China Airlines B747 Crash (Merged)
80% of wreakage recovered
"The Aviation Safety Council announced yesterday that salvage operations for a China Airlines crash in May this year is finished, with 175 bodies and about 80 percent of the wreckage from the plane being recovered.
But so far, the council said, it still cannot determine the cause of the crash of Flight CI611 near the Penghu island chain, off Taiwan's southwestern coast, on May 25. "
http://www.etaiwannews.com/Taiwan/20...1035940330.htm
Any comments ?
But so far, the council said, it still cannot determine the cause of the crash of Flight CI611 near the Penghu island chain, off Taiwan's southwestern coast, on May 25. "
http://www.etaiwannews.com/Taiwan/20...1035940330.htm
Any comments ?
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: 40N, 80W
Posts: 233
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
According to an update with many photographs on the ASC web-site, the final draft report is expected to be released "on Sep, 2003".
However, the Taiwan News.com article linked to by atakacs above says, "Yong said the ASC, a Cabinet-level agency responsible for investigating aviation accidents, is scheduled to deliver a comprehensive investigative report in September 2004. Before such a report is finalized, all findings are factual information which cannot be lightly used to judge the cause of the flight disaster".
So a factual report will be released in 2003, but not until 2004 will we get the conclusions as to the cause of the crash.
Cheers,
However, the Taiwan News.com article linked to by atakacs above says, "Yong said the ASC, a Cabinet-level agency responsible for investigating aviation accidents, is scheduled to deliver a comprehensive investigative report in September 2004. Before such a report is finalized, all findings are factual information which cannot be lightly used to judge the cause of the flight disaster".
So a factual report will be released in 2003, but not until 2004 will we get the conclusions as to the cause of the crash.
Cheers,
Last edited by PickyPerkins; 5th Jun 2005 at 20:15.
Most insterresting update... still digesting it !
That being said I really wonder how they came up with this Sept 03 date ? Either the cause is identifed, and it's a long time to finalise a report, or it is not, in which case who knows how much effort is still needed ?!
That being said I really wonder how they came up with this Sept 03 date ? Either the cause is identifed, and it's a long time to finalise a report, or it is not, in which case who knows how much effort is still needed ?!
The Reverend
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Sydney,NSW,Australia
Posts: 2,020
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The factual collection phase will complete on April 2003 after the factual verification meeting and followed by a 6 months’ of the analysis phase.
>However rest assured, the manufacturer and regulatory authorities would be right now, well aware of the necessity of any issues of ADs if warranted to avoid a repeat of this accident.<
Agree
For All
So what are the other operators of similar equipment doing different?
Service bulletins?
Airworthiness directives?
Agree
For All
So what are the other operators of similar equipment doing different?
Service bulletins?
Airworthiness directives?
most accident investigation final reports take about two years to produce and that's how long it takes to eliminate conjecture from facts
I am still really surprised that they can forecast when this one will be complete !
--alex
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: 40N, 80W
Posts: 233
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I have edited my last post above.
I guess it takes another year to eliminate the politically unacceptable facts from the overall facts. However, the time that this will take is apparently accurately known two years in advance.
Seriously, this investigation does seem to be meticulously detailed with many photos, maps, and records published from the start, and with many agencies and companies involved from both Asia and the USA, as well as with good cooperation with mainland China. But the slowness of it all leaves the ASC and their government open to speculation as to why its all so slow.
I guess it takes another year to eliminate the politically unacceptable facts from the overall facts. However, the time that this will take is apparently accurately known two years in advance.
Seriously, this investigation does seem to be meticulously detailed with many photos, maps, and records published from the start, and with many agencies and companies involved from both Asia and the USA, as well as with good cooperation with mainland China. But the slowness of it all leaves the ASC and their government open to speculation as to why its all so slow.
Last edited by PickyPerkins; 5th Jun 2005 at 20:17.
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: USA
Posts: 286
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
For what its worth, yesterday during the NTSB hearing on AS261 John Clark of the NTSB, while illustrating the importance of correct procedural practices, used a comparison and made the comment that poor maintenance years ago on the damaged tail, and then the repair being overlooked during maintenance periods, caused the cracks which most likely led to the Air China accident. The
conversation was quickly changed away from the Air China incident.
Could one now say the cargo door theory is mute
conversation was quickly changed away from the Air China incident.
Could one now say the cargo door theory is mute
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Carmel Valley California USA
Posts: 116
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Dear PPrune: Let's see:
WW>For what its worth, €yesterday during the NTSB hearing on AS261 John Clark of the NTSB, while illustrating the importance of correct procedural practices, used a comparison and made the comment that poor maintenance years ago on the damaged tail, and then the repair being overlooked during maintenance periods, caused the cracks which most likely led to the Air China accident. The conversation was quickly changed away from the Air China incident.
Could one now say the cargo door theory is mute
Firehorse>But don't forget guys that we are still missing a fair chunk of the door in question.
JBS>The aft cargo door is shattered, in pieces, left very early, and a 'fair chunk' still missing and will remain so. The pieces match other open cargo door events.
The repair doubler is intact with 'cracks' around it.
Now which is more likely to be the initial structural failure event from the NTSB point of view while making conclusions two years ahead of the final report?
NTSB continues to also wishfully believe TWA 800 was an initial event of center tank explosion by issuing ADs to protect those fuel tanks from exploding. If they say it enough, maybe it will become true...like praying.
And no, one can not now say the cargo door theory is mute. I will always speak out. They even made a movie about it, "Rough Air" 2001 with Eric Roberts.
The wiring/cargo door explanation is not moot either.
Cheers,
Barry Smith
To: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
From: John Barry Smith <[email protected]>
Subject: AD on Fuel Tanks
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Dear Aviation Safety Officials:
Regarding the latest AD from USA FAA on onboard inerting: Good idea.
Regarding the statement "like the one that downed a TWA Boeing 747 in 1996:
That is TWA 800 and the hardest evidence in the world says engine number 3 of TWA 800 became uncontained: a piece of jet engine made of the hardest substance in the world, a stator blade.
That hard evidence refute center fuel tank explosion as initial event and supports the wiring/cargo door explanation with number three becoming fodded and spitting out blades.
China 611 may have had aft cargo door pop so would not have the same evidence as TWA 800. There will be no engine blade stuck in the right horizontal stabilizer as was discovered in TWA 800.
Regardless of which door explosively decompressed the interior fuselage, the probable cause may well have been the same, faulty polyX wiring shorting on the door unlatch motor.
Below is email I've sent before on the earlier ADs to attempt to solve a problem that may or may not exist in other planes but did not exist in TWA 800.
