CRM Training - A question about its operational limitations
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CRM Training - A question about its operational limitations
This is a question for CRM trained ATPL's.
I'm writing an essay for a post graduate Aviation Medical qualification ( Australia) and the question is....
" Discuss the advice by a senior airline pilot - "Dont let CRM training dull your Flying sense " - In your answer use any examples or real situations you consider appropriate."
My own response will concentrate on the importance of the "A" part of AGRAPE, but I'd be very interested in the real life experiences of flight crew.
I'm writing an essay for a post graduate Aviation Medical qualification ( Australia) and the question is....
" Discuss the advice by a senior airline pilot - "Dont let CRM training dull your Flying sense " - In your answer use any examples or real situations you consider appropriate."
My own response will concentrate on the importance of the "A" part of AGRAPE, but I'd be very interested in the real life experiences of flight crew.
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A 'grape' - U.S. fighter pilot slang for an easy kill or weak opponent -
"he's a grape."
Grapes = soft and easy to crush.
AGRAPE? No idea what it stands for. Even google doesn't know.
"he's a grape."
Grapes = soft and easy to crush.
AGRAPE? No idea what it stands for. Even google doesn't know.
Is AGRAPE like GRADE ?
Gather Information
Review Information
Analyse Alternatives
Decide
Evaluate Outcome of Action
But what does the A represent … Australian ?
"Dont let CRM training dull your Flying sense"
This depends on many variables; what is the ‘local’ definition of CRM and flying senses (Airmanship?). What was the focus of CRM training - interpersonal or cognitive, and how is CRM integrated into daily operation – organisational and professional cultures.
If AGRAPE relates to decision making, then this acronymic basis of decision training might not be a suitable example for comparing real life decisions and personal experiences, which are more likely to have been recognition primed decisions.
If you understand which question to ask, then the answer is usually obvious; I don’t understand the question.
Gather Information
Review Information
Analyse Alternatives
Decide
Evaluate Outcome of Action
But what does the A represent … Australian ?
"Dont let CRM training dull your Flying sense"
This depends on many variables; what is the ‘local’ definition of CRM and flying senses (Airmanship?). What was the focus of CRM training - interpersonal or cognitive, and how is CRM integrated into daily operation – organisational and professional cultures.
If AGRAPE relates to decision making, then this acronymic basis of decision training might not be a suitable example for comparing real life decisions and personal experiences, which are more likely to have been recognition primed decisions.
If you understand which question to ask, then the answer is usually obvious; I don’t understand the question.
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Correction it is AGRADE which sounds a bit less tasty as you say.
As it is a rather odd essay question, I thought it post it to Flight Deck folks.
I asked a captain for a a well known Australian airline - all he could come up with was that the whole CRM process might give one the best possible decision in a fairly logical problem solving situation, but if you are stalling at 1200 feet on approach ( or 38,000 feet and 40 degrees nose high ) you need a bit less problem solving and a bit more of "the right stuff" so to speak - the immediate reasonable safe option to buy time. Flying sense might equate to experience, judgement, or situational awareness or whatever magic is needed at the pointy end.
I would guess that if the whole crew suffers some type of group think situational awareness lossand theres little or no time,, one could CRM the problem till you are blue in the face all the way down from 38,000 feet but it wouldn neccessarily help. One person flying the aircraft well might be all one needs.
ALso - can anyone think of particular accidents where this kind of consideration may have played a role?( other than the one i just hinted at)
I would appreciate experienced comments thanks
As it is a rather odd essay question, I thought it post it to Flight Deck folks.
I asked a captain for a a well known Australian airline - all he could come up with was that the whole CRM process might give one the best possible decision in a fairly logical problem solving situation, but if you are stalling at 1200 feet on approach ( or 38,000 feet and 40 degrees nose high ) you need a bit less problem solving and a bit more of "the right stuff" so to speak - the immediate reasonable safe option to buy time. Flying sense might equate to experience, judgement, or situational awareness or whatever magic is needed at the pointy end.
I would guess that if the whole crew suffers some type of group think situational awareness lossand theres little or no time,, one could CRM the problem till you are blue in the face all the way down from 38,000 feet but it wouldn neccessarily help. One person flying the aircraft well might be all one needs.
ALso - can anyone think of particular accidents where this kind of consideration may have played a role?( other than the one i just hinted at)
I would appreciate experienced comments thanks
Last edited by Mimpe; 10th Mar 2013 at 05:17.
