF445, however, showed no signs of malfunctioning.
France's air accident investigation bureau, the BEA, said: "The flight data could provide us with new information. We cannot pass up [looking into] such a coincidence."
The BEA is due to provide an update on the investigation into the AF447 crash next week, and the search for the AF447 black boxes is due to resume in February.
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There will be some recommendations made when the French investigators release another preliminary report later this week, this article says, a.o. the following:
Air crash cause remains unknown - The Irish Times - Sun, Dec 13, 2009
... like I think I said earlier, extending the battery life of the pingers is the first obviously reasonable thing to do and probably the quickest thing to fix, but there needs to be regulation in place also - which will take it´s own time.
the BEA is expected to make at least three recommendations on general aircraft safety, this source said.These include extending the life of locator beacons attached to the flight recorders to 90 days from 30 days.
Regulators could also be asked to consider ordering further beacons to be attached to important parts of the aircraft structure to assist in locating wreckage in the event of a crash. Such beacons would need to be active for 30 days.
Regulators could also be asked to consider ordering further beacons to be attached to important parts of the aircraft structure to assist in locating wreckage in the event of a crash. Such beacons would need to be active for 30 days.
... like I think I said earlier, extending the battery life of the pingers is the first obviously reasonable thing to do and probably the quickest thing to fix, but there needs to be regulation in place also - which will take it´s own time.
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Finn47
Thanks.
Judging from that article, somebody seems to have been reading PPRuNe..... it's all on the thread.
But then.... most of the suggestions are logical conclusions from the event.
One thing I was going to suggest.....
We all know what will go into a mere cellphone, nowadays.
GPS, to start with.
And we all know about digital multimeters you can throw on the floor, hard, without any effect.
And what about the last time you threw your TV remote across the room, and it still worked?
Combine enough of todays technology, GPS and all, pack it into a small near-indestructible shell that will float, mass-produce it (to get the price right down), feed it with flight data from the IFE (why not? it can recharge the batteries at the same time) and spread a dozen or so all through the aircraft.
Only needs one or two to survive.
Just tossing this out as an idea for the moment, but it would solve far more than just AF447.
Dragging the ELB into the 21st century?
CJ
Thanks.
Judging from that article, somebody seems to have been reading PPRuNe..... it's all on the thread.
But then.... most of the suggestions are logical conclusions from the event.
One thing I was going to suggest.....
We all know what will go into a mere cellphone, nowadays.
GPS, to start with.
And we all know about digital multimeters you can throw on the floor, hard, without any effect.
And what about the last time you threw your TV remote across the room, and it still worked?
Combine enough of todays technology, GPS and all, pack it into a small near-indestructible shell that will float, mass-produce it (to get the price right down), feed it with flight data from the IFE (why not? it can recharge the batteries at the same time) and spread a dozen or so all through the aircraft.
Only needs one or two to survive.
Just tossing this out as an idea for the moment, but it would solve far more than just AF447.
Dragging the ELB into the 21st century?
CJ
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New BEA Interim Report available
Hi Friends,
This new interim report is available at:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e2.en.pdf
Jeff
This new interim report is available at:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e2.en.pdf
Jeff
Second interim report published today, available here:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e2.en.pdf
As expected, safety recommendations are made, as follows:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e2.en.pdf
As expected, safety recommendations are made, as follows:
1. extend as rapidly as possible to 90 days the regulatory transmission time for ULB’s installed on flight recorders on airplanes performing public transport flights over maritime areas;
2. make it mandatory, as rapidly as possible, for airplanes performing public transport flights over maritime areas to be equipped with an additional ULB capable of transmitting on a frequency (for example between 8.5 kHz and 9.5 kHz) and for a duration adapted to the pre-localisation of wreckage;
3. study the possibility of making it mandatory for airplanes performing public transport flights to regularly transmit basic flight parameters (for example position, altitude, speed, heading)
2. make it mandatory, as rapidly as possible, for airplanes performing public transport flights over maritime areas to be equipped with an additional ULB capable of transmitting on a frequency (for example between 8.5 kHz and 9.5 kHz) and for a duration adapted to the pre-localisation of wreckage;
3. study the possibility of making it mandatory for airplanes performing public transport flights to regularly transmit basic flight parameters (for example position, altitude, speed, heading)
Last edited by Finn47; 17th Dec 2009 at 12:17. Reason: add data
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AF447 Accident - BEA Interim Report No.2
The original French language version of the report complete with the Annex is at:-
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...cp090601e2.pdf
mm43
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...cp090601e2.pdf
mm43
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The interim reports also recommends that EASA changes the certification criteria to take in account the weather conditions encountered by AF447 and the other events studied in the report.
