SR111 Disaster in the Air on UK TV tonite
 

The second in this series of disaster documentaries will be on Channel 5 at 8 pm, dealing with the GVA-bound MD11 SR 111 fire on 02 SEP 98. It will also look at the IFE equipment and wiring.

This one quite well done actually.Next week or so the Alaska Air MD80 tail feather failure,not too many in the series.

It dealt with the basic facts quite competently, but in my view failed to deal with the issues of questionable contracters and technicians being used to instal the the IFE system.

In other discussions, it became apparent to me that the IFE wiring was attached to existing wire bundles in a way that disregarded the original care taken to prevent unwanted vibrational effects leading to chaffing, namely by using overly tight cable ties.

It also failed to address the many concerns about Kaptan wiring insulation and its unbelievable quality for spontaneous combustion and progressive 'flaring' within wire bundles when shorted/arced and supplied with current. Since it was only thought of as a real problem when and if pilots held in CBs that had popped thus feeding an arcing bundle with the power to cause fire/flaring, nobody considered the possibility of cowboy contracters installing an IFE system that could not be turned off through the cabin bus.

There are many other tangental issues that this accident revealed, such as the FAA's failure to adequately inspect the IFE installation and therefore pass it as airworthy when it probably was not.

I can't say I fully agree with some of the speculation, nor am I qualified to voice any conclusive opinion, but there is much more to this than the programme suggests, while some learned colleagues and families of the victims were disappointed that the final report failed to deal with some of these issues as they would have hoped.

Having watched it I kind of feel as though I owe some kind of an apology to the captain of the a/c. In previous programmes relating to the accident which formed part of my ATPL groundschool and MCC training, it was always inferred that the a/c could have been landed (if overweight) had the captain not elected to dump fuel, thus seemingly wasting time. This led to many a classroom debate on the 'correct' course of action.

The programme seems to have been at pains to point out that regardless of the actions taken by the crew, insufficient time was available from the problem becoming apparent to the crash occurring for an immediate diversion to Halifax to have been of any use.

WD
This is true but the calculation was based on CYHZ which was some way from the original pan call. I remember the speculation about this along the lines that, had the crew declared a full emergency Mayday Mayday then there may have been an airfield in the immediate vicinity of the call that could have accomodated an overweight landing. I don't have any maps to confirm this and I'm not trying to be judgemental, this was the crew room speculation at the time.

Would the fire have been 'fightable' if cabin crew had been asked to come to the flight deck and deal with it?

Very difficult to say since the fire started behind the panels to the rear of the FO and progressed into the ceiling. It only became exposed and 'fightable' once it had burned through by which time it would be beyond the capabilities of the fire extinguishers supplied.

As a pilot, would you ask a CC member to rip out electrical panels to access a fire of unknown (at the time) magnitude and potential?

I think it is fair to say that until this accident, it was widely assumed that fire retardent materials and regulations would not allow a fire to start and progress so quickly causing so much damage to systems.

Pretty good programme IMHO - in the same vein as the one on the Friedrichshafen mid-air on BBC1 last year. Obviously inspired from the CAIB report.

Having been cabin crew in a previous life, I can't help but wonder why the flight deck crew didn't ask one of the flight attendants to stay in the cockpit with a smoke hood and extra fire extinguishers handy to investigate/fight the fire if necessary :confused: Some lack of CRM?

Also, if the EMERGENCY descent checklist needs 20 minutes to be implemented, then obviously, these checklists sorely need to be reviewed - and pruned!:eek:

Noticed that when the FO shut down engine no.2, the computer animation actually showed the starboard engine (no.3) being shut down... No2 is the TAIL engine on an MD-11. :E

Cheers

This is one air disaster that i knew little about so i found the programme quite interesting, the computer graphics were also incredibly good.

Pointless speculation, I know, but I can't help wondering that had there been a Flight Engineer as part of the crew, would the fire still have taken such a fatal hold?
Watching the reinactment of the poor F/O trying to control the aircraft with a row of blank EFIS screens in front of him, in a smoke filled cockpit with no autopilot, and the captain either dead or dying behind him, well, he never had a chance, did he.

At least with a F/E, both pilots could have concentated on getting the aircraft on the deck ASAP, whilst someone else was dealing with, and fighting the fire.

The nearest airport was Yarmouth, CYQI, about 50 miles nearer than Halifax. One runway, 6500 feet long, if memory serves me right.

I found the programme very interesting, and of course it was a shame that only 60 mins were devoted to it.