The AD that needs to be written is all poly x wiring be removed or planes grounded.
The military did it. The civilians should to.
Sincerely,
John Barry Smith
And all the opinions of Loeb and Wildey will not change the location or discovery of that stator blade directly aft of engine three.
12 DEC 2002 The DFAA unveiled plans for adding an onboard system to make commercial airliners' fuel tanks safer and reduce the chance of catastrophic explosions like the one that downed a TWA Boeing 747 in 1996. Inexpensive and lightweight, the onboard inerting system works by pumping nitrogen-enriched air into fuel tanks, thereby reducing the oxygen in fuel vapors and reducing flammability. (AP)
At 9:43 PM -0700 9/3/02, John Barry Smith wrote:
To: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
From: John Barry Smith <[email protected]>
Subject: China Airlines Flight 611 cargo door strange areas...
Cc:
Bcc:
Dear FAA: 3 Sep 02
All the ADs in the world trying to make Trans World Airlines Flight 800 a center tank explosion as the initial event will not make that stator blade in the right horizontal stabilizer go away which shows engine 3 uncontainment and therefore makes the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation a plausible, reasonable explanation with precedent of United Airlines Flight 811.
'Ron Wojnar, the FAA's deputy director of aircraft certification services, explained that submersion would prevent any sparks from igniting fuel vapors.'
"The Paris-bound Boeing 747 exploded in a fireball at 13,700 feet, minutes after leaving John F. Kennedy International Airport. All 230 people on board were killed. "All of our pumps that were on Flight 800 were recovered and not found to be contributors to the crash," Ward said."
Let's see, the NTSB says center tank exploded as initial event with undetermined ignition source, FAA says check wiring around center tank and wiring for fuel pumps: but Trans World Airlines Flight 800 fuel pumps were OK. And FAA and NTSB never suggested checking wiring to cargo door although the photographs show shattered and torn door with precedent of United Airlines Flight 811.
Now it appears another cargo door in an early model Boeing 747 has ruptured in flight, China Airlines Flight 611.
It appears that Kay Yong of ASC, Neil Schalekamp of FAA, and Ken Smart of AAIB were open to apparently admit that the cargo door ruptured open inflight and the reasons may be a repair doubler failure, or a bomb, or a center tank explosion. I offer the United Airlines Flight 811 reason, wiring.
MICHAEL A. DORNHEIM
MD>Investigators have recovered the upper and lower parts of the aft cargo door of China Airlines Flight 611 still connected to the surrounding fuselage. A middle portion of the door hasn't been recovered yet.
JBS>That is assuming the missing piece(s) are only one; the middle may be in more than one piece.
MD>Aft cargo door is located on the lower right fuselage behind the wing, and was recovered in several pieces. The upper part (top photo) is still hinged to the fuselage, and the lower part (green structure, below) is latched in place next to cargo rollers.
JBS>Conjecture: can’t be sure about ‘latched in place’ until see it latched in place.
MD>Even though both pieces are attached, Taiwan's Aviation Safety Council (ASC) has not ruled out the door as a cause, and in fact "we are paying more attention to it now than before," said Kay Yong, ASC managing director.
JBS>The cat is out of the bag. If and when they follow the evidence of what ruptured open cargo doors in flight do to Boeing 747s, it will become apparent it has happened at least four times before. Not ruling out the cargo door as a cause is to imply it could be the cause; such an obvious deduction but many are loathe to admit it.
MD> "There are some strange areas that we can't explain right now; we need more evidence." ASC officials believe the aft fuselage of the Boeing 747-200, also known as Section 46, was the first area to come apart, and the aft cargo door is on the aft fuselage ( AW&ST Aug. 5, p. 41).
JBS>Yes, strange areas. Yes, need more evidence.
MD>The main thrust of the investigation is still a 21.7 X 16.7-ft. segment of Section 46 that includes the bulk cargo door, which is to the rear of the aft cargo door. Laboratory analysis has confirmed there are fatigue cracks up to 9 in. long around a doubler. The doubler was used to repair tail-strike damage in 1980. The preliminary lab report needs further discussion before it is released, Yong said.
JBS>Lets’ see: The cracks did not crack, the doubler did not fail: The cargo door is shattered...and the main thrust is the.....doubler? Of course. Note that it is Mike Dornhiem saying main thrust, not the actual thruster: ASC.
MD>Recovery efforts are focusing on trying to find the right side of Section 46, including the aftmost passenger doors 4R and 5R. The aircraft did not have a passenger deck cargo door. Most of the left side has already been recovered. The ASC has started moving wreckage from the Penghu Islands to Tao Yuan AFB near Taipei, and plans to make a two-dimensional reconstruction of the rear fuselage and perhaps part of the forward fuselage. A 3D reconstruction may then be made to better explain findings to the public, Yong said.
JBS>Looking for the right side, the starboard side, the aft cargo door side, the shattered side, the side with precedent. They are on the right track. At least a 2D and maybe a 3D, that's very good.
Now, to the examination of the aft cargo door of China Airlines Flight 611:
Items identified:
Top hinge.
Outline of pressure relief doors.
Jagged metal at tear area about one third down.
Door actuator motor.
Pull in hook mechanism.
Bottom sill.
Cargo floor ball mats.
Torque tubes.
Thin fiberglass internal skin of door.
Non parallel lines of bottom of door and sill.
Some wiring inside door.
Cargo rollers.
Top: Vertical tear lines at aft and forward leading edge of the cargo door.
Missing pressure relief doors.
Longitudinal split about one third down from top.
Intact hinge and door attached to top fuselage skin.
Bottom:
Straight torque tubes apparently
Leading edge of door missing.
Edge of door and edge of fuselage sill not parallel.
Latches not seen in photo.
Some internal door cover missing and bent.
Analysis:
Top of aft cargo door matches other ruptured open cargo doors in flight, such as United Airlines Flight 811 and Pan Am Flight 103, in having vertical tear lines at aft and forward leading edge of the cargo door, missing pressure relief doors, longitudinal split about one third down from top and intact hinge and door attached to top fuselage skin.
Bottom of door with its attachment to sill and locked latches (if confirmed) matches Trans World Airlines Flight 800.
Conclusion: Can not yet rule in or rule out the shorted wiring/aft cargo door rupture/rapid decompression/inflight breakup explanation explanation for China Airlines Flight 611. Need more evidence, such as the actual middle parts with its latching hardware, before determination can be made.
JBS>For Trans World Airlines Flight 800:
Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."
Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.
