Pilot fatigue...a victory, of sorts
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It still sends a shiver down my spine when a company refuses to forward safety data to the regulator.
Flying for a large UK operator on 80's we received a quarterly flight safety magazine with all company reports and also from other operators of the same type. Many of these came via the UK Flight Safety Association. We enjoyed a lot of information about the what & why of many varied incidents, even those that were similar of others or repeat events.
In my last years the opposite was true. We heard of lots of company incidents in a single sentence on a news website, or by rumour in the bazaars. We never heard the why or how. If a full XAA report was made we would receive that, but it was a few years later, and so it could have been repeated in the meantime due to ignorance.
One suspected the companies were reluctant to promulgate information to crews because it might leak into the public domain. Towards the end of my career I felt very ignorant about operational safety issues that could have made my job safer by learning from other's mistakes. No doubt. I did have 35 years of experience to fall back on, read all data I could find and watched all Air Crash Investigation. We now have an industry where captains are home grown inside a company and can morph from cadet to captain in 4 years. They need all the flight safety information they can get to improve their overall education and improve their proactive professionalism. Instead I'm concerned they are kept too much in the dark.
I wonder how it is in other cultures, e.g. various EU & FAA lands.
It still sends a shiver down my spine when a company refuses to forward safety data to all their crews
Flying for a large UK operator on 80's we received a quarterly flight safety magazine with all company reports and also from other operators of the same type. Many of these came via the UK Flight Safety Association. We enjoyed a lot of information about the what & why of many varied incidents, even those that were similar of others or repeat events.
In my last years the opposite was true. We heard of lots of company incidents in a single sentence on a news website, or by rumour in the bazaars. We never heard the why or how. If a full XAA report was made we would receive that, but it was a few years later, and so it could have been repeated in the meantime due to ignorance.
One suspected the companies were reluctant to promulgate information to crews because it might leak into the public domain. Towards the end of my career I felt very ignorant about operational safety issues that could have made my job safer by learning from other's mistakes. No doubt. I did have 35 years of experience to fall back on, read all data I could find and watched all Air Crash Investigation. We now have an industry where captains are home grown inside a company and can morph from cadet to captain in 4 years. They need all the flight safety information they can get to improve their overall education and improve their proactive professionalism. Instead I'm concerned they are kept too much in the dark.
I wonder how it is in other cultures, e.g. various EU & FAA lands.
It still sends a shiver down my spine when a company refuses to forward safety data to all their crews
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RAT5
"about engineering & bits falling off"
Yes and when they do who stands in the way of a major disaster but just a bloke with real bottle. The June 1993 PA31 accident is a good case in point. One engine gone, the other hanging under the wing, aircraft in a spin 5000-3000 feet agl and they land in veg field, pax dust themselves off, pick up their briefcases and walk off without a bruise or scratch. I`d say the insurance salesman certainly earned his pittance that day.
Here is the link from the dusty old archives.
https://assets.publishing.service.go...994_G-BMGH.pdf
"about engineering & bits falling off"
Yes and when they do who stands in the way of a major disaster but just a bloke with real bottle. The June 1993 PA31 accident is a good case in point. One engine gone, the other hanging under the wing, aircraft in a spin 5000-3000 feet agl and they land in veg field, pax dust themselves off, pick up their briefcases and walk off without a bruise or scratch. I`d say the insurance salesman certainly earned his pittance that day.
Here is the link from the dusty old archives.
https://assets.publishing.service.go...994_G-BMGH.pdf
If a reporter considers that an MOR should be forwarded to the 'Authority' then it is dishonest, immoral and possibly illegal for the operator not to forward that report. It is, of course, quite possible for an individual to file an MOR direct to the Authority. This can be done quite simply online. Go to the CAA website and search for 'file an MOR'.
There is also guidance on the CAA webite as to when an MOR must be filed - and it's a long list!
There is also guidance on the CAA webite as to when an MOR must be filed - and it's a long list!
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Chronus - That pilot did a fair chunk of my command line training. A lovely guy. What was really good was on one trip was his gasp of "Oh God" when after avoiding one particularly nasty Cb, an even bigger one was waiting round the corner. He thought he'd let me go in to the little one to teach me a lesson. I was able to teach him one. The escape route was clear to me before we went in - what I didn't do was explain my thinking beforehand. One all, good instruction.
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The real villains are EASA. This bunch of ignorant Euro-buffoons do whatever the are told by vested interests. What is worse is that they use faux science to back up their outrageous FTL regime and at the same time try to make it difficult for those affected to draw attention to their plight. Standard European government corrupt practice.
