A breath of fresh air at last. One pilots view of CRM

[Herr Piece]

I just attended my annual CRM recurrent training.

I am very happy to say that I learned that the letter 'I' is not part of the word 'TEAM' in the English language

I find it astonishing that CRMIs are being paid to wheel out the same material year after year.

[Slasher]

In the 1920s Al Capone knew far more about CRM technique
than any latter day one. His style was simple - independent
individual achievement while still part of a team.

His spelling of "TEAM" had "I" in it.

[safetypee]

A significant problem is that there are many views of what CRM is, or is not. Few if any posts in this thread have chosen to define CRM. Thus what has or has not been taught or achieved cannot be judged objectively.
Many examples of CRM training appear to indicate poor subject selection (single focus), weak instruction, or have little follow up; we have yet (in this forum) to hear from the successes in the industry.
Helmreich provides a useful view of what CRM is – “the application of human factors”, although his other contributions have added complexity with ideas on evolution, TEM, etc.

The original idea – even if this can be identified, together with a sociological approach, now detracts from evolving need (safety and efficiency). Past focus has been on the human/human interface, whereas human factors involve a wide range of activities – SHELL model. The industry must pay more attention to other HF aspects.
How many CRM programs cover the S, H, & E aspects (automation, procedures, weather), or indeed consider the central ‘L’ which governs all interactions – individual human behaviour, thinking, acting, applying what has been (or should have been) considered.

CRM has an important role in safety. However, it is not the cure-all solution as some would promote, it’s just a small but necessary contribution, in combination with perhaps the more effective (efficient / reliable / controllable) inputs from technology and organisational control. Yet the effectiveness of these also depend on human involvement – application of human factors. Thus perhaps everyone requires some training / review of resource management, particularly that of individual performance.

[Armchairflyer]

The current definitions of CRM I am aware of refer to it as smartly using all the human resources available (including cabin crew and maybe even passengers, which possibly could have prevented the Kegworth accident, for instance) for a safe and efficient flight accomplishment. AFAIK it has not much to do with patting the back of cocky FOs or starting lengthy team discussions in situations that require quick response.

Pity that judging from the descriptions of actual CRM training here, it seems that most of its potential is wasted by restricting it to tedious lectures and Dilbert-like management "wisdom".

[PEI_3721]

The ICAO view of CRM; chapter 2 of HF training manual (ICAO training requirements come from Annex 6).
I wonder how many CRM courses follow these guidelines.
ICAO Human FactorsTrng Manual Rev 9_03, Chapt 2 CRM TEM

An example of a CRM training programme.
CRM

[pol1whiskey]

so Ronald Neves has deemed CRM as a failure. Fair enough. What Does he suggest as an alternative?

[A37575]

I would go with common sense and intelligence

Can't argue with that

[Armchairflyer]

Common sense and intelligence go a long way, but unless pilots' common sense and intelligence are fundamentally different, I doubt that it makes them aware offhand of, e.g., the effects of stress on decision making and communication (fostering plan continuation bias, a narrow attention focus and reduction/elimination of communication with the other crew members when in all three instances the opposite would be more helpful).

IMHO, CRM should not be a substitute but an enhancement of "pilot-specific" common sense and intelligence.

[Slasher]

Well a Makeshift Pilot Licence (MPL) holder can possess all the
commonsense and intelligence in the world but he will still be
as useless as tits on a bull whenever it comes to making a life
threatening judgement call.

Its instilled airmanship and a healthy dose of experience that
makes all the difference - we flew 727s, DC9s and F27s very
safely indeed well before CRM was invented.

[Armchairflyer]

Certainly, but the idea is apparently that (individual) airmanship and experience combined with appropriate CRM concepts might make you (whoever "you" are exactly here ) fly 7[3..8]7s/3[1..8]0s/whatever even more safely.

BTW, the captain of KLM 4805 probably had a lot of instilled airmanship and experience.

[parabellum]

so Ronald Neves has deemed CRM as a failure. Fair enough. What Does he suggest as an alternative?

Whatever it was we used in the seventy years before someone invented, yes I do mean invented, CRM. As others have suggested, intelligence and airmanship seemed to work.

[thefodfather]

Damn lies and statistics

Given that the commercial aircraft accident rate in 1970 was just over 11 per million departures compared to less than 1 per million departures today, the statistics suggest that the old reliance on common sense and good airmanship wasn't as good as some people think it was.

And, yes, before someone points out the improvements in technology this is, of course, a major factor as well.

If done properly CRM/ HF should not just be about the illustrious aviators who take to the skies. If it's carried out as part of a proper SMS it is as much about improving the organisation that supports those that fly so that decisions makers, whether in the cockpit or not, are able to make the best choices possible in every situation.

