AF447
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Tcas Too
Originally Posted by Graybeard
Robin42, there is also the TCAS Fail report, which BEA could not explain.
But, as I understand your point, there are several electrical busses, and without a circuit diagram at hands you would not assume you had more HF than power on all these different circuits.
Last edited by Robin42; 14th Jul 2009 at 20:09. Reason: missing words
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CONF iture,
In an earlier post directed at JuggleDan I said,
The position ultimately needs to be in 3D, and in this respect it would be reasonable to assume that AF447's flight level was other than FL350 at 02:10:34. As mentioned in the above quote, I am sure the BEA had the concurrence of both the AAIB and NTSB when using the "until" wording. Open to interpretation either way and leaving room to manoeuver. Or did no one actually see the potential implications of what was published?
mm43
By the way, there is no doubt in the original version, which is in French, that the BEA had no intention whatsoever to bring forward any kind of deviation for that last automatic position report !
I am not about to dispute your technical French definition of the meaning attributed by the BEA to the 02:10:34 final position, but I'd rather suggest the BEA has further data surrounding the basic position, e.g. flight level etc.. which they have deemed not relevant or desirable to be released in the Preliminary Report. In this respect, I submit that the AAIB and NTSB concurred with the wording used both in the prime report and the translated English version.
mm43
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Sorry, loss of airspeed does not kill TCAS. Altitude is a separate ADR output from airspeed.
A lightning strike could damage the upper TCAS antenna. I've been involved with a few lightning strike events, and don't remember any causing a power surge on the electrical busses. They will damage poorly bonded antennas, however.
A lightning strike could damage the upper TCAS antenna. I've been involved with a few lightning strike events, and don't remember any causing a power surge on the electrical busses. They will damage poorly bonded antennas, however.
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Given the deviation, what was the reported altitude at 0210:34??
If Prim1 was inop at some stage in the final minutes would the HS "lockout" obtain, given EASA's conclusion that reset involved no Pitch authority, irrespective of 'Load' prot.??? Had the a/c entered a dive at 0210, established descent, then encountered only stab trim to pullout, to find a serious lack of Pitch authority while waiting for reset??? I.E. "0" HS 'set'.
(This may not derive if AD was complied with, unless PRIM1 was inop on launch, MEL). Either way, if PRIM1 was inop and what followed was a second computer trip, this HS lock explains a possible unrecoverable descent, perhaps with parts leaving the airframe closer to 0214:30.
If Prim1 was inop at some stage in the final minutes would the HS "lockout" obtain, given EASA's conclusion that reset involved no Pitch authority, irrespective of 'Load' prot.??? Had the a/c entered a dive at 0210, established descent, then encountered only stab trim to pullout, to find a serious lack of Pitch authority while waiting for reset??? I.E. "0" HS 'set'.
(This may not derive if AD was complied with, unless PRIM1 was inop on launch, MEL). Either way, if PRIM1 was inop and what followed was a second computer trip, this HS lock explains a possible unrecoverable descent, perhaps with parts leaving the airframe closer to 0214:30.
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Loss of control at high altitude
How did it occur since this plane can perfectly be flown using pich & thrust ?
I wonder whether we should add hypothesis to the events already known like brutal turbulences (see the wind measures of the AMDAR flight at FL325), up/downdrafts, engines loss, inertial/artificial horizon loss, mid air break up, etc...
I see that a sudden AP disengagement as a consequence of problems already unfolding (Pitot freezing, icing of the airframe,...) can initiate a drift (altitude, roll/bank,...) that you have to notice/detect & control switfly at high altitude. It may be in a context of stress/frustration/tasks overload due to instrumental ambiguities/failures hard to understand and to isolate, multiples sound/visual alarms, new tasks and procedures to implement, loss of flight assistances possibly for the rest of the flight... In a context of very poor visibility & possible spatial disorientation (despite the artificial horizon), shared/split attention, etc...
I see that all these Pitot symptoms may go hand in hand with stall alarms like in the Air Caraïbe case, 30 sec after the AP disengagement (possibly overspeed alarms in other cases) and that pilots are instructed to take them in account and react accordingly. Meaning that this plane was not piloted according to a normal pich a thrust procedure that would otherwise have done it ?
It may also be that the first copilot (37 yrs) was taking his duty, possibly replacing the Captain in this time frame (around 02:00Z).
