The eager beaver pilot
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The eager beaver pilot
In another thread, Tee Emm posted something that struck a chord with me:
`Working together` does not mean the captain must ask the first officer or second officer his opinion for every tactical decision. It should never be a committee situation. There is no room for a voting democracy in the cockpit much as some crew members would love that.
Since the first mention of CRM (which was originally aimed at curbing arrogance in some captains and a very tiny minority at that - although every captain eventually became tarred the same brush) CRM principles have been either deliberately abused by some subordinate crew members or been genuinely misunderstood.
Tact and good manners has been replaced in some Western cockpits by downright smart-arsing designed to promote one-upmanship where the unstated aim is to impress the captain with eager-beaver way ahead of the aircraft attitude.
This inevitably leads to latent hostility when the captain finds himself pushed into a corner and having to explain every decision he makes to the satisfaction of his first officer. Some say it is a generational thing where teen-agers watching too much TV and laughing as the actors play at kids who steal laughs at the expense of their parents who are seen as `wrinklies`.
This generalised and ill disguised contempt for good manners is part of Western society nowadays and it shows on the flight deck where challenging the captain's every small decision is seen as `cool`.
Well, it is not `cool` at all. This sort of juvenile behaviour in some first officers is unnecessary, irritating and in the worst case flight safety can be compromised.
Of course, dangerously incompetent actions or decisions by the captain must be challenged by the first officer. As second-in-command that is one of his responsibilities. But where a certain type of character challenges for the sake of challenging in order to establish his position in the pecking order, and thus forces the captain on the defensive and accountable to his subordinate for even minor actions or decisions, the time has come for firm action by the captain to stop the rot and quick-time at that.
CRM does not mean open season on captains - although it is going that way; except in some Asian cultures where first officers are culture driven to being `your most obedient servant et al"...
I have been noticing the same thing but I could neither put the behavior pattern into words nor adequately describe the negative CRM impacts of the behavior. Well done Tee Emm. This is NOT a body slam of FOs, Captains could be eager beavers too. I am just very interested in fully fleshing out this behavior pattern because I want to recognize it immediately and have some tools to mitigate the behavior with 'tact and manners'.
I will post any recent eager beaver experiences from now on under this thread and how I handled it. I would like to ask any other PPruners to do the same.
My only new addition to the behavioral description is that the eager beavers seem to gossip a lot about other pilots. I'm not talking about a funny bar story, I'm talking about running another pilot's skills down when he's not there to give his side of the story. As you would expect, the other pilot is a poor fool and the eager beaver saved the day. When I ask: "Did you look the other pilot in the eye and discuss the problem?" They just have a blank look on their face.
I don't have a clinical name for it so eager beaver is as good as any.
`Working together` does not mean the captain must ask the first officer or second officer his opinion for every tactical decision. It should never be a committee situation. There is no room for a voting democracy in the cockpit much as some crew members would love that.
Since the first mention of CRM (which was originally aimed at curbing arrogance in some captains and a very tiny minority at that - although every captain eventually became tarred the same brush) CRM principles have been either deliberately abused by some subordinate crew members or been genuinely misunderstood.
Tact and good manners has been replaced in some Western cockpits by downright smart-arsing designed to promote one-upmanship where the unstated aim is to impress the captain with eager-beaver way ahead of the aircraft attitude.
This inevitably leads to latent hostility when the captain finds himself pushed into a corner and having to explain every decision he makes to the satisfaction of his first officer. Some say it is a generational thing where teen-agers watching too much TV and laughing as the actors play at kids who steal laughs at the expense of their parents who are seen as `wrinklies`.
This generalised and ill disguised contempt for good manners is part of Western society nowadays and it shows on the flight deck where challenging the captain's every small decision is seen as `cool`.
Well, it is not `cool` at all. This sort of juvenile behaviour in some first officers is unnecessary, irritating and in the worst case flight safety can be compromised.
Of course, dangerously incompetent actions or decisions by the captain must be challenged by the first officer. As second-in-command that is one of his responsibilities. But where a certain type of character challenges for the sake of challenging in order to establish his position in the pecking order, and thus forces the captain on the defensive and accountable to his subordinate for even minor actions or decisions, the time has come for firm action by the captain to stop the rot and quick-time at that.
CRM does not mean open season on captains - although it is going that way; except in some Asian cultures where first officers are culture driven to being `your most obedient servant et al"...
I have been noticing the same thing but I could neither put the behavior pattern into words nor adequately describe the negative CRM impacts of the behavior. Well done Tee Emm. This is NOT a body slam of FOs, Captains could be eager beavers too. I am just very interested in fully fleshing out this behavior pattern because I want to recognize it immediately and have some tools to mitigate the behavior with 'tact and manners'.