From AAR 00/03 for Trans World Airlines Flight 800:
1.12.4 Engines ‘No evidence of uncontainment, case rupture, fire, penetration of an object from outside into the engine, or preimpact damage was found in any of the engines.’
JBS>The engine obviously came apart in the air throwing the broken from FOD blades everywhere including the right horizontal stabilizer just aft of number three, there is nothing ‘soft’ inside the engine so the ‘soft body impacts’ came from without, and sooting means abnormal fire inside the engine.
To say ‘No evidence of uncontainment, case rupture, fire, penetration of an object from outside into the engine, or preimpact damage was found in any of the engines.’ is as close to a lie as NTSB can come and still not be laughed out of the room.
But then, having one engine have FOD and the others not would conflict with the center tank as initial event explanation. Because, how could engine three have FOD and the others not? They were four huge vacuum cleaners up three nearby a mystery explosion. To say they had nothing negates the whole explosion explanation, especially a center tank explosion while engines at full climb power.
That stator blade in the right horizontal stabilizer of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 will always be there and it will always mean uncontainment of engine three and that will always mean ruptured open nearby cargo door inflight.
And all the opinions of Loeb and Wildey will not change the location or discovery of that stator blade directly aft of engine three.
Regardless, an explanation is needed for the two rupture holes at the midspans of the forward cargo door of Trans World Airlines Flight 800. An honest person would say the center fuel tank explosion blew it open. But they never do. Except one guy, Neil Schalekamp of FAA who quickly recanted and stated the NTSB point of view:
Manager in the Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, dated 30 January 98. Neil Schalekamp:
"While no one scenario has been categorically proven to the the cause, it is believed, based upon available data, that the center tank (CWT) explosion preceded any separation of the forward cargo door. The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT. Furthermore, you mentioned that the forward cargo door was recovered a considerable distance from the rest of the structure. This could be due to its aerodynamic characteristics and prevailing winds at the time of the accident, rather than attributing this as the primary cause of the accident."
JBS>Shortly thereafter, nine days later, he changed his tune after I emailed his response to NTSB: Note his suddenly changed attitude.
NS>"It appears that you are determined to impose your theory about the events that led to this unfortunate accident upon the official investigators."
"Please take note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquires about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."
"The evidence from the reconstructed 747 airplane reveals that the forward cargo door was attached to the forward section of the airplane and was latched in the closed position when this section of the airplane impacted the ocean."
JBS>Well, an honest man even if only for a few days.
Ken Smart, the current head of AAIB, has said about Pan Am Flight 103,
X-From_: [email protected] Thu Apr 18 09:41:49 2002
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2002 17:41:27 +0100
To: John Barry Smith <[email protected]>
From: Ken Smart <[email protected]>
Subject: Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA 103 message!
Cc: "Tucker, Bill" <[email protected]>
Dear Mr Smith
Thank you for your hypothesis on the immediate cause of the PanAm 103.
During the first five days of the investigation into PanAm 103 the AAIB were pursuing two general lines of inquiry. The first was that the aircraft had suffered a structural failure in-flight as a result of a defect or induced structural overload, the second was that an improvised explosive devise was responsible.
When the evidence of an improvised explosive device was found, the investigation nevertheless concentrated on discovering whether there was any evidence that a structural weakness had been exploited. In that respect the fwd. cargo door was the subject of very detailed examination. All the specialists involved were satisfied that the fwd. cargo door was correctly latched when the device detonated and that the subsequent structural failures where secondary events.
All structures by nature of their design have paths of least resistance when subjected to abnormal loading. The structure in the vacinity of large strengthened apertures such as the fwd. cargo door provide very good examples of this. The window belt on pressurised aircraft provides another and similar example. You should not be surprised to find similar patterns of breakup in structural failures that emanate from very different causes. The important differences lie in the detailed examination rather than the macro features.
I'm sorry to be the one to pour cold water on your hypothesis, but the scenario that you suggest was the subject of very considerable examination in the early stages of the Lockerbie investigation.
Ken Smart
Chief Inspector of Air Accidents
JBS>I evaluated this letter at length and responded to him pointing out that essentially he said the cargo door structural failure occurred in flight but was secondary. I then argued that the only difference of opinion we had was ‘when’ it occurred. I pointed out the at initial event time the large hole where the forward cargo door used to be appeared as well as the 20 inch shatter hole on the port side (According to AAIB report itself). So, by the evidence, holes on both side of nose occurred at the same time. He never replied, most bomb guys never do when confronted with the evidence. Note how quick the AAIB rushed to judgment, five days. The NTSB narrative has the ‘go’ team thinking bomb before they took off from Andrews AFB that same night of the event.
KS>'All the specialists involved were satisfied that the fwd. cargo door was correctly latched when the device detonated and that the subsequent structural failures where secondary events.'
JBS>Another assumption that once assumed, it's bomb forever. 'When the device detonated...' It's like assuming from day one that JFK was killed by two or more people and then all the conspiracy 'facts' make sense. It's a false initial premise.
Dear FAA , it's never too late to pursue safety related items when presented to you with evidence:
shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for early model Boeing 747s.
Cheers,
John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
[email protected]
WW>For what its worth, €yesterday during the NTSB hearing on AS261 John Clark of the NTSB, while illustrating the importance of correct procedural practices, used a comparison and made the comment that poor maintenance years ago on the damaged tail, and then the repair being overlooked during maintenance periods, caused the cracks which most likely led to the Air China accident. The conversation was quickly changed away from the Air China incident.
Could one now say the cargo door theory is mute
Firehorse>But don't forget guys that we are still missing a fair chunk of the door in question.
JBS>The aft cargo door is shattered, in pieces, left very early, and a 'fair chunk' still missing and will remain so. The pieces match other open cargo door events.
The repair doubler is intact with 'cracks' around it.
Now which is more likely to be the initial structural failure event from the NTSB point of view while making conclusions two years ahead of the final report?
NTSB continues to also wishfully believe TWA 800 was an initial event of center tank explosion by issuing ADs to protect those fuel tanks from exploding. If they say it enough, maybe it will become true...like praying.
And no, one can not now say the cargo door theory is mute. I will always speak out. They even made a movie about it, "Rough Air" 2001 with Eric Roberts.
The wiring/cargo door explanation is not moot either.
Cheers,
Barry Smith
To: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
From: John Barry Smith <[email protected]>
Subject: AD on Fuel Tanks
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Dear Aviation Safety Officials:
Regarding the latest AD from USA FAA on onboard inerting: Good idea.
