A flight safety lesson all airline pilots should read
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A flight safety lesson all airline pilots should read
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I have read Will Langewiesche's Vanity Fair Article "THE HUMAN FACTOR" this morning. And skimmed over the most recent 6 pages of PP comment.
A few points have occurred to me. First, I am horrified that the Captain brought his lady friend to Brazil, and in consequence, SLEPT FOR ONLY ONE HOUR the night before the accident flight. Says it all, really. Abdicated his responsibilities. Left the care of his passengers to the automation and the two nervous co-pilots.
When the pitot tubes that had not yet been replaced froze up under a bit of frost, and the automation not enjoying ASI data stepped down from doing the flying, the two young ones remaining at the controls also froze in every sense.
After two years of searching the CVR and data recorder were recovered. The unfortunate arrangement of side stick controls, that made it likely the PNF could not know what the PF was up to, let alone those buttons that are supposed to override control, did not help.
The efforts of the PF to overcome the PIO was according to the VF article solved by the captain's tardy arrival on the flight deck, when he told the PF to use the rudder to sort out the roll. Too late, alas. And of course using the rudder too strenuously can cause other problems, as happened to the Boeing departing Kennedy shortly after 9/11.
In my experience as a gliding instructor, I have found that men usually think they are better than they are! the women have less overconfidence. If the standard and experience of the average airline pilot continues to decay, with very little real flying, real takeoffs and landings, the job becomes more and more boring, monitoring the computers. Which could just as well be done from the ground, like drones. We are happy to ride on the little train that takes us to the outer terminals at Orlando with no train driver.
How long will it be before we are happy to ride on the LHR Dulles UA with no pilots to fall asleep at the controls?
A few points have occurred to me. First, I am horrified that the Captain brought his lady friend to Brazil, and in consequence, SLEPT FOR ONLY ONE HOUR the night before the accident flight. Says it all, really. Abdicated his responsibilities. Left the care of his passengers to the automation and the two nervous co-pilots.
When the pitot tubes that had not yet been replaced froze up under a bit of frost, and the automation not enjoying ASI data stepped down from doing the flying, the two young ones remaining at the controls also froze in every sense.
After two years of searching the CVR and data recorder were recovered. The unfortunate arrangement of side stick controls, that made it likely the PNF could not know what the PF was up to, let alone those buttons that are supposed to override control, did not help.
The efforts of the PF to overcome the PIO was according to the VF article solved by the captain's tardy arrival on the flight deck, when he told the PF to use the rudder to sort out the roll. Too late, alas. And of course using the rudder too strenuously can cause other problems, as happened to the Boeing departing Kennedy shortly after 9/11.
In my experience as a gliding instructor, I have found that men usually think they are better than they are! the women have less overconfidence. If the standard and experience of the average airline pilot continues to decay, with very little real flying, real takeoffs and landings, the job becomes more and more boring, monitoring the computers. Which could just as well be done from the ground, like drones. We are happy to ride on the little train that takes us to the outer terminals at Orlando with no train driver.
How long will it be before we are happy to ride on the LHR Dulles UA with no pilots to fall asleep at the controls?
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Rio Investigation Ground
The Gendarmerie was sent to investigate the activities of the crew over their 72hr stop in Rio.
The report was censored other than they enjoyed themselves and sightseed Rio with an Helicopter.
Questions remain:
Why was Dubois standing?
Was someone else seated on the observer seat?
Was the observer seat recovered? Seatbelts?
4th voice not of F/A?
So long as the DCVR is hashed and truncated, we're running around like headless chickens.
The report was censored other than they enjoyed themselves and sightseed Rio with an Helicopter.
Questions remain:
Why was Dubois standing?
Was someone else seated on the observer seat?
Was the observer seat recovered? Seatbelts?
4th voice not of F/A?
So long as the DCVR is hashed and truncated, we're running around like headless chickens.
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And of course using the rudder too strenuously can cause other problems, as happened to the Boeing departing Kennedy shortly after 9/11.
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Food for thought
Interesting article. After reading the first few pages I was worried that it would descend into a journalistic dramatisation of what happened, using emotive language and assumptions, but it goes on to make some interesting observations and points.
I am not sure that I agree on all of the things and indeed some of the relevance of what is written, nevertheless it is well worth a read.
For those interested, I would suggest that Bill Palmers book, Understanding Air France 447, is a much more informative and technically rigorous account of the flight, including underlying causes and the industry as a whole.
I am not sure that I agree on all of the things and indeed some of the relevance of what is written, nevertheless it is well worth a read.
For those interested, I would suggest that Bill Palmers book, Understanding Air France 447, is a much more informative and technically rigorous account of the flight, including underlying causes and the industry as a whole.
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GPS software and aircraft displays
With the latest software that is now available in stand alone GPS devices.
It might be an idea if a separate GPS system with its own power supply was provided to give the crews a better spatial monitoring system.
It would allow the crew to view a 3D perspective of where the aircraft is in relation to the ground below and whats ahead.
Imagine a flight sim screen but showing the aircraft in profile against the surface of the earth which is monitoring the position and altitude in real time.
Just a thought if any makers are reading,
It might be an idea if a separate GPS system with its own power supply was provided to give the crews a better spatial monitoring system.
It would allow the crew to view a 3D perspective of where the aircraft is in relation to the ground below and whats ahead.
Imagine a flight sim screen but showing the aircraft in profile against the surface of the earth which is monitoring the position and altitude in real time.
