Airbus crash/training flight
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No news and no report yet.
Investigation (or data evaluation) still ongoing, perhaps a delay due to other investigations (AF 447, IY 626?)?
@ flyingphil: your statement:
"and this is what went wrong!
A test recommended at FL140 or higher that low and without any "special experience" related to this task"
is not correct.
FL140 is the maximum FL for this test, not the minimum recommended!!. Above this altitude the software prevents some automatic functions to be switched off by the pilot. But this "manual" flying is necessary to perform the stall test
Investigation (or data evaluation) still ongoing, perhaps a delay due to other investigations (AF 447, IY 626?)?
@ flyingphil: your statement:
"and this is what went wrong!
A test recommended at FL140 or higher that low and without any "special experience" related to this task"
is not correct.
FL140 is the maximum FL for this test, not the minimum recommended!!. Above this altitude the software prevents some automatic functions to be switched off by the pilot. But this "manual" flying is necessary to perform the stall test
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lomapaseo
It "protected" itself with its programmed limit, AoA and 'G' prox, perhaps disallowing a nose up that would have avoided contact with the sea, in spite of PF's commands.
Sorry if I sounded cryptic; I assumed that this popular myth (perhaps it is not one), would have been known by those who followed that tragic crash.
cheers, bear
It "protected" itself with its programmed limit, AoA and 'G' prox, perhaps disallowing a nose up that would have avoided contact with the sea, in spite of PF's commands.
Sorry if I sounded cryptic; I assumed that this popular myth (perhaps it is not one), would have been known by those who followed that tragic crash.
cheers, bear
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Bearfoil
Please explain how with the "programmed" limit of MAX alpha caused the impact. The pilot pulling more nose up would have resulted in a stall or an in and out of the buffet profile. If the nose had been raised more it still does not "kill" the ROD. There have been many display pilots killed thinking they were getting away with it because the nose was above the horizon! The aircraft impacted because there was insufficient ALTITUDE to recover. Perhaps due to a part of the "test" being carried out at an incorrect altitude.
Please explain how with the "programmed" limit of MAX alpha caused the impact. The pilot pulling more nose up would have resulted in a stall or an in and out of the buffet profile. If the nose had been raised more it still does not "kill" the ROD. There have been many display pilots killed thinking they were getting away with it because the nose was above the horizon! The aircraft impacted because there was insufficient ALTITUDE to recover. Perhaps due to a part of the "test" being carried out at an incorrect altitude.
Originally Posted by Bearfoil
Rumour only: The aircraft "protected" itself into the Ocean. allegedly.
(...)
It "protected" itself with its programmed limit, AoA and 'G' prox, perhaps disallowing a nose up that would have avoided contact with the sea, in spite of PF's commands.
(...)
It "protected" itself with its programmed limit, AoA and 'G' prox, perhaps disallowing a nose up that would have avoided contact with the sea, in spite of PF's commands.
If protections worked as planned, we wouldn't have this thread, there would be one more A320 flying around and there would be 7 men more in our ranks.
Both AoA inputs to flight control computers froze at 5° sometime into the flight and remained constant until the crash, which disabled AoA protection. While the aeroplane was slowing down (to test alpha prot), stab got stuck at full nose up deflection. Stall warning fired, crew recovered from first stall but due to stab position and TOGA:
Originally Posted by BEA interim report
At 15 h 45 min 44 s the maximum recorded values were: pitch 57 degrees, altitude 3,800 ft.
The speed was below 40 kt.
The speed was below 40 kt.
Issue was insufficient pitch authority, but not insufficient nose up due to AoA or G protections, rather it was insufficient nose-down due to stuck THS.
Hopefully, BEA will be able to answer how and why did it happen.
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Smilin Ed
The AP trimmed the THS as the speed reduced.
Clandestino
I don't recall it being established that the THS was "stuck" - all we know from the published FDR data is that it did not move after AP disengagement.
The AP trimmed the THS as the speed reduced.
Clandestino
I don't recall it being established that the THS was "stuck" - all we know from the published FDR data is that it did not move after AP disengagement.