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The latest generation of CRM is about threat and error management (avoid threats, manage errors, mitigate errors which happened). If the aircraft is in an undesired state, you have to switch from error management to undesired state management.
"An example would be as follows: a flight crew selects a wrong approach in the Flight Management Computer (FMC). The flight crew subsequently identifies the error during a crosscheck prior to the Final Approach Fix (FAF). However, instead of using a basic mode (e.g. heading) or manually flying the desired track, both flight crew become involved in attempting to reprogram the correct approach prior to reaching the FAF. As a result, the aircraft “stitches” through the localiser, descends late, and goes into an unstable approach. This would be an example of the flight crew getting "locked in" to error management, rather than switching to undesired aircraft state management. The use of the Threat and Error model assists in educating flight crews that, when the aircraft is in an undesired state, the basic task of the flight crew is undesired aircraft state management instead of error management. It also illustrates how easy it is to get locked in to the error management phase."(Robert L. Helmreich, University of Texas)
You have to differentiate between time critical decisions and non time critical decision. If the situation requires immediate action, a great part of decision making will be INTUITION (if not covered by SOP's e.g.). Intuition becomes more and more accepted as term, because most of our daily decision are made intuitively, unconsciously. Then, a major role, to rely on the intuitively made decisions, plays the "knowledge experience". Situations were your unconscious decision has shown good results and situations were this intuitive decision has gone wrong. (Prof. Gigerenzer of the MPI of Bildungsforschung in Germany is doing studies in this field, which is fairly new). But this intuition is probably the so called AIRMANSHIP, or the SATISFICING, to be near enough, e.g., if the sitiation is time critical, you would aim for the first suitable solution, wheras the situation is not time critical, you would aim for the best solution.
"An example would be as follows: a flight crew selects a wrong approach in the Flight Management Computer (FMC). The flight crew subsequently identifies the error during a crosscheck prior to the Final Approach Fix (FAF). However, instead of using a basic mode (e.g. heading) or manually flying the desired track, both flight crew become involved in attempting to reprogram the correct approach prior to reaching the FAF. As a result, the aircraft “stitches” through the localiser, descends late, and goes into an unstable approach. This would be an example of the flight crew getting "locked in" to error management, rather than switching to undesired aircraft state management. The use of the Threat and Error model assists in educating flight crews that, when the aircraft is in an undesired state, the basic task of the flight crew is undesired aircraft state management instead of error management. It also illustrates how easy it is to get locked in to the error management phase."(Robert L. Helmreich, University of Texas)
You have to differentiate between time critical decisions and non time critical decision. If the situation requires immediate action, a great part of decision making will be INTUITION (if not covered by SOP's e.g.). Intuition becomes more and more accepted as term, because most of our daily decision are made intuitively, unconsciously. Then, a major role, to rely on the intuitively made decisions, plays the "knowledge experience". Situations were your unconscious decision has shown good results and situations were this intuitive decision has gone wrong. (Prof. Gigerenzer of the MPI of Bildungsforschung in Germany is doing studies in this field, which is fairly new). But this intuition is probably the so called AIRMANSHIP, or the SATISFICING, to be near enough, e.g., if the sitiation is time critical, you would aim for the first suitable solution, wheras the situation is not time critical, you would aim for the best solution.
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Thank you - I felt there was a difference betwen the management styles of the crew in the SWISSAIR 111 fire ( Transportation Safety Board of Canada - Media) compared to the Fed Ex Flight 1406 Fire ( National Transport Safety Board. In Flight fire/Emergency landing Federal Express Flight 1406. 1996. PB98-9104O3
NTSB/AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079. Downloaded from http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1998/AAR9803.pdf ).
In the former a perfect outcome was sought as fas as SOP's were concerned, however the checklist was so long ( over 200 items) 6 precious minutes were lost, despite crew being in full agreement about what they wanted to do. An opportunity to immediately descend and land was offered by ATc but refused, and perhaps an instant command decision to that effect was a less perfect but ultimately safer thing to do. In the Fed Ex flight 1406, the PIC decided quite quickly to get the aircraft on the ground no matter what, neglecting a few of the checklist items in the process, but all survived, though the hull burnt itself out soon after landing.
Another point is that the experience based "naturalistic" model of problem solving seems more suited to time critical tasks and to the stressed cockpit, to give a workable solution while CRM processes "management by committee" can be bought to bear later on if more perfection is required.
Well I quized 3 friends with miles of Major airline experience ( A330, A380 and 757) and they came up with some ideas for me!