If you cumulate these adverse elements, wouldn't it be already enough to put a crew in a dire strait ? Does a high altitude loss of control require more hypothesis ?
Jeff
I wonder whether we should add hypothesis to the events already known like brutal turbulences (see the wind measures of the AMDAR flight at FL325), up/downdrafts, engines loss, inertial/artificial horizon loss, mid air break up, etc...
I see that a sudden AP disengagement as a consequence of problems already unfolding (Pitot freezing, icing of the airframe,...) can initiate a drift (altitude, roll/bank,...) that you have to notice/detect & control switfly at high altitude. It may be in a context of stress/frustration/tasks overload due to instrumental ambiguities/failures hard to understand and to isolate, multiples sound/visual alarms, new tasks and procedures to implement, loss of flight assistances possibly for the rest of the flight... In a context of very poor visibility & possible spatial disorientation (despite the artificial horizon), shared/split attention, etc...
I see that all these Pitot symptoms may go hand in hand with stall alarms like in the Air Caraïbe case, 30 sec after the AP disengagement (possibly overspeed alarms in other cases) and that pilots are instructed to take them in account and react accordingly. Meaning that this plane was not piloted according to a normal pich a thrust procedure that would otherwise have done it ?
It may also be that the first copilot (37 yrs) was taking his duty, possibly replacing the Captain in this time frame (around 02:00Z).
If you cumulate these adverse elements, wouldn't it be already enough to put a crew in a dire strait ? Does a high altitude loss of control require more hypothesis ?
Jeff
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Jeff
My guess is that at no time would copilot2 be PIC, which means PIC would either be Captain, or F/O, both flying in their respective assigned seats, LH (Capt.) or RH (F/O). Is this correct?
My guess is that at no time would copilot2 be PIC, which means PIC would either be Captain, or F/O, both flying in their respective assigned seats, LH (Capt.) or RH (F/O). Is this correct?
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Who was the PF at 02:10Z ?
Will,
Here is a contribution by Pihero on the Airliner.net forum
The Case of the Cruise Crew
Task attributions are generally well defined in a modern flight-deck: One pilot flies and communicates, the other manages the systems and the check-lists..
There is some uncertainty, though, as to who the “Pilot Flying” was. With the Captain in the LH seat, either one could have been it. During the Captain’s rest, only the most experienced co-pilot could have been PF and only from the RH seat, the second co-pilot being in charge of the systems, radio-com and navigation from the left-hand seat.
It was then up to him to keep an update of the weather at alternates, keep a sharp eye on the ETPs between the alternates in an ETOPS environment, fuel siytuation, including the aircraft balance, help with the radar… It’s also his job to compute at every reporting waypoint engine and speed parameters for turbulence penetration, altitude capability and possible step climb…etc.,..
This is how AF captains generally manage their crews : to establish a roster, take off ½ an hour for climb and ½ hour for descent ; then divide the remainin time by three that’s the times of rest.
So we have (hours rounded up) as per the flight plan :
22.30 Takeoff
23.00 end of climb
08.30 Descent
09.00 Landing.
So remain 9 hrs and 30 mins for rest, divided by 3 = 3 hrs and 10 mins each., minus 5 to 10 minutes for hand over, control transfer and instructions :
So we have this roster :
Captains in general chose the middle bunk-slot as they want to be in the cockpit during the most work-loaded phases of the flight : Dense ATC, multiple clearances for level changes, direct routings, Departure and arrival procedures...etc...leaving the - comparatively - quieter and more routine phase of the cruise to his young aides.
Here is a contribution by Pihero on the Airliner.net forum
The Case of the Cruise Crew
Task attributions are generally well defined in a modern flight-deck: One pilot flies and communicates, the other manages the systems and the check-lists..
There is some uncertainty, though, as to who the “Pilot Flying” was. With the Captain in the LH seat, either one could have been it. During the Captain’s rest, only the most experienced co-pilot could have been PF and only from the RH seat, the second co-pilot being in charge of the systems, radio-com and navigation from the left-hand seat.
It was then up to him to keep an update of the weather at alternates, keep a sharp eye on the ETPs between the alternates in an ETOPS environment, fuel siytuation, including the aircraft balance, help with the radar… It’s also his job to compute at every reporting waypoint engine and speed parameters for turbulence penetration, altitude capability and possible step climb…etc.,..
