At 10:32:55.8 - 10:32:58.9 PIC says
"Approaching to land, in case of unsuccessful approach, go around on (using) automatics."

do you say this (auto G/A) does not work if there is no ILS?

franzl, the other forum says they don't know the distance, do count down from Far Beacon, and the real spans covered by the plane would depend on its speed and trajectory of the flight. The running speed know other black boxes, which contents are not told :o(
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Overall, the crew clearly had no desire to land, as follows from the talks (as min., from Russian text). aggravation - "fog" - we've got a problem "let's circle around may be for half an hour", etc.
But were "talked" into it.
"and what if we won't land? - we'll go to the spare aerodrome"

Of the fact that they were "talked" into landing - they informed the aerodrome nil. Kept shut up about it.
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Yes, I will ask more - but from what I understood from prev. posts - there should be an exchange at some point - military aerdorome, un-military - Decision? We are landing. or something like that. Any aerodrome should know what a plane is up to. That one was free of planes, but normally there are many in air, everywhere, I think a permission or informing the ground - something like that ought to have taken place, standardly, as part of procedures. An exchange with the ground on that.
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I also think it's not for nothing, that in first interviews that leaked through the aerodrome chaps exclaimed "They were giving no quittungs!"
And nobody understood what "quittungs" the despatcher meant. The height reporting, by the plane. Clearly the dispatcher knew he missed their real height on the glideslope and was deadly worried about it. May be he couldn't know theoretically - remains to be found out, depending on his equipment. By Russian military aerodrome procedures a plane is to tell his height at every talk exchange with the ground. But did the Polish crew know it - nobody knows.
How they were doing it on the 7th, for example? Did they report to the ground their height back then, 3 days previously? Nobody tells the public.
Also, it's the Captain was not the Captain on the 7th, he was 2nd pilot on the 7th. All is so aggravated :o(

One thing, the chap the ground controller is no young soldier, but qualified as much as you wish (by his aerodrome rules whatever they are). He does it daily for the past 35 years or so, a pensioner age by now.

"do you say this (auto G/A) does not work if there is no ILS?"

Alex, if you can read Russian, I was asking Alexander Leonov (the pilot on duty :o) at page 1228 of Smolensk forum.
He replied quote "The Right one commanded (the go-around to the 2nd circle), and his next step should have been the go-around itself, but he didn't do it likely waited for the Captain's decision. I think the go-around was possible even without ILS but apparently not so energetic as in the wheel regime.
They ought to have switched off the Automate of Pull? Tug? and pilot in the wheel regime and at 100m by barometric height-meter really go around for the 2nd circle."

The way I read this transcript, it very much looks like they were planning and executing a landing even though they notified ATC that they plan to "take a look". So they thought they were on a "glissade" (as if there was an ILS) and navigator counted down to the ground.

Waiting for the FDR
 

I have been wondering about the altimeter setting. The transcript indicates 745 which is likely a QFE.

Was this a good setting: what QFE did the press plane use?

Was the QFE properly set onboard?

But then there's the descent rate as the CVR raises the possibility of a duck under during the last 100m, we are hearing the Navigator announcing 10m lower about every half second. There's 6.5 seconds between the Navigator's 100m and 20m announcements -- a descent rate of approx 740m/min or 2400'/min.

Of course if he's reading the RA, a good chunk of that descent rate would be the ground coming up -- the FDR will tell a fuller story.

They got the same number and when they landed the altimeter was showing zero. It was confirmed by them.

That's the RA readings, the ground was raising up!!! It's been said so many times and confirmed by MAK - they used the radio altimeter.