I will post any recent eager beaver experiences from now on under this thread and how I handled it. I would like to ask any other PPruners to do the same.
My only new addition to the behavioral description is that the eager beavers seem to gossip a lot about other pilots. I'm not talking about a funny bar story, I'm talking about running another pilot's skills down when he's not there to give his side of the story. As you would expect, the other pilot is a poor fool and the eager beaver saved the day. When I ask: "Did you look the other pilot in the eye and discuss the problem?" They just have a blank look on their face.
I don't have a clinical name for it so eager beaver is as good as any.
PCars (and Tee Emm), an interesting and valid view.
I would also agree that the root of the emerging behaviour is in the social climate. As an example see the following from ‘Beyond Feelings’, by Vincent Ruggiero;
"The Influence of Mass Culture”
In centuries past, family and teachers were the dominant, and sometimes the only, influence on children. Today, however, the influence exerted by mass culture (the broadcast media, newspapers, magazines, and popular music) often is greater.
By age eighteen the average teenager has spent 11,000 hours in the classroom and 22,000 hours in front of the television set. He or she has done perhaps 13,000 school lessons, yet has watched more than 750,000, commercials. By age thirty-five the same person has had fewer than 20,000 school lessons, yet has watched approximately 45,000 hours of television and seen close to two million commercials.
What effects does mass culture have on us? To answer, we need only consider the formats and devices commonly used. Modem advertising typically bombards the public with slogans and testimonials by celebrities. This approach is designed to appeal to emotions create artificial needs for products and services. As a result, many people develop the habit of responding emotionally, impulsively and gullibly to such appeals.
Television programmers use frequent scene shifts and sensory appeals such as car crashes, violence, and sexual encounters to keep audience interest from diminishing. Then they add frequent commercial interruptions. This author has studied the attention shifts that television viewers are subjected to. In a dramatic program, for example, attention shifts might include camera angle changes; shifts in story line from one set of characters (or subplot) to another, or from a present scene to a past one (flash back) or to fantasy: and shifts to “newsbreaks,” to commercial breaks, from one commercial to another, and back to the program. Also included are any shifts of attention that occur within commercials. I found as many as 78 shifts per hour, excluding the shifts within commercials. The number of shifts within commercials ranged from 6 to 54 and averaged approximately 17 per fifteen-second commercial. The total number of shifts came out to over 800 attention shifts per hour, or over 14 per minute. A century ago, even uneducated Americans were accustomed to listen attentively to political debates lasting five or six hours. And the speakers used bigger words and longer sentences than are common today. What many people today perceive to be dullness in teachers, text-book authors, and work assignments may actually be their own deficiency. Television viewing (and other modern entertainments) may have prevented them from developing a mature attention span and accepting normal rhythms of life.
Finally, mass culture promotes values that oppose those held by most parents and teachers. Play is presented as more fulfilling than work, self gratification as more desirable than self-control, and materialism as more meaningful than idealism. People who adopt these values with out questioning them may end up sacrificing worthy goals to their pursuit of “a good time” and lots of money.
Re “… of course, dangerously incompetent actions or decisions by the captain must be challenged by the first officer.”
This is a common assumption in CRM and a cornerstone of some monitoring routines, but in modern operations how do we ensure that the first officer has sufficient competence (experience) to intervene without being an eager beaver?
Are many of the challenges or interruptions poorly couched quests for knowledge, lacking, because of the current pressures on training, or due to a covert acceptance of lower standards – a creeping social change?
I would also agree that the root of the emerging behaviour is in the social climate. As an example see the following from ‘Beyond Feelings’, by Vincent Ruggiero;
"The Influence of Mass Culture”
In centuries past, family and teachers were the dominant, and sometimes the only, influence on children. Today, however, the influence exerted by mass culture (the broadcast media, newspapers, magazines, and popular music) often is greater.
By age eighteen the average teenager has spent 11,000 hours in the classroom and 22,000 hours in front of the television set. He or she has done perhaps 13,000 school lessons, yet has watched more than 750,000, commercials. By age thirty-five the same person has had fewer than 20,000 school lessons, yet has watched approximately 45,000 hours of television and seen close to two million commercials.
What effects does mass culture have on us? To answer, we need only consider the formats and devices commonly used. Modem advertising typically bombards the public with slogans and testimonials by celebrities. This approach is designed to appeal to emotions create artificial needs for products and services. As a result, many people develop the habit of responding emotionally, impulsively and gullibly to such appeals.