NTSB/AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079. Downloaded from http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1998/AAR9803.pdf ).
In the former a perfect outcome was sought as fas as SOP's were concerned, however the checklist was so long ( over 200 items) 6 precious minutes were lost, despite crew being in full agreement about what they wanted to do. An opportunity to immediately descend and land was offered by ATc but refused, and perhaps an instant command decision to that effect was a less perfect but ultimately safer thing to do. In the Fed Ex flight 1406, the PIC decided quite quickly to get the aircraft on the ground no matter what, neglecting a few of the checklist items in the process, but all survived, though the hull burnt itself out soon after landing.
Another point is that the experience based "naturalistic" model of problem solving seems more suited to time critical tasks and to the stressed cockpit, to give a workable solution while CRM processes "management by committee" can be bought to bear later on if more perfection is required.
Well I quized 3 friends with miles of Major airline experience ( A330, A380 and 757) and they came up with some ideas for me!
Last edited by Mimpe; 10th Mar 2013 at 13:22.
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Yes. In a complex world, where you know all facts and risks (an ideal world), then a complex solution will deliver the best, the most logical results. But in an environment like flying an aircraft, with so many changing facts, you cannot know all facts and by aiming for a complex solution making, the load of information will become an overkill (if it is a time critical decision). So what do you do. You have to stay simple. You have to get rid of most of the information and stick to one or 2 points which you focus. (If you cannot extinguish the fire immediately, get the aircraft down, and get it down anyway, also if you successfully extinguished the fire, cause you never know.) This will deliver a better result in the end, like getting the plane on the ground, before it burns in the air. You use a Heuristic, also known as Rule of Thumb (an explanation for an unconsious/ intuitive decision). Often, these rule of thumbs are applied unconsiously. Like the Hudson River Emergency Landing, which is also described above in the movie by Prof. Gigerenzer. If, during the glide, the angle from the aircraft to the tower gets flatter, then the tower rises more and more, you know, you won't make it to the airfield. You don't have to do mathematical calculations, if it is possible to reach an airfield, there would be no time and it would be too complicated anyway. That is, why it makes it difficult to explain decisions made of intuition. So people refer to this as Airmanship, expierence, skills...active captain leadership and so on (which is understood as part of effective CRM). I wouldn't see Decision Making or Airmanship or Pilot Judgement or Error Management as an operational limitation. IT IS EFFECTIVE CRM if applied correctly (or not effective). But it is PART OF CRM. Like communication, which is also a part of CRM. If you ask people a few years later, who were tought a CRM-training, what CRM stands for, they will often answer that CRM is there that they should communicate better. But why do we have to communicate better? TO AVOID MISTAKES/ Errors which result in fatal accidents (or as nowadays to manage errors). Like communication, also all other non-technical skills (error management and so on) are part of CRM. Therefore I don't see an operational limitation of CRM. Flying skills are flying skills, and non-technical skills (CRM) are non-technical skills, which of course are always applied together at the same time if you want or not. So if the aircraft burns in the sky, it was, because CRM was not applied correctly. That is, why also CRM continous to develop further. If the aircraft burns, you have to apply undesired state management. Get the aircraft down. But it is always easier to judge afterwards...
So I would differentiate between effective and non effective CRM. Alone with flying skills, you won't get the aircraft on the ground, because you have to make the decision first, that you start your descend-now! (and that is part of CRM). To stay in the air without getting to a point would be poor decision making-poor CRM. And CRM does not mean "management by committee", I think that is a wrong understanding (it seems for me), for me CRM means getting the best, the safest result. And that can be sometimes an active leadership behaviour, or like a Co-Pilot who is assertive when the captain is about to do something stupid or against the law and speaks up. That is effective CRM. (To use all available resources; if the checklist is there, but if it is too complicated to use for this specific time critical situation, then don't use it!) We don't have to understand CRM as a group-decision. But it usually offers more chances to get to a safer decision, if subordinates feel free to speak up first. You get better results and better opinions, if subordinates are being asked first. If the Captain proposes an opinion first, it it will be adapted by subordinates and the result will be, that you won't get a different sight on things, which could have been better. But sometimes, there is no time for group decisions, and CRM may not be understood as group decision. CRM will continue to develop, it is not a final solution. Therefore I think, the question you are referring to should be more like what is effective CRM and what not. And not to ask what is the operational limitation of CRM...that depends on how it is used!