This is how AF captains generally manage their crews : to establish a roster, take off ½ an hour for climb and ½ hour for descent ; then divide the remainin time by three that’s the times of rest.
So we have (hours rounded up) as per the flight plan :
22.30 Takeoff
23.00 end of climb
08.30 Descent
09.00 Landing.
So remain 9 hrs and 30 mins for rest, divided by 3 = 3 hrs and 10 mins each., minus 5 to 10 minutes for hand over, control transfer and instructions :
So we have this roster :
- From T/O to 23.00Z All three in Flight Deck
- From 23.00Z to 0210Z, One co-pilot resting
- From 0210Z to 0520Z, F/O and SF/O on duty, Captain resting
- From 0520Z to 0830Z, Second cop-pilot resting
- From 0830Z to landing (ETA 0900) All three in Flight Deck.
Captains in general chose the middle bunk-slot as they want to be in the cockpit during the most work-loaded phases of the flight : Dense ATC, multiple clearances for level changes, direct routings, Departure and arrival procedures...etc...leaving the - comparatively - quieter and more routine phase of the cruise to his young aides.
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the AF 447 debris arriving at the Toulouse Aeronautical Test Centre
The debris are currently been transfered to the Toulouse Aeronautical Test Centre (CEAT), a test center under the aegis of D.G.A. (French Weapon Procurement Agency), where a deeper analysis will hopefully provide new facts, along with the autopsy results.
Jeff
The CEAT was established in 1949. Located in the vicinity of Toulouse at Balma, CEAT occupies a site of 40 hectares. CEAT is the main European centre for ground testing of military and civil aircraft. It is gradually offering tests for other domains: land and naval systems and missiles.
DGA - Aeronautical tests
Jeff
The CEAT was established in 1949. Located in the vicinity of Toulouse at Balma, CEAT occupies a site of 40 hectares. CEAT is the main European centre for ground testing of military and civil aircraft. It is gradually offering tests for other domains: land and naval systems and missiles.
DGA - Aeronautical tests
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If I may, I'll suggest a finer schedule. At 0200, all three pilots would be on the FD. It is 'changeover' and at 0200, the copilot2 is 'getting the panel' to relieve Captain. At 0210, exactly, copilot2 is taking the LS, Captain would probably hang around, to satisfy himself all was smooth, before heading aft to rest. This is no doubt on the CVR, but it isn't absolutely what we have to go on here, obviously.
Will
Will
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Mm43,
Strongly disagree here : Would the FL be different from 350 at that last position, it is an absolute crucial information that would have to be mentioned.
We are not talking here of a mere 5 pages preliminary report but 70 pages and almost as many in annexes, where such raw data must have priority.
I really don’t see that kind of info as "irrelevant"
Also, what do you mean by "not desirable to be released" ?
Would you give an example ?
Strongly disagree here : Would the FL be different from 350 at that last position, it is an absolute crucial information that would have to be mentioned.
We are not talking here of a mere 5 pages preliminary report but 70 pages and almost as many in annexes, where such raw data must have priority.
I really don’t see that kind of info as "irrelevant"
Also, what do you mean by "not desirable to be released" ?
Would you give an example ?
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Where some things are excluded but can be supported (deviation)
And some things are included but can't be supported (intact @ impact)
It becomes unclear what means what, and to whom.
A lower alt. at final report would indicate a descending deviation, or any of a number of other possibilities. Oh what a tangled web.....
Will
And some things are included but can't be supported (intact @ impact)
It becomes unclear what means what, and to whom.
A lower alt. at final report would indicate a descending deviation, or any of a number of other possibilities. Oh what a tangled web.....
Will
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CONF iture;
My reference to "not relevant or desirable" was my assumption that the BEA had not determined why the a/c was at some level other than the cleared level of FL350. If so, it could have been the reason they have chosen not to mention it. On the other-hand the a/c could have still been at FL350, and until that information is released, we will not know one way or the other. My only concern, is that it is sometimes not in the best interest of an investigation to promote something as fact, when there could be another reason for the position/FL being transmitted in the form that it presumably was, i.e. the data validity could be in questionable.
Hopefully, time will tell, but in the meantime anything said in this thread regarding the 02:10:34 position is speculation - nothing more.
mm43
I really don’t see that kind of info as "irrelevant"
Also, what do you mean by "not desirable to be released" ?
