AF447
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: UK
Posts: 24
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BOAC
We do know their track and had they continued on track have a good idea where they would have gone. We would also seem to suppose that the last reported position supports the idea that they did not deviate from track, although none can say this for sure, it is not an unreasonable assumption especially as following aircraft heard nothing from them at all and a deviation is usually announced as a courtesy to others, of whom there were several who found deviation an appropriate exercise.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Paris
Posts: 691
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
DJ777:
Wx deviations ?
Precise calculations using the last ACARS position message coordinates (as reported by BEA) show that the crosstrack error (XTK) was 2.95 nm left of UN873 centerline.
Examination of the messages reception times and precedence, assuming equal transmission times, exclude the possibility that the a/c was on track and on course when the AP disconnected.
This can neither be explained by assuming they were using a tactical route offset since these offsets are only allowed right of track.
Hence, I tend to believe there is a strong clue that weather deviations had been in progress when the first cockpit alarms occured.
Wx deviations ?
Precise calculations using the last ACARS position message coordinates (as reported by BEA) show that the crosstrack error (XTK) was 2.95 nm left of UN873 centerline.
Examination of the messages reception times and precedence, assuming equal transmission times, exclude the possibility that the a/c was on track and on course when the AP disconnected.
This can neither be explained by assuming they were using a tactical route offset since these offsets are only allowed right of track.
Hence, I tend to believe there is a strong clue that weather deviations had been in progress when the first cockpit alarms occured.
If you were using Google-earth for the calculation, as I did two weeks ago, you will notice that the flight plan "flat line" and the flight plan "at altitude (35,000 ft or 10,670 m)" is somewhat slightly moving to the west, making a 2.68 NM separation from the "flight plan center line". The last positional report (2.98, -30.59) is taken from the aircraft GPS which also may be rounded for ACARS sendings and could be affected by another error margin added to GPS one. The other positions (0200, 0150, 0140) that I reported are extracted from BEA reconstructed flight plan as the real coordinates are still waiting to be published yet.
Looking at the map I did from the Meteosat-9 image, which was part of the preliminary documents (6 June) from Météo France in BEA site, one may notice that the 0210 event is taking place exactly where the top of the CB was the coldest at 0208 (then the highest) but nobody can say for sure how it was pictured by the radar below @ FL350. From the last BEA report, it is described that this image was the situation at 0208 instead of 0215 because the area pictured was scanned at this time:
One may look also at the CB animations made by Météo-France and notice that before departure time and during meteo briefing, this CB wasn't formed:
- Les conditions météo dans la ZCIT vues par Meteosat
(infrarouge, du 30 mai 0h TU au 4 juin 0h TU);
=> Hourly meteo map animation:30.05.09, 00.00 to 04.06.09, 00.00:
- Zoom du 1er juin de 0h à 3h45 TU:
=> 1/4 hour meteo map animation: 01.06.09, 00.00 to 01.06.09, 03.45:
S~
Olivier
Last edited by takata; 4th Jul 2009 at 13:35. Reason: typo
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Paris
Posts: 691
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
tubby linton:
One thing that has been puzzling me in the list of failure messages from the aircraft is the reference to FPV flags on both PFD. and no mention of FD flags.
One thing that has been puzzling me in the list of failure messages from the aircraft is the reference to FPV flags on both PFD. and no mention of FD flags.
It seems to me that both FD were flaged on both PFD respectively at 02.11.00 and 02.11.15 one minute before the FPV flags (02.12.10 and 02.12.16). No?
S~
Olivier
If you were using Google-earth for the calculation, as I did two weeks ago, you will notice that the flight plan "flat line" and the flight plan "at altitude (35,000 ft or 10,670 m)" is somewhat slightly moving to the west, making a 2.68 NM separation from the "flight plan center line".
I used the official coordinates of the waypoints, the BEA published position received at 0210Z (2.98, -30.59) and Sodano's formulas witch are, I remember reading somewhere, the recommended formulas to use with navigation computers and WGS84.
About satellite weather images, I just understand they are no to be taken as snapshots, so I won't imply anything unless I learn more. However, I think we can see on your map where the following LH flight crossed through the storm.
DJ
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Somewhere out there
Age: 39
Posts: 65
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Juggle Dan,
The link on my previous post is the report to Dakar, that BEA said did not happen...
The link on my previous post is the report to Dakar, that BEA said did not happen...