There were many references early on to the possibility of additional people (non-crew) being on the flight deck for those last few minutes. I've seen nothing in conjunction with the release of the CVR transcripts to confirm or rebut that notion.
Anybody?....

a) many voices have not been recognized
b) the transcripts published are 1 month old. Apparently there is already an updated version - not yet available.
c) define "last few" - I read all 40 pages and there are extra voices all over the place.

updated picture published before
 

http://img44.imageshack.us/img44/4126/flightpath.jpg

with 3 extra time points:

A - First report of 100m height
B- Last report of 100m height
C - Command "odchodzimy" - "go around" (by first pilot I believe)

So, it now appears as if 13 aural warnings are still not enough to prevent press-on-itis. Just what does have to happen by way of external stimulus before the human brain admits it has phucked up and takes appropriate action?
I despair!

Does anyone have a link to a full copy of the translated document?

CTV (Canadian) national news tonight ran a segment on the release of the transcript, included in which was this quote from the pilot: "You can see the ground...maybe there won't be a tragedy"

Is this a "lost in translation" moment or the epitome of irony?

Story is here at 10:35

Singapurcanac, for the 3rd or 4th time, you completely miss the point. All your points are completely irrelevant, because they are NOT supposed to work according to ICAO rules. Ever heard about GAT and OAT? They are simply working according to regulations applied by relevant authority. Again:

-No TL - what's your point here? It doesn't have to be on RT if it's known from other sources, and anyway they are cleared to a height based on local pressure, so they know they are below TL.

-there is approach clearance - not in ICAO phraseology, but they are cleared for 3rd and 4th turn in the pattern depicted on a chart, and that's enough for them.

-no word identified - why would they be? He's not APS, and we don't know what type of radar service he provides. And again, he's not an ICAO controller. BTW, previous sector had him identified, so local rules may specify that after a handoff from one radar unit to another no identification is required, because it was permanent, and that's perfectly ok.

-PAR app by unqualified soldier - and exactly how do you know he's unqualified for PAR? Just because he has no ICAO licence? Hundreds of mil controllers worldwide do it daily without an ICAO/FAA endorsement, and you wouldn't call them unqualified.

-is it PAR at all? Not really

-sending to another freq for landing clearance is not always required, it may be provided on the same frequency as approach services.

And anyway, that's not what killed them. At no point they seem to feel unease with the ATC, as they were accustomed to it. What killed them was knowingly (and it was planned) busting minima looking for ground contact.

Grizzled - in the complete CVR, 3 persons are in cockpit at different times. 1st one is chief purses, which is of course quite normal. Then it's one of the President's minister - he's informed conditions are bad and they will probably have to go somewhere else. After some time he informs the crew "the President hasn't yet decided", but the rest of his statement is marked as unclear, so we don't know what the decision was supposed to be about. The last one was Polish Air Force general - he stayed there until the crash, but there is almost no interaction between him and the crew, he rather seems to be reading something (approach chart) aloud to himself.

Rubik - they earlier discuss their approach planning, and it seems they PLAN to disregard any TAWS warning - "we will be ok as long as Zietas (navigator) reads out our height".

Gwillie - this statement was early in the CVR, about 40 minutes before the crash, while still at FL330 over Minsk. It sounds ominous, but is rather irrelevant to further outcome.

Full text
 

Dlaczego podeszli do l?dowania? Ostatnie s?owa za?ogi Tu-154M - Najwa?niejsze informacje - Informacje - portal TVN24.pl - 01.06.2010 click first link for full transcript second for explanation of symbols.


A general is confirmed in the cabin, one of the presidents staff comes in at least twice. An unidentified person is in the cabin until the end.

On tvn 24 there are regular updates of the interpretation.

Could it be that they were doing well till 30 sec before crash, in fact stable on the glide path, even slightly above (safe) where this was for some reason the point where they started following the RA? What can be causes for changing here to the RA? Outside pressure? known unreliability of the normal altimeter? Bad approach briefing not making the peculiar approach heights clear?

I'm referring to post #176 here, which gives a description of the glide path both at 3 degrees and actual, as well as the terrain heights.

This departure from the glidescope is right after (according to post #172) ATC has said for the last time: on course on glidescope (give or take a second).

From there for a few seconds the ground slopes away along with the plane increasing it's rate of decent (this is where the thought comes from that the RA was being used i guess).