Just a thought if any makers are reading,
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Vanity Fair article on 447
Despite a couple of minor errors, a superb layman's explanation of 447 and current automation problem. Suspect we all will learn something from it!
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Vanity Fair 447 article
Written for non pilots but some info. I haven't read before. Issues clearly stated. Shouldn't some regular hand flying be required reqired outside the sims? Criuse, at altitude as well as full approaches?
Many of the newer generation would be hard pressed to hand fly today. In the old days pre glass clockwork on the -200 I had my hands full (and my brain) but nowadays glass and automation have sadly declined skills considerably.
As for 447, case in point, everything from basic flying skills to CRM fell apart before our very eyes. More worrying than the loss of the hull and lives should be the insight into training gaps that were succinctly distilled into a few minutes.
As for 447, case in point, everything from basic flying skills to CRM fell apart before our very eyes. More worrying than the loss of the hull and lives should be the insight into training gaps that were succinctly distilled into a few minutes.
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The article higlights the contradictory sidestick command inputs, and the lack of situational awareness of the captain on re-entering the cokpit.
Is it true that there is no display on Airbus that shows both sidestick inputs and the resulting composite input at one glance? Why not?
On double-yoke planes, I guess the input states are immediately visible.
Is it true that there is no display on Airbus that shows both sidestick inputs and the resulting composite input at one glance? Why not?
On double-yoke planes, I guess the input states are immediately visible.
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There is a "side stick indication display" on the PFD, however it is only active while on the ground, and disappears shortly after rotation during take-off.
It is disabled after take-off because this indicator was only designed for control check purposes (e.g., during pre-flight) and could be misleading during flight.
There is a "side stick priority" button either pilot can press to take over the flight control from the other pilot (and/or from the autopilot).
It is disabled after take-off because this indicator was only designed for control check purposes (e.g., during pre-flight) and could be misleading during flight.
There is a "side stick priority" button either pilot can press to take over the flight control from the other pilot (and/or from the autopilot).
Controversial, moi?
In the old days pre glass clockwork on the -200 I had my hands full (and my brain) but nowadays glass and automation have sadly declined skills considerably.
I would argue that automation and modern flight deck aids mean that one has to make the effort to manually fly at appropriate times to maintain manual skills.
In the case of Air France 447 I still am absolutely staggered that a trained and experienced pilot could maintain full aft stick and think that it was an appropriate way to fly the aircraft!
I have never flown a sidestick and have nothing against them in principle but, as was proven in the AF case, it means that pilot monitoring has absolutely no idea what pilot flying might be doing. And what competent pilot would expect his/her colleague to be holding full aft stick?
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There is a "side stick indication display" on the PFD, however it is only active while on the ground, and disappears shortly after rotation during take-off.
It is disabled after take-off because this indicator was only designed for control check purposes (e.g., during pre-flight) and could be misleading during flight.
There is a "side stick priority" button either pilot can press to take over the flight control from the other pilot (and/or from the autopilot).
It is disabled after take-off because this indicator was only designed for control check purposes (e.g., during pre-flight) and could be misleading during flight.
There is a "side stick priority" button either pilot can press to take over the flight control from the other pilot (and/or from the autopilot).
How could he even have been *sure* which pilot had effective control of the stick if either pilot can take it over?
Yes, he could have observed and figured it out; but the whole issue of stress and fatigue is that it degrades cognitive performance up to a point where even trained individuals cannot reason well - which is why instruments and controls should be designed for clarity.
I see a design error here. Updating the controls by adding a composite sidestick display to one of the panels is a simple technical solution - but probably an instrument update would be tantamount to admitting liability and therefore legally impossible as an initiative for Airbus to take if not mandated.
Last edited by edmundronald; 28th Sep 2014 at 23:35.
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No, Petercwelch and also some else too. You have chosen a Professional Pilots,screen and it was not meant to be Evening News. We are really not supposed or expected to, -only find the most uncomfortable seat to sit on, and belt up for a free flight anywhere in the world. We really want to do that as professionals,as good as we all can. so You might read these threads and opinions as a gift for You. We allow You to read these,and expect that You have the same respect that we have for all who fly,or are with us. So i would wish that all who want to express opinions outside ,would find their ways somewhere else and leave these for us,to talk about.
Last edited by Naali; 28th Sep 2014 at 23:43.
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I think there's one glaring omission in the crew discussions on the CVR record as AF447 descended out of control.
At no time did any one person state, "I have control". I would have thought that would have been a critical statement, showing leadership and setting the command structure for the emergency, and stopping the confusion over who was actually in control.
The problem appears to be that no-one on that flight deck exercised any strong leadership and took full control, thereby relegating the others to supporting, advisory positions.
That one person should have been the Captain, of course. Despite just being woken and despite still trying to regain full faculties, he should have shown immediate strong leadership and actions.
He failed, and the other two crew members also failed in their duties, in like manner.
At no time did any one person state, "I have control". I would have thought that would have been a critical statement, showing leadership and setting the command structure for the emergency, and stopping the confusion over who was actually in control.
The problem appears to be that no-one on that flight deck exercised any strong leadership and took full control, thereby relegating the others to supporting, advisory positions.
That one person should have been the Captain, of course. Despite just being woken and despite still trying to regain full faculties, he should have shown immediate strong leadership and actions.
He failed, and the other two crew members also failed in their duties, in like manner.