It is interesting that they admit that not enough is known about the composition of high-altitude clouds.
It is interesting that they admit that not enough is known about the composition of high-altitude clouds.
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From BEA Report
I suspect that return traces using an echo sounder on 37.5kHz confirmed during the last two searches that temperature/salinity changes were creating inversion layers. This would greatly hinder the chances of a weak ULB signal on 37.5kHz getting to the surface from the depths associated with this search. The use of the lower frequency in the range mentioned will alleviate the problem.
A quick read of the BEA analysis of the ACARS messages which hadn't previously been explained, tend to demonstrate the ADIRU's had a major disagreement and the TCAS took a similar view and threw its hand in. Apparently no lightning was detected by satellites during the period of this upset.
mm43
with an additional ULB capable of transmitting on a frequency (for example between 8.5 kHz and 9.5 kHz)
A quick read of the BEA analysis of the ACARS messages which hadn't previously been explained, tend to demonstrate the ADIRU's had a major disagreement and the TCAS took a similar view and threw its hand in. Apparently no lightning was detected by satellites during the period of this upset.
mm43
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15 years ago : same causes, same effects...
On October 31, 1994, Eagle flight 184 from Indianapolis to Chicago-O'Hare, an ATR 72 operated by Simmons Airlines, crashed-during a rapid descent in severe icing conditions after an uncommanded roll excursion. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces; the captain, first officer, 2 flight attendants and 64 passengers received fatal injuries.
The National Transportation Safety Board has determined that the probable cause of this accident was the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots because :
1) /…/
2) The French Directorate General for Civil Aviation's (DGAC's) inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions;
3) The DGAC's failure to provide the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing conditions, as specified under the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement and Annex 8 of the International Civil Aviation Organization.
The Safety Board concludes that no airplane should be authorized or certified for flight into icing conditions more severe than those to which the airplane was subjected in certification testing unless the manufacturer can otherwise demonstrate the safety of flight in such conditions.
As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration :
“Revise the icing certification testing regulation to ensure that airplanes are properly tested for all conditions in which they are authorized to operate, or are otherwise shown to be capable of safe flight into such conditions. If safe operations cannot be demonstrated by the manufacturer, operational limitations should be imposed to prohibit flight in such conditions and flightcrews should be provided with the means to positively determine when they are in icing conditions that exceed the limits for aircraft certification. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-96-56)”
After reading that NTSB safety recommendation, we can expect the French BEA also recommends in the AF 447 report : “Airplanes equipped with Pitot probes must not fly through ice crystal areas”
The National Transportation Safety Board has determined that the probable cause of this accident was the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots because :
1) /…/
2) The French Directorate General for Civil Aviation's (DGAC's) inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions;
3) The DGAC's failure to provide the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing conditions, as specified under the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement and Annex 8 of the International Civil Aviation Organization.
The Safety Board concludes that no airplane should be authorized or certified for flight into icing conditions more severe than those to which the airplane was subjected in certification testing unless the manufacturer can otherwise demonstrate the safety of flight in such conditions.
