situational awareness and human information processing
 

To anyone who can help!!

would anyone out there who knows a bit about aviation psychology be able to tell me if there are any linkages between situational awareness and the characteristics of human information processing. If there are what might they be??

My next question would be...how might these be applicable in a multi-crew environment.

any help would be much appriciated.

Cheers!!

h1tman47 , I make no claims of expertise in aviation psychology, but reading the standard texts suggest that there is a direct link between SA and information processing. In addition, I would conclude that the association between SA and information processing is critical in a multi-crew environment.

For background reference, see:

1. The ESSAI project (Working Paper 1)
2. RAeS Human Factors Group, Conference on Situation Assessment and Decision-Making, May 2001.
3. Publications section of Mica Endsley’s website: www.satechnologies.com/html/overview.html
4. Paper on Non Adherence to Procedures by A Karwal given at a Flight Safety Foundation conference

From Karwal’s paper, several problems in information processing are identified.

• Failures in the input from the senses; relevant information is not seen or incorrect information used. Problems with illusions etc.
• Failures in pattern matching; the misperception of information. Procedure design (input senses, interpretation), Experience / training (long term memory), Cultural aspects (influencing factors), Personality aspects / attitudes (influencing factors) and aspects of the situation itself.
• Problems also arise from inappropriate attention; the incorrect allocation of attention resources, focus of attention. Stress fatigue, Personality aspects / attitudes.

I would include failures in decision making because SA relates to projecting a course of action (gathering, understanding, and planning ahead), feed back from the action is sensed, which closes the information processing loop.

An interesting paper “Errors in Aviation Decision Making: A Factor in Accidents and Incidents”, Judith Orasanu, Lynne Martin, NASA-Ames Research Center, gives another view of the failures in information processing and SA.

• The situations were not recognized as ones that should trigger a change of course of action, due to the ambiguity of the cues;
• Risk was underestimated;
• Goals conflicted (safety vs. productivity, mission completion or social factors);
• Consequences were not anticipated or evaluated.
  
  For ambiguity “Cues that signal a problem are not always clear-cut. Conditions can deteriorate gradually, and the decision maker's situation assessment may not keep pace. If events occur infrequently, the decision maker may not have amassed the experience to recognize the signals associated with a different course of action. Flight crews are typically in a "go" frame of mind. A substantial weight of evidence is needed to change the plan being executed. Weather and certain system malfunctions can change dynamically and pose a challenge for situation assessment. For decisions that have consequences, such as rejecting a takeoff or diverting, the decision maker needs to justify a course of action that may entail a cost. If the situation is ambiguous, the decision is harder to justify than if the situation is clear-cut, which may work against a decision to change the course of action.”

The paper proposes that improvements in decision making should come from improved SA, that in turn requires improved displays (high quality information) and better training – directed training to give experience; and in the judgment of risk and time (time management).

Many of the problems in mental processing as above could apply directly to a multi-crew environment, particularly if the crew is considered an entity of information processing; i.e. the group suffers the same failures as an individual. In addition, there is the need for individuals to share mental models to achieve collective agreement; this involves communication and other CRM aspects – individual resource management.

A primary defence within threat and error management is cross monitoring; thus, a failure in one individual’s SA should be detected by another crewmember, and an alert should be given – or question asked. It is essential for all crewmembers to realise that until they establish a common mental model of the situation that they are likely to have differing views of a situation and hence differing strategies; CRM again – group resource management.

Some items from the USN HFACS Primer:

Sensory- Perceptual factors
Misjudged distance, clearance, altitude, speed, etc.
False perception due to visual illusion
False perception due to vestibular illusion
Spatial Disorientation/Vertigo

Loss of Situation Awareness (SA)
Geographic disorientation (off navigation route or map/lost)
General loss of SA (did not perceive hazardous condition)
Erroneous situation assessment (misinterpreted situation or condition)
Failed to predict/anticipate changing conditions
False hypothesis/confirmation bias (persistent false perception or misconception of situation)
Attention failure (did not monitor or respond when correct information was available)
Types:
A. Missed flight checklist items, callout, or crew challenge.
B. Failed to monitor flight progress or maintain instrument scan.
C. Failed to respond to communication or warning input.
D. Control action errors (motor response SLIP or memory LAPSE)

Conditions that influence Attention and Situation Awareness:
1. Inattention (focused on information unrelated to cockpit tasks/flying)
2. Channelized or task fixated (psychological perceptual narrowing)
3. Distraction (by internal/mental preoccupation, or by external event)
4. Task overload (excess tasking with/without mission performance time pressure)
5. Cognitive workload (problem-solving concentration or information overload)
6. Habituation (old/previous learned habit interference)
7. Excess aircrew stress or fatigue level.
8. Excess mission tasking or workload.
9. Inadequate briefing or poor flight preparation.
10. Inadequate training or experience for mission.
11. Negative learning transfer (e.g. transitioning to new aircraft).
12. Adverse weather/meteorological conditions.
13. Adverse cockpit environmental conditions (temperature, vibrations, etc.)
14. Tactical situation or display information overload.
15. Low aircrew motivation and poor flight vigilance.
16. Poor cockpit design (control/display location or data format)

Mica Endsley is one of the most prominent authors here and is well worth a read. I have an essay floating around somewhere of HIP and SA. She produced some great models of the interactions of SA and HIP which i also have.


“The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1988, p.97)

Well msg me if u require more

Thanks everyone!!
 

Just want to say thank you very very very much to
alf5071h, safetypee and readbackcorrect.

The information you have provided has been extremely helpful. Thanks for the offer readbackcorrect. Just goes to show that this PPRUNE is not just for spreading rumors and gossip. It can be useful too :O

h1tman47

By the Way how did my post get a Three stripes Rating?? gosh i feel special!!!
:p