Dealing with difficult Captains
 

I experienced a difficult situation with a Captain who wanted to go directly outbound on a VOR/ILS after completing a parallel entry over the VOR. Weather was at minima and big nasty mountains very close to our immediate position.

We were a B737 EFIS and ploughing a long at 280Kts (instead of the required 210Kts) on the procedure!!!

How do you confront a CAPTAIN in the heat of the moment and especially when he believes it is a legal maneuver?

He caught me off guard and went straight outbound without completing the required one time around the hold... I refused to call 'outbound'. I told him it was his call and then advised to him headings to steer to save the tattered procedure and prompted radial and DME. Landed safely, but I know this will happen again.

What would you do?

Perhaps ask yourself the question, "Am I prepared to let this guy kill himself?"

So easy for me to say, I know. I sympathise.

Does CRM work in your company? If so, then you might be able to speak to him about it. If not, then you are in a very difficult situation indeed, and there may be many lives at stake.

Of course, we often have one side of the story (here is no exception) but OTOH 280 knots is a tad fast, altho I'm not so sure the specific procedure used (directly from high station) was not 'legal', it depends on the circumstances.

So, all things considered, one has to ask...was the inbound procudure/course flown properly, at the correct speed (more or less) and was the approach stabilized in accordance with the normal company procedure?

The writer mentions....I had to give him headings etc to save the tatered procedure...

I wonder, could it have been more or less correctly flown, yet from the RHS, not all that much 'help' was given?
Co-pilot envy perhaps?

Perhaps a bit more info would be needed to make a good judgement call.

Sometimes, the F/O just does not like the Commander assigned, so will use any excuse to direct attention.

IF the F/O truly feels that the Commander is unsafe, an official note to the fleet manager is warranted.
After all, that is what the boss is for, among other things.

For instance, deciding just which First Officers deserve to be upgraded.

I'm sure you get the drift...:ooh:

With regard to proceeding straight outbound from a parallel entry to a racetrack procedure for a ILS, I can see no problem with this manoeuvre, and nowhere in Pan Ops Doc 8168 does it say you have to complete 1 hold? However flying the procedure at 280kts could have implications, to ensure you remain within the protected airspace??

Bring this up at the approach briefing stage if you have any doubt as to how the Captain will fly the procedure.

If you find yourself in this situation in future, tell the Captain "you feel uncomfotable with the situation and would like to return to the holding facility"
This would have been more constructive rather than refusing to call outbound!

Didn't want to be the first to say, but I'm not aware of a "Required once around the hold" either. Perhaps you usually did as part of your training?

HOWEVER,you shouldn't be APPROACHING a hold at 280 (In fact, for starters, shouldn't you be 250 below FL100?

The reversal procedure should have been flown at 210kts, so a diplomatic statement like "It's 210 Max in the procedure captain" would have been appropriate. if no or inadequate response, then perhaps a more assertive "Captain you must slow down" would have been the next step.

Points i wanted to raise have already been given (250 below 10, 210 kts proc speed etc) but it seems to be a common thread on here about dealing with difficult captains, i have done both jobs and sometimes dealing with difficult first officers is more challenging as they sometimes do not have the experience to fall back on, in both seats you have to bend your personality to a degree.

Bluepilot has it right - when you are a First Officer you think all the dorks are in the left seat but when you become a captain then you realise there are one or two guys in the right seat who are not too great either!

Regarding 280kts in a procedure - a potential disaster awaits. In my last company we had a captain who not once but twice did that and both times it resulted in hard GPWS warnings near high ground. On the first occasion it also nearly resulted in disaster as the captain got stuck in Alpha Floor/Toga Lock and could not get out of it (if you are not on the Airbus just ignore this bit!). He was given retraining in the sim and then did the same thing again some months later! He was given the choice of becoming a First Officer or leaving and he chose to leave. He is now on a 737 with a company that has a less than perfect safety record! This guy had a long history of being a nightmare to fly with and taking unprofessional decisions. The moral of the story is that if the guy next to you is being stupid you tell him! It is so easy to say that but the bottom line is you have a higher responsibility to your passengers than you do to your own comfort. That is definitely a case for expressing your concern on the ground afterwards. If you get no satisfaction then you should take it to higher authority.

