AF447

[Squawk_ident]

mm43

I now realize you are raising your question based on the 0133z position report with ETO SALPU 0148 and ETO ORARO 0200z. This raises an issue with RECIFE / ATLANTICO ATC as the filed plan showed the sector at M0.82 and it would now seem that the Captain had planned a reduction to M0.80 after INTOL. Somehow this didn't eventuate as the A/C continued to 'derniére position connue' - last known position at M0.82.

You got the point.
I knew the mp3 snippet release by the FAB . It's the only official information that TASIL was estimated at 0220. And the controller speaking to Dakar states "Mach 82" But this estimation is not correct at 0.82. It should have been 0211 something like this.

[woodja51]

Bea report

I agree that the initial report is a bit light on any sort of conclusion.. as yet..but ...

and I am not Chuck Yeager...

so certainly not overly critical of the crew as they are a product of any system...

I still can't get away from the possible mishandled loss of airspeed reference ... not say that flying a jet in turb in alternate law is easy but if all that stuff happened and you just did.....well ..... nothing!! it should stay where it is.. ie throttles in climb detent ( as per loss of airspeed so no need to do anything as the auto throttle had already disconnected ..maybe have to move them if for some reason they went into thrust lock?..) pitch.. 5 degrees.. well it is probably a bit less than that anyway on a/p disconnect at FL350 so nothing to do there..much??- but I could be wrong...??

Faced with lots of ECAM and stuff in a short space of time what would anyone do... wings level , nose on the horizon and power set to climb. Yes yes hind sight you say..

(I vaguely remember 'nose above the horizon .. speed goes down... nose below the horizon... speed goes up... from my RAAF U/A recovery stuff..)


And as far as stalls go... have done this in the simulator once or twice and ...yes accept fidelity past limits and R/N etc may not make the real jet the same ....but I believe it stalls pretty much like any aircraft.. you know heavy buffet. etc which 'elevator forward sufficient to unstall the wings' works to fix... aft c/g maybe more unstable ..yes..spin prone B/A ratios and stuff maybe..

I think this is what we all really want to know.... how it managed to get away from the drivers, and if it was mechanical/environmental that started the sequence.. fine fix the fleet ( I see accelerated replacement programme in place)... but I don't see anyone grounding their jets as yet so guess the blame is going to come back to the pilots.... or never be known.

Time for training to look at these type of events and react accordingly.. but facts yet to be known so just ideas at moment.

W

[wall-e]

wx

That's interesting

Air France 447 - AFR447 - A detailed meteorological analysis - Satellite and weather data

[Nightrider]

I am beginning to wonder if the BEA formally asked to view the autopsies. I get the impression that the Brazilians are sticklers for procedure. The French may have asked informally relying on their formal status and been "rightly" rebuffed by the Brazilians. A formal request might have turned the trick.

Read between the lines, the BEA report does not give any statement about how or when a request to this effect has been issued. There may also be the attitude on the Brazil side that only an official channel (French embassy) can deal with such a request, whereas the BEA may have the attitude that they are the authorized communication partner.

SOPs are a good tool, however, they only work for the environment they are designed for. Two or more SOPs crashing into each other will most certainly contradict each other in several areas, a given fact we see in our job often enough if crew are changing employers....
"in my last company this was SOP, why is it not allowed here?"....

[LeandroSecundo]

Hi,

I am beginning to wonder if the BEA formally asked to view the autopsies. I get the impression that the Brazilians are sticklers for procedure

Read between the lines, the BEA report does not give any statement about how or when a request to this effect has been issued. There may also be the attitude on the Brazil side that only an official channel (French embassy) can deal with such a request, whereas the BEA may have the attitude that they are the authorized communication partner.

Seem's from head .. it is a international law or a international agreement in the case of transmission of such forensic or other results in civil aircraft crash investigation.
Anyone can confirm ?
I think at this:
Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which envisages full and free cooperation.
Convention on International Civil Aviation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation


Bye.

[DJ77]

And the controller speaking to Dakar states "Mach 82" But this estimation is not correct at 0.82. It should have been 0211 something like this.

Squawk_Ident and mm43, I think this is unrelated with the accident but since you are doubting the positions/timing of AF447, just consider that, for whatever reason, the estimate for ORARO we read in the BEA's report is almost certainly erroneous. It should be about 0204 and that makes all other positions/estimates consistent with a GS of about 470 kt. In particular, 0220 for TASIL was correct.