Television programmers use frequent scene shifts and sensory appeals such as car crashes, violence, and sexual encounters to keep audience interest from diminishing. Then they add frequent commercial interruptions. This author has studied the attention shifts that television viewers are subjected to. In a dramatic program, for example, attention shifts might include camera angle changes; shifts in story line from one set of characters (or subplot) to another, or from a present scene to a past one (flash back) or to fantasy: and shifts to “newsbreaks,” to commercial breaks, from one commercial to another, and back to the program. Also included are any shifts of attention that occur within commercials. I found as many as 78 shifts per hour, excluding the shifts within commercials. The number of shifts within commercials ranged from 6 to 54 and averaged approximately 17 per fifteen-second commercial. The total number of shifts came out to over 800 attention shifts per hour, or over 14 per minute. A century ago, even uneducated Americans were accustomed to listen attentively to political debates lasting five or six hours. And the speakers used bigger words and longer sentences than are common today. What many people today perceive to be dullness in teachers, text-book authors, and work assignments may actually be their own deficiency. Television viewing (and other modern entertainments) may have prevented them from developing a mature attention span and accepting normal rhythms of life.
Finally, mass culture promotes values that oppose those held by most parents and teachers. Play is presented as more fulfilling than work, self gratification as more desirable than self-control, and materialism as more meaningful than idealism. People who adopt these values with out questioning them may end up sacrificing worthy goals to their pursuit of “a good time” and lots of money.
Re “… of course, dangerously incompetent actions or decisions by the captain must be challenged by the first officer.”
This is a common assumption in CRM and a cornerstone of some monitoring routines, but in modern operations how do we ensure that the first officer has sufficient competence (experience) to intervene without being an eager beaver?
Are many of the challenges or interruptions poorly couched quests for knowledge, lacking, because of the current pressures on training, or due to a covert acceptance of lower standards – a creeping social change?
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Wow! Is this really what it's like in the dual-pilot cockpit now? Glad I'm SP. Whilst I would expect to be aided by my co-pilot (if I had one) I would feel uncomfortable, unnerved even, if I thought he/she was there with a judgmental mindset with the intention to undermine.
Like alf5071h, I've often wondered about television exposure on my children. I often sit and watch what they're watching just to check-up and try to (in my own untrained way) assess its impact. I often have non-electric days where they have to invent their own fun. (Parents, try it! After the initial whinges, the results can be enlightening, after all, creative play is crucial to developing social skills). Is too much telly/gaming the reason behind the cultural change described? I don't really know.
I do know that modern CRM techniques apply effective communication as being key. Just to throw another thought in, is this eager-beaver mentality a function of the relative age and inexperience in the modern airliner RHS I hear about so often. I mean to say, has this cultural change been determined by the airlines themselves by their employing ever less experienced copilots in order to save money?
Like alf5071h, I've often wondered about television exposure on my children. I often sit and watch what they're watching just to check-up and try to (in my own untrained way) assess its impact. I often have non-electric days where they have to invent their own fun. (Parents, try it! After the initial whinges, the results can be enlightening, after all, creative play is crucial to developing social skills). Is too much telly/gaming the reason behind the cultural change described? I don't really know.
I do know that modern CRM techniques apply effective communication as being key. Just to throw another thought in, is this eager-beaver mentality a function of the relative age and inexperience in the modern airliner RHS I hear about so often. I mean to say, has this cultural change been determined by the airlines themselves by their employing ever less experienced copilots in order to save money?
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Paul,
If you will forgive me saying so, you are starting to come across as mildly obsessed with this topic. All these "shocking stories" and "rumours of captains who want to eat their dinner in courses"?
In my experience (a lot of it,) work colleagues, be they F/O's, cabin crew, line engineers, and people in the office, are not usually shy about talking about anything or anyone that they consider out of the ordinary in some way.
Perhaps their "reluctance" requires a more introspective consideration on the part of the interrogator?
If you will forgive me saying so, you are starting to come across as mildly obsessed with this topic. All these "shocking stories" and "rumours of captains who want to eat their dinner in courses"?
In my experience (a lot of it,) work colleagues, be they F/O's, cabin crew, line engineers, and people in the office, are not usually shy about talking about anything or anyone that they consider out of the ordinary in some way.
Perhaps their "reluctance" requires a more introspective consideration on the part of the interrogator?
Paul, I recommend that you consider a range of different viewpoints.
Allocating labels to people, i.e. ‘bad’, indicates closure of thought or inability / reluctance to think about the situation which could contribute to the individual's behaviour. In the extreme your view or attitude could have precipitated the ‘bad’ behaviour.