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To their credit, the IAA treat all ASRs as MORs, preventing any concealment (intentional or otherwise) by company managers. The CAA are less enlightened, as I suspect are most EASA member authorities.
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Pilot preparation and readiness to face worst case situations is not recognised by many airline managers. If they knew what we know on PPRuNe, pilots would be more valued and appreciated. Airlines shouldn't want to jeopardise that readiness by aggressive rostering and fatigued crews.
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EASA to blame
I totally agree with the gent who mentioned EASA. They are extremely weak and in the pockets of lobbyists for airline shareholders and politicians who wants cheaper tickets no matter what. They are the ones who could build more robust and conservative rules but they went the opposite way.
Free marked and liberalisation of the aviation sector in Europe has been a disaster for aircrew, just look at salaries and the introduction of Pay2fly schemes and bogus contracts (ryanair etc). It all started in Europe because it were allowed and EASA turned a blind eye! Pilot salaries in Europe are at pair with salaries in Asia, Africa and lower than Middle east even though living cost are much higher in Europe and I have not even mentioned the tax! If someone have a way to turn it around please share it, you have my support.
Free marked and liberalisation of the aviation sector in Europe has been a disaster for aircrew, just look at salaries and the introduction of Pay2fly schemes and bogus contracts (ryanair etc). It all started in Europe because it were allowed and EASA turned a blind eye! Pilot salaries in Europe are at pair with salaries in Asia, Africa and lower than Middle east even though living cost are much higher in Europe and I have not even mentioned the tax! If someone have a way to turn it around please share it, you have my support.
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CAA MOR WHERE IS IT?
This can be done quite simply online. Go to the CAA website and search for 'file an MOR'.
Is there an online MOR report link on the CAA website for individual professionals? I may need to raise one...
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Has anyone had any luck with the UK CAA enquiry email? I've sent three emails without response. Seems there's very little support for licence holders from the regulator.
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Good article on LinkedIn given the topic of this thread:
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/has-s...raham-hamilton
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/has-s...raham-hamilton
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"There are no SOPs for the unknown unknowns and the 21st Century airline pilot is so heavily drilled in sticking to the SOPs that when something unusual is thrown at him, he doesn’t know what to do, doesn’t have the basic stick and rudder skills to take over and hand-fly or even worse, looks to the automation to save the day."
Doesn't know what to do = lack of in-depth training. No knowledge of all the options in the design of the a/c, the envelop boundaries of the a/c nor themselves.
Looks to automation = having been taught like a trained monkey.
Add: Scared to deviate from SOP's. = finding oneself outside the comfort zone. Thinking that the SOP might not be so appropriate, but scared to try something else for fear of reprisal.
Today's minimum trained pilots do not think first as pilots, they think first as SOP a/c systems operators. What irritated me, after spending various moments of a varied career at various airlines flying the same type, was when I left one with some very good SOP's for some profiles, then had to relearn an inferior method with the following company. They too had some very good SOP's, some better than the previous, but they thought they were the top dog at everything and thus were reluctant to discuss possible improvements/changes to anything. "we've done it like this for years with no bother." They were reactive not proactive. Changes came after events; some that could have been avoided by being more open minded: or a change of C.P. or HOT's. It's human nature, but not the best CRM that is rammed down our throats ad infinitum. Trouble with applying CRM is there has to be a perceived problem first to start the process.
Doesn't know what to do = lack of in-depth training. No knowledge of all the options in the design of the a/c, the envelop boundaries of the a/c nor themselves.
Looks to automation = having been taught like a trained monkey.
Add: Scared to deviate from SOP's. = finding oneself outside the comfort zone. Thinking that the SOP might not be so appropriate, but scared to try something else for fear of reprisal.
Today's minimum trained pilots do not think first as pilots, they think first as SOP a/c systems operators. What irritated me, after spending various moments of a varied career at various airlines flying the same type, was when I left one with some very good SOP's for some profiles, then had to relearn an inferior method with the following company. They too had some very good SOP's, some better than the previous, but they thought they were the top dog at everything and thus were reluctant to discuss possible improvements/changes to anything. "we've done it like this for years with no bother." They were reactive not proactive. Changes came after events; some that could have been avoided by being more open minded: or a change of C.P. or HOT's. It's human nature, but not the best CRM that is rammed down our throats ad infinitum. Trouble with applying CRM is there has to be a perceived problem first to start the process.
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On the BALPA forum it looks like the guy involved in this case has asked the CAA directly the question about FDP. Apparently he wrote to the head of the CAA
"Is the requirement for an Operator to ‘ensure’ the ‘Flight Duty Period’ (FDP) conforms with E.U.Ops 2.2 (ANO)
a) At the ‘Roster Stage?’