So I would differentiate between effective and non effective CRM. Alone with flying skills, you won't get the aircraft on the ground, because you have to make the decision first, that you start your descend-now! (and that is part of CRM). To stay in the air without getting to a point would be poor decision making-poor CRM. And CRM does not mean "management by committee", I think that is a wrong understanding (it seems for me), for me CRM means getting the best, the safest result. And that can be sometimes an active leadership behaviour, or like a Co-Pilot who is assertive when the captain is about to do something stupid or against the law and speaks up. That is effective CRM. (To use all available resources; if the checklist is there, but if it is too complicated to use for this specific time critical situation, then don't use it!) We don't have to understand CRM as a group-decision. But it usually offers more chances to get to a safer decision, if subordinates feel free to speak up first. You get better results and better opinions, if subordinates are being asked first. If the Captain proposes an opinion first, it it will be adapted by subordinates and the result will be, that you won't get a different sight on things, which could have been better. But sometimes, there is no time for group decisions, and CRM may not be understood as group decision. CRM will continue to develop, it is not a final solution. Therefore I think, the question you are referring to should be more like what is effective CRM and what not. And not to ask what is the operational limitation of CRM...that depends on how it is used!
60 lines with no paragraph breaks and you are talking about strategies for effective communication 
So I would differentiate between effective and non effective CRM
One instance of so-called "good" CRM are support calls that are usually mandated in the company operations manual. Some may argue the more "support" calls by the PNF the better for CRM. Others disagree and prefer a less talkative flight deck. The Boeing manufacturers FCTM gives examples of support calls such as localiser alive, glide slope alive, approaching minimums, I have control, 1000 to level off and so on.
Operators then add their own ideas. This often leads to continuous "fly-by-mouth" chatter that can be very distracting to the PF. Verbalising mode changes, speed, height, heading outside company published tolerances calls, all add to the cacophony of noise coming through the head-phones.
For example, some operators require the PNF to call "SPEED" if the PF is even momentarily outside typical speed range tolerances of more than 10 knots above the selected speed or more than 5 knots below the selected speed. On final in moderate turbulence, it is common to see tolerances exceed momentarily and it is left to the good judgement of the PNF to assess whether the situation is serious enough to warn the PF of excess outside tolerance flying. But perceptions of what contitutes good judgement can vary considerably between pilots. Points scoring often occurs.
Readers will instantly recognise the PNF over-enthusiastic points scorer who shouts "SPEED" or "TRACKING" or "ALTITUDE" in a quite unnecessarily loud voice designed secretly to show the PF how alert he is; or worse still, to deliberately show his CRM authority while innocently claiming he as PNF is only doing his job by following company SOP to the letter.
This type of personality on the flight deck is not only irritating but potentially dangerous as he causes deep resentment in the PF who may be concentrating on flying the aircraft. Try having a bloody fool screaming "SPEED" on very short final as the PF is deliberately bleeding off speed to cross the threshold at VREF.
Using the terminology "Speed fast - or speed slow" means something to the PF. Clearly "speed slow" for example, would alert the PF that there may be an ASI problem if his own ASI shows correctly. Whereas the call of "SPEED" gives immediate cause to doubt IAS readings and a cross reference to the standby ASI may be called for. Concentration may be lost momentarily.
In every case of the Boeing recommended standard call-outs (or support calls if you wish), the observation is clear such as "Glide Slope Alive" In many company mandated tolerance "support" calls, the word "GLIDE SLOPE" is used to indicate an out of company tolerance, rather than a call of "Glide Slope Low (or High)" Operators need to review their stated tolerance calls from vague terms such as Speed, Altitude, Tracking, Sink Rate etc to something more definate such as the previous examples.
But back to the so called CRM of support calls. Deliberately loud and insistent repeated calls by the PNF are similar to offenders who tailgate when driving. They can be irritating and can drive the victim to distraction. Where it is clear that is happening too many times to be a coincidence, then after warning the offender to pull his head in, and with no change of behaviour, the PF has a duty to submit a report on the offender on flight safety grounds. The pity is that too many operators dismiss this as two kids fighting in the playground and refuse to take whatever action is necessary. Insolence on the flight deck must never be tolerated as it is a break-down in discipline. A poisonous atmosphere on the flight deck is intolerable on flight safety grounds. Those responsible for pushing the CRM barrow need also to be aware of its pitfalls.
Last edited by Centaurus; 15th Mar 2013 at 12:27.