The Heading for this topic should be changed to...

Dealing with difficult..insert rank here

Norman SF-so the Airbus was at max angle of attack and only allows so much backstick...right? Did they use max thrust and later have the engines inspected?
The Captain described at the beginning could kill everybody else if he leaves the charted airspace-not just himself. Read up on the 757 crash at Cali, Columbia, plus at least dozens of others. My first procedure turn (in a transport jet) was just west of high mountains in Bozeman, Montana (BZN). Luckily, the VOR is right on the airport and the ILS localizer is used.

The last time was about three years ago at Kalispell, MT-my first time there. Had taken all the approach charts home before the trip even began. On arrival over the pitch-black huge mountains just several miles east of the airport, Salt Lake Center said "would you like to do the VOR approach to a circling approach?" I realized that the controller was a jerk. Told the FO that he was crazy, and we wanted the normal procedure turn on the localizer.

The one thing that helps is to have already studied all the approach charts and we used about 180 knots outbound (about 3 miles/minute). You can only go 10 miles outbound, can you not? At 280, you cover over half of the protected airspace in just one minute.

You don't want to create any unnecessary challenges near mountains or on slippery runways. Some of those mountain airports have un-forecast snow (no snow removal late at night) or fog (from the lakes), and the tower people are gone. Snow can quickly cover up all of your runway lights. One crew found this and had no alternate fuel.:oh:

There's several simultaneously running discussions on the same topic here, but to address the 'Once around the Hold requirement' - The completed holding pattern ENTRY is considered as the first completed holding pattern, thus, there is no further holding pattern needed (unless ATC require it).

Regards,

Old Smokey

Old Smokey

ICAO Doc 8168 states that, when proceeding to the final segment of an approach procedure from a parallel entry, aircraft shall intercept the inbound track of the hold and not return direct to the facility. I'm not sure whether this would be achieved at 280kts (don't know because I've never tried it).

Touch'n'oops

Why didn't you ask the captain to slow to max holding speed prior to entering the hold? This might have prevented the subsequent problems.

Airclues

I have been studying!
 

I understand that it is hard to visualize the situation.

The reason why I did not approve of this turn is that during my training I was pulled up by the instructor for trying to complete the same maneuver.

I have been picking through Pans-Ops 8168 V1 & V2.
And have found this requirement, which I had known to be true.

(3.5.3 Entry. Entry into a reversal procedure should be from a track within +/- 30 degrees of the outbound track (see Figures 1-4-3-4 and 1-4-3-5). Where entry is desired from tracks outside these limits, suitably protected airspace must he provided to allow the pilot to maneuver onto the outbound track. This maneuvering will be in accordance with the entry procedures associated with a suitably located holding pattern , which must be shown on the approach chart (see Figure 1-4-3-6).)

Out of all the entry procedures recognized by the Doc. 8168, the parallel turn is obviously not considered a method of establishing one's self. Where as, the offset (base turn) and race track are recognized methods.

To recap, we tracked on the 230 Rad inb. to VOR, then 069 track outb. on the hold, right turn after 1min, attempted to establish inb. to VOR 069 rad. Sort of overhead VOR straight outb. on 249 till 7.7 DME, right turn intercept ILS course 271. Landed.

A Question of Speed
I had informed the captain that speed was high for the entry and the reply was 'It's OK'. Once again I advised that it could compromise the protected maneuvering area. I was ignored. I repeated the information calmly again. Captains reply 'I know it is OK'.
I left it, I knew the holding side had plenty of room for error. The turn was where I was going to put my foot down, because we would then be tracking towards terrain. He slowed during the turn to 210Kts.
Sadly my airline suffers every now and then from the KAL syndrome. And management are not very approachable, especially when talking about the Captains that they desperately need.

Are you a Loco?

For my 2 Eurosworth - yes, I would have been more forceful in the RHS about the speed during entry. Was it briefed? If so did you challenge it?

A 'smart' way to solve the procedure problem is to get yourself onto the 249 radial BEFORE the VOR and go straight outbound. Whether or not it would pass an IRT I know not, but it is SAFE and WORKS.


