Forget the stories of 'daring do' and answer the question, what is your acceptable margin of additional required runway in order for you to abort above V1.

Mutt

Really? Got any examples? You never know your knowledge might save lives one day.

I'd appreciate examples for:

V1+5kts, +10kts, +20kts, +30kts.

When do you do these calculations? Pre-departure or during the take off roll?

Johns7022

You fly a G-IV for an operator that lets pilots with NO type training act as a SIC? Leaving alone the fantastical idea that it's you being selected, what would the insurers or passengers say at that breathtaking bit of irresponsibility? At what distance can you read N numbers? I doubt it could be more 1,000 feet, so you didn't get that close, I know that. How did the SW B737 suddenly become a "jumbo jet"? If this was KLAX, how did ATC clear a visual and let your plane close that close? You can BS the fans, but you cannot BS the players. Here, we are all players.

Mutt. Ah yes, we some, no doubt cruder, versions of that kit, too.

GF

Asking me if I can or can't do something isn't teaching. What I can and can't do is irrelevant. If it's so easy to calculate post V1 abort performance why does it matter what is past the DER?

Can you show us some examples or not?

Again, what range can N numbers be read? They are, by FAA standard, 12 inches high; are you telling me you can read something the height of a laptop at 1,000 feet. I doubt that ver much. I live in FAA and ICAO world, no competent operator of Gulfstream-class planes does the minimum under FAR 61 for training. All of our pilots have a full type rating or they don't fly, as required crew. Internationally, everyone must have a type rating.

I have not heard of an "open pilot waiver", but I do know of FAR 61.55 SIC qualification.

Still, I'd like to see how you calculate accelerate- stop distances.

GF

So who performed the Go-Around?

We operate about 150 aircraft ranging from 16,700 lbs to 870,000 lbs with some crews who initially trained on DC-3's, none of them are employed with 200 hrs. I know exactly how many engine failures we have had in the last 10 years, how many high speed aborts, how many incidents, how many overruns. We operate aircraft built by 7 aircraft manufacturers, and train crews in about 5 different countries.......... So i guess that we have enough experience to decide that YOU DON'T ABORT AFTER V1........

So did you do a reduced thrust takeoff in that G4?

Mutt

You haven't given us any examples of post V1 perf. calcs.

Johns7022

You are the one here proposing new,"improved" performance planning, do show us professional engineers and pilots how you do it. I would be especially interested in how you use landing charts to calculate safe ASDR on a post-V1 reject. An unknown technique prior to 2100Z today
GF

JT – moderator; appreciating your forbearance with aspects of this thread, it is unfortunate that the original theme has been disrupted by less relevant discussions. May I suggest that the thread be split, that the latter discussions be removed elsewhere so that a more meaningful exploration of the original subject might continue to be explored?

This request is not intended to stifle a broad range of views. We all seek ‘truth’ and require open minds lest we are mistaken, but unfortunately it is difficult to debate currently accepted ‘science’ truths relating to post V1 RTOs without rational and logical presentation of alternatives.
I’m very interested in the ‘aside’ discussions as they provide insight to aspects of human thought, behavior, needs, belief, etc; possibly relating to problems of pilot training and progression of corporate pilots into commercial operations.

In other threads, some protagonists (including johns) express views that they are overlooked when seeking commercial positions, and that ‘cheaper’ and less experience first officers are being hired instead.
The corporate experience indicated in this thread is not as required by the airlines (nor the industry). This experience is not flying hours, but consists of personal qualities, airmanship, and human interaction which contribute to ‘attitude’. I recall that many airlines hire for attitude and train aptitude. I doubt that they would hire a pilot exhibiting a ‘know it all’, self centered view of operations, particularly if they could not explain opinions which differ from the accepted norm.

With respect to the thread subject, the distracting discussion could cause us question that deep and often intuitive beliefs of ‘us ground abiding humans’ might be hidden in our subconscious, only to surface in stressful situations - RTO assessments at high speed. However, this would only be another cause for RTOs after V1, suggesting that current training suppresses this innate behavior.

