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"Pilotless airliners safer" - London Times article

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Old 8th Dec 2014, 07:09
  #321 (permalink)  
 
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Could a fully autonomous aircraft have "done a Sully"? Unlikely.

Despite this undoubted fact, it is also a fact that losses are caused by pilots.
It is a fact, that not all losses could be prevented by pilots, we all know that. And in the course of events, some losses are caused by pilots by making the wrong decisions due to several reasons, from limited information due to failed sensors, by overload while working with downgraded systems, or just by wrong judgement to name a few.

Not all sensors necessary for an autonomous operating aircraft will fail and cause the loss of the aircraft, but at the moment they do fail now and then and will continue to do so. When we are able to produce those sensors failsafe, then lets do so, there is no need to wait for an computerized aircraft.

Not all computer programs will have false codes and cause loss of aircraft, but some will. If we can make them safer, lets start with them now.

Car drivers are not only causing accidents, they also prevent them by acting with situational awareness. If there are systems in the pipeline which increase their situational awareness in a reliable way like it will be necessary for autonomous vehicles in daily traffic, lets implement them. But there are none tested and certified for daily use by the daily driver now.

All those systems first have to be tested and introduced in piloted aircraft, and they will improve the accident rates if they work ok like other computerized systems did. At that point we may look again what effect the removal of humans from the flight deck may have, a further improvement or a greater risk.

To remove one ccontroling entity (the pilot) and replace it with another one (computer) removes one statistical failure source, but creates other possible failure sources. At the present concept the human is the last redundancy when everything else fails, is unreliable or is unable to make decisions. As the accident numbers turn out this concept works fairly well. It does not prevent all accidents, and sometimes it even leads to accidents, but to oversee the functioning of computers by another computer dependent on the same or a different set of sensors didn't work until now that good. How many ADIRU's will we add and how will the decision making take place which ones to reject and which ones to use? Will we add another sixpack of FCPc's to compensate for the failure possibility of the present ones? Will we add how much more rate and load factor sensors and how will be the decision made which ones are good and which ones are failed? How much cameras IR and Radar sensors do we have to add to the airframe to get the necessary redundant informations? It is not a question of computer power, it is a question of information reliability and redundancy.

If we like to talk science fiction ( what will be in 50 or 100 years), than go ahead. We all do not know. All the necessary input devices, sensors, software and hardware might get that failproof, that complicated systems can and will work autonomously. But all the present developements for the military or for some specialised niche systems are no indicators, that such systems are operational and implemented within the next time (20years) for civil air traffic.

Last edited by RetiredF4; 8th Dec 2014 at 09:48.
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 07:54
  #322 (permalink)  

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"Hi guys, my sensors are giving inconsistent airspeed indications.
Everything else seems OK, so I'm going to fly pitch and power until I get things sorted out"

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Old 8th Dec 2014, 09:13
  #323 (permalink)  
 
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My sensors

"And my sensors are telling me that the selected airport does not exist so I am just going to carry on until the fuel runs out." (Bit like my interest in this ludicrous thread!)
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 09:35
  #324 (permalink)  
 
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Revisit in 20yrs?
I'll put it in my diary
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 09:37
  #325 (permalink)  
 
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I'm curious about how taking the human being out of the equation would actually be accomplished.

Boiled down to some simplistic ideas-
Take the pilots away.
Theres a computer. With a program. Will the program be written by a computer, or human?
The aircraft will be refuelled. Will the refuelling be done by computer, or human?
The aircraft will be built and maintained...

I could go on, but the general idea is there.
The computer should only augment the situation, not replace. As has already been mentioned, Humans have notably been the saving factor (yes, also the weak link at times) in a number of very prominent events.

Is it the reality that somewhere along the line, it will be tried? Yes. But insidiously, rather like our gradual decline in standards. UAVs doing the reconnaissance, crop spraying, banner towing, combat, to name a few.
There would be a level of success sufficient to make it commercially viable, with acceptable levels of risk and loss built in. What level of redundancy will be needed to ensure that multiple system failures won't automatically result in losses?
To go along with wholly automated flight, there would have to be a dramatic change in systems capable of last ditch efforts at saving the SLF from a grim end.

I don't trust computers 100% (I'm an ex engineer), but neither do I trust humans 100% (ex engineer and current pilot), nor do I trust myself 100% (you should see me on day 1 after a break! I won't even mention days 2 thru 6)

I wonder how the Apollo landing, Sioux City and the Sully Ditching would have turned out with total automation.
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 10:27
  #326 (permalink)  
 
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Lancelot de boyles

Sioux city probably would end up badly because no one really considered assymetric engine thrust before as a way to control aircraft. Said that DHL Baghdad will be ok based on lessons learn from Sioux city.