Edited to add: - and AMZINGLY easy with EFIS:D

Touch'n'oops wrote: Out of all the entry procedures recognized by the Doc. 8168, the parallel turn is obviously not considered a method of establishing one's self. Where as, the offset (base turn) and race track are recognized methods????

This I copied directly from Doc8168:

3.2.3.2 Entry into a racetrackprocedure
Normally a racetrack procedure is used when aircraft arrive overhead the fix from various directions. In these cases,
aircraft are expected to enter the procedure in a manner similar to that prescribed for a holding procedure entry with the
following considerations:
a) Offset entry from Sector 2 shall limit the time on the 30" offset track to 1 min 30 s, after which the pilot is
expected to turn to a heading parallel to the outbound track for the remainder of the outbound time. If the
outbound time is only 1 min, the time on the 30' offset track shall be 1 min also;
b) Parallel entry shall not return directly to the facility without first intercepting the inbound track when proceeding to the final segment of the approach procedure; and
c) All manoeuvring shall be done in so far as possible on the manoeuvring side of the inbound track.

From how I understand it the Captain made a parallel entry to a racetrack procedure then to proceed straight outbound, I see no problem!!!

I never knew Shumacker was a Captiano!

I can't understand why you were at 280 below 10000! Did ATC not go ape s**t? God, I have flown 255 at 9500 ft and been told off!

If you feel worried enough to tell all us then it's a problem. When briefing the approach make the call yourself and wait for him to approve!

Until then....try to keep your knickers clean!

Normal Nigel, are you suggesting that the Low Cost airlines have a monopoly on idiots in the left seat? Why is it that you and others continually try to throw dirt at these airlines? I suspect you might work for Big Airway with a name like that but I am still curious as to why you asked that shameful question?

On the topic of Doc 8168 procedure design...

Yes - 280 KIAS will get you well outside the protected airspace boundary if you time the turn. If you fly a DME-limited turn and the speed is reduced before the inbound turn is commenced, you have violated the word & letter of 8168, but have not jeopardised your obstacle clearance. Either way, the intended outbound speed should have been covered in the brief, and 280 should have triggered a challenge, no matter what.

The "once-around -the-hold"-issue is somewhat more clear-cut. The 8168-wording as cited (especially the bold-face sentences) are at best ambigous. But this does not subtract from the fact that if you do things the way BOAC suggest, you're a lot safer than if you just parallel-tracked outside the inbound radial. If you intercept that radial outbound - you know where you are (but are complying with 8168 word & letter). If you just head outbound on a parallel track (especially non-EFIS A/C) - you & 8168 are best buddies, but your position awareness could be better. I know which one I prefer (and fly)...

Further, if the speed had been correct (racetrack vs. hold - not hold-vs.-280 :ouch: ), you are established on the LOC & are configured for the approach & everybody has been briefed & is ready - then why not shoot the approach straight in? You are in the right piece of sky, tracking the right way, on the right config, speed & SA - so why not do it? I have only come across UK F/Os asking why we did not go once more around the hold, no other EU crew thought it a problem. Is it a particular training habit @ UK FTO's or are the rest of us missing the point?

Brgds fm
Empty

If the Captain, or the FO, flies in IMC in a manner which is a surprise and/or makes the other pilot a bit uncomfortable, feeling that he/she is behind or caught off guard, then he/she should ask why the speed is not being reduced or how far out (WHEN?) the turn will be made towards the maneuvering side, and if time allows other duties to be done.

You guys can quote all the pertinent regulations if you want, but the flying pilot should brief how far and in which direction/at what airspeed the manuever will be done: the time available can be more compressed than anticipated. The other pilot (even if very experienced) will be very busy with flows/checklists and maybe anti-icing, clearances (with a closed tower, traffic reports also) and fairly soon, braking action reports-and has limited time for a briefing if enroute center or approach control gives you an approach which is totally unexpected. You might need to slow up quite a lot, in order to allow time to brief a non-precision on final instead of an ILS. Possibly fly a 360 (but well clear of terrain/towers), slow circle in order for both crewmembers to be coordinated. With no real automation, it can require even more work. If this is on a very short leg, i.e. 20-30 minutes enroute, you might slightly delay a takeoff and brief just the basics, based on the NOTAMS and winds, before you even takeoff. Captains often assume that an FO can read his/her mind. Being the Captain is no excuse-especially in weather, near terrain or in any IMC conditions with low vis. or a low ceiling etc. How about also with a back-course localizer (switch off most flight directors!) to a slippery, short runway?