Juggle Dan seems to express an acknowledgment it did indeed happen.
Brazil on its side has to admit that there are some officials - "Joe Bean", for instance - that could let all the stuff to the pros downstream instead of showing up personally in live tv with an eye at voting ballots.
You can see that after that episode the airforce and navy officials dealt with the problem in a much more professional way.
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: us
Posts: 694
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Three more images.
The first is the meteorological data reported by EU0046, which had AMDAR installed. AMDAR reports basic meteorology every seven or eight minutes. EU0046 flew through this thunderstorm complex about 30 minutes prior to AF447, at 32,500 feet. (To me, the track looks to be a bit to the left of AF447.) BEA and France Meteo have superimposed the track of EU0046 as of 0206 hours on the satellite image for 0152 hours. As I read the explanation en francais, the text in the box is representative of the CB at 0144 at that position. "La position de l’observation la plus représentative de l’amas est celle de 1 h 44 TU matérialisée par un carré"
(I am guessing that EU is LAN Ecuador.) The BEA report states that BEA has not completed its interviews with the crews of flights other than IB, LH, and AF that flew this route that night, so there presumably will be further reports of actions taken (deviations) or not taken.
The second image is duration of the coldest temperatures at the top of the CB complex. The abscissa is time from 0007 to 0207. The ordinate is temp in C.
The third image is the areal extent of various temperature levels within thin the CB complex. The ordinate is 1000 sq km, the abscissa is time from 0007 to 0207.
The first is the meteorological data reported by EU0046, which had AMDAR installed. AMDAR reports basic meteorology every seven or eight minutes. EU0046 flew through this thunderstorm complex about 30 minutes prior to AF447, at 32,500 feet. (To me, the track looks to be a bit to the left of AF447.) BEA and France Meteo have superimposed the track of EU0046 as of 0206 hours on the satellite image for 0152 hours. As I read the explanation en francais, the text in the box is representative of the CB at 0144 at that position. "La position de l’observation la plus représentative de l’amas est celle de 1 h 44 TU matérialisée par un carré"
(I am guessing that EU is LAN Ecuador.) The BEA report states that BEA has not completed its interviews with the crews of flights other than IB, LH, and AF that flew this route that night, so there presumably will be further reports of actions taken (deviations) or not taken.
The second image is duration of the coldest temperatures at the top of the CB complex. The abscissa is time from 0007 to 0207. The ordinate is temp in C.
The third image is the areal extent of various temperature levels within thin the CB complex. The ordinate is 1000 sq km, the abscissa is time from 0007 to 0207.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Subterranea
Age: 70
Posts: 187
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Equally, who would have recognized a flat spin anyway - would the instruments tell you? How would today's AHRS electronic instrument sensors translate the forces of a spin? It used to be that the only dependable clues were the slip indicator and the rate of turn indicator (turn & bank) and airspeed...
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Paris
Posts: 691
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
France-Brazil
Rob2: To clarify
The link on my previous post is the report to Dakar, that BEA said did not happen...
The link on my previous post is the report to Dakar, that BEA said did not happen...
Then, the clarification should be much more detailed than that as, again, I'm suspecting some bad translations and press fuzz over everyone declarations considering what the BEA actually said.
1. Brazilian ATC transcripts are part of the BEA report, Annexe 3, pages 98-101, French document. This brazilian tape dialog is in the BEA report. Then, the BEA can't claim this dialog doesn't exist when it is printed in its report, right?
2. Origin of misunderstanding:
a) Brazilian ATC, for unknow reason(s) under investigation, forget to include DAKAR ATC when the flight plan was dispatched to all concerned air controls, but DAKAR (GOOO) was rightly inserted in the flight plan delivered by Air France to Brazilian ATC.
b) As a consequence of a), DAKAR ATC could not create AF447 on its system because they lacked the informations (like aircraft immatriculation, codes, etc.). After Brazilian calls, DAKAR created manualy this flight on their system, but without the necessary flight plan informations.
c) As a consequence of b), AF447 ASD-C could not logon to DAKAR and was rejected at 0133, 0135 & 0201. At the same time, DAKAR radio problems (confirmed by other flights) prevented that any contact could be made between DAKAR ATC and AF447.
d) as a consequence of c), no contact being ever made between DAKAR ATC and AF 447 meant that no official transfer existed between Brazilian and Senegalese controls. The Brazilian control was still in charge of the flight until the flight could make a contact with its next ATC.