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Thanks for the discusion. One Australian ATPL I interviewed for my work raised the locally famous case of QF 2- the uncontained A380 engine explosion out of Singapore. I quite like this event because it illustrates how experienced practitioners make a novel solution in a crisis that instantly improves years of Airbus design! In that instance the 50+ simultaneous alarm and subesuent reconfigurations setting off new alarms became part of the problem as much as part of the solution. In the end the Airbus crisis design got instantly replaced by a crew decision to run the ruler over the aircraft from the point of view of what was working rather than what was not working- immediatley reducing. a 50+ item problem to its more essential parts. But then thats good crew process and not really what my question asked.
I must say time limited and crisis type decision making tends to fall back onto simple naturalistic and innate styles of getting to the heart of the matter- that was the beauty of the Hudson landing. Also its been known that complex issues cant be worked through in a high stimulus environment, so anything that increases the stimulus will worsen the problem solving, and anything that simplifies the problem to its fundamentals will render it more readily solved under. the immense pressures of the occasion. Thats aons of human problem solving at work. Conversely, destimulating increases the chance of a solution being found- hence the highly professional calm of Sullenberger as an intentional crisis response, wheras adding to the complexity of the issues (read multiple alarms about unimportant things, low piority checks for a high priority probem) just adds to the risk.
In Capt. Sullenbergers case, there was only one solution, the execution of which required very timely and proficient exclusion of the diminishing options.
As an aside, i did think that AF 447 crew may have collectivly suffered from some degree of "pitch up" illusion as the preoccupation with concerns about overspeed seemed to capture the groupthink of the moment. There has never been any mention of this possibility in the BEA report despite the aircraft being at outrageous nose high attitude for much of its final few moments. Not much use for CRM if an entire crew becomes confused- one pilot flying a sensible power and attitude setting would have done it.
I must say time limited and crisis type decision making tends to fall back onto simple naturalistic and innate styles of getting to the heart of the matter- that was the beauty of the Hudson landing. Also its been known that complex issues cant be worked through in a high stimulus environment, so anything that increases the stimulus will worsen the problem solving, and anything that simplifies the problem to its fundamentals will render it more readily solved under. the immense pressures of the occasion. Thats aons of human problem solving at work. Conversely, destimulating increases the chance of a solution being found- hence the highly professional calm of Sullenberger as an intentional crisis response, wheras adding to the complexity of the issues (read multiple alarms about unimportant things, low piority checks for a high priority probem) just adds to the risk.
In Capt. Sullenbergers case, there was only one solution, the execution of which required very timely and proficient exclusion of the diminishing options.
As an aside, i did think that AF 447 crew may have collectivly suffered from some degree of "pitch up" illusion as the preoccupation with concerns about overspeed seemed to capture the groupthink of the moment. There has never been any mention of this possibility in the BEA report despite the aircraft being at outrageous nose high attitude for much of its final few moments. Not much use for CRM if an entire crew becomes confused- one pilot flying a sensible power and attitude setting would have done it.
Last edited by Mimpe; 18th Mar 2013 at 13:38.
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Thanks to all for the help. I ended up getting a HD for the essay and that almost completes my Aviation Medicine study. Its been really interesting - especially all the Human Factors and risk management stuff. Its also been a great source of help for my own piloting safety as well.
Another point is that the experience based "naturalistic" model of problem solving seems more suited to time critical tasks and to the stressed cockpit, to give a workable solution while CRM processes "management by committee" can be bought to bear later on if more perfection is required.
I agree that time critical situations require a naturalistic decision making process, but I also think that CRM can play a role in good naturalistic decisions.
For example, what leads to good decisions? Good information. It doesn't matter if the decision is time critical or if you are calling your fourth meeting with the board to discuss the issue, good information is what you need to analyse to make a good decision.if you agree with that then let's look at two crews who have to make a time critical decision. One crew has been chatting about golf and the kids and not actively gathering information to maintain their SA. The other crew has been discussing the weather patterns, seeking enroute airport updates, monitoring traffic relative to them and their aircrafts fuel state and engine parameters etc etc etc. ie actively maintaining and building their SA. If those two crews are are faced with a time critical situation they will both call upon the information they have at that moment in time to make their decisions. The second crew has much more relevant and up to date information to work with. In the post match debrief on lookers will probably talk about intuition and experience but a lot of it will just be ' good information'. Why did they have that good information to make their time critical naturalistic decision? Because they had the discipline to build and maintain their SA, ie they exercised good CRM.
That's my take on it.
Framer
framer, re “… a common mis understanding of what CRM is.”
But doesn’t your version of CRM consider that a different viewpoint might involve your mis understanding of CRM?