One argument is that we are approaching the limit of human performance and thus for high speed RTOs there should be greater margins of safety (not necessarily as expounded previously). Technology has and still continues to improve reliability, thus the human in comparison appears the weaker link. Human behavior can be improved, but not always dependably in increasingly complex operations.
Some might call for automation, which is by no means as dependable or flexible as the human, or do we persevere with the human in times of economic hardship, including a reducing source of ‘experienced’ pilots and fewer opportunities to gain experience, and even perhaps a diminishing passion for flying vs just a job; but again these are problems not solutions.

I've got a type, several in fact.

I still want to know how you easily calculate runway required on a post V1 stop. You haven't answered because you can't.

I still want to know the reason that you will stop after V1.
Is it the weather conditions?
Or flying a SID?
Or icing?
Or flying an approach to minimums?
Is it what's beyond the DER? Does that matter if you're calcs are so good and easy to do?

All of those things we are trained to do in an aircraft designed and certified to do it.

Tell you what Lord..it's a slow night....

You load up a Citation 560, 9000 ft field, 1000 MSL...fly from PDX to DAL, full pax, call it ten peeps at 210 each, 35 lbs of bags each...

Plan the trip, come back with the numbers, show me you can plan a flight..then we will talk departure numbers...ok?

Show me a 10 passenger C560, first! Second, assuming you meant 8 passengers and 2 crew, your load exceeds ZFW by, at least, 150 pounds in an XLS+, more in an Excel. Third, the PDX 7 departure has a min climb gradient of 350 ft/nm or greater and numerous close-in obstacles, do you have a runway analysis provider? Fourth, the Excel cannot do this trip, probably in either direction, with your fictional payload. Any other bright ideas? I could do it in GLEX without even trying.

I've answered your BS questions, now answer one simple, do you calculate accel-stop distance on each take-off to justify a decision to reject after V1?

GF

If you are going to put a passenger on the dark, belted potty for 3+25, eastbound, and with a stop 5+00 westbound, be my guest. I don't do that, don't plan that way, either. Cessna says 8 seats plus a belted potty for a total of 9 passengers; add in the crew for a total of 11. Where are you getting 13? And the ZFW restriction means it doesn't matter what you say for seating, you reach ZFW FIRST!

It would be nice, if you knew what you were talking about.

GF

BTW, J_T, I think this thread is getting far off track--in fact, so far, it is out of HF range.

Yep, and a very satisfying career it was too, working with professionals, which if you ever get to learn to fly you may have a crack at as well, though I doubt anyone would take you on because of personality issues.

How come the XLS has a ZFW of 15,100 pounds and you quote 12,200? Which one is a CE 560, an Encore or an Ultra? And how come Cessna's website shows both models as not being single pilot qual'd? My single pilot jet time is all tac fighter, btw, with a seat to solve all problems!

Gee, I thought 13 was about 4 too many in GLEX. I never flew the CE560, so knave learned that their website doesn't show all the possible interior arrangements. So, if an operator is stupid enough, he can put 10 valued employees in your careless hands. Being solo, I presume you wear an O2 mask above FL 350. No, not really, you don't follow any other reasonable regulations or good practices like climb gradients, the history of rejected take-offs, why that one.

Good luck, hope you don't make headlines!

GF

Bull****e. No you don't, cause the aircraft ain't certified SP. You don't fly nothin.

As you are talking about the Cessna Citation 560, Encore/Ultra.... please have a look at....
Performance

It's worth noting that this is the latest in this family.... also note the following.." Single Pilot Certified No".... (but this doesnt apply to the older versions)

Now if you are talking about a different aircraft, please let us know.

Mutt

There is no issue about flying the small Citation single pilot..... but look at the performance figures that are given for the Ultra ++. They don't appear to agree that you can operate PDX-DAL with 10 passengers.... I would presume that the performance of the older Citation 560s would be even less.


Mutt

Worked for me when I ran it tonight... :)

Tell you what...I won't wander into your make and model if you don't wander into mine...ok?

Look at the performance chart from Cessna, it shows Max Payload for the Citation 560 Ultra ++ at about 2,350 lbs, not your required 2,500 lbs. With this payload you can carry the max payload about 1180 nms in nil wind conditions. The distance from PDX-DAL is 1493 nms which today happens to be 1280 nms with a 75 kt tailwind (Jetplan data). That gives you about a 2000 lb payload. So how are you getting 2500 lbs?