Regarding the statement "like the one that downed a TWA Boeing 747 in 1996:
That is TWA 800 and the hardest evidence in the world says engine number 3 of TWA 800 became uncontained: a piece of jet engine made of the hardest substance in the world, a stator blade.
That hard evidence refute center fuel tank explosion as initial event and supports the wiring/cargo door explanation with number three becoming fodded and spitting out blades.
China 611 may have had aft cargo door pop so would not have the same evidence as TWA 800. There will be no engine blade stuck in the right horizontal stabilizer as was discovered in TWA 800.
Regardless of which door explosively decompressed the interior fuselage, the probable cause may well have been the same, faulty polyX wiring shorting on the door unlatch motor.
Below is email I've sent before on the earlier ADs to attempt to solve a problem that may or may not exist in other planes but did not exist in TWA 800.
The AD that needs to be written is all poly x wiring be removed or planes grounded.
The military did it. The civilians should to.
Sincerely,
John Barry Smith
And all the opinions of Loeb and Wildey will not change the location or discovery of that stator blade directly aft of engine three.
12 DEC 2002 The DFAA unveiled plans for adding an onboard system to make commercial airliners' fuel tanks safer and reduce the chance of catastrophic explosions like the one that downed a TWA Boeing 747 in 1996. Inexpensive and lightweight, the onboard inerting system works by pumping nitrogen-enriched air into fuel tanks, thereby reducing the oxygen in fuel vapors and reducing flammability. (AP)
At 9:43 PM -0700 9/3/02, John Barry Smith wrote:
To: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
From: John Barry Smith <[email protected]>
Subject: China Airlines Flight 611 cargo door strange areas...
Cc:
Bcc:
Dear FAA: 3 Sep 02
All the ADs in the world trying to make Trans World Airlines Flight 800 a center tank explosion as the initial event will not make that stator blade in the right horizontal stabilizer go away which shows engine 3 uncontainment and therefore makes the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation a plausible, reasonable explanation with precedent of United Airlines Flight 811.
'Ron Wojnar, the FAA's deputy director of aircraft certification services, explained that submersion would prevent any sparks from igniting fuel vapors.'
"The Paris-bound Boeing 747 exploded in a fireball at 13,700 feet, minutes after leaving John F. Kennedy International Airport. All 230 people on board were killed. "All of our pumps that were on Flight 800 were recovered and not found to be contributors to the crash," Ward said."
Let's see, the NTSB says center tank exploded as initial event with undetermined ignition source, FAA says check wiring around center tank and wiring for fuel pumps: but Trans World Airlines Flight 800 fuel pumps were OK. And FAA and NTSB never suggested checking wiring to cargo door although the photographs show shattered and torn door with precedent of United Airlines Flight 811.
Now it appears another cargo door in an early model Boeing 747 has ruptured in flight, China Airlines Flight 611.
It appears that Kay Yong of ASC, Neil Schalekamp of FAA, and Ken Smart of AAIB were open to apparently admit that the cargo door ruptured open inflight and the reasons may be a repair doubler failure, or a bomb, or a center tank explosion. I offer the United Airlines Flight 811 reason, wiring.
MICHAEL A. DORNHEIM
MD>Investigators have recovered the upper and lower parts of the aft cargo door of China Airlines Flight 611 still connected to the surrounding fuselage. A middle portion of the door hasn't been recovered yet.
JBS>That is assuming the missing piece(s) are only one; the middle may be in more than one piece.
MD>Aft cargo door is located on the lower right fuselage behind the wing, and was recovered in several pieces. The upper part (top photo) is still hinged to the fuselage, and the lower part (green structure, below) is latched in place next to cargo rollers.
JBS>Conjecture: can’t be sure about ‘latched in place’ until see it latched in place.
MD>Even though both pieces are attached, Taiwan's Aviation Safety Council (ASC) has not ruled out the door as a cause, and in fact "we are paying more attention to it now than before," said Kay Yong, ASC managing director.
JBS>The cat is out of the bag. If and when they follow the evidence of what ruptured open cargo doors in flight do to Boeing 747s, it will become apparent it has happened at least four times before. Not ruling out the cargo door as a cause is to imply it could be the cause; such an obvious deduction but many are loathe to admit it.
MD> "There are some strange areas that we can't explain right now; we need more evidence." ASC officials believe the aft fuselage of the Boeing 747-200, also known as Section 46, was the first area to come apart, and the aft cargo door is on the aft fuselage ( AW&ST Aug. 5, p. 41).
JBS>Yes, strange areas. Yes, need more evidence.
MD>The main thrust of the investigation is still a 21.7 X 16.7-ft. segment of Section 46 that includes the bulk cargo door, which is to the rear of the aft cargo door. Laboratory analysis has confirmed there are fatigue cracks up to 9 in. long around a doubler. The doubler was used to repair tail-strike damage in 1980. The preliminary lab report needs further discussion before it is released, Yong said.
JBS>Lets’ see: The cracks did not crack, the doubler did not fail: The cargo door is shattered...and the main thrust is the.....doubler? Of course. Note that it is Mike Dornhiem saying main thrust, not the actual thruster: ASC.
MD>Recovery efforts are focusing on trying to find the right side of Section 46, including the aftmost passenger doors 4R and 5R. The aircraft did not have a passenger deck cargo door. Most of the left side has already been recovered. The ASC has started moving wreckage from the Penghu Islands to Tao Yuan AFB near Taipei, and plans to make a two-dimensional reconstruction of the rear fuselage and perhaps part of the forward fuselage. A 3D reconstruction may then be made to better explain findings to the public, Yong said.
JBS>Looking for the right side, the starboard side, the aft cargo door side, the shattered side, the side with precedent. They are on the right track. At least a 2D and maybe a 3D, that's very good.
Now, to the examination of the aft cargo door of China Airlines Flight 611:
Items identified:
Top hinge.
Outline of pressure relief doors.
Jagged metal at tear area about one third down.
Door actuator motor.
Pull in hook mechanism.
Bottom sill.
Cargo floor ball mats.
Torque tubes.
Thin fiberglass internal skin of door.
Non parallel lines of bottom of door and sill.
Some wiring inside door.
Cargo rollers.
Top: Vertical tear lines at aft and forward leading edge of the cargo door.
Missing pressure relief doors.
Longitudinal split about one third down from top.
Intact hinge and door attached to top fuselage skin.
Bottom:
Straight torque tubes apparently
Leading edge of door missing.
Edge of door and edge of fuselage sill not parallel.
Latches not seen in photo.
Some internal door cover missing and bent.