3. It doesn't mean that ATLANTICO didn't give DAKAR AF447 estimated time to TASIL with speed and altitude.
S~
Olivier
Last edited by takata; 4th Jul 2009 at 16:16. Reason: error removed
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Chelan, WA
Age: 48
Posts: 43
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by lomapaseo
I say again, don't get too wrapped up in simplified theories about pitot tubes.
"This problem has been known for 15 years" is something that gets repeated a lot, but even granting such a point (and IMO the problem has been known for a lot longer), in 15 years, it has not resulted in a problem similar to this one.
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: us
Posts: 694
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
takata, I see no reference that Atlantico asked AF447 to contact Dakar.
01:35:15 AF447 -AIR FRANCE FOUR FOUR SEVEN, by checking INTOL zero one three three, level three five zero, SALPU zero one four eight, next ORARO zero two zero zero, selcall check Charlie Papa Hotel Quebec.
01:35:38 Atlantico Acionamento do código SELCALL
01:35:43 AF447 -AIR FRANCE FOUR FOUR SEVEN, thank you. [This is the last radio communication from the crew.]
01:35:46 Atlantico -Welcome, maintaing flight level three five zero,
say your estimate TASIL?
01:35:53 Atlantico -Say your estimate TASIL?
01:35:59 Atlantico -AIR FRANCE FOUR FOUR SEVEN estimate TASIL?
01:36:14 Atlantico -AIR FRANCE FOUR FOUR SEVEN say your estimate
TASIL? [This is Atlantico's last attempt to communicate with AF 447.]
Dakar apparently made no attempt to contact AF447 before 0354, when Dakar told Cape Verde it would attempt to contact. It appears that Dakar actually made no such attempt, because Cape Verde subsequently asked Dakar at 0408 where was AF447? and Dakar then asked AF0459 to try and contact AF447. (One has to wonder about the capability of Dakar control.) The BEA report acknowledges that the record is still fragmentary, but the published record includes no information of an attempt by Dakar to establish radio contact with the crew.
AF447 did not provide an estimate for Tasil in the selcall message,and did not reply to subsequent requests from Atlantico for the estimate. Were they considering a deviation after Oraro, and thus re-estimating Tasil? Aside from the SIGMETS, at 0031 dispatch sent the following message:
“BONJOUR AF447
METEO EN ROUTE SAILOR :
o PHOTO SAT DE 0000Z : CONVECTION ZCIT SALPU/TASIL
o PREVI CAT : NIL
SLTS DISPATCH”,
01:35:15 AF447 -AIR FRANCE FOUR FOUR SEVEN, by checking INTOL zero one three three, level three five zero, SALPU zero one four eight, next ORARO zero two zero zero, selcall check Charlie Papa Hotel Quebec.
01:35:38 Atlantico Acionamento do código SELCALL
01:35:43 AF447 -AIR FRANCE FOUR FOUR SEVEN, thank you. [This is the last radio communication from the crew.]
01:35:46 Atlantico -Welcome, maintaing flight level three five zero,
say your estimate TASIL?
01:35:53 Atlantico -Say your estimate TASIL?
01:35:59 Atlantico -AIR FRANCE FOUR FOUR SEVEN estimate TASIL?
01:36:14 Atlantico -AIR FRANCE FOUR FOUR SEVEN say your estimate
TASIL? [This is Atlantico's last attempt to communicate with AF 447.]
Dakar apparently made no attempt to contact AF447 before 0354, when Dakar told Cape Verde it would attempt to contact. It appears that Dakar actually made no such attempt, because Cape Verde subsequently asked Dakar at 0408 where was AF447? and Dakar then asked AF0459 to try and contact AF447. (One has to wonder about the capability of Dakar control.) The BEA report acknowledges that the record is still fragmentary, but the published record includes no information of an attempt by Dakar to establish radio contact with the crew.