As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration :
“Revise the icing certification testing regulation to ensure that airplanes are properly tested for all conditions in which they are authorized to operate, or are otherwise shown to be capable of safe flight into such conditions. If safe operations cannot be demonstrated by the manufacturer, operational limitations should be imposed to prohibit flight in such conditions and flightcrews should be provided with the means to positively determine when they are in icing conditions that exceed the limits for aircraft certification. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-96-56)”
After reading that NTSB safety recommendation, we can expect the French BEA also recommends in the AF 447 report : “Airplanes equipped with Pitot probes must not fly through ice crystal areas”
After reading that NTSB safety recommendation, we can expect the French BEA also recommends in the AF 447 report : “Airplanes equipped with Pitot probes must not fly through ice crystal areas”
The regulations can assess the probabilities of such encounters and provide for tolerance of the product to some level, but beyond that the avoidance is basically a recommendation.
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CVR and CDR recorders are obsolete antiques.
Carrying around important data on an aircraft that is ultimately only useful if the aircraft crashes is self-defeating.
The physical link between the aircraft and the data needs to be broken, to ensure the first rule of aviation is applied – fail-safe !
There is absolutely no reason why a regular data transmission of the CVR and CDR data cannot be sent from the aircraft to a central database every 15 mins or so during flight, therefore making the carrying of the data on the doomed aircraft only a back-up system.
The technology exists to do this today at minimal cost. The bandwidth required is tiny.
It would make searching for important key components of the crashed aircraft much more targeted following interrogation of data and could mean that no recovery is necessary at all, from deep ocean, high mountain terrain etc. Notwithstanding the recovery of bodies where possible.
Carrying around important data on an aircraft that is ultimately only useful if the aircraft crashes is self-defeating.
The physical link between the aircraft and the data needs to be broken, to ensure the first rule of aviation is applied – fail-safe !
There is absolutely no reason why a regular data transmission of the CVR and CDR data cannot be sent from the aircraft to a central database every 15 mins or so during flight, therefore making the carrying of the data on the doomed aircraft only a back-up system.
The technology exists to do this today at minimal cost. The bandwidth required is tiny.
It would make searching for important key components of the crashed aircraft much more targeted following interrogation of data and could mean that no recovery is necessary at all, from deep ocean, high mountain terrain etc. Notwithstanding the recovery of bodies where possible.
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French AF447 investigators have recommendations, no answers
Friday December 18, 2009
In its second interim report on the May 31 loss of the Air France A330-200 over the Atlantic, France's BEA issued its first safety recommendations and concluded that "In the absence of any data from the flight recorders, the main parts of the airplane and any witness testimony on the flight, the precise circumstances of the accident, and therefore its causes, have still not been determined."
Investigators' inability to recover the recorders "raise[s] questions about the adequacy of the means currently in use on civil transport aircraft for the protection of flight data with the technological possibilities and the challenges that some accidents represent." Consequently, it recommended to ICAO and EASA that commercial aircraft flying over water should be equipped "as rapidly as possible" with an additional locator beacon capable of transmitting on a frequency between 8.5 and 9.5 kHz and that transmission time of the flight recorder ULBs must increase to at least 90 days from the current 30. It also urged a study into the possibility of mandatory regular transmission of basic flight parameters.
Regarding the possibility that malfunctioning pitot tubes played a role in the accident, BEA said it analyzed 13 examples of the temporary loss of reliable indications of one or more airspeeds involving A330s/A340s operated by AF, TAM, Qatar Airways, Northwest Airlines and Air Caraibes. The events occurred in highly unstable air masses in the vicinity of deep convective weather phenomena, flight levels were between FL340 and FL390, static temperature was below -40C in 12 cases and turbulence was recorded each time (ATWOnline, Dec. 17).
"The certification criteria are not representative of the conditions that are really encountered at high altitude, for example, with regard to temperatures," BEA concluded. "In addition, it appears that some elements, such as the size of the ice crystals within cloud masses, are little known and that it is consequently difficult to evaluate the effect that they may have on some equipment, in particular the pitot probes. In this context, the tests aimed at the validation of this equipment do not appear to be well-adapted to flights at high altitude."