Pardon my level 2 English and indiscriminate use of "stuck". You're correct, of course. I didn't mean to imply THS was mechanically stuck at full nose-up position.
When the aeroplane started tumbling, control law went to direct, which has no autotrim, therefore THS remained in last position before law switching, as expected. However, once the gear was up, law went to alternate, which has autotrim (except abnormal alternate, that disables it while the aeroplane is tumbling, but restores it once it gets upright), yet the THS maintained extreme position. I keep my fingers crossed for investigators to find out why.
When the aeroplane started tumbling, control law went to direct, which has no autotrim, therefore THS remained in last position before law switching, as expected. However, once the gear was up, law went to alternate, which has autotrim (except abnormal alternate, that disables it while the aeroplane is tumbling, but restores it once it gets upright), yet the THS maintained extreme position. I keep my fingers crossed for investigators to find out why.
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Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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I have not dug out the old thread, but is there now a suggestion that perhaps vents were blocked during painting? I recall surprise that such had not shown up earlier in the flight on the old thread.
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Human error more important than 2 blocked sensors?
Human error to blame for Air NZ crash - report
By Catherine Field
4:00 AM Wednesday Jun 30, 2010
Human error to blame for Air NZ crash - report - National - NZ Herald News
PARIS - Experts for French prosecutors probing the fatal crash of an Air New Zealand jet in November 2008 have agreed with air safety investigations which partially blame human error.
The experts say responsibility may also lie with two of the three sensors essential for the plane's computerised flying system, but further investigation is needed.
Their report was ordered by public prosecutors probing the crash of the Airbus A320 in which five New Zealanders and two Germans lost their lives off the French town of Perpignan.
The specialists said the plane was flying at too low an altitude to carry out a low speed test, a finding which was separately reached last year by France's air safety board, the Bureau d'Enquetes et Analyses (BEA).
"There was a manoeuvre....at an altitude which was far too low," state prosecutor Jean-Pierre Dreno told the Herald after receiving the report. "Further investigation" is needed with regard to the sensors, he said.
At a press conference in Perpignan, deputy prosecutor Dominique Alzaeri said it could not be ruled out that the 'jamming of the sensors' may connected to cleaning work carried out the day before.
Dreno said no decision had yet been made about any criminal prosecutions as a result of the disaster.
"Lawyers from other parties such as Air New Zealand and other parties involved have been asked to give their points of view," he said. "We are not yet at the stage where we can give an answer to that question."
One of the air safety investigators involved in the crash probe told the Herald that there are many aspects surrounding the crash which need to be examined, including which of the systems were not functioning and the decisions made by the crew. 'It was a test flight checking the low speed alert system at a very low altitude which is not consistent with that type of flight,' he said.
The crash occurred off France's Mediterranean coast at 4:46 pm on November 27 2008. It cost the lives of five New Zealanders and two Germans. They were testing the twin-engine airliner before it was to be handed back to Air New Zealand by XL Airways Germany, a charter company that had leased the craft.
The five New Zealanders were Captain Brian Horrell, 52, from Auckland; engineers Murray White, 37, also from Auckland, Michael Gyles, 49, and Noel Marsh, 35, both from Christchurch; and Jeremy Cook, 58, an airworthiness inspector from Wellington. The German pair were Captain Norbert Kaeppel, 51, and co-pilot Theodor Ketzer, 58, both from the Frankfurt region.
The BEA's preliminary report in February 2009 prompted the introduction of a range of new safety guidelines for non-revenue flights (flights without passengers). The BEA described the critical moments when the plane, flown by two Germans but under the instructions of an Air New Zealand pilot, began a test to assess the plane's recovery from low speed, at an altitude of 3,000 feet (925 metres).
As the speed fell swiftly from 136 knots (238 kph) to 99 knots (173 kph), the craft pitched and rolled violently while an automatic stall warning sounded. Just 96 seconds from the test's start, despite frantic efforts by the German pilot to regain control, the Airbus smashed nose-first into the sea at an angle of 14 degrees at 263 knots (486 kph).