Sully's ditching however will result in landing at TEB with no drama apart from pax wet pants be it a fully automated aircraft and after heavy landing inspection and engines change aircraft will be flying in 2-3 days.
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 12:01
  #327 (permalink)  
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"Hi guys, my sensors are giving inconsistent airspeed indications.
Everything else seems OK, so I'm going to fly pitch and power until I get things sorted out"
This wise in almost every case.

But what if (unknown to yourself as you are receiving conflicting information) you are in a deep stall with idle thrust and you now increase the thrust to, say, 83%?

(NB: I realise you would have had to have been asleep to jump from normal flight to a deep stall without noticing something was awry).
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 14:50
  #328 (permalink)  
 
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Sully's ditching however will result in landing at TEB with no drama apart from pax wet pants be it a fully automated aircraft and after heavy landing inspection and engines change aircraft will be flying in 2-3 days.
That is assuming that the stricken aircraft had an abort routine with a non-standard heavy landing in an emergency mode coupled with an appropriately pre-recorded "Mayday! Get out of my way" message, all local METARs, an automatic 7700 squawk with an optimal quick'n'dirty "glide to the nearest threshold, disregard the weather and performance if it's just slightly out and weave around the traffic" 2.1 upgrade pack then it's entirely feasible.

But how many versions of software will it take to get there? More than one is un-acceptable. So only when software arrives as a final version, bug free, with every possible eventuality coded will this "game-changer" be acceptable for use on public transport aircraft.
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 15:11
  #329 (permalink)  
 
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So only when software arrives as a final version, bug free, with every possible eventuality coded .....

Snooze-button glitch delayed Rosetta's wake-up - space - 21 January 2014 - New Scientist

From the piece:

"Yes, we will have to fix it but this doesn't affect anything we are doing now. It is past history," he says.

The ESA team already has a number of hypotheses for why the unplanned reboots took place. They say they are now working to determine the true reason and the solution.
"They" being Human Beings....
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 16:20
  #330 (permalink)  
 
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Not that I'm supporting the ethos but, one occasion when we should have left the computers to it:

Dramatis personae: Ol' Skip, Bas, Heavy Crew FO.

Scene: A calm B744 flight deck - night.

Bas: (Bored and looking at fuel config) "Bally heck, the stabiliser fuel hasn't started to transfer."
OS: "You're right, I wonder why?"
Bas: (Following fag packet calc) "We'd have to land by Delhi before we're out of trim, so we've got five hours."
OS: "Lets get the heavy crew up to see if they have any ideas."
All: "Hmm." "That's odd." "Is it nice in Delhi?"
HCFO: (Eventually) "It's not meant to transfer yet; the centre tank contents to trigger the transfer have been reduced. Didn't you read the tech advisory?"
All: (except HCFO) "Umm."

Calm returns.
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 16:26
  #331 (permalink)  

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Piltdown. You forgot the database has to have all the latest buildings on approach for every runway worldwide, and every possible eventuality, and the notams about the tall ship's race taking place down the Hudson.
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 17:10
  #332 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Lancelot de boyles
I wonder how the Apollo landing, Sioux City and the Sully Ditching would have turned out with total automation.
If I remember correctly, at least one Apollo landing was flown all the way down by the computer. Others would have landed in craters or on rocks, and bad things would have happened as a result. Another required a last-minute software patch because there was a chunk of metal rattling around inside the controls that intermittently shorted the abort switch.

Of course they weren't designed to handle those situations, so no-one was surprised. But, to handle it properly, you'd need either much fancier radar, or some kind of computer vision system that would spot hazards and avoid them. I presume any pilotless airliner would need something similar for avoiding birds, drones, people who drive on the runway at the last second, etc.
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 19:26
  #333 (permalink)  

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Operation of any aircraft inevitably requires communication and integration into the existing air traffic infrastructure. Without a communication and control being provided for, it is impossible to integrate them. This cannot occur overnight. As I've said a number of times (and mainly ignored by Tourist, probably put in the too difficult to answer file) - physically making an autonomous aircraft is only the first part of the equation.
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 19:54
  #334 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Tourist
What computers are exceptionally good at is following instructions without error.
ie, if A happens then do B
I suspect that you have forgotten about everyone's favorite military officer, General Protection Fault.