Analysis:
Top of aft cargo door matches other ruptured open cargo doors in flight, such as United Airlines Flight 811 and Pan Am Flight 103, in having vertical tear lines at aft and forward leading edge of the cargo door, missing pressure relief doors, longitudinal split about one third down from top and intact hinge and door attached to top fuselage skin.
Bottom of door with its attachment to sill and locked latches (if confirmed) matches Trans World Airlines Flight 800.
Conclusion: Can not yet rule in or rule out the shorted wiring/aft cargo door rupture/rapid decompression/inflight breakup explanation explanation for China Airlines Flight 611. Need more evidence, such as the actual middle parts with its latching hardware, before determination can be made.
JBS>For Trans World Airlines Flight 800:
Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."
Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.
From AAR 00/03 for Trans World Airlines Flight 800:
1.12.4 Engines ‘No evidence of uncontainment, case rupture, fire, penetration of an object from outside into the engine, or preimpact damage was found in any of the engines.’
JBS>The engine obviously came apart in the air throwing the broken from FOD blades everywhere including the right horizontal stabilizer just aft of number three, there is nothing ‘soft’ inside the engine so the ‘soft body impacts’ came from without, and sooting means abnormal fire inside the engine.
To say ‘No evidence of uncontainment, case rupture, fire, penetration of an object from outside into the engine, or preimpact damage was found in any of the engines.’ is as close to a lie as NTSB can come and still not be laughed out of the room.
But then, having one engine have FOD and the others not would conflict with the center tank as initial event explanation. Because, how could engine three have FOD and the others not? They were four huge vacuum cleaners up three nearby a mystery explosion. To say they had nothing negates the whole explosion explanation, especially a center tank explosion while engines at full climb power.
That stator blade in the right horizontal stabilizer of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 will always be there and it will always mean uncontainment of engine three and that will always mean ruptured open nearby cargo door inflight.
And all the opinions of Loeb and Wildey will not change the location or discovery of that stator blade directly aft of engine three.
Regardless, an explanation is needed for the two rupture holes at the midspans of the forward cargo door of Trans World Airlines Flight 800. An honest person would say the center fuel tank explosion blew it open. But they never do. Except one guy, Neil Schalekamp of FAA who quickly recanted and stated the NTSB point of view:
Manager in the Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, dated 30 January 98. Neil Schalekamp:
"While no one scenario has been categorically proven to the the cause, it is believed, based upon available data, that the center tank (CWT) explosion preceded any separation of the forward cargo door. The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT. Furthermore, you mentioned that the forward cargo door was recovered a considerable distance from the rest of the structure. This could be due to its aerodynamic characteristics and prevailing winds at the time of the accident, rather than attributing this as the primary cause of the accident."
JBS>Shortly thereafter, nine days later, he changed his tune after I emailed his response to NTSB: Note his suddenly changed attitude.
NS>"It appears that you are determined to impose your theory about the events that led to this unfortunate accident upon the official investigators."
"Please take note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquires about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."
"The evidence from the reconstructed 747 airplane reveals that the forward cargo door was attached to the forward section of the airplane and was latched in the closed position when this section of the airplane impacted the ocean."
JBS>Well, an honest man even if only for a few days.
Ken Smart, the current head of AAIB, has said about Pan Am Flight 103,
X-From_: [email protected] Thu Apr 18 09:41:49 2002
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2002 17:41:27 +0100
To: John Barry Smith <[email protected]>
From: Ken Smart <[email protected]>
Subject: Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA 103 message!
Cc: "Tucker, Bill" <[email protected]>
Dear Mr Smith
Thank you for your hypothesis on the immediate cause of the PanAm 103.
During the first five days of the investigation into PanAm 103 the AAIB were pursuing two general lines of inquiry. The first was that the aircraft had suffered a structural failure in-flight as a result of a defect or induced structural overload, the second was that an improvised explosive devise was responsible.
When the evidence of an improvised explosive device was found, the investigation nevertheless concentrated on discovering whether there was any evidence that a structural weakness had been exploited. In that respect the fwd. cargo door was the subject of very detailed examination. All the specialists involved were satisfied that the fwd. cargo door was correctly latched when the device detonated and that the subsequent structural failures where secondary events.
All structures by nature of their design have paths of least resistance when subjected to abnormal loading. The structure in the vacinity of large strengthened apertures such as the fwd. cargo door provide very good examples of this. The window belt on pressurised aircraft provides another and similar example. You should not be surprised to find similar patterns of breakup in structural failures that emanate from very different causes. The important differences lie in the detailed examination rather than the macro features.
I'm sorry to be the one to pour cold water on your hypothesis, but the scenario that you suggest was the subject of very considerable examination in the early stages of the Lockerbie investigation.
Ken Smart
Chief Inspector of Air Accidents
JBS>I evaluated this letter at length and responded to him pointing out that essentially he said the cargo door structural failure occurred in flight but was secondary. I then argued that the only difference of opinion we had was ‘when’ it occurred. I pointed out the at initial event time the large hole where the forward cargo door used to be appeared as well as the 20 inch shatter hole on the port side (According to AAIB report itself). So, by the evidence, holes on both side of nose occurred at the same time. He never replied, most bomb guys never do when confronted with the evidence. Note how quick the AAIB rushed to judgment, five days. The NTSB narrative has the ‘go’ team thinking bomb before they took off from Andrews AFB that same night of the event.
KS>'All the specialists involved were satisfied that the fwd. cargo door was correctly latched when the device detonated and that the subsequent structural failures where secondary events.'
JBS>Another assumption that once assumed, it's bomb forever. 'When the device detonated...' It's like assuming from day one that JFK was killed by two or more people and then all the conspiracy 'facts' make sense. It's a false initial premise.
Dear FAA , it's never too late to pursue safety related items when presented to you with evidence:
shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for early model Boeing 747s.
Cheers,
John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
[email protected]
BS>For Trans World Airlines Flight 800:
Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."
From AAR 00/03 for Trans World Airlines Flight 800:
1.12.4 Engines ‘No evidence of uncontainment, case rupture, fire, penetration of an object from outside into the engine, or preimpact damage was found in any of the engines.’
JBS>The engine obviously came apart in the air throwing the broken from FOD blades everywhere including the right horizontal stabilizer just aft of number three, there is nothing ‘soft’ inside the engine so the ‘soft body impacts’ came from without, and sooting means abnormal fire inside the engine.
To say ‘No evidence of uncontainment, case rupture, fire, penetration of an object from outside into the engine, or preimpact damage was found in any of the engines.’ is as close to a lie as NTSB can come and still not be laughed out of the room.
Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."