The BEA recommended that prior to such non-revenue flights civil aviation authorities ensure "the qualifications and training of crews" for carrying out such manoeuvres and called for new rules to ensure flight plans and schedules of tests be filed and approved before take off. The report noted that the German crew had not received "any specific training" for the test flight, although the Air New Zealand pilot had undertaken sessions on a training simulator. Many airlines have pilots who are specially trained to conduct test flights after maintenance and are aware of the possible 'glitches' in the plane's operations.
In September 2009 Airbus Industries introduced a new training programme specifically designed to provide additional training for pilots on technical flights.
In January 2009, the A 320's makers, Airbus, issued a safety recommendation to its entire roster of 218 customers. It warned them not to obscure the sensors during paintwork and reminded them that test flights should be conducted safely and low-speed manoeuvres should not be conducted at low height.
Dreno's remarks come a day after a meeting in Perpignan for the parties involved in the tragedy. Among those present were the two judge d'instruction, Perpignan prosecutor Jean-Pierre Dreno, Air New Zealand chief executive Rob Fyfe and the general manager airline operations and safety, Captain David Morgan.
The BEA's final report into the crash is expected to be issued later this year after being reviewed by all interested parties.
By Catherine Field
View: The Air NZ A320 crash Photos The Air NZ A320 crash (29 pics)
By Catherine Field
4:00 AM Wednesday Jun 30, 2010
Human error to blame for Air NZ crash - report - National - NZ Herald News
PARIS - Experts for French prosecutors probing the fatal crash of an Air New Zealand jet in November 2008 have agreed with air safety investigations which partially blame human error.
The experts say responsibility may also lie with two of the three sensors essential for the plane's computerised flying system, but further investigation is needed.
Their report was ordered by public prosecutors probing the crash of the Airbus A320 in which five New Zealanders and two Germans lost their lives off the French town of Perpignan.
The specialists said the plane was flying at too low an altitude to carry out a low speed test, a finding which was separately reached last year by France's air safety board, the Bureau d'Enquetes et Analyses (BEA).
"There was a manoeuvre....at an altitude which was far too low," state prosecutor Jean-Pierre Dreno told the Herald after receiving the report. "Further investigation" is needed with regard to the sensors, he said.
At a press conference in Perpignan, deputy prosecutor Dominique Alzaeri said it could not be ruled out that the 'jamming of the sensors' may connected to cleaning work carried out the day before.
Dreno said no decision had yet been made about any criminal prosecutions as a result of the disaster.
"Lawyers from other parties such as Air New Zealand and other parties involved have been asked to give their points of view," he said. "We are not yet at the stage where we can give an answer to that question."
One of the air safety investigators involved in the crash probe told the Herald that there are many aspects surrounding the crash which need to be examined, including which of the systems were not functioning and the decisions made by the crew. 'It was a test flight checking the low speed alert system at a very low altitude which is not consistent with that type of flight,' he said.
The crash occurred off France's Mediterranean coast at 4:46 pm on November 27 2008. It cost the lives of five New Zealanders and two Germans. They were testing the twin-engine airliner before it was to be handed back to Air New Zealand by XL Airways Germany, a charter company that had leased the craft.
The five New Zealanders were Captain Brian Horrell, 52, from Auckland; engineers Murray White, 37, also from Auckland, Michael Gyles, 49, and Noel Marsh, 35, both from Christchurch; and Jeremy Cook, 58, an airworthiness inspector from Wellington. The German pair were Captain Norbert Kaeppel, 51, and co-pilot Theodor Ketzer, 58, both from the Frankfurt region.
The BEA's preliminary report in February 2009 prompted the introduction of a range of new safety guidelines for non-revenue flights (flights without passengers). The BEA described the critical moments when the plane, flown by two Germans but under the instructions of an Air New Zealand pilot, began a test to assess the plane's recovery from low speed, at an altitude of 3,000 feet (925 metres).
As the speed fell swiftly from 136 knots (238 kph) to 99 knots (173 kph), the craft pitched and rolled violently while an automatic stall warning sounded. Just 96 seconds from the test's start, despite frantic efforts by the German pilot to regain control, the Airbus smashed nose-first into the sea at an angle of 14 degrees at 263 knots (486 kph).