From 14 seconds from impact things go completely wrong (vastly increased descent rate same time as upsloping ground). It is EXACTLY where the FO states: "Go around".

Then it's almost as if something seriously happened, either an authority thing (the FO calls out "go around" which is neglected by the PF) or a disturbance in the cockpit resulting in an accidental push on the control column, or a bold move to purposely push the nose down one final time in a bout of get-it-down-itis....

I'm just a humble MEP PPL.... perhaps somebody can make a match between the time line, the communications as well as the glide path (3 degrees and actual). Sorry if I've waisted bandwidth

Partital Transcript

10:06:05,0:
ST: 118,975, Polish Air Force 101, thank you, good day.
D: Bye.
2P: You're supposed to say, "Do swidanija".
ST: Well, I don't know, is it "Do swidaija", or...
2P: Or how?
ST: I wouldn't agree...
2P: "Dobroje ranieco".
2P: Say that, we'll see if he gets it (laughter).
2P: Dobroje ranieco.

10:11:01,5:
2P: No, I can see the ground... I can see something... It may not be a tragedy...
2P: Do you have something to write with?
ST: Yes, I do.
2P: So? Let's start getting ready.

10:11:34,7:
B/I: Can I have the air pressure and temperature too?
ST: How should I know (incomp.)?
2P: I don't know. No, tell them the temperature. Coooooooold. (laughter).
A: (incomprehensible)
A: (incomprehensible)
2P: Coooooooold.

10:14:06,5:
D: Polish Air Force 1-0-1, for information at 06:11 Smolensk visibility 400 meters fog.

10:17:40,2:
KVS: Not looking good, there's fog, it's unknown whether we'll land.
B/P: Yeah? (incomprehensible)
A: And if we don't land, then what?
KVS: We'll leave.
A: (incomprehensible)
A: What information do we have (incomprehensible) to Warsaw?
A: Around 7.
A: How much fuel?
2P: We have about 13-12.5 tonnes.
A: (incomprehensible)
2P: We'll make it!

10:24:22,3:
D: PLPH-2-0-1, there is fog at Korsaż, visibility 400 metres.

10:24:40,0:
D: There is fog at Korsaż, visibility 400 metres.

10:24:49,2:
KVS: Temperature and air pressure, please.
044: We greet you warmly. You know what, speaking honestly, it's a bitch down here. Visibility is about 400 metres and in our view the bases are below 50 metres, thick.
D: The temperature (incomp.), air pressure 7-45. 7-4-5, the landing conditions are nonexistent.
KVS: Thank you, if it's possible we'll try to approach, but if not, if the weather's bad, we'll circle around.
2P: Have you landed yet?
044: Yeah, we managed to land at the last minute. But speaking frankly, you can definitely try. There are two APMs, they made a gate, so you can try, but... If you're unable by the second attempt, I advise you to try, for example Moscow, or somewhere [else].

10:25:55,1:
2P: According to them, it's about 400 visibility, 50 metres base.
A: How much?
A: 400 metres visibility, 50 metres base (incomp.)
A: (incomprehensible)
2P: No, they made it.
2P: He also said, that the fog (incomp.)
A: (incomprehensible)
KVS: Mr. director, there's fog...
KVS: At the moment, in the present conditions, we won't be able to set down.
KVS: We'll try to approach, we'll make one attempt, but most likely nothing will come of it.
KVS: If it turns out that (incomp.), what should we do?
KVS: We don't have enough fuel for this (incomp.).
A: Well, then we have a problem... {director Kazana}
KVS: We can hang around for half an hour and fly to the reserve.
A: What reserve?
KVS: Minsk or Witebsk.