Maybe ask Dispatch a free-text message about whether the destination runway is full-length and about any changes in nav-aids, winds, snow/fog info, even braking reports (we only trust jet reports-they have no props to slow down for a sharp turn-off). Often, our Ops people rarely monitor the company radio freq and are out getting good coffee or smoking. Especially after landing. They might have good info, but are often unavailable unless requested early on ACARS.:hmm:

Nigel, we await your answer.
If he does it wrong once, tell him, twice and shout so that the recorder gets it! Three times and take control, say nothing until the following day then file the MOR.
Arrive safely!

In the flightdeck pilots normaly tend to argue who is right, rather than what is right .

Interesting to note someone made reference to speed below 10000ft. This is perfectly acceptable if given the go ahead from ATC. The procedure being flown at 280 kts, is however, totally unacceptable. What was this guy thinking, or maybe not as the case may be. Lacking in situational awareness for sure. Sympathise with the F/O but it does highlight how important your role is on the flightdeck. Here is another question, leading on from a response above, how many of F/O's would take control !!. Rgds.

Point, If EVER there is a question of safety of flight. put the aircraft somewhere safe and take the time Think.! Say right up loud and clear. Captain I think this is UN safe!! Then offer a safe place to think/ Reveiw. comunicate. If the captain blows you off. don't let him/her kill you. If he/her doesn't like this. its time to talk/question the company. Or quite and find another job.

Luckily it is only the minority of Capts that are difficult. Most take advice well personally I'm glad to have a FO to catch all the balls I drop, I've only made one buy the alcohol free beer all night.

You need to speak out as FO, it's your job. If we were all as perfect as some as the 'old school' BOAC Capts there would be no need for anyone in the RHS. :cool:

this thread seems to forget the other possible scenario...difficult FO's.

Interesting reading!!! (PPL 100 Hours thinking of going for the ATPL)

What was the name of the Captain flying the TRI-STAR which deep stalled with a young FO, it was very big at the time, this seems to be the same sernio as you are talking about.

Since my last post I have picked the brains of many senior Captains and found that most approved the method of intercept for the outbound course. However, a couple did not agree.

The experience has now taught me to ask more detailed questions about the approach, especially entry procedures!!!

The approach was into the Philippines where 250Kts below 10'000ft is NOT a requirement.
Now that I have thought about the events further. I believe the captain did know where he was and knew he was too high, thus a reason for keeping the speed so high. I also think he was relying on local knowledge/EFIS to keep the a/c away from terra firma!!! STILL, I DON'T APPROVE!!!
Sadly my airline has many 'YES, SIR' FOs and "Shut-up and watch" Capts. because that is the culture. And at this point in time I do not feel confident reporting to the company, as I am seen as very disposable to management. :uhoh:

Next question: would I take control from a captain? YES. A couple of days ago I reached for the controls when a captain didn't respond to a Mandatory "Go Around". He must have thought he would get away with it, thats was until he saw me move to take control. Go Around completed as norm, but a very quite flight deck on the return sector!!!:ugh:

It still astounds me that this kind of misunderstanding can still happen in a world of CRM / LOFT / multi crew training.....(to differing degrees at differeing companies all be it). I say misunderstanding because obviously what the flying pilot was thnking was not what the non flying pilot was.

Touch'n'oops, was there a thorough and detailed approach breifing prior to descent? If there was and the Capt still acted as you say then this is a sorry state of affairs. If there wasn't then there was an initial breakdown in basic multi crew ops, let alone CRM, etc.

I have had, as an FO and Capt, instances where the friendly crew member just said "You're happy with XXX approach?" to which I've agreed with. He / she thought that was all I needed and was almost offended when I requested a full briefing of the approach chart, levels, speeds, configuration.... You are entering the most critical phase of flight and cannot be taken lightly.

If either pilot then strays from the briefing given both crew members know it and recognise it. From there I find there is less "tension" when questioning something in the approach. The first piece of "swiss cheese" has already occured if the initial briefing did not occur properly.