[spornrad]

Speculation about human remains offensive

Speculation about human remains and autopsy results are at least inappropriate if not outright offensive, given this is a public forum that may well be seached e.g. by relatives of the deceased.

One of the worse examples lacking any respect to the victims as well as every decently compassionate person in my eyes is post #3130 http://www.pprune.org/5043385-post3130.html

Eventually BEA will obtain and study the records and release conclusions.

[SubsonicMortal]

I would like to read the pre-lim report that is posted on here somewhere but sifting through over 3000 posts will be a little time consuming. Can someone refer to the post number so I can jump to it?

Thanks

SSM

[Dave Gittins]

Interim Report

T'were in post #2995 (amongst others.)

http://www.aviaciondigitalglobal.com...02022842-4.pdf

DGG

[FrequentSLF]

I recall to have read somewhere in PPRuNE that on the A330 the manual selection of "Direct Law" is no possible, but can be forced shutting down the PRIMs and the SECs. If my recollection is correct, is it worth to consider that the crew was trying to get in direct law?

[takata]

BEA (Bureau Enquête et Analyse)

Links to BEA (Bureau Enquête et Analyse)
. English page related to AF447:
News
. AF447 Interim Report (without Annexes) 02/07/2009:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e1.en.pdf
. AF447 Organisation of investigation 02/07/2009:
http://www.bea.aero/anglaise/actuali...n.af447.en.pdf
. AF447 Findings 02/07/2009:
http://www.bea.aero/anglaise/actuali...s.af447.en.pdf
. AF447 Sea search operations 02/07/2009:
http://www.bea.aero/anglaise/actuali...h.af447.en.pdf

. French page related to AF447:
Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses
. AF447 Interim Report (Including Annexes):
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...cp090601e1.pdf

S~
Olivier

[SaturnV]

I've reposted some surface current images in JB. Post#487 in the AF447 thread.

http://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/3759...ml#post5044468

[lomapaseo]

JuggleDan

From a scientific reader's standpoint, there are two issues with this expose:
- The conclusion extends the findings of section 1.12.4 by adding that the a/c was not destroyed in flight without justifying this extension;
- The conclusion mixes as "established facts" on the one hand a long series of factual information and on the other hand a single non-factual conclusion (airplane was not destroyed in flight...).

My feeling is that the BEA is putting forward their theory (airplane was not destroyed in flight) as an established fact at a time when they probably don't have enough evidence to do so: as WF repeatedly points out, they don't have the autopsies' results yet.

I tend to read their releases a little bit higher on the surface, (I never trust translations). In other words we (the reader) should be less sure of our conclusions.

At this point I haven't seen anything that concludes what started the airplane to fall out of the sky. Like Will Fraser intimated, after it fell is all secondary to what we need to know to prevent a similar accident.

[BJ-ENG]

Water Impact

A reminder of the significant damage inflicted on an airframe even during a
successful ditching - US Airways Flight 1549 (Airbus A320-214 – N106US
January 15, 2009).

NTSB Structures Group Chairman’s Factual Report:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation...026/418719.pdf

See photos 12 through to 15 showing bulkhead and rear tail cone damage looking aft from frame 70. Displacement of the tail cone and bulkhead rupture would appear to be the result of the hydraulic action created by water ingress through the damaged underside (FR50+ photo's 16, 23, 24 in Attachment 2 - Addendum 1).

Attachment 2:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation...026/418716.pdf

Attachment 2 - Addendum 1:
Damage to underside:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation...026/419640.pdf

Attachment 4:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation...026/420144.pdf

Attachment 1 to the Factual Report Figures:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation...026/418699.pdf

See also:
FAA Report AR-95/54 Transport Water Impact and Ditching Performance:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation...026/419887.pdf

Original src:
CD List Of Contents

[Hyperveloce]

about the way the VS detached from the fuselage

Hi there
The BEA report states:

"The tail fin was damaged during its recovery and transport but the photographs available made it possible to identify the damage that was not the result of the accident. The middle and rear fasteners with the related fragments of the fuselage hoop frames were present in
the fin base. The distortions of the frames showed that they broke during a forward motion with a slight twisting component towards the left." (p.35).
On another hand, it is said that most of the debris suggest a strong vertical decceleration and the action of strong compressive forces:
why don't the middle and rear fasteners of the VS with the related fragments of the fuselage hoop frames (who suggest a forward motion & slight twist) show this strong compressive structural effect ?
That the connecting brackets between the floor and the walls were bent

backwards also suggest an horizontal acceleration component ? Shouldn't the thousands of vertical Gs of the vertical impact on the belly have compressed the fasteners and fuselage hoop frames in the same way ? Why only a foward motion with a slight twist is seen on the VS ?