GIGO is another thought you may wish to ponder, Tourist, when you start to deal with complex software, rather than "light is on, light is off" levels of simplicity.
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 20:38
  #335 (permalink)  

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OK, how would the computer handle this one, which actually happened. FO flying, A/P 2 engaged. Cleared to FL230, which the aircraft merrily sailed through. FO levels and returns to FL230. re-engages A/P 2 and aircraft starts to climb. Capt takes control, returns to FL230, engages A/P 1. All normal. Diving into the pages of the FMS it transpires that, although the FO's instruments show STD (1013) selected, and the altimeter agrees, the FMS 2 is stuck on QNH. Computer says "everything normal", and gaily climbs to 23,000ft.
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Old 8th Dec 2014, 23:50
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How would the computer flown aircraft deal with the what is it doing now scenario? I have to interfere with my FMC almost every day at work. It's as thick as . Great at straight and level and autoland. Turbulence, crosswinds, medical emergencies, too high on approach, annoying passengers. Not a hope. It might drink less tea.
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Old 9th Dec 2014, 02:32
  #337 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Piltdown man
But how many versions of software will it take to get there? More than one is un-acceptable. So only when software arrives as a final version, bug free, with every possible eventuality coded will this "game-changer" be acceptable for use on public transport aircraft.
(playing devils advocate, somewhat) Sadly, only by todays reasoning and rationale. As time and tech move on (i hesitate to use the word 'progress'), so will the expectations.
However, without people, whats the point?
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Old 9th Dec 2014, 02:55
  #338 (permalink)  
 
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Computers are already better at operating planes than humans, have been for years, and having read this entire thread, I don't think anyone has stated an opinion to the contrary. Every example of "humans being better" is an example of when it's all gone wrong, and the pilot has bailed the automation and/or the aircraft out.
Not strictly true in that I can operate my jet to the full limit of it's design capability and the autopilot can't. It also doesn't handle tailwinds on approach very well and/or anticipate big wind changes quickly which are all normal operational stuff day to day.

To beat the human you would need the next generation of autopilots and systems AND get them certified. So maybe some engineers can comment where we are with that but in the Airbus/Boeing world today we are still in the 80's really.
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Old 9th Dec 2014, 03:06
  #339 (permalink)  
 
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OK, how would the computer handle this one, which actually happened. FO flying, A/P 2 engaged. Cleared to FL230, which the aircraft merrily sailed through. FO levels and returns to FL230. re-engages A/P 2 and aircraft starts to climb.
Trivial. Triple (or more) redundant systems with voting. Herod, you seem to be latched into pilotless airplanes using the same systems that are in use today - systems that were intentionally designed for human input/interaction. Autonomous systems simply wouldn't work that way.
And you seem to be hung up with the ability of a computer to 'see'. Except that humans can only really see well when it's clear and daylight or lit - the rest of the time we depend on, wait for it, computer generated radar and night vision TCAS 'sees' other aircraft well beyond human visual range, figures out what to do about it, and tells the pilots. Since the widespread adoption of TCAS, there has been one major mid-air, and that occurred when the pilots ignored what TCAS told them and did what a human controller told them instead Most of the automated systems on todays airplanes are archaic and horribly outdated because it's so expensive to certify updates.

BTW, since Sioux City was brought up, another minor detail. Yes, human pilots did a remarkable job of flying that airplane - I understand that when they put the scenario in a simulator most pilots crashed within minutes. When the idea of training pilots to be able to fly an airplane without hydraulics by using differential thrust, it was rejected as impractical - that scenario was so rare that it would be waste of simulator time. Yet, in the aftermath, there was a team at Boeing working on a computer program that would do exactly that for the 777 (they focused on the 777 as it was the only Boeing product at the time where the throttles could be independently controlled automatically - today 787 has that same capability). Now, I don't know what ever became of that study (I moved off the 777 program shortly afterward and lost visibility), but if they could get it right, it would always be right - unlike humans you can transfer complete and total knowledge between computers.
Total loss of hydraulics is just one example - there are many other examples of failures that are considered so remote that training is not justified, yet we've had to redesign system hardware and software to accommodate or preclude the extremely rare failure - in some cases simply in order to certify - since we couldn't take credit for crew action as they never train for it
Oh, and someone brought up the first moon landing. You do realize that the LEM had less computing power than my $20 digital watch? Oh, and 7 years later we autonomously landed two Viking landers on Mars?
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Old 9th Dec 2014, 08:28
  #340 (permalink)  
 
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That is assuming that the stricken aircraft had an abort routine with a non-standard heavy landing in an emergency mode coupled with an appropriately pre-recorded "Mayday! Get out of my way" message, all local METARs, an automatic 7700 squawk with an optimal quick'n'dirty "glide to the nearest threshold, disregard the weather and performance if it's just slightly out
With modern computing power it would take less than 0.1 second to perform all of above. Obviously it will take some time to program all this logic and get it tested and certified, that's why new regulations and guide lines need to be published soonest possible.

ps. Some of the major automotive manufacturers expect to release fully autonomous cars to the market in 2020. You can say it is not the same speed. True. But then road environment is also much less structured and less predictable. Current prototypes driving cities and highways without major issues, it took around decade to get there.
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