Is an MD-11 fly-by-wire or mechanical? Is anyone aware that there was a loss of flying surface control due to the fire?

The procedures have been changed from those used for that emergency, is it now an immediate divert as soon as anyone reports smoke, or the smell of it?

I don't think it's pointless, esp as I raised this in an earlier accident thread, maybe this one. However, it's a matter of economics, really ie the cost of more crew vs the number of passengers who will be taking more risky transportation methods, such as drivin--in the US, at least.

Just to pick up on Pigboat's post. CYQI has two runways, 1- 5000 feet long and the other 6000 feet long. Just one precision approach which is on the 6000 ft runway. There is a 50,000lb limit on some of the manoeuvring sufaces. The only communication on the field is a unicom. CFR has to come from the town. Other than that the options were Halifax (CYHZ) or the Atlantic Ocean.

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MD 11 has no "electricaly powered flight controls" and yes, the check lists for "Electrical Fire" and "Smoke" have been modified.

I can tell that this issue is much more complicated that you think, the only thing I would say is:

With a FIRE or SMOKE on board you have to immediately react, meaning go down and land. BUT depending of a lot of factors they where not able to do this.

This IFEN system should not have been mounted on A/C.

None of us was on board...

Armchair quarterbacks.
 

If you are using your own technical knowledge (or the lack of it) about the MD-11 tragedy then I can’t wait to see the postings criticizing the programs about the Alaska MD-80 crash in the Pacific or the Air Transat forced landing in the Azores. These productions are based on accident reports, the comments of the participants (when available) and information (if any) from the manufacturers. They can’t be technically accurate due to time constraints (to include commercials) and, they also have to protect themselves from any legal liability. The technical accuracy of some of the failures is limited to the producer’s ability to get the correct technical information or their ability to gain access to the actual equipment. Also these programs are not directed to commercial pilots but to the general public that has enough interest to tune into the program.

:E :E

Nice to hear from you again Ivan Taclue, I hope you are well, me still busy studying!

I watched the programme, and was a little stunned to be honest. How, in these times could an IFE be installed that had no equipment cooling and no means of switching it off. Did Swissair actually know this or not.

The other thing that puzzled me was that the CVR/FDR experts stated that the recorders stopped working six minutes before the aircraft crashed into the sea. How did they find out then that the FO shut down the No2 engine approx 1 minute before impact?

With regard to the "do you do the checklist list or do you just get down" debate I will say this. Had they decided to just get down ASAP and said to hell with the checklist, and subsequently not made it and something that was in the checklist that was not actioned contributed to the loss of the aircraft you can bet the media take would have been "had the crew followed check list procedures the aircraft might have been saved". Get my point?

As other people have said, we were not there in that cockpit with a major fire burning behind us. The cause of the accident, as the investigators highlighted, seems to lay well before the first smell of smoke in the cockpit.

IMHO it is VITAL to complete emergency checklists. They are designed to safe up the ac systems when something goes wrong. Thats why CRM normally has the flying pilot concentrating solely on flying and the NFP working like a one-armed paperhanger doing the checklist, radios, et al...

What if you got smoke in the cockpit three miles out on the ILS? Would you do a missed approach and sit in the hold for 20 mins and do the checklist, while unknowingly you to you the aircraft turns into a raging inferno and crashes. Or would you just get the thing on the ground where you can have to passengers off in 90 seconds with full emergency facilities at hand to assist and fight any fire.

Just being the devils advocate.....

tim...

the investigators were able to determine that No.2 (the centre) engine was shut down because it was controlled by FADEC - full authority digital engine control. There was a memory chip in this computer which showed that this engine was shut down at a speed of 227Kts and an altitude of 1800Ft. By correlating this information with the raw data radar trace they were able to fix the time of shutdown.

I watched the television programme with great interest having unfortunately missed the first 10 minutes. The first thing I saw was a film of Swissair pilots holding hands over the throttles during take-off so that either could initiate an abandon - absolute rubbish! The reporting was sometimes accurate but irritated me by presenting speculation as fact, as is common with today's sensationalism driven media.

Nobody will ever know what happened in the last six minutes of the flight. Most of the recovered wreckage pieces from the forward fuselage are no larger than a coin.

It is known that the copilot was in his seat at impact and that the captain's seat was run to the aft outboard position, from which one could only assume that he had left his seat. He might have simply moved it aft in order to get a better view of the overhead panel.

The accident was caused by unqualified people making criminally incompetent modifications to the aircraft to the orders of useless managers. The crew did not stand a chance.