Is ‘bad’ only bad in your view, or are there other reasons for what is perceived. Doses a ‘mildly annoying’ FO / Capt (to you) appreciate that s/he is causing concern, and if given opportunity to explain, what is his/her view of you, or the reasons for ‘poor’ interactive behaviour?
Without discussion or at least thoughtful observation and reasoning, we often end up with single channelled opinion, which in aviation safety related situations is not very helpful.
Consider the other persons point of view. Perhaps the other person’s training and experience are such that s/he is still in educational acquisition mode – they just don’t know, thus they seek more information. Some unfortunately might couch their question as a challenge due to weaknesses in CRM training or understanding of its application, for others it might represent embarrassment, or indicate aspects of personality. This can apply to Capts as well as FOs.
This is an important and apparently emergent subject for aviation. It’s useful to discuss the issues around it to widen our understanding, but this requires an open and thoughtful mind.
If you have relevant research, then please share it so that we all might learn.
My very limited experience was as a direct command captain after a career of single ‘pilot’ military operations; I am thankful for the few civilian co-captains who crewed with me and took time to explain some of the fundamentals.
Me an eager beaver? Yes, very much so, but the vast majority of the questioning occurs within the thought processes before considering open communication.
Allocating labels to people, i.e. ‘bad’, indicates closure of thought or inability / reluctance to think about the situation which could contribute to the individual's behaviour. In the extreme your view or attitude could have precipitated the ‘bad’ behaviour.
Is ‘bad’ only bad in your view, or are there other reasons for what is perceived. Doses a ‘mildly annoying’ FO / Capt (to you) appreciate that s/he is causing concern, and if given opportunity to explain, what is his/her view of you, or the reasons for ‘poor’ interactive behaviour?
Without discussion or at least thoughtful observation and reasoning, we often end up with single channelled opinion, which in aviation safety related situations is not very helpful.
Consider the other persons point of view. Perhaps the other person’s training and experience are such that s/he is still in educational acquisition mode – they just don’t know, thus they seek more information. Some unfortunately might couch their question as a challenge due to weaknesses in CRM training or understanding of its application, for others it might represent embarrassment, or indicate aspects of personality. This can apply to Capts as well as FOs.
This is an important and apparently emergent subject for aviation. It’s useful to discuss the issues around it to widen our understanding, but this requires an open and thoughtful mind.
If you have relevant research, then please share it so that we all might learn.
My very limited experience was as a direct command captain after a career of single ‘pilot’ military operations; I am thankful for the few civilian co-captains who crewed with me and took time to explain some of the fundamentals.
Me an eager beaver? Yes, very much so, but the vast majority of the questioning occurs within the thought processes before considering open communication.
Bad fos make a bad day for the captain - but he should be mature enough to deal with that. Bad captains make dysfunctional crews.
Captain watching his radar and notes Cb's ahead and to one side and also notes wind direction at his cruising altitude. He makes the decision to divert 25 miles right of track to avoid possible overhang of large CB. He says to his F/O "Request ATC approval for diversion 25 miles right of track". F/O looks at radar and replies "25 miles is a bit excessive don't you think? How about 10 miles right of track"? Hello?
Captain repeats his direction to the F/O who then asks ATC for 15 miles right of track and at the same time winks to the captain and says "go you halves, Jack". Is that an example of good humour or not? In fact, this example of one F/O's behaviour is not uncommon and the captain is left with several options.
Does he pick up the microphone and talk to ATC himself? Or does he laugh and bow to the F/O opinion that 15 miles is good enough and pretend not to be annoyed at the gross lack of professionalism displayed by the F/O? Does he savage the F/O in no uncertain terms and put him in his place to ensure such behaviour will not be repeated? What do you think?
Or - in future before he makes the request does he patiently explain to the F/O the full reasons why he made the decision that 25 miles right of track was made - to include wind direction, further CB's along track that would have to be studied on radar which would not be a problem if 25 miles right of track was approved. Then if the F/O agrees with the captains point of view he goes ahead and requests the weather diversion? More to the point should the F/O under these circumstances accept the captains request without question if he was satisfied the diversion distance was safe?
Example 2. During cruise, the company flight planning department (despatcher) contact the aircraft with an amended route clearance. The captain studies the amended clearance and decides this will cause problems further down the track and he decides to recommend an alternative course of action.
He asks the F/O to contact the despatcher and request a further amended route with details of the captain's suggested route. The F/O looks at the captain and says "Oh! do I really have to call the despatcher now? And why can't we just accept his route"?