[Genghis the Engineer]

Could you keep quiet and let me do this, please?

A phrase I've been forced to use a few times with instructors who show insufficiently good understanding of CRM that they keep jabbering on whilst somebody else (me!) is trying to do something that requires significant mental effort. Particularly something I've already taken the trouble to study (as I'm sure that TP had).

Some of the best CRM I ever saw happened when I had an EFATO whilst teaching a PPL how to fly an old taildragger. My student handed control to me, I called an emergency and proceeded to turn onto a disused runway. Both my instructor and the tower monitored everything I was doing and ONLY when they judged I needed to know something said it. Both, independently, probably passed me information that saved two lives and the aeroplane, but at the same time both left me with the mental space to make the decisions I neeed, as captain, to do the same.

Well a Makeshift Pilot Licence (MPL) holder can possess all the
commonsense and intelligence in the world but he will still be
as useless as tits on a bull whenever it comes to making a life
threatening judgement call.

Its instilled airmanship and a healthy dose of experience that
makes all the difference - we flew 727s, DC9s and F27s very
safely indeed well before CRM was invented.

The statistics indicate that since CRM's advent something has substantially improved safety. It may have been CRM. It probably was to be fair only part of the solution, since numerous other things were being worked on in the same timescale - such as improved avionics, engine reliability, maintenance procedures, and so-on.

However you make a really valid point. Back in that era people's stick-and-rudder skills were generally superb, so most accidents had a substantial teamwork / comms element, leading to the creation of the CRM concepts - and rightly so. The big concern I have, and MPL exemplifies it, is that in concentrating too much on CRM, we have lost track of the primary importance of excellent handling skills. AF447 seems to show that distressingly well - three pilots who worked very well as a team - but in complete ignorance of what the aeroplane was actually doing.

I am a huge fan of CRM, but not where it throws the baby out with the bathwater by ignoring the utter importance that pilots have got to be able to fly and understand their aeroplane.

G

[Sir Niall Dementia]

I did my first CRM course at the same time as I did my command course with my then employer. One of the line trainers and I came up with the following for the CRMI's

Simplex humanoid confirmation: I'm cold I'll turn up the heating,

Duplex humanoid confirmation: I'm cold, shall we turn up the heating?

Triplex humanoid confirmation: We're cold, get the purser up here and ask if we should turn up the heating.

The CRMI's had orgasms over those!

Sadly these days CRM isn't just a case of the FD crew sorting themselves out, I'm heartily fed up of the CC questioning my decisions. P2 can question all he wants, and I hope he will, he at least has a license and in this company anything from 400-6500 hours, but CC going to the company with minimal knowledge and a lot of supposition really grips me. From CC I want a concise report of something that concerns them, if I have time I will answer their concerns in flight, if not then when we've got rid of the pax.

Luckily I'm our Head of Flight Safety so I get to see the written reports before anyone else, but a scan through some of the old posts on the CC Forum here may raise the eyebrows of quite a few pilots.

SND

[Armchairflyer]

AF447 seems to show that distressingly well - three pilots who worked very well as a team - (...)

You really see it that way?

[thefodfather]

Interesting thinking regarding the CC.

CC - "Captain, there are flames coming out of the left engine"

Captain - "Leave me in peace, I'm very busy dealing with a right engine fire"

CC inputs are often valid and experience has sadly shown that ignoring them, especially in high pressure situations, is a mistake that is only identified when its too late.

Involvement from the CC, if managed properly and in the right organisational culture, is only a positive thing. If the CC are going straight to company first, I might be questioning the cultural relationships between the FD and CC as well whether the CC training is preparing them properly for the way your company wishes them to act.

Out of interest, Sir Niall, if you get to read the reports first does that mean you filter out the ones you don't like? Or am I inferring too much from your last sentance.

[Genghis the Engineer]

You really see it that way?

Partly - they seem to have pooled information and communicated well. The FO(s) seem(s) to have deferred to the Captain appropriately.

They just all completely misunderstood what was going on, and as a consequence got everybody killed. It strikes me that the big failings were almost certainly in all of their understanding of the situation and the behaviour of the aeroplane, not their ability to work together.


Who doesn't want their CCM telling them there's ice on the wing that hasn't been cleared as the aeroplane taxis out?

G

[A37575]

CC - "Captain, there are flames coming out of the left engine"

Captain - "Leave me in peace, I'm very busy dealing with a right engine fire"

CC inputs are often valid and experience has sadly shown that ignoring them, especially in high pressure situations, is a mistake that is only identified when its too late.