From AAR 00/03 for Trans World Airlines Flight 800:
1.12.4 Engines ‘No evidence of uncontainment, case rupture, fire, penetration of an object from outside into the engine, or preimpact damage was found in any of the engines.’
JBS>The engine obviously came apart in the air throwing the broken from FOD blades everywhere including the right horizontal stabilizer just aft of number three, there is nothing ‘soft’ inside the engine so the ‘soft body impacts’ came from without, and sooting means abnormal fire inside the engine.
To say ‘No evidence of uncontainment, case rupture, fire, penetration of an object from outside into the engine, or preimpact damage was found in any of the engines.’ is as close to a lie as NTSB can come and still not be laughed out of the room.
For the benefit of those in this forum who have open minds. The description of damage to engine pos 3 correlates with an engine that was intact, but no longer running as it fell face first towards the ocean. During this fall it was still attached to the wing for a period of time and as such it ingested a good deal of flames into the inlet. The wing surface on this side of the aircraft also showed the same sort of sooting asymetric to the normal fore to aft wing flow. (presumably the wing was no longer operating as intended).
Subsequently the no 3 engine separated and continued its free fall into the sea where it struck the inlet cowl first causing the inlet cowl to fold into the fiberglas nose spinner and thence into the fan rotor itself. The hydraulic loading of the water was of such force that it folded the blades which had survived the impact of the inlet cowl and nose spinner aft in a reverse spiral folding action causing the blades to close the gaps between them and to crush the blade shrouds out of the way.
No mysteries here to the trained investigators, just food for conspiracy folks who like to get their name in print.
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Carmel Valley California USA
Posts: 116
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Lomapaseo>For the benefit of those in this forum who have open minds. The description of damage to engine pos 3 correlates with an engine that was intact....
No mysteries here to the trained investigators, just food for conspiracy folks who like to get their name in print.
JBS>One of the many things I have learned during this last decade of discussing the wiring/cargo door explanation is that people who always toss out personal insults always makes unsupported statements contrary to the facts and attempt to distract from their inaccuracies with emotion. Thus it is again above.
Enough to say again that I am a non conspiracy person but a mechanical explanation with precedent person.
To the facts: Engines number 1, 2, and 4 of TWA 800, as described in Exhibit 8A Powerplant report, show none of the sooting, impact damage, missing blades, or soft body impacts which are evident to engine number three.
The right horizontal stab is directly aft of engine number three and had an 'engine stator blade' embedded in it. The blade in the stabilizer and engine number three were found some distance apart on the ocean floor as all the engines separated from their pylons during the free fall.
There is evidence of uncontainment and fire in engine number three of TWA 800 which matches UAL 811 engine number three after the cargo door opened and ejected debris fodded nearby number three and caused the uncontainment and fire.
Spit out blades, missing blades, and soot are contrary to an engine(s) this is operating normally and falls into the sea, as the other three engines reveal in their breakdown report.
Again, that solid, hard alloy of engine blade is not going to disappear because it is said over and over again there was no uncontainment of engine number three and everything was normal.
TWA 800 blown out cargo door showing the ruptures and missing pieces was not normal, CI 611 with its missing cargo door pieces and spread out door pieces in the debris field is not normal either.
The cargo doors of all five early model Boeing 747s are rupturing open in flight and the cause I offer for the blow outs is the one confirmed and solid mechanical reason, wiring/cargo door explanation.
It's not the explanation that blames Libyan terrorists, Sikh terrorists, dumb groundhandlers that improperly latch, dumb repair mechanics for a foreign airline, or spontaneous fuel tank explosion with no ignition source. There is a common cause for the uncommon event with common evidence.
I've also learned in the past years there are some things so horrible to believe that humans just refuse to believe them and substitute alternative more pleasing explanations, regardless of facts, data, and evidence. They are not being conspirators but just human.
Cheers,
Barry Smith
BS>For Trans World Airlines Flight 800:
Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward.\
Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."
Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.
No mysteries here to the trained investigators, just food for conspiracy folks who like to get their name in print.
JBS>One of the many things I have learned during this last decade of discussing the wiring/cargo door explanation is that people who always toss out personal insults always makes unsupported statements contrary to the facts and attempt to distract from their inaccuracies with emotion. Thus it is again above.
Enough to say again that I am a non conspiracy person but a mechanical explanation with precedent person.
To the facts: Engines number 1, 2, and 4 of TWA 800, as described in Exhibit 8A Powerplant report, show none of the sooting, impact damage, missing blades, or soft body impacts which are evident to engine number three.
The right horizontal stab is directly aft of engine number three and had an 'engine stator blade' embedded in it. The blade in the stabilizer and engine number three were found some distance apart on the ocean floor as all the engines separated from their pylons during the free fall.
There is evidence of uncontainment and fire in engine number three of TWA 800 which matches UAL 811 engine number three after the cargo door opened and ejected debris fodded nearby number three and caused the uncontainment and fire.
Spit out blades, missing blades, and soot are contrary to an engine(s) this is operating normally and falls into the sea, as the other three engines reveal in their breakdown report.
Again, that solid, hard alloy of engine blade is not going to disappear because it is said over and over again there was no uncontainment of engine number three and everything was normal.
TWA 800 blown out cargo door showing the ruptures and missing pieces was not normal, CI 611 with its missing cargo door pieces and spread out door pieces in the debris field is not normal either.
The cargo doors of all five early model Boeing 747s are rupturing open in flight and the cause I offer for the blow outs is the one confirmed and solid mechanical reason, wiring/cargo door explanation.
It's not the explanation that blames Libyan terrorists, Sikh terrorists, dumb groundhandlers that improperly latch, dumb repair mechanics for a foreign airline, or spontaneous fuel tank explosion with no ignition source. There is a common cause for the uncommon event with common evidence.
I've also learned in the past years there are some things so horrible to believe that humans just refuse to believe them and substitute alternative more pleasing explanations, regardless of facts, data, and evidence. They are not being conspirators but just human.
Cheers,
Barry Smith
BS>For Trans World Airlines Flight 800:
Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward.\
Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."
Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.
The Reverend
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Sydney,NSW,Australia
Posts: 2,020
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
JBS, I suppose you refuse to fly on Boeing airplanes, especially 747 types, since you are convinced they have defective wiring and unsafe cargo doors. I am sure that in your homeland of frivolous litigation you could find an ambulance chasing attorney to plead your case in a civil suit against the Boeing Company for endangering life and limb; in spite of your timely warnings, based on your expert knowledge of airplane design and your proof of the cause of past disasters.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: US
Posts: 26
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Latest report: metal fatigue
TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) -- Investigators analyzing the wreckage of a China Airlines' jumbo jet that broke apart over the Taiwan Strait in a crash that killed all 225 people on board last May have found a crack seen as evidence of metal fatigue, a Taiwanese official has said.