No alternate? No reserve? What?

Mutt

As I sit back with popcorn and chuckle, for those too ignorant to know, you're trying to match whits with a professional performance engineer (Mutt) who quite possibly knows more at this stage on the subject and is far more conversant about performance, safety, and requirements, than some of those arguing with him ever will be in their sorry lifetimes.

You guys sure know how to pick 'em. I wouldn't argue with Mutt regarding performance, because I know from the outset, I'd lose. Some of you are simply too stupid to understand that, so have fun beating your head against the wall.

Personally I'll have fun watching Galaxy Flyer and Mutt wipe the floor with you, when they're done. (Not that they haven't, already...)

Like I said earlier, never argue with an idiot, they drag you down to their level, then beat you with experience.

Cessna has certainly messed things up with designations--two different planes, the old Citation 5, improved is a CE 560; as is a Citation XLS with an entirely different fuselage and engines. And 28 years since I last flew one, I can attend recurrent and and fly any of them. The TCDS is complicated to go through as any.

Just to clarify things, we are a private operator, we have a customized runway analysis for each take-off and remain within it's limits; we have a comprehensive ops manual and a SMS program. We try to operate to FAR 121 standards, to the extent of doing 3 page airport surveys before operating into a Cat B or Cat C field. I'd like to think other private operators are a conscientious about their operations, as we do not what to put others at risk.

Mutt. Better than that, he probably says he can do a non-stop return!


This thread has strayed far from a V1 discussion.

Mutt..I gave you my BEW and ZFW.

12200 ZFW - 9645 BEW = 2555 ZFW Payload

Based on last night winds..and some creative use of choosing certain power settings and the optimum alts....the trip was more then doable, considering all the places to stop between PDX and DAL....if the winds changed I probably would have stopped in Colo somewhere.

If your doing this on paper...shoot yourself now...your not going to be able to sit there, moving alts/power settings around to find and optimum combination that will keep you legal for take off, and have a legal reserve on the other end. Not in this lifetime that is.

safetypee . . .
 

. . . tell that to the Quantas A380 pilots at SIN who had experienced 50+ ECAM messages, many contradictory; Engines 1+4 operating in "degraded mode;" Buses 1+2 dead; APU wouldn't take up electrical load; pneumatic leaks in left wing; fuel leak in left wing; failed fuel-dump system; No.1 engine couldn't be shut down after landing and continued to run for 4 hours...! :ooh:

GB, “Technology has and still continues to improve reliability, …”
Perhaps of interest / relevance in this thread, is that Trent engine did not go ‘bang’ during takeoff, often assumed to be the most critical period.
“The human in comparison appears the weaker link." - Context. An essential component of awareness and understanding the problem, which I assume you already know … ;)
This does not detract from the excellent talent and skills of the crew, which IMHO argues strongly for the human to remain in the loop during critical tasks. We Still Need Exceptional People.

However, humans do have limitations, especially in high stress, time-critical tasks. The Qantas crew had time and managed it, and other resources very well.
In critical instances such as a high speed RTO we should review the tasks which we ask of the crew. We could better match the task to actual capability (as indicated by accident reports) and not necessarily persevere with assumed human performance based primarily on engine failures during takeoff (possibly in older / slower aircraft), particularly where nowadays engine failures are less frequent.

Like I said earlier, never argue with an idiot, they drag you down to their level, then beat you with experience.


Sometimes I think I am far too tolerant. Tidied up a few posts .. hopefully we can get back to rational and pertinent discussion ...

Actually John...your tolerant to the same 4 trolls in here, and ban the people they jump on for fun.....if you want to fix these problems might I suggest you reign in the obvious trouble makers..

If your just about making friends and not promoting any serious discussion on aviation...put that on the banner, I won't come back....

I think your guise as a wise and tolerant moderator is a pretty thin veneer.

Sincerely,

Johns, SSG, ect....

The people you complain of as being trolls are actually practising or retired professional aviators from a very wide background, helo, corporate, airline, GA, military etc.