Or
b) On production of the ‘flight plan’ (PLOG) that is produced before report time that is ultimately signed as a legal document by the Commander.
E.U. Ops states an operator must ‘ensure’ ‘that for all its flights. Flights are planned to be completed within the allowable flying duty period taking into account the time necessary for pre-flight duties, the flight and turn-around times.’
For all professional pilots we now know exactly the answer and where the CAA stand because the response he had was from the CAA legal division.
The CAA's official response
''We will not offer an interpretation of a matter of academic interest"
I have written to ask. Maybe if enough of us do we might get an answer.
I think the question is does answer is that it confirms what we have all suspected all along re CAA and the airlines.
"Is the requirement for an Operator to ‘ensure’ the ‘Flight Duty Period’ (FDP) conforms with E.U.Ops 2.2 (ANO)
a) At the ‘Roster Stage?’
Or
b) On production of the ‘flight plan’ (PLOG) that is produced before report time that is ultimately signed as a legal document by the Commander.
E.U. Ops states an operator must ‘ensure’ ‘that for all its flights. Flights are planned to be completed within the allowable flying duty period taking into account the time necessary for pre-flight duties, the flight and turn-around times.’
For all professional pilots we now know exactly the answer and where the CAA stand because the response he had was from the CAA legal division.
The CAA's official response
''We will not offer an interpretation of a matter of academic interest"
I have written to ask. Maybe if enough of us do we might get an answer.
I think the question is does answer is that it confirms what we have all suspected all along re CAA and the airlines.
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That letter & response should be copied to the Minister of Transport and the MP for both constituencies, the pilot's & CAA's, should be asking questions in the house. Is the CAA not still answerable to the government?
I had this wishy washy experience with the old 100hrs in 28 days. The ANO said quite clearly that the limit was exactly that. However, my roster had me taking off at 95 hours on a 10hour sector and westbound. CAA confirmed I could takeoff even though I landed on day 28 at 105hours. HOW? They would not answer. I then asked them what would happen if I went east and landed on day 29 locally, but day 28 at home base? The silence was deafening. They didn't have an answer because they didn't have a clue about the question.
Regarding the first scenario; I was planned to land in USA at 105/28. Day off, then repeat and land back in Europe at 102/28, the 2 days off and then down south with 3 days off to reduce the rolling 28hrs by enough to seat all over again.
The CAA were clueless how to interpret the law. Astonishing.
I had this wishy washy experience with the old 100hrs in 28 days. The ANO said quite clearly that the limit was exactly that. However, my roster had me taking off at 95 hours on a 10hour sector and westbound. CAA confirmed I could takeoff even though I landed on day 28 at 105hours. HOW? They would not answer. I then asked them what would happen if I went east and landed on day 29 locally, but day 28 at home base? The silence was deafening. They didn't have an answer because they didn't have a clue about the question.
Regarding the first scenario; I was planned to land in USA at 105/28. Day off, then repeat and land back in Europe at 102/28, the 2 days off and then down south with 3 days off to reduce the rolling 28hrs by enough to seat all over again.
The CAA were clueless how to interpret the law. Astonishing.
Dear Sir/Madam,
Your response of
will not suffice. It does not satisfy the responsibilities and accountability incumbent upon you or your department.
As an Airline pilot I am regularly required to answer questions such as " what are your actions in response to a fire warning at V1 -10kts?" . I cannot answer
. That is because I hold a position of responsibility and accountability. I suggest that you do too. Duty limitations are of utmost importance to aviation safety and become more so every day, you and your department are charged with providing rules and regulation in order to protect the public. To shy away from this responsibility is unacceptable and indicative of an inability of o shoulder responsibility of this weight.
BALPA legal representatives will be following this to conclusion in order to prevent loss of life being traced back to your desk.
Kind Regards.
Your response of
'We will not offer an interpretation of a matter of academic interest"
As an Airline pilot I am regularly required to answer questions such as " what are your actions in response to a fire warning at V1 -10kts?" . I cannot answer
'I will not offer an interpretation of a matter of academic interest"
BALPA legal representatives will be following this to conclusion in order to prevent loss of life being traced back to your desk.
Kind Regards.
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I had this wishy washy experience with the old 100hrs in 28 days. The ANO said quite clearly that the limit was exactly that. However, my roster had me taking off at 95 hours on a 10hour sector and westbound. CAA confirmed I could takeoff even though I landed on day 28 at 105hours. HOW?