But the official declined to speculate whether metal fatigue was the cause of the crash, saying only that it was "one of the risk factors" related to the incident.
Findings by Taiwan's Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology were recently confirmed by the aircraft's maker, Seattle-based Boeing, said Kay Yong, Taiwan's chief crash investigator.
"We can only say that metal fatigue was one of the risk factors," Yong told The Associated Press.
It is still unknown why the Boeing 747-200 broke apart about 20 minutes into a flight from Taipei to Hong Kong on May 25, said Yong, managing director of Hong Kong's Aviation Safety Council.
Investigators discovered a crack several inches (centimeters) long in the rear of the plane.
It was later determined that the crack was not caused by the impact of the crash but had grown out of a smaller crack that was previously documented and related to a minor accident in 1980, when the plane's tail hit the ground during takeoff.
The part of the aircraft damaged in that accident was covered by a metal patch measuring 23 inches (half a meter) by 125 inches (3 meters).
The findings indicated that all airlines need to conduct a more thorough inspection for signs of metal fatigue on any Boeing jets that have undergone a major repair, he said.
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/25/taiwan.jet.ap/index.html
But the official declined to speculate whether metal fatigue was the cause of the crash, saying only that it was "one of the risk factors" related to the incident.
Findings by Taiwan's Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology were recently confirmed by the aircraft's maker, Seattle-based Boeing, said Kay Yong, Taiwan's chief crash investigator.
"We can only say that metal fatigue was one of the risk factors," Yong told The Associated Press.
It is still unknown why the Boeing 747-200 broke apart about 20 minutes into a flight from Taipei to Hong Kong on May 25, said Yong, managing director of Hong Kong's Aviation Safety Council.
Investigators discovered a crack several inches (centimeters) long in the rear of the plane.
It was later determined that the crack was not caused by the impact of the crash but had grown out of a smaller crack that was previously documented and related to a minor accident in 1980, when the plane's tail hit the ground during takeoff.
The part of the aircraft damaged in that accident was covered by a metal patch measuring 23 inches (half a meter) by 125 inches (3 meters).
The findings indicated that all airlines need to conduct a more thorough inspection for signs of metal fatigue on any Boeing jets that have undergone a major repair, he said.
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/25/taiwan.jet.ap/index.html
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Carmel Valley California USA
Posts: 116
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Repair Doubler/patch intact. It's been intact for 20 years.
Cargo door shattered and critical pieces missing. Pieces missing are in the middle area where ruptures occur.
Probable cause?
Oh, the thing that didn't break caused it and the thing that did break did not cause it.
The thing that gets me is the lack of pursuit for the obvious mechanical answer with precedent, wiring/cargo door problem, and the too anxious claims of officials that it was a 'crack' while making comments like, 'It is still unknown why the Boeing 747-200 broke apart about 20 minutes into a flight from Taipei to Hong Kong on May 25', said Yong,
Genuine pursuit of probable cause of 611 means getting all the parts to the shattered cargo door, all those missing big parts, all the special parts tthat have the area of midspan rupture such as pins, latches, cams, torque tubes, and manual locking handle, all missing.
They are missing for a reason. I don't know the reason but they should have been recovered. The aft area debris field was extensively searched.
Until the mysterey of those missing pieces is answered there can be no probable cause that excludes a wiring/cargo door fault....like UAL 811 except it was the identical aft cargo door with identical known faulty poly x wiring instead of the forward cargo door.
Cargo door shattered and critical pieces missing. Pieces missing are in the middle area where ruptures occur.
Probable cause?
Oh, the thing that didn't break caused it and the thing that did break did not cause it.
The thing that gets me is the lack of pursuit for the obvious mechanical answer with precedent, wiring/cargo door problem, and the too anxious claims of officials that it was a 'crack' while making comments like, 'It is still unknown why the Boeing 747-200 broke apart about 20 minutes into a flight from Taipei to Hong Kong on May 25', said Yong,
Genuine pursuit of probable cause of 611 means getting all the parts to the shattered cargo door, all those missing big parts, all the special parts tthat have the area of midspan rupture such as pins, latches, cams, torque tubes, and manual locking handle, all missing.
They are missing for a reason. I don't know the reason but they should have been recovered. The aft area debris field was extensively searched.
Until the mysterey of those missing pieces is answered there can be no probable cause that excludes a wiring/cargo door fault....like UAL 811 except it was the identical aft cargo door with identical known faulty poly x wiring instead of the forward cargo door.
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: around abouts
Posts: 41
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
JBS,
There are numerous reasons why some items still remain unrecovered off Taiwan, none of those reasons being devious. For example try sea currents up to 4.3 knts, seas up to 8m, winds up to 75knts, typhoon season, 64sq mile search area, limited assets, the list goes on. Keep in mind that there was only one specialist diving vessel with 2 divers in the bell at any one time. The seabed in that area is covered with sand waves which tend to trap objects between them, in very short time sand fills the wave and it tends to "move" on. Even some large objects were nearly completely buried and only luck enabled them to be discovered. The bottom line here is that nature doesn't descriminate based on importance of objects when it comes to what gets buried and what doesn't. Some objects will remain buried forever, the only way to find buried objects is by searching with sub-bottom profilers which is expensive and time consuming to say the least!
Not everthing is a conspiracy mate, the best people tried for nearly 4mths and simply missed certain parts. End of story.
Cheers.
There are numerous reasons why some items still remain unrecovered off Taiwan, none of those reasons being devious. For example try sea currents up to 4.3 knts, seas up to 8m, winds up to 75knts, typhoon season, 64sq mile search area, limited assets, the list goes on. Keep in mind that there was only one specialist diving vessel with 2 divers in the bell at any one time. The seabed in that area is covered with sand waves which tend to trap objects between them, in very short time sand fills the wave and it tends to "move" on. Even some large objects were nearly completely buried and only luck enabled them to be discovered. The bottom line here is that nature doesn't descriminate based on importance of objects when it comes to what gets buried and what doesn't. Some objects will remain buried forever, the only way to find buried objects is by searching with sub-bottom profilers which is expensive and time consuming to say the least!
Not everthing is a conspiracy mate, the best people tried for nearly 4mths and simply missed certain parts. End of story.
Cheers.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: what U.S. calls ´old Europe´
Posts: 941
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Boeing released Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2489 on November 26th.