The BEA recommended that prior to such non-revenue flights civil aviation authorities ensure "the qualifications and training of crews" for carrying out such manoeuvres and called for new rules to ensure flight plans and schedules of tests be filed and approved before take off. The report noted that the German crew had not received "any specific training" for the test flight, although the Air New Zealand pilot had undertaken sessions on a training simulator. Many airlines have pilots who are specially trained to conduct test flights after maintenance and are aware of the possible 'glitches' in the plane's operations.
In September 2009 Airbus Industries introduced a new training programme specifically designed to provide additional training for pilots on technical flights.
In January 2009, the A 320's makers, Airbus, issued a safety recommendation to its entire roster of 218 customers. It warned them not to obscure the sensors during paintwork and reminded them that test flights should be conducted safely and low-speed manoeuvres should not be conducted at low height.
Dreno's remarks come a day after a meeting in Perpignan for the parties involved in the tragedy. Among those present were the two judge d'instruction, Perpignan prosecutor Jean-Pierre Dreno, Air New Zealand chief executive Rob Fyfe and the general manager airline operations and safety, Captain David Morgan.
The BEA's final report into the crash is expected to be issued later this year after being reviewed by all interested parties.
By Catherine Field
View: The Air NZ A320 crash Photos The Air NZ A320 crash (29 pics)
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"I think it was the "she'll be right", "mend and make do", "No 8 wire and binder-twine" can-do attitude that sadly led to this tragedy"
What a load of drivel.
What a load of drivel.
Last edited by Ford Transit; 29th Jun 2010 at 22:47.
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to Oleo
"Personally I think the fault lies with the individuals on board and the culture at AirNZ,"
Perhaps it is worth reminding you ( and indeed all the other people who keep referring to this as an Air New Zealand crash ) that this was NOT an Air New Zealand flight , it was an XL Airways flight of an NZ aircraft prior to returning the aircraft to NZ - it was being flown by XL Airways crew who surely ought to have been able to say "No" to any requests by the Air NZ observers on board if they thought it was compromising safety .
"Personally I think the fault lies with the individuals on board and the culture at AirNZ,"
Perhaps it is worth reminding you ( and indeed all the other people who keep referring to this as an Air New Zealand crash ) that this was NOT an Air New Zealand flight , it was an XL Airways flight of an NZ aircraft prior to returning the aircraft to NZ - it was being flown by XL Airways crew who surely ought to have been able to say "No" to any requests by the Air NZ observers on board if they thought it was compromising safety .
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Air NZ crash ruling 'superficial'
Air NZ crash ruling 'superficial'
Air NZ crash ruling 'superficial' | Stuff.co.nz
By MICHAEL FIELD - Stuff
A ruling by French prosecutors that an Air New Zealand crash was pilot error, is superficial and unreasonable, one of New Zealand's leading forensic engineers and independent air accident investigators says.
Seven people died when the Air New Zealand Airbus A320, in the process of being handed over from a charter to German carrier XL Air, crashed into the Mediterranean off Canet-en-Roussillon in the South of France on November 27, 2008, killing five New Zealanders and two Germans.
Private accident investigator Andrew McGregor of Auckland based Prosolve Ltd, says the French investigations to date are alarming for what they missed.
"It is easy to blame the pilot, but I would delve a bit deeper and suggest that humans often get the blame over a machine," he said, adding that the human error could be the result of a systemic issue in the Airbus operating system rather than with the crews of individual planes.
A criminal manslaughter investigation has been underway in France along with a formal crash investigation by the Paris-based Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses (BEA).
Yesterday a French deputy prosecutor, Dominique Alzeari, told a press conference in Perpignan that based on their assessment of the BEA's preliminary report the Airbus had performed "an inappropriate test, in unsuitable conditions, with a manoeuvre carried out in an unprepared manner, which made it all the more perilous."
