Thomas almost cooks his goose!

[NigelOnDraft]

i fail to see the incident. the pilot made wrong data input but corrected this at TO and nothing happened.

Agreee totally - entering wrong TO data is not an issue

Oh, hang on:
EK A340
MK 747 Halifax

From p52 of that report:

1.18.8 Take-off Accidents – Inadequate PerformanceA review of large (above 5700 kg), turbine-powered aircraft accident and incident data has shown that there have been at least 12 major occurrences where take-off performance was significantly different from scheduled performance. Four of the aircraft involved were destroyed and there were 297 fatalities.

I am not "blaming" the crew - the dumbing down of takeoff perf (typing figures into a computer / ACARS get semeingly random results out/back) and the range of types / weights one can fly even on the same day mean that trapping errors by observaiton / experience is almost impossible. Rigourous use of SOPs - yes, but across lots of airlines / fleets / crews, all that is reduce the number of errors, not eliminate them.
NoD

[CONF iture]

Originally Posted by BOAC

if a BA Fleet Chief Pilot can do it........

Would you have a link ... ?

[Down Three Greens]

...and probably the reason why additional green-dot checks are in place post-incident (on top of those in place) and the new FMS software Revision 1A including the new Airbus Take-Off Securing System is being rolled out as soon as it became available from Airbus. I guess that's what you call a Safety Management System in use.

[763 jock]

We are now using computerised performance. On two occasions I have begun to enter the ZFW and then realised what I was doing. If the SOP is correctly followed, a mistake such as this will be picked up.

The computerised load sheets are worse than useless, always turning up just as you want to get going. Perhaps the actual TOM should be in bold or colour. The old "somethings not right" is also thrown out because the computer provides optimum performance and will vary the flap settings according to the conditions.

Take care!

[fireflybob]

One gross error check I observed that a very experience pilot always made was to write down the ACTUAL ZFW, TOW and LW from the loadsheet adjacent to the figures in the Fuel Plan (of course this assumes that the figures on said plan are about right!).

Recall the crew of a certain airline doing Iraklion to Manchester in A320 did not notice that the ACTUAL load was 5 tonnes more than the planned until they did the first fuel check and were embarrassingly down on fuel to make destination. They had to lob into Luton for some more gas!

[CONF iture]

Originally Posted by NoD

I am not "blaming" the crew - the dumbing down of takeoff perf (typing figures into a computer / ACARS get semeingly random results out/back) and the range of types / weights one can fly even on the same day mean that trapping errors by observaiton / experience is almost impossible. Rigourous use of SOPs - yes, but across lots of airlines / fleets / crews, all that is reduce the number of errors, not eliminate them.

Totally agree on that.
In our operation the crew still does the W&B and use performance paper chart to get the figures out.
IMO the overall situation awareness is so much better.

[Down Three Greens]

Ref : Not suggesting that pilots should absolve responsibility, nor should they be unaware of the weight of the thing they are about to fly, and yes, it should be flagged in a slightly more urgent manner than the "are you sure?" message we all get when we use any Microsoft software if there is perceived to be a discrepancy. (Realise this is not as simple - For example, it could be a positional flight with few or zero passengers so my 90% load suggested could be way off, but this could be overridden if appropriate).

Google : Airbus/Honeywell/Thales Take-Off Securing System. I think Airbus and Honeywell/Thales have designed such a 'soft' warning....and it is now being rolled out. Another defence (not cure) in the 'Swiss cheese' model. It had only been available for retrofit for a relatively short time.

The solution to this is robust procedures, crew adhering to procedures and software warnings. All contribute to reducing the impact/propagation of human errors (which are made in every line of work including flying)

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by Conf

Would you have a link ... ?

- I don't think it was ever properly 'reported'. There certainly did not seem to have been an F/O in the cockpit

Same chap left not long after (another 'interesting' handling incident) and almost 'demolished' a complete airline.