This SB recommends visual inspection for doubler repairs in the aft lower fuselage area (typical tail strike area) and, if doublers are found, eddy curent inspection for scratches and cracks with subsequent repair depending on flight cycle number and extent of damage found.
The SB is applicable to all 747 models, including the -200B, -200C and -200F models.
´...will make shure that skin cracks or scratches that could cause skin cracks are found and repaired in the aft lower body skin. Fatigue cracks originating from unremoved damage that are not detected can affect the structural integrity of the airplane.´
´Existing maintenance program may not be sufficient for external doubler repairs that conceal unremoved damage.´
Seems the Boeing guys are really worried about the findings on China Airlines 611 wreakage, do they know much more than we do ?
This SB recommends visual inspection for doubler repairs in the aft lower fuselage area (typical tail strike area) and, if doublers are found, eddy curent inspection for scratches and cracks with subsequent repair depending on flight cycle number and extent of damage found.
The SB is applicable to all 747 models, including the -200B, -200C and -200F models.
´...will make shure that skin cracks or scratches that could cause skin cracks are found and repaired in the aft lower body skin. Fatigue cracks originating from unremoved damage that are not detected can affect the structural integrity of the airplane.´
´Existing maintenance program may not be sufficient for external doubler repairs that conceal unremoved damage.´
Seems the Boeing guys are really worried about the findings on China Airlines 611 wreakage, do they know much more than we do ?
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: 40N, 80W
Posts: 233
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Volume said
---- Start quote ---------
…….. do they know much more than we do ? …………..Boeing released Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2489 on November 26th. ……….
---- End quote ---------
Yes, I am sure they do. And not only Boeing. The ASC in Taiwan and the NTSB in the USA probably know as much.
But I am puzzled as to why, when so many Ppruners must see Service Bulletins, it took 44 days for anyone to post this info here and comment on it. While the ASC has threatened to take legal action against leaking unpublished info, there can hardly be any risk in noting and discussing Service Bulletins.
Question: Do the majority of Ppruners who read SBs think this SB is NOT related to CI611?
Cheers,
---- Start quote ---------
…….. do they know much more than we do ? …………..Boeing released Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2489 on November 26th. ……….
---- End quote ---------
Yes, I am sure they do. And not only Boeing. The ASC in Taiwan and the NTSB in the USA probably know as much.
But I am puzzled as to why, when so many Ppruners must see Service Bulletins, it took 44 days for anyone to post this info here and comment on it. While the ASC has threatened to take legal action against leaking unpublished info, there can hardly be any risk in noting and discussing Service Bulletins.
Question: Do the majority of Ppruners who read SBs think this SB is NOT related to CI611?
Cheers,
Last edited by PickyPerkins; 5th Jun 2005 at 18:51.
Join Date: Dec 1998
Location: England
Posts: 242
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Is Boeing Concerned about ASB's getting to be Public Knowledge?
The Alert Service Bulletin that was put up on a web-site in 1999 about a Kapton wiring fire that had caused IFE-related in-seat fires on 747-400's was made subject of a Boeing Legal Team DMCA approach to my ISP (who then promptly killed the website).
DMCA = Digital Millenium Copyright Act
And of course the DMCA is now spreading internationally so the subject matter may soon come down, under a new national DMCA, yet again, from its new position.
Service Bulletins and Alert Service Bulletins are couched in specific terms whereas the AD's that they sometimes give rise to are couched in more harmlessly unalarming and innocuous terms.....but refer the reader back to the SB/ASB for actual implementation details. The reasoning is that some (in fact most) SB/ASB are non-mandatory and anyone reading them might ask embarrassing questions about just why that was.
In the case of the Kapton wiring pax-seat fires, the sensitivity was related to the fact that Kapton wiring was mentioned by name throughout as the cause and the ASB had it being replaced due to it having caused fire(s). That is a very very sensitive subject as far as Boeing, FAA, NTSB and theATA/airlines are concerned. Why? Because the official line is that Kapton is not a problem and has no events officially attributable to it and need not therefore be replaced. The same sensitivity was accorded Kapton by Airline Q when they sent out a MEMO instructing that all inventory-held stocks of Kapton wiring and its aromatic polyimide variants were to be destroyed.
If you really need to read up on ASB's or SB's just go to the dungeons of the Federal Repository and they are all there. You can read them, but if you try to copy or disseminate them or publish them, Mr Boeing has a whole team that will descend upon you like a ton of bricks. They closely husband their sensitive secrets.
DMCA action is unilateral. You have no right of appeal (and neither does the ISP).
No need to wonder any more about ASB/SB's.
DMCA = Digital Millenium Copyright Act
And of course the DMCA is now spreading internationally so the subject matter may soon come down, under a new national DMCA, yet again, from its new position.
Service Bulletins and Alert Service Bulletins are couched in specific terms whereas the AD's that they sometimes give rise to are couched in more harmlessly unalarming and innocuous terms.....but refer the reader back to the SB/ASB for actual implementation details. The reasoning is that some (in fact most) SB/ASB are non-mandatory and anyone reading them might ask embarrassing questions about just why that was.
In the case of the Kapton wiring pax-seat fires, the sensitivity was related to the fact that Kapton wiring was mentioned by name throughout as the cause and the ASB had it being replaced due to it having caused fire(s). That is a very very sensitive subject as far as Boeing, FAA, NTSB and theATA/airlines are concerned. Why? Because the official line is that Kapton is not a problem and has no events officially attributable to it and need not therefore be replaced. The same sensitivity was accorded Kapton by Airline Q when they sent out a MEMO instructing that all inventory-held stocks of Kapton wiring and its aromatic polyimide variants were to be destroyed.
If you really need to read up on ASB's or SB's just go to the dungeons of the Federal Repository and they are all there. You can read them, but if you try to copy or disseminate them or publish them, Mr Boeing has a whole team that will descend upon you like a ton of bricks. They closely husband their sensitive secrets.
DMCA action is unilateral. You have no right of appeal (and neither does the ISP).
No need to wonder any more about ASB/SB's.
Overtalk
I realize my post is going slightly off topic, but I suspect Boeing's concern was that of publication out of context.
It's important for those that folow and implement SBs that they are aware of all previous SBs relating to the issue as well as those that supercede.
Publication of any one SB out of this context could be misleading.
I realize my post is going slightly off topic, but I suspect Boeing's concern was that of publication out of context.
It's important for those that folow and implement SBs that they are aware of all previous SBs relating to the issue as well as those that supercede.
Publication of any one SB out of this context could be misleading.