A decision by German pilots Norbert Kaeppel, 51, and co-pilot Theodor Ketzer, 58, monitored by Air New Zealand Captain Brian Horrell, 52, was termed "human error".
The French judicial report, written by aviation legal expert and pilot Claudine Oosterlinck, said that when the plane was at 600 metres and stalling, the pilots opened the throttle.
The plane remained unstable and climbed almost vertically 300 metres before diving over 1000 metres and hit the sea at about 500kmh 20 seconds later.
Mr Alzeari said the accident was not due to the aircraft design, nor to the regular maintenance which was overseen by the Airbus company.
"It was an aircraft that was working properly and was correctly maintained and its design was not called into question by the investigators."
He noted that the aircraft had been repainted just before the flight by Perpignan's Europe Aero Services Industries (EAS).
When it left EAS two of three external sensors essential for the plane's computerised flying system might also be partly to blame for the crash.
Two of the three sensors were not working and thus the excessive pitching "could not be corrected by the electronic brain of the aircraft," he said.
That could be "linked to cleaning operations" on the plane the day before the crash, but he said that "the accident is not due to a maintenance or design problem of the aircraft."
Aviation industry insiders, some with senior Air New Zealand connections but who wished to remain nameless, have suggested that French investigators were always anxious to blame foreign crews while clearing the French manufactured Airbus and the French maintenance firm.
Mr McGregor said the preliminary BEA report was superficial and did not address many aspects which normally feature in a comprehensive international air accident report. Often such accidents can be caused by a whole series of defense breaches and it is not always possible to determine a primary cause.
Despite implicating the pilot and the low flying, there was no evidence in the judicial or BEA statements as to why the plane had failed and crashed.
"There appears to be a lot of criticism about the pilots not conducting the flight tests at 10,000 feet instead of 3000 feet, and this may be a fair criticism," he said.
"But what we don't know is that if they had conducted it at 10,000 feet, whether or not the crash would still have occurred, because we don't have sufficient information.
"We don't know whether an extra 7000 feet would have been enough for them to recover if the same problem occurred."
He said he would want to understand what caused the loss of control because the information available suggested it was not simply a case of being at low level.
"I am not convinced that that was the cause of the loss of control. We don't know why the pilots lost control. It is unlikely to be a lack of skill; they were quite experienced."
He said it was clear the pilots were all highly experienced.
"It is pretty hard to blame the pilots and give credit to the machine with that kind of experience onboard."
Airbus has a highly computer-controlled aircraft and Mr McGregor said investigators should be looking at the man-machine interface.
He said there was no evidence the French had used the FDR and CVR to simulate the accident flight on an Airbus simulator.
"What I would do in the simulator is put myself in the shoes of the pilot and try and replicate what he did and note the problems and issues he experienced along the way, without benefit of hindsight," The preliminary BEA report does not mention this being addressed.
Mr McGregor said his views on superficiality of the preliminary BEA report was shared among many in the aviation and investigation community.
Human error may rest not with the pilot, but with others such as those who designed the aircraft.
"It may be a systemic error, something deeper than an individual pilot making a mistake.
"There maybe a systemic problem affecting all these machines."
Mr McGregor said the question of possible faulty sensors had not been properly considered by the French BEA preliminary report.
"We need to hold judgment. It is unfortunate that the preliminary report isn't more comprehensive than it is," he said.
"We don't know very much at the moment."
Air NZ crash ruling 'superficial' | Stuff.co.nz
By MICHAEL FIELD - Stuff
A ruling by French prosecutors that an Air New Zealand crash was pilot error, is superficial and unreasonable, one of New Zealand's leading forensic engineers and independent air accident investigators says.
Seven people died when the Air New Zealand Airbus A320, in the process of being handed over from a charter to German carrier XL Air, crashed into the Mediterranean off Canet-en-Roussillon in the South of France on November 27, 2008, killing five New Zealanders and two Germans.
Private accident investigator Andrew McGregor of Auckland based Prosolve Ltd, says the French investigations to date are alarming for what they missed.
"It is easy to blame the pilot, but I would delve a bit deeper and suggest that humans often get the blame over a machine," he said, adding that the human error could be the result of a systemic issue in the Airbus operating system rather than with the crews of individual planes.