Differing views and implementation of CRM is a major issue for the industry, heightened by the oft touted ‘poor CRM’, without explaining which particular aspects are poor or how they might be improved. Furthermore, in some versions, aeronautical decision making (and cognition in general), is treated as an add-on to ‘social / interpersonal’ focused ‘CRM’.
So what is 'good CRM' ?
Mimpe, I still do not understand the meaning of ‘A’.
I would have debated whether ‘GRADE’ is of any practical value as it only describes a process (used as an explanation in training), and one which is not necessarily in agreement with research views of actual decision making.
I would also differentiate between problem solving – a strategic process with different / more information; and ‘tactical’ decision making with many constraints particularly of time.
Did the A320 ditching really have only one solution?
I think not, there were several solutions involving varying degrees of ‘success’:- the level of safety. A satisfactory solution was chosen within the many ‘tactical’ constrains, but was this the first option chosen and then evaluated, or was there an iteration. There are some indications of iteration, but not of judging options against each other; e.g.
1. return to departure airfield – ‘no’ (R/T) insufficient distance. (Note that this was accomplished without reference to EFIS track / green arc computed information – expert vs novice behaviour?)
2. land at an alternative airfield – ‘no’ (R/T), as above but a more closely balanced evaluation.
3. off-airfield landing - ‘it’s the Hudson’ (R/T), water was the better option vs a city area.
However, was the ‘city’ considered and rejected, thus water was the only other option, or was water the initial naturalistic choice, and all of the apparent iteration was confirmation that the 'initial' option was viable.
Perhaps the choice of ditching in the Hudson has been labelled optimum or as the only (ideal) solution due to hindsight. Consider how other pilots might have judged the situation – any turn back towards the departure airfield would most probably eliminated viable options, and thus a reasonable choice of alternative landing sites. Therefore that initial situational evaluation and ‘decision’ was critical to the success of the event – ‘it’ made sense; how do we make sense of things.
From a medical view, any thoughts on this:- http://www.pprune.org/medical-health...ml#post7864244
.
But doesn’t your version of CRM consider that a different viewpoint might involve your mis understanding of CRM?
Differing views and implementation of CRM is a major issue for the industry, heightened by the oft touted ‘poor CRM’, without explaining which particular aspects are poor or how they might be improved. Furthermore, in some versions, aeronautical decision making (and cognition in general), is treated as an add-on to ‘social / interpersonal’ focused ‘CRM’.
So what is 'good CRM' ?
Mimpe, I still do not understand the meaning of ‘A’.
I would have debated whether ‘GRADE’ is of any practical value as it only describes a process (used as an explanation in training), and one which is not necessarily in agreement with research views of actual decision making.
I would also differentiate between problem solving – a strategic process with different / more information; and ‘tactical’ decision making with many constraints particularly of time.
Did the A320 ditching really have only one solution?
I think not, there were several solutions involving varying degrees of ‘success’:- the level of safety. A satisfactory solution was chosen within the many ‘tactical’ constrains, but was this the first option chosen and then evaluated, or was there an iteration. There are some indications of iteration, but not of judging options against each other; e.g.
1. return to departure airfield – ‘no’ (R/T) insufficient distance. (Note that this was accomplished without reference to EFIS track / green arc computed information – expert vs novice behaviour?)
2. land at an alternative airfield – ‘no’ (R/T), as above but a more closely balanced evaluation.
3. off-airfield landing - ‘it’s the Hudson’ (R/T), water was the better option vs a city area.
However, was the ‘city’ considered and rejected, thus water was the only other option, or was water the initial naturalistic choice, and all of the apparent iteration was confirmation that the 'initial' option was viable.
Perhaps the choice of ditching in the Hudson has been labelled optimum or as the only (ideal) solution due to hindsight. Consider how other pilots might have judged the situation – any turn back towards the departure airfield would most probably eliminated viable options, and thus a reasonable choice of alternative landing sites. Therefore that initial situational evaluation and ‘decision’ was critical to the success of the event – ‘it’ made sense; how do we make sense of things.
From a medical view, any thoughts on this:- http://www.pprune.org/medical-health...ml#post7864244
.
Last edited by alf5071h; 10th Jun 2013 at 19:12. Reason: typo
But doesn’t your version of CRM consider that a different viewpoint might involve your mis understanding of CRM?
I think that paragraph shows a common mis understanding of what CRM is.
“… a common mis understanding of what CRM is.”
Differing views and implementation of CRM is a major issue for the industry