It recommended that EASA study the composition of cloud masses at high altitude "with appropriate precision" and modify icing certification criteria in accordance with the results and in coordination with other regulatory authorities.
by Cathy Buyck
Air Transport World
Friday December 18, 2009
In its second interim report on the May 31 loss of the Air France A330-200 over the Atlantic, France's BEA issued its first safety recommendations and concluded that "In the absence of any data from the flight recorders, the main parts of the airplane and any witness testimony on the flight, the precise circumstances of the accident, and therefore its causes, have still not been determined."
Investigators' inability to recover the recorders "raise[s] questions about the adequacy of the means currently in use on civil transport aircraft for the protection of flight data with the technological possibilities and the challenges that some accidents represent." Consequently, it recommended to ICAO and EASA that commercial aircraft flying over water should be equipped "as rapidly as possible" with an additional locator beacon capable of transmitting on a frequency between 8.5 and 9.5 kHz and that transmission time of the flight recorder ULBs must increase to at least 90 days from the current 30. It also urged a study into the possibility of mandatory regular transmission of basic flight parameters.
Regarding the possibility that malfunctioning pitot tubes played a role in the accident, BEA said it analyzed 13 examples of the temporary loss of reliable indications of one or more airspeeds involving A330s/A340s operated by AF, TAM, Qatar Airways, Northwest Airlines and Air Caraibes. The events occurred in highly unstable air masses in the vicinity of deep convective weather phenomena, flight levels were between FL340 and FL390, static temperature was below -40C in 12 cases and turbulence was recorded each time (ATWOnline, Dec. 17).
"The certification criteria are not representative of the conditions that are really encountered at high altitude, for example, with regard to temperatures," BEA concluded. "In addition, it appears that some elements, such as the size of the ice crystals within cloud masses, are little known and that it is consequently difficult to evaluate the effect that they may have on some equipment, in particular the pitot probes. In this context, the tests aimed at the validation of this equipment do not appear to be well-adapted to flights at high altitude."
It recommended that EASA study the composition of cloud masses at high altitude "with appropriate precision" and modify icing certification criteria in accordance with the results and in coordination with other regulatory authorities.
by Cathy Buyck
Air Transport World
CVR and CDR recorders are obsolete antiques.
There is a very good adage in engineering - "If it ain't broke, DON'T try to fix it".
It sounds nice and simple to devolve everything to ground based receivers and recorders, but........
1) Who records the information?
2) Where?
3) Who has jurisdiction WHEN something goes wrong?
4) Who pays for this service?
5) How many transmitting systems do you put on the plane to make it fail safe?
6) Do you use satelite or terrestrial radio?
7) How do you control the data volume? The comment about minimal bandwidth is simply wrong. There are according to Flight magazine figures roughly 19,000 western manufactured Large commercial jets in passenger service, plus just under 3,000 regional jets / turboprops, to say nothing of freighter conversions and Eastern bloc built aircraft. Effectively, to transmit this to a ground station, you are looking at a near real time transmission of a mandatory 88 parameters from each one. Putting the number together means that you are looking at a system acieving somewhat better than a Safety Integrity Level 4 rating.
I'm not suggesting that the current system is perfect, but bottom line - it has worked when it has had to. In the future, when we are a bit more aligned between national Aviation Authorities and national governments AND the technology fpr storing & transmitting data has improved substantially, we will likely have a land based system. But, until then.....
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Bea Interim Report
Many thanks to those who made the Interim Report available. Data remains the fundamental truth most of us want to understnd. The analysis remains a variable. The conclusions still far away.
The ITCZ was a challenge before the accident. It will be a challenge and risk for some time to come.
Tom
The ITCZ was a challenge before the accident. It will be a challenge and risk for some time to come.
Tom