10:27:45,9:
KVS: Ask Artur, if the clouds are thick.
2P: I don't know if they'll be there, that... If they're still there.
2P: Ok, I'll transfer.
2P: Artur, are you there?
A: (incomprehensible)
044: I'm Remek.
2P: Oh, Remuś, ask Artur, whether... Or maybe you know, are those clouds thick?
A: (incomprehensible)
A: (incomprehensible)
2P: How many?
KVS: 9-9, hold.
2P: 9-9.
A: (incomprehensible)
044: About 400-500 metres.
ST: Stay on course?
KVS: No.
ST: About 400-500 metres.
2P: But is that the thickness?
A: Visible.
044: Are you there?
2P: But is the thickness of the clouds 400-500 metres??
044: As far as I remember, at 500 metres we were still above the clouds.
2P: Ah... At 500 metres [you were] above the clouds... Good, good, thanks.
044: Ah... One more thing... The APMs are about 200 metres from the edge of the runway.
2P: Thanks.
2P: The APMs are there.
2P: 200 metres from the edge of the runway.
KVS: Ask if the Russians have landed yet.
2P: Have the Russians landed yet?
A: (incomprehensible)
022: They approached twice and I think they flew somewhere else.
2P: Ok, I understand, thanks.
2P: Did you hear that?
KVS: Great.

10:30:10,2:
KVS: Korsaz, Polish 101, holding 1500.
D: Ahh... Polish 1-0-1, according to pressure 7-4-5, descend 500.
KVS: According to pressure 7-4-5, descending 500.

10:30:32,7:
A: At the moment, there's no decision from the president about what to do next. {director Kazana}

10:32:58.8:
KVS: We're making our approach. In case of a failed approach, we ascend on autopilot.

10:34:45,2:
Signal at F=500 Hz.
A: 6.
D: PLF (incomp.) 500 copy?
KVS: We've descended 500 metres.
D: 500 metres, have you landed at a military airport before?
KVS: Flaps 15.
A: Lit.
KVS: Yes, of course.
D: Reflectors on the left, on the right, at the start of the runway.
KVS: Understood.
B/P: Captain, board ready for landing.
KVS: Thank you.

10:37:01,4:
044: Arek, the visibility is now 200.
KVS: Flaps.
A: (incomprehensible)
KVS: Thank you.

10:39:50,2:
Signal at F=845 Hz. Pursuing further.

10:40:04,7:
TERRAIN AHEAD.
D: 4 and on course.

10:40:32,4:
TERRAIN AHEAD.
ST: 200.
KVS: On.
ST: 150.
D: 2 and on course.
TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
A: 100 metres.
ST: 100.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
ST: 100.
(2P): In the norm.
ST: 90.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
ST: 80.
2P: We're aborting.
Signal at F=400 Hz. (Unsafe altitude).
PULL UP, PULL UP.
ST: 60.
ST: 50.
D: Horizon 101.
ST: 40.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
ST: 30.
D: Altitude control, horizon.
ST: 20.
Signal at F=400 Hz. ABSU.
Signal at F=800 Hz. Close lead.
Signal at F=400 Hz. ABSU.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
Signal at F=400 Hz. ABSU.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
Sound of hitting trees.
2P: F*cking hell!
PULL UP, PULL
D: Abort to second approach!
A: Screaming F*ckkkkkkkkkkkk.....
END OF TRANSMISSION

I think again some issues are being mixed up here.

People take callouts from RA and calculate a rate of descent (wchich doesn't make much sense). Anyway, rising terrain is already included in this calls, so they didn't have to increase their rate, just the closing rate increased. Then, after coming to this rate of descent, people again say - "increasing rate of descent and rising terrain" - so they in fact insert the rising terrain twice into the same equation.

I assume you say that based on your own, better simulation.
We would appreciate very much if you could share it wit us.

On the Polish forum, where I have taken it from, it is valued as valid,
and even enhanced by other forum members.

[WYPADEK] 2010.04.10 TU-154 - Samolot Prezydenta RP rozbi? sie pod Smole?skiem

http://img44.imageshack.us/img44/4126/flightpath.jpg

A - first 100 call
B - second 100 call
C - go around call

From A to B they fly following terrain
from C they probably try to GA, but inertia takes over...
or they continue in search for visual with ground...