You would be more than welcome to share these pages (speaking for myself) if you didn't carry on with the Walter Mitty story telling. You bluff no one who has any aviation credentials, and may in fact be something of a safety hazard by influencing an audience who don't have the background to be able to sort the wheat from the chaff.

There is plenty of serious discussion to be had, but with your lack of knowledge and unwillingness to accept the advice of experts you are in fact the one who derails the serious aspect.

John Tullamarine is indeed a wise and tolerant moderator, and has a background in aviation that gives him truly encyclopedic knowledge, though I'm sure he would blush and deny at me saying so.

I think that has just been done.

Should you have a change in heart as to how you engage you will find the community here welcoming with open arms and with a very warm embrace.

Peace be with you.

Sincerely,
Brian

Brian Abraham:

Your message is well stated for the most part, and in particular about John. But, I believe good engagement in this forum doesn't necessarily result in very warm open arms.

An RTO question:-
 

Is there any data for RTOs which resulted in serious incidents or accidents, particularly those commenced above V1, indicating other contributory / external factors, i.e. less than the recommended overrun distance / area.
The line of thought is that if an ‘overrun’ is contained in a safety area without major damage, then these may not appear in accident statistics and thus hide a potentially higher rate of high speed RTOs – incorrect decision but successful outcome.
Conversely how many incidents became accidents because of systematic failures; the crew decision (> V1) might only have been the initiating contribution.

For someone operating a single pilot jet that requires a 5,000 ft ASD from a 10,000 ft runway, there is some logic in deciding to abort on the runway prior to VLOF rather than take flight following an engine failure or some other serious malfunction, especially considering the work load for a single pilot.... however, where do you draw the line, are you willing to do the same on a 9,000 ft runway or even a 7,000 ft runway? In order for you to make a rational decision, you should know what version of FAR 25-109 your aircraft was certified under, the brake condition, and even the calculations methodology used for the AFM.

When you move into the airline world or even the larger corporate world, things change, the aircraft that you fly are designed to operate in the most economical manner possible, you may fly different variants of the same family, (A320/321)(A330/340), there is no possible way that you can know the different characteristics associated with each tail number or runway. But you should be aware if your airline has adopted a Min or Max V1 or optimized V-speeds policy and the reduced thrust policy?

When the people sitting in some dark office decided how these aircraft were going to be operated, they had days or even months to review all of the related facts, to look at in-depth details about the aircraft's performance, the airport, the runway condition and in some cases they have even walked the runway to ensure that the data is correct. For more obscure runways they may have flight tested the departure profiles in a real Flight Simulator, or flown test flights into the airport. The result of all that work is given to the crew on one sheet of paper, it gives a limiting take-off weight at a specific temperature/pressure/wind and it gives V-speeds.

With the aim of reducing high speed rejected takeoff's and enhancing safety. The industry evolved into being more "Go Minded", V1 changed from being a "Decision Speed" into a "Action Speed", a training aid called the Boeing Takeoff Safety guide was released circa 1991 to educate people about RTO's and the correct methods to be used during an RTO. Its worth reading...

Some may ask you to second guess the decision to reject once above V1, but surely if this was the safest option, then in the last 20 years since the formation of the Boeing Takeoff Safety group, then the teaching methods would have changed!

As a final note, As these are anonymous forums the origins of the contributions may be opposite to what may be apparent. In fact the press may use it, or the unscrupulous, or sciolists*, to elicit certain reactions.

Mutt

Let me translate that for you Mutt....for clarity sake...

'When you fly corporate the boss is sitting in the back with his family, he doesn't want his pilot driving the plane to the fence and pulling it off...but when you fly for the airlines, and the flying public has no clue as to how a plane should be flown...it's ok to burn up all the runway with reduced power take offs, because when you bring the plane back to the shop, your own mechanics, who are compelled to stretch the engine overhaul times out as far as possible, can have an easier time not seeing things in the boroscope during the inspection process.

It's all about having enough insurance for each passenger seat, vs paying for more engines, and if you hire cheap pilots, who believe that burning up runway on purpose make sense, in some alternate reality, they can walk up and down the aisle telling the passengers, that safety is first, and actually believe it.."