Jeff

[ClippedCub]

Why only a foward motion with a slight twist is seen on the VS ?

One explanation is the afterbody broke off in-flight and impacted independantly.

Another is the horizontal failed down and aft, in-flight, taking pieces of the frames with it. Both scenarios would give the illusion of the VS failing forward, when in fact the after body failed away from it.

[Chomolungma]

Well I think that what they are thinking is that it hit the surface of the water at level attitude so the deceleration from the wings and fuselage ripped the VS off forward before the empennage hit. Not sure where the damage to the rudder came from though...perhaps the tail cone.

[Will Fraser]

Continue to be far less than fluent in AB Flight Law. In an attempt to unwind back toward initial upset (I am convinced there was one), There is an interesting video of a HS failure on a light twin at high speed at low altitude, a Partenavia. The a/c was attempting a crisp pull up into a "loop", and the HS failed, downward, as you would expect. If 447's nose had dropped, perhaps a last gasp effort of the a/p as it dropped out, having sensed the Unreliable a/s as low, and with a raised AoA, would be for it to lower the nose. It is possible that crew, perhaps surprised and not a little overwhelmed at the auto disconnect, were thereby confronted with an overspeed a short while later. If it developed, and they found Alt. Law unhelpful in an urgent need to arrest a/s, would that explain their attempt at Direct Law by defeating two critical computers by switching them off? (FrequentSLF posed this bit).

If in any case the HS was overloaded in a high speed input, suffered damage, and failed downward, that might be considered consistent with a VS failure as BEA divined, "Forward" would then be a misunderstanding, but still retain validity, though not a demonstration of failure at impact with water.
Why not give BEA all latitude in 'translation' issues, and 'mistakes' in jurisdictions or protocol, to this extent, the document still reads biased, impatient, less than technical, and political. I seriously expect that BEA would want to correct their omission of all scientific 'medical' information, given that the passengers may be able to demonstrate in many ways what even the CVR/FDR could not.

Again, I think it likely some failure of the tail and/or aft pressure bulkhead occurred at high speed, post ACARS. Even if the tail failed during ACARS tx, is it not possible evidence was 'backed up'? Also, ACARS is mx, it doesn't troubleshoot? Rudder Travel Limiter loss could be its 'understanding' of a catastrophic empennage failure? Though the VS was gone, the computer may sense it as 'there goes the RTL'. With a loss of hydraulic pressure consistent with separation, its tx might be what ? If the VS loss happened when the ACARS was 'busy' or after 0214? With the possibility of statics problems and/or pressure loss in cabin, the warning may be doing its task as designed, 'faster than 1800'/min.' is consistent with a complete loss of pressure in the cabin, is it not?

My Edit. Regardless who is 'responsible' for autopsy data to be missing from the report, it is a glaring error. If the argument gets more attention than the data, you will know it was deliberate and political. No one could notice its absence without demanding its subsequent inclusion via 'append'.

IMO

[Hyperveloce]

retaining the BEA suggestion that the aircraft did impact the surface in one piece, could these two types of structural distortions (forward motion & slight twist versus strong vertical compression) also suggest that the aircraft impacted the surface at high velocity with mainly a vertical component (as said by the BEA) but with a positive pich, not only on the belly ? (tail impacted first, snapping off the VS, bending backward the connecting brackets between the floor and the walls, immediatly followed by the belly impact and the compressive stress ?).
Jeff

[einhverfr]

Hyperveloce:

why don't the middle and rear fasteners of the VS with the related fragments of the fuselage hoop frames (who suggest a forward motion & slight twist) show this strong compressive structural effect ?
That the connecting brackets between the floor and the walls were bent...

Here is my take. The VS is a large and comparatively massive bit sitting on the end of the tail, with a small connective cross section facing downward against the tail cone. With strong vertical deceleration, the VS is going to compress against the upper wall of the tail cone and in this case, probably punch through, breaking the body around it. The forward deceleration then causes the VS to continue through the air forward relative to the rest of the aircraft.

A slight leftward twist in the airframe would affect damage on the VS, and might affect its tragectory after departing the airframe. However it wouldn't affect the rest of the scenario substantively.

I don't think a forward failure would necessarily be seen from an in-flight separation because of the aerodynamic forces involved.