I think the example quoted is too extreme to be a valid point - although I realise you may be just joking.

The statistics indicate that since CRM's advent something has substantially improved safety. It may have been CRM. It probably was to be fair only part of the solution, since numerous other things were being worked on in the same timescale - such as improved avionics, engine reliability, maintenance procedures, and so-on.

Ghengis thought that CRM has improved flight safety in that there have been fewer accidents since the term was first invented. Could be - although I think technical advances such as EGPWS, improvements in airborne weather radar, reliable and amazingly accurate automation and improvements in ATC have been the real key. I question the suggestion that CRM has played any significant part in reduction of accidents. Personalities in the cockpit rarely change their spots. If they are autocratic - they remain that way all their professional lives - in my experience. Subordinates might speak up more but that is more generational than empowered by CRM lectures.

And another thing. I have yet to see a company policy that lays out exactly how a first officer will take over control from a stubborn press-on-regardless captain when things are really getting out of hand. Few captains will cower in terror if the first officer announces "I have control" when an approach becomes unstable and the captain decides to continue the approach instead of going around.

While company manuals theoretically give authority for the second in command to take over control if the captain ignores the rules, they offer no advice as to the physical acts recommended such as smash the captain over the knuckles with a head set or arm wrestle over the the autothrottles. I do know of one enterprising F/O who grabbed the crash axe and threatened to smite the captain during an IFR descent towards hills below the MSA. That life saving act cost the first officer his future command with that company. Yet all he did was use the one CRM tool at his disposal

[Armchairflyer]

Partly - they seem to have pooled information and communicated well. The FO(s) seem(s) to have deferred to the Captain appropriately.

I beg to differ here; although they did talk a lot, it appears that important "standard" pieces of information were omitted (see avherald excerpt below). Agree that it was not a CRM breakdown that caused or significantly contributed to the crash though.

At 02:10:47Z the thrust levers were moved to about 2/3 of travel resulting in 85% N1. The climb rate reduced to 100 feet/min, the angle of attack reduced to about 3 degrees and the roll is controlled. The first officers now attempt to call the captain back to the cockpit. The BEA analyses that after a quick trim and levelling off as result of PF inputs the trajectory of the aircraft appeared controlled again, however the initial increase in altitude was excessive and should have been pointed out by the PNF. However, none of the pilots called out speeds, vertical speeds, pitch angles or altitude.

At 02:11:37Z the PNF pushes the priority button and provides a large left input in reaction to a high right bank, calling "controls on the left". He almost instantly released the priority button and ceased control inputs again without required calls.

At 02:11:42Z the captain entered the cockpit, just before the stall warning stops, the airplane was at 35800 feet MSL, 9100 feet/min sink rate, airspeeds below 100 KIAS, pitch 12 degrees nose up and engines at 102% N1. Neither first officer provides an account to the captain what is happening.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Arm chair flyer;

I don't filter any of them, and they are all available for all crew to read they come on a pad with individual numbers printed on them so each one can be traced. All of our CC go on he same CRM courses as the pilots, and so do our ground ops staff. There's a good chance if there is a problem we know at the front, but we need a concise accurate report of what the CC member is seeing, when possible they get to ride on a sim jump seat to see how we handle emergencies at the front (it took me a long time to get that approved, but its been really worthwhile).

Any member of crew can file an air safety report, but I prefer CC to discuss it with the pilots before filing so that it is based on technical fact rather than a supposition, I have read some fairly inaccurate ASRs based on the fact that the crew member thought something was wrong and that the pilots failed to inform her, in one case there was, it was an autopilot runaway and the pilots had their hands too full, just before DA to tell the CC what was happening. They sorted the problem, landed went down the pub and had a laugh about it, the CC filed an ASR believing the FD had mis-handled the aircraft (empty positioning sector). OK they should have told her, but maybe she should have hung around and asked what went on rather than going straight into print. Their MOR and the snag sheet arrived with me at the same time as her ASR, a well done for good flying and a wrist slap for poor CRM went to the pilots, I then had to explain to the CC member with the P1 what it all meant, and I have few enough hours in my day as it is.

I've also known a CC member who called the front during initial climb to report "a buzz and vibration" from her seat nothing showed up up front until after landing the crew found a section of rudder trim tab had broken off as they climbed. Her concerns were very valid and the crew spent a long time analysing things, turned out afterwards the buzz started as the gear retracted and the pilots didn't notice over the noise of the nose gear coming up. According to the P1 her report was as accurate as hell, but the problem left them shaking their heads in tracing it.

I value the CC, but I value accurate reporting as well.