AF447 did not provide an estimate for Tasil in the selcall message,and did not reply to subsequent requests from Atlantico for the estimate. Were they considering a deviation after Oraro, and thus re-estimating Tasil? Aside from the SIGMETS, at 0031 dispatch sent the following message:
“BONJOUR AF447
METEO EN ROUTE SAILOR :
o PHOTO SAT DE 0000Z : CONVECTION ZCIT SALPU/TASIL
o PREVI CAT : NIL
SLTS DISPATCH”,
Last edited by SaturnV; 4th Jul 2009 at 15:55.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Somewhere out there
Age: 39
Posts: 65
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
clarifications...
a) Brazilian ATC, for unknow reason(s) under investigation, forget to include DAKAR ATC when the flight plan was dispatched to all concerned air controls, but DAKAR (GOOO) was rightly inserted in the flight plan delivered by Air France to Brazilian ATC.
b) The FAB also states that there is an agreement between Brazil and Senegal providing that after three minutes from the estimated time for a given a/c to enter the area under DAKAR jurisdiction from the Brazilian one and vice-versa, the control is considered to be transfered to that jurisdiction without any further communication. And as DAKAR ATC didn't seek any information from ATLANTICO long after that estimated time the flight already was, officially, under DAKAR FIR control.
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: UK
Posts: 24
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Green Dot
"from instrument indications, due to loads, the crew on the flight deck would have been thrown violently forward and to the left or right, depending on direction of the flat spin. Perhaps unable to move at all for periods of time if the rate of spin was high enough."
Why all the violence? Surely there is enough in the turbulance to satisfy your worst nightmare? In a spin the bigger the airplane the less violently it behaves - to a point and, by the way, centrifugal force builds in a flat spin with both wingtips pulling towards the horizon, which is why it is a spin and not a continuing roll.
If you think about what you wrote there is little difference between what you say and what might be found in severe turbulance - I might submit that you could stall an airliner and enter a spin, in conditions of severe turbulance, without even noticing any change to your discomfort and the real point is that there is little, if anything, that will tell you something else has happened - except, perhaps, systems will start shutting down.... including engines, at the high angles of attack associated with the situation. So it is not impossible that some of this might be passed along via ACARS and much of it... not.
Ciao
Why all the violence? Surely there is enough in the turbulance to satisfy your worst nightmare? In a spin the bigger the airplane the less violently it behaves - to a point and, by the way, centrifugal force builds in a flat spin with both wingtips pulling towards the horizon, which is why it is a spin and not a continuing roll.
If you think about what you wrote there is little difference between what you say and what might be found in severe turbulance - I might submit that you could stall an airliner and enter a spin, in conditions of severe turbulance, without even noticing any change to your discomfort and the real point is that there is little, if anything, that will tell you something else has happened - except, perhaps, systems will start shutting down.... including engines, at the high angles of attack associated with the situation. So it is not impossible that some of this might be passed along via ACARS and much of it... not.
Ciao
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Uruguay
Posts: 8
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Paris
Posts: 691
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SaturnV:
takata, I see no reference that Atlantico asked AF447 to contact Dakar.
takata, I see no reference that Atlantico asked AF447 to contact Dakar.
When one take a step back, this event happened in this area at the worst place possible. No radar coverage and exactly at the juncture of two ATC on separate continents with poor communications. I'm not blaming the Brazilian or Senegalese but this was not the best place to lose an aircraft for hours.
S~
Olivier
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: London
Posts: 45
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There has been some discussion about why the a/c appeared not to have diverted around the CB.
The Captain had carried out sixteen rotations in the South America sector since 2007 and the co pilot had performed 39 rotations on the South America sector since 2002. Both I think would be use to avoiding CBs.
I see that
It appears that there were no further voice communication after that time, only ASD-C and ACARS.
I wonder whether the problems they experienced may have started just after 1 h 35 min 43
The Captain had carried out sixteen rotations in the South America sector since 2007 and the co pilot had performed 39 rotations on the South America sector since 2002. Both I think would be use to avoiding CBs.
I see that
1.9.1. p 33
At 1 h 35 min 38 s, the ATLANTICO controller sent a SELCAL call.
At 1 h 35 min 43 s, the crew thanked the controller.
At 1 h 35 min 46 s, the controller asked them to maintain an altitude of FL350 and to give a
TASIL estimate.
Between 1 h 35 min 53 s and 1 h 36 min 14 s, the ATLANTICO controller asked the crew
three times for their estimated time passing the TASIL point. The crew did not answer.
At 1 h 35 min 38 s, the ATLANTICO controller sent a SELCAL call.
At 1 h 35 min 43 s, the crew thanked the controller.
At 1 h 35 min 46 s, the controller asked them to maintain an altitude of FL350 and to give a
TASIL estimate.
Between 1 h 35 min 53 s and 1 h 36 min 14 s, the ATLANTICO controller asked the crew
three times for their estimated time passing the TASIL point. The crew did not answer.