On a similar note, it infuritaes me when another crew member knowingly breaks SOPs and puts me in the position to have to mention it, and then gets the sh$ts. On that note I've also learnt that the way something is said can get differing reactions due differing pilots and personalities.

All in all it's an uncomfortable position you were put in, but as others have stated, your ego or that of the Capt's is not worth comprimising the full safety of the pasengers you are carrying. I hope you get a good result from the unfortunate experince down the track.....

Okay, I am now aware that it is possible to join the outbound course after completing a parallel entry. I had a flick through Trevor Thom's Instrument flying book (Book 5) and one of his examples was near identical to that of my approach. He does use a parallel join over the beacon and proceeds outbound.
For those that have the book and are interested: P365. Fig.20-16.

I WAS WRONG!

The Captain did not breif the join. Being inexperienced I did not realise that this is vital and quite honestly didn't think about it! CRM is not strong at my company, even though Captains and FOs are being sent for CRM training, not much is changing.

In our SOPs it is stated that during the final approach Vert. speed becomes more than 1000ft/min call "Sink Rate". When a captain exceeded this, I called it in the simplest mono-toned voice. The reply, "I KNOW, be quite and watch!!!"

Correct procedures are put in place for safe conduct of flight full stop...breaching them can increase the risk of a safe conducted flight and I believe if you feel out of place with what is happening express your concern to the Captain and let him know you are concerned with the way he or she has proceeded with the approach (in your case the speed below 10000ft and the correct approach pattern) etc...

I believe there is no harm in speaking up. Advise the Captain of the correct speed in your case 210kts for the procedure and not 280kt.. Get you point through until you are satisfied with the result between Captain and F/O …but then again I can imagine the situation you are in and along with the many RHS pilots who go through it…

Airway-

You also hit the nail on the head.

No matter how large or small the Captain's ego,he/she can always be the person who is right, if they need to exploit their rank.

The types with ego problems and/or the unwillingness to consider concerns voiced by other crewmembers, even if they have the best situational awareness/self-descipline in the world, created the need for a CRM program. This was begun partly because of a DC-8 which was getting very low on fuel over Portland, Oregon. The L-1011 crash in the Everglades might have inspired the need, along with the (Western) DC-10 in Mexico City, the Jetstream accident at Hibbing, Minnesota, and the worst disaster, at Tenerife.

Egos or over-riding anxieties over duty period regulations etc led to thousands of deaths.:ouch:

Touch'n'oops

Nice to see you are big enough to admit you are wrong. The topic has made interesting reading from a CRM perspective.

Not sure about the couple of posters who so keen to change it to a "difficult FO' situation. I hope they read your confession to being in the wrong.

Once on the ground, did you try asking the other pilot why they had done those two things - high speed approaching the hold and the hold entry? They must have seen that it left you confused. Perhaps you can phrase it in such a way that it looks like you are wanting to learn from them, not challenge their authority?

F

Very true Ignition...

No FO should be intimidated, FO's should never hesitate to challenge, enquire or express concern.

Strong words like "I'm not happy", "I'm concerned" or even "I'm uncomfortable" should alert the captain to evaluate or re-think the moment/situation.

I know it is easier said than done especially with junior FO's when questioning actions or decisions by the captain, no human being is the same or perfect, we all have different reactions or attitudes to everything in life, but we can learn and adapt to ensure cockpit efficiency, safety and awareness.

DQ4 is absolutely correct. The problem is not many pilots are aware of a racetrack entry and when one is performed it takes F/O's by surprise.

You could argue that the entry should be briefed but shouldn't "standard racetrack entry" be sufficient??

As for the speed. If I caught any Pilot flying in excess of the published speed on a published procedure he wouldn't be doing it again. He would be taken off line. It is dangerous and neglegent. Standard speeds are essential for terrain clearence and it is unsatisfactory for a pilot to fly any faster than that published just because he thinks it's ok. Its the same guy that throws away the plate and we read about him in chirp in the CFIT section.

If any of you fly in a non standard manner, ask yourself if you should be flying at all. I wouldn't want my children in the cabin with aircraft flying procedures at 280 knots. No way.