Would you give an example ?
Also, what do you mean by "not desirable to be released" ?
Would you give an example ?
Hopefully, time will tell, but in the meantime anything said in this thread regarding the 02:10:34 position is speculation - nothing more.
mm43
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mm43
Bear with me please. The plot of the last reported position is connected to the previous reported position with a straight line. Is such a line from BEA?
Because that would mean they had determined the course between positions was straight. Fair enough, but what if the 3nm discrepancy West was a sharpish turn made in the last few miles before LRP? Do we know this? Also because I don't see how anyone would know the route, the points yes, but not the route. The originator of the straight course line has some explaining to do, whomever it was. Yes?? In other words, isn't the straight course line speculation? If not, and it is accurate, it means the crew started diverting at the previous course report.
Will
Bear with me please. The plot of the last reported position is connected to the previous reported position with a straight line. Is such a line from BEA?
Because that would mean they had determined the course between positions was straight. Fair enough, but what if the 3nm discrepancy West was a sharpish turn made in the last few miles before LRP? Do we know this? Also because I don't see how anyone would know the route, the points yes, but not the route. The originator of the straight course line has some explaining to do, whomever it was. Yes?? In other words, isn't the straight course line speculation? If not, and it is accurate, it means the crew started diverting at the previous course report.
Will
Last edited by Will Fraser; 15th Jul 2009 at 04:11.
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CONF iture,
Irrelevant or not it appears there is another serious lack in the ACARS messages reports that I mentioned before. If you look at page 46 (adobe acrobat page 47) of the English report you will see the table of ACARS messages WITH the position report at 02:10:34 interspersed with the other messages. It shows latitude and longitude and no altitude.
This simple minded crazed cyberunit, therefore, draws the conclusion that for some reason unknown to rational people the altitude was left out of the ACARS messages (or somebody is hiding something.)
JD-EE
Would the FL be different from 350 at that last position, it is an absolute crucial information that would have to be mentioned.
This simple minded crazed cyberunit, therefore, draws the conclusion that for some reason unknown to rational people the altitude was left out of the ACARS messages (or somebody is hiding something.)
JD-EE
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Why would a rational person put altitude in an ACARS message when they're paying by the byte? In normal circumstances the airline wants to know where their planes are, not how high.
Will,
Fact is design probability targets and statistics don't automatically agree.
I don't think the Pitots are framed correctly here, as I have said, to pin all Ua/s on freezing pitots (three at a time), stretches credulity.
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Pitot
RE: DJ77 (#3589)
Thank you for your explanation. So its not icing, but still the only known problem with these probes (as far as I know) is the drainage, and apparently its not easy to solve.
The BEA Interim report mentions that the probes are inspected and cleaned at C-checks. Does anyone know the frequency of C-checks?
regards,
HN39
Thank you for your explanation. So its not icing, but still the only known problem with these probes (as far as I know) is the drainage, and apparently its not easy to solve.
The BEA Interim report mentions that the probes are inspected and cleaned at C-checks. Does anyone know the frequency of C-checks?
regards,
HN39
For Robin42 & GB
"This made me to think about why Air France proposed that a lightning strike might have brought down the plane in the first place. Shortly afterwards they even speculated about a general power failure. I still think this was a honest statement originating from their maintenance engineers pondering the ACARS pattern"
& "
Robin42, there is also the TCAS Fail report, which BEA could not explain.
GB""
Can I just ask you guys what would happen if 447 took a lighting strike on the left had side on or neat the pitot tubes. All being well, the strike should dissipate itself around the aircraft, but could the electricty travel around the circuits in the nose rendering a few of the to reset themselves or blowing fuses. Just asking to clarify any situation that may have arisen.
"This made me to think about why Air France proposed that a lightning strike might have brought down the plane in the first place. Shortly afterwards they even speculated about a general power failure. I still think this was a honest statement originating from their maintenance engineers pondering the ACARS pattern"
& "
Robin42, there is also the TCAS Fail report, which BEA could not explain.
GB""
Can I just ask you guys what would happen if 447 took a lighting strike on the left had side on or neat the pitot tubes. All being well, the strike should dissipate itself around the aircraft, but could the electricty travel around the circuits in the nose rendering a few of the to reset themselves or blowing fuses. Just asking to clarify any situation that may have arisen.