Sully-Hudson-and FEW safety changes
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Sully-Hudson-and FEW safety changes
Safety recommendations unfulfilled 7 years after Flight 1549
Safety recommendations unfulfilled 7 years after Flight 1549 | The Seattle Times
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Safety recommendations unfulfilled 7 years after Flight 1549 | The Seattle Times
By JOAN LOWY
The Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) — More than seven years after an airline captain saved 155 lives by ditching his crippled airliner in the Hudson River, now the basis of a new movie, most of the safety recommendations stemming from the accident haven’t been carried out.
Of the 35 recommendations made by the National Transportation Safety Board in response to the incident involving US Airways Flight 1549, only six have been successfully completed, according to an Associated Press review of board records. Fourteen of the recommendations issued to the Federal Aviation Administration and its European counterpart, EASA, are marked by the NTSB as “closed-unacceptable.” One has been withdrawn, and the rest remain unresolved. . . . Recommendations that got an “unacceptable” response deal with pilot training, directions for pilots facing the loss of power in both engines, equipping planes with life rafts and vests and making it easier for passengers to use them, among other issues.
The Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) — More than seven years after an airline captain saved 155 lives by ditching his crippled airliner in the Hudson River, now the basis of a new movie, most of the safety recommendations stemming from the accident haven’t been carried out.
Of the 35 recommendations made by the National Transportation Safety Board in response to the incident involving US Airways Flight 1549, only six have been successfully completed, according to an Associated Press review of board records. Fourteen of the recommendations issued to the Federal Aviation Administration and its European counterpart, EASA, are marked by the NTSB as “closed-unacceptable.” One has been withdrawn, and the rest remain unresolved. . . . Recommendations that got an “unacceptable” response deal with pilot training, directions for pilots facing the loss of power in both engines, equipping planes with life rafts and vests and making it easier for passengers to use them, among other issues.
I don't know if it was one of the NTSB recommendations, but in the aftermath the FAA came to us and wanted us to create an EICAS message that would tell the crew that the engine that just quit was too badly damaged to restart. The idea was to keep the crew from wasting time trying to get the engine(s) restarted and let them focus on flying the aircraft.
We responded that we didn't know how to do that - it was particularly difficult to determine the health of an engine when the engine wasn't actually running. Further, an engine rundown is a dynamic transient phenomena, and nearly all of our engine health algorithms are dependent on quasi steady-state conditions.
The FAA must have realized how impossible their request was because we never heard any more about it.
We responded that we didn't know how to do that - it was particularly difficult to determine the health of an engine when the engine wasn't actually running. Further, an engine rundown is a dynamic transient phenomena, and nearly all of our engine health algorithms are dependent on quasi steady-state conditions.
The FAA must have realized how impossible their request was because we never heard any more about it.
There are things that can be done to recover some power, but it requires training for the uniqueness. Best to let some black box do this on command and leave the crew to fly the aircraft as well as they can.
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The thing I would like to be changed is a FADECS ability to shut down engines automatically. In multiengine transport aircraft I would like the fadecs to have a "cross talk" which allows an automatic shut down only one engine, but not any more without crew action. If it is over temping, rolling back, slowly disintegrating, shedding parts, I don't care as long as any thrust is being made.
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From a functional safety viewpoint, surely switching something off should always be a last resort... the turn it of then back on again attitude we have become used to with our PCs should not be acceptable in any safety-critical environment.
Autonomy is all well and good, but if you permit a FADEC to switch off an engine automagically, I'd like to see your PROOF that it can't turn off another.
Autonomy is all well and good, but if you permit a FADEC to switch off an engine automagically, I'd like to see your PROOF that it can't turn off another.
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double failure in a twin
One of the issues to come out of the Kegworth crash was that we hadn't been given training on restarting using the APU air as in a ground start.
It was hard to use the systems correctly without prior thought but v simple once a method was established . all the outer air switches off the APU air on press the start button, simple but only with training
It was hard to use the systems correctly without prior thought but v simple once a method was established . all the outer air switches off the APU air on press the start button, simple but only with training
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Six have been implemented. Great the system works as it should.
14 have not. Before deploring FAA/EASA inactivity I'd like to understand what the recommendations were, and why the FAA/EASA believed them to be unacceptable.
Too little information here.
14 have not. Before deploring FAA/EASA inactivity I'd like to understand what the recommendations were, and why the FAA/EASA believed them to be unacceptable.
Too little information here.
Last edited by ExXB; 16th Sep 2016 at 11:05. Reason: Typo
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For example, each engine controller could determine the health of its own engine and specifically if it was reliable enough to allow another engine to shut down. If it was, it would send a continuous coded "reliable engine" message to the other engine controller. A controller would only shut down the engine after it had terminated its own "reliable engine" message for some period of time (a few seconds), was receiving the "reliable engine" message from the other controller, and had determined that running its own engine was unsafe.
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A controller would only shut down the engine after it had terminated its own "reliable engine" message for some period of time (a few seconds), was receiving the "reliable engine" message from the other controller, and had determined that running its own engine was unsafe.