I wonder whether the problems they experienced may have started just after 1 h 35 min 43
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Paname
Age: 55
Posts: 21
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
France-Brazil (cont'd)
takata,
Thanks for correcting me. Indeed, the interim report fully details the various communications that took place, and I don't think the BEA is denying them in any way.
However, the interim report states that (English version p.32):
During the press conference, the BEA slides stated the following:
From the Journal du Dimanche (beware, French tabloid...), it seems that this point was strongly emphasized during the press conference:
From then on, the meaning was slightly changed from repetition to repetition, from copy to paste, and from translation to translation as below:
From then on, the saga could live a life on its own...
Thanks for correcting me. Indeed, the interim report fully details the various communications that took place, and I don't think the BEA is denying them in any way.
However, the interim report states that (English version p.32):
At 1 h 46, the DAKAR controller asked the ATLANTICO controller for further information regarding flight AF447 since he had no flight plan
No transfer from ATLANTICO to DAKAR
The aircraft was neither in contact with Dakar nor with Brazil, "said Alain Bouillard." This is obviously today among our major concerns and areas of investigation. We want to understand why it took so long between the last radio contact and the initiation of the search
Brazil ATC did not notify Senegal regarding flight 447
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Paris
Posts: 691
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
John47:
I wonder whether the problems they experienced may have started just after 1 h 35 min 43
I wonder whether the problems they experienced may have started just after 1 h 35 min 43
S~
Olivier
France-Brazil
The AF crew probably switched too quickly to selcall watch after it tested OK and did not hear the controller's request.
I wonder why the BEA report does not states whether Atlantico tried to raise AF447 on selcall, during or after their three unsuccessful attempts to get their TASIL estimate, or just dropped the concern.
I wonder why the BEA report does not states whether Atlantico tried to raise AF447 on selcall, during or after their three unsuccessful attempts to get their TASIL estimate, or just dropped the concern.
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: us
Posts: 694
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
DJ77, possibly because Atlantico was talking with Dakar at the time about AF447.
At 0135, Atlantico is giving Dakar AF447's flight plan including an estimate for Tasil at 0220. At 0135:45, Dakar says to Atlantico, "-Ok, call you back, please." At 0135:46, Atlantico replies, "-Ok, ok, no problem."
Dakar called Atlantico back at 0140, and created a virtual flight plan.
About 2 1/2 hours later, things get stirring in the various ATCs over the lack of contact with AF447, which by this time should be under control of Cape Verde ATC. The concern is initiated by Cape Verde, and as the printed transcript does not convey inflection, one can't say whether Cape Verde was a bit incredulous about Dakar's que sera que sera insouciance.
The BEA report contains this paragraph re: Dakar.
"At 5 h 09 min 15 s, the ATLANTICO controller asked the DAKAR controller if he had any news of flight AF447. The DAKAR controller replied that he hadn’t and then the ATLANTICO controller requested confirmation that the flight was already in the SAL FIR. The DAKAR controller replied: "yes, no worry". He also confirmed that SAL had not established contact with flight AF447."
At 0135, Atlantico is giving Dakar AF447's flight plan including an estimate for Tasil at 0220. At 0135:45, Dakar says to Atlantico, "-Ok, call you back, please." At 0135:46, Atlantico replies, "-Ok, ok, no problem."
Dakar called Atlantico back at 0140, and created a virtual flight plan.
About 2 1/2 hours later, things get stirring in the various ATCs over the lack of contact with AF447, which by this time should be under control of Cape Verde ATC. The concern is initiated by Cape Verde, and as the printed transcript does not convey inflection, one can't say whether Cape Verde was a bit incredulous about Dakar's que sera que sera insouciance.
The BEA report contains this paragraph re: Dakar.
"At 5 h 09 min 15 s, the ATLANTICO controller asked the DAKAR controller if he had any news of flight AF447. The DAKAR controller replied that he hadn’t and then the ATLANTICO controller requested confirmation that the flight was already in the SAL FIR. The DAKAR controller replied: "yes, no worry". He also confirmed that SAL had not established contact with flight AF447."
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Chelan, WA
Age: 48
Posts: 43
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Carjockey:
By carefully analysing the wreckage. However, this makes sense to a large extent. The previous choices were breakup in flight or high-angle, high-speed impact. A belly-first impact would show quite patterns in the aircraft debris.
Well I would like to believe that, but without benefit of CVR/FDR, just how did BEA establish this "fact"?