A criminal manslaughter investigation has been underway in France along with a formal crash investigation by the Paris-based Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses (BEA).
Yesterday a French deputy prosecutor, Dominique Alzeari, told a press conference in Perpignan that based on their assessment of the BEA's preliminary report the Airbus had performed "an inappropriate test, in unsuitable conditions, with a manoeuvre carried out in an unprepared manner, which made it all the more perilous."
A decision by German pilots Norbert Kaeppel, 51, and co-pilot Theodor Ketzer, 58, monitored by Air New Zealand Captain Brian Horrell, 52, was termed "human error".
The French judicial report, written by aviation legal expert and pilot Claudine Oosterlinck, said that when the plane was at 600 metres and stalling, the pilots opened the throttle.
The plane remained unstable and climbed almost vertically 300 metres before diving over 1000 metres and hit the sea at about 500kmh 20 seconds later.
Mr Alzeari said the accident was not due to the aircraft design, nor to the regular maintenance which was overseen by the Airbus company.
"It was an aircraft that was working properly and was correctly maintained and its design was not called into question by the investigators."
He noted that the aircraft had been repainted just before the flight by Perpignan's Europe Aero Services Industries (EAS).
When it left EAS two of three external sensors essential for the plane's computerised flying system might also be partly to blame for the crash.
Two of the three sensors were not working and thus the excessive pitching "could not be corrected by the electronic brain of the aircraft," he said.
That could be "linked to cleaning operations" on the plane the day before the crash, but he said that "the accident is not due to a maintenance or design problem of the aircraft."
Aviation industry insiders, some with senior Air New Zealand connections but who wished to remain nameless, have suggested that French investigators were always anxious to blame foreign crews while clearing the French manufactured Airbus and the French maintenance firm.
Mr McGregor said the preliminary BEA report was superficial and did not address many aspects which normally feature in a comprehensive international air accident report. Often such accidents can be caused by a whole series of defense breaches and it is not always possible to determine a primary cause.
Despite implicating the pilot and the low flying, there was no evidence in the judicial or BEA statements as to why the plane had failed and crashed.
"There appears to be a lot of criticism about the pilots not conducting the flight tests at 10,000 feet instead of 3000 feet, and this may be a fair criticism," he said.
"But what we don't know is that if they had conducted it at 10,000 feet, whether or not the crash would still have occurred, because we don't have sufficient information.
"We don't know whether an extra 7000 feet would have been enough for them to recover if the same problem occurred."
He said he would want to understand what caused the loss of control because the information available suggested it was not simply a case of being at low level.
"I am not convinced that that was the cause of the loss of control. We don't know why the pilots lost control. It is unlikely to be a lack of skill; they were quite experienced."
He said it was clear the pilots were all highly experienced.
"It is pretty hard to blame the pilots and give credit to the machine with that kind of experience onboard."
Airbus has a highly computer-controlled aircraft and Mr McGregor said investigators should be looking at the man-machine interface.
He said there was no evidence the French had used the FDR and CVR to simulate the accident flight on an Airbus simulator.
"What I would do in the simulator is put myself in the shoes of the pilot and try and replicate what he did and note the problems and issues he experienced along the way, without benefit of hindsight," The preliminary BEA report does not mention this being addressed.
Mr McGregor said his views on superficiality of the preliminary BEA report was shared among many in the aviation and investigation community.
Human error may rest not with the pilot, but with others such as those who designed the aircraft.
"It may be a systemic error, something deeper than an individual pilot making a mistake.
"There maybe a systemic problem affecting all these machines."
Mr McGregor said the question of possible faulty sensors had not been properly considered by the French BEA preliminary report.
"We need to hold judgment. It is unfortunate that the preliminary report isn't more comprehensive than it is," he said.
"We don't know very much at the moment."
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"It was an aircraft that was working properly
When it left EAS two of three external sensors essential for the plane's computerised flying system might also be partly to blame for the crash.
Two of the three sensors were not working
Two of the three sensors were not working