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With the brilliance of hindsight............................but Sully was in a position where the book had to be thrown out the window and go with his instincts. I am very happy he got cleared and commended for what he did; save the passenger's lives !
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Recommendations begin at page 141.
From working with the US Dept of Agriculture to figure out a way to minimize bird strikes (not a bad goal) to requesting Airbus redesign a specific part of the fuselage structure and expand training to (wisely) further explore pitch control issues within Alpha protection, to the (almost laughable) procedural changes when loss of power occurs down low, the recommendations are, not all, but in part, a laundry list of items that narrowly focuses on the unique circumstances of 1549 rather than addressing broader safety concerns.
In a sentence, post accident, the NTSB is typically pie in the sky, while the FAA works with airlines and industry to (for the most part at least) issue practical guidance that tends to be more pragmatic.
Autonomy is all well and good, but if you permit a FADEC to switch off an engine automagically, I'd like to see your PROOF that it can't turn off another.
TCMA was first implemented on the 777/GE90-115B and is basic on the 787, 747-8, and will be on the 737MAX and the 777X. Both the electronic overspeed and TCMA are to meet mandatory regulatory requirements (FAA and EASA).
We intentionally do not cross talk data between the different engine FADECs to maintain engine to engine isolation.
BTW, while I assume automagically is a typo, it did make me smile...
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Are these the most recent docs?
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/P...rways1549.aspx
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/A...ts/AAR1003.pdf
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/P...rways1549.aspx
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/A...ts/AAR1003.pdf
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Anyone who has read the last several pages of almost any NTSB Final Report will easily understand that this response by FAA is far from rare. FAA often ignores NTSB or makes endless excuses about why NTSB's suggestions cannot be implemented. It is also obvious that FAA Does NOT like being told what to do and NTSB has no authority to DO anything beyond investigate and report; obviously a cluster-f'ing mess, but also our law. Further, FAA often lacks budget bucks and it can take them a year or more to write/revise regulations that the Part 121 carriers must implement at their own expense. Personally, I often envy the nations that use one agency to cover both major functions. Why is this so in the U.S? Turf battles!
The NTSB staff perform the very important functions of investigating transportation accidents, determining probable cause, contributing factors and making safety recommendations to regulatory agencies, manufacturers and operators. That is the charter of the organization. They recommend and it's up to industry and regulators whether to adopt the advice or not.
Were it not this way, just about all transportation systems might be completely impractical and without economic viability. Without the recommendations made by all the various transportation safety organizations, travel would be much less safe than it currently is. After all, a good number of safety initiatives got their impetus from the accident reports and associated recommendations. The balance between safety and performance (economic and capabilities-wise) is actually very good in that progress continues in both of these seemingly opposite imperatives simultaneously. There remain a number of areas where more emphasis is required and the tides shift slowly. The NTSB does not get all it wants and industry must sometimes accept the recommendations when regulatory bodies mandate them. Not a perfect system by any means, but it's the only one we've got. Debating the relative merits of each and every recommendation continues to be the best way forward.
Were it not this way, just about all transportation systems might be completely impractical and without economic viability. Without the recommendations made by all the various transportation safety organizations, travel would be much less safe than it currently is. After all, a good number of safety initiatives got their impetus from the accident reports and associated recommendations. The balance between safety and performance (economic and capabilities-wise) is actually very good in that progress continues in both of these seemingly opposite imperatives simultaneously. There remain a number of areas where more emphasis is required and the tides shift slowly. The NTSB does not get all it wants and industry must sometimes accept the recommendations when regulatory bodies mandate them. Not a perfect system by any means, but it's the only one we've got. Debating the relative merits of each and every recommendation continues to be the best way forward.
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The NTSB recommendations do not appear to have addressed the sole and only cause for the Hudson incident. That is bird ingestion at the most crucial and common phase of flight, take off.
Perhaps the only item that seems to whisper some clue to the real issue is quoted below from the report as follows.
"large flocking bird certification test standards to determine whether they should apply to engines with an inlet area of less than 3,875 square inches"
Compelled by the ever increasing need for profit by airlines, aircraft powered by two engines with thrust equivalent to three or more engines is demanded from engine manufacturers. This can only be achieved by increasing intake and fan sizes. The resultant larger area contributes to increased risk for bird ingestion.
Now, the question is how could this be resolved.
Perhaps the only item that seems to whisper some clue to the real issue is quoted below from the report as follows.
"large flocking bird certification test standards to determine whether they should apply to engines with an inlet area of less than 3,875 square inches"
Compelled by the ever increasing need for profit by airlines, aircraft powered by two engines with thrust equivalent to three or more engines is demanded from engine manufacturers. This can only be achieved by increasing intake and fan sizes. The resultant larger area contributes to increased risk for bird ingestion.
Now, the question is how could this be resolved.
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Chronus:
"two engines with thrust equivalent to three or more engines" ... "how could this be resolved? "
Three or four engine planes need smaller engines and less total thrust than twins. So there's your answer.
"two engines with thrust equivalent to three or more engines" ... "how could this be resolved? "
Three or four engine planes need smaller engines and less total thrust than twins. So there's your answer.