............................................................ ....................................
These examples of replies by each F/O to the captain's operational request are typical of many first officer's lack of good manners and in turn is guaranteed to annoy any captain. But it is not just lack of good manners and maturity. It is challenging the captain's authority just for the sake of it and when there is no obvious danger to the conduct of the flight. Some captains are happy to sit down and patiently explain the reasons for these operational decisions. But should they have to? Some argue they should not be put in that position in the first place.
Some put the blame fairly and squarely where they perceive it should be - and that is on the head of the F/O. At the induction stage of new first officers entering an airline, management need to acquaint new recruits with commonsense rules of the game. It is called Cockpit Etiquette. F/O's are primarily in the RH seat to support the captain. They also have the responsibility of being second in command. That means complying with the captain's directions within reason and without arguing the toss for no good flight safety reason. Is it any wonder that some captains are forced into strong words when faced with eager beaver obstinate first officers who just love to needle the bloke in the left seat. A hostile atmosphere on the cockpit then becomes a flight safety issue.
YP
Not a bad tactic, and that's pretty much I would do ( sharing the mental model, etc ). But you still need to consider what you're going to do if the f/o is one of the very very few (<10%) who will argue the toss for the sake of it? As was pointed out to me in my Command upgrade years ago: "not all the a****holes are in the Left hand seat"?
Why start by telling the fo to do something at all? Why not say, "There's weather ahead - I'm thinking we should look to be 25 miles east of it. What do you think?
Not a bad tactic, and that's pretty much I would do ( sharing the mental model, etc ). But you still need to consider what you're going to do if the f/o is one of the very very few (<10%) who will argue the toss for the sake of it? As was pointed out to me in my Command upgrade years ago: "not all the a****holes are in the Left hand seat"?
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Young Paul:
None of your buisness, has no safety implication, let the old man fly his ship as he likes. He will have to justify additional fuel burn and might just take some time to get used to the new FMS
You must intervene. That is what an FO is for, most definately.
I'd laugh about an order like that - is it a joke or what?
Legally you should have had a flight plan with the fuelcalculation on it, including wind. So what the hell? Would you land asap if your FMS failed?
What sad, indignified behaviour, but none of your business as an FO.
Sorry, I don't understand what you wrote.
Big, big nono. This requires a debriefing, and if the CPT shows no insight into his mistake may even call for a report to safety/training department.
Your questions are easy to answer. An FO is there to execute the orders of the Captain and run the ship according to his plan (military XO and CO). The FO's responsibility extends to a monitoring aspect of flight safety and the duty to intervene should it become endangered. Personal preferences like flying 15nm iso 25nm off track to circumnavigate CBs will have to wait until the tailor has stiched on the 4th stripe. The same goes for descent planning (your FMS story). Maybe you knew better, your margine for error had gotten narrower as you had many hours on type, but you have to grant the other guy a more conservative plan if wanted. I let the FOs do stuff like that, what do I care. The opposite (I'll show you a descent where we don't have to add power until 1500'...) calls for absolute alertness and maybe intevention, be you CPT or FO.
In a Sim session during my conversion training last week I was flying with a guy just out of flightschool. He had not even sat one hour in a real jet, but he straight out refused my acceptance of a clearance below MSA (in FRA, radarvectored). I was shocked, had not expected such resistance. As we were in a timecritical scenario (Elec problems, Battery discharging) I quickly weighed the need for saving a minute of flighttime (shooting the ILS out of 3000' iso 4000') and the time it would take to explain to the new guy something about MRVA, emergency authority, OMA regulations,...
I swallowed my pride (harder than I thought, to not let my ego insist on having my order followed), got on the ILS in 4000' and flew to a happy outcome of the situation.
During the debriefing however I told the FO about the difference of taking a clearance below MSA in Frankfurt to doing so in other parts of the world.
So tell me, those of you grumbling about eager beaver fos. What should I have done in each of these cases?
- new to type, used the speedbrake to descend thousands of feet below target descent profile because he didn't trust the FMC to calculate a proper descent path
- did a manual loadsheet that was incorrect, not realising that the problem with the computer loadsheet was actually that the position of the bags was taking the aircraft out of trim
- asked me to disconnect the autopilot and fly in such a way as to simulate turbulence, to justify strapping the passengers in for the sake of the cabin crew
- refused point blank to put en route winds into the FMC because it shouldn't change the ETA
- waited until he thought I wasn't looking then reduced the cost index so that the aeroplane flew well below company target speed, to increase his overtime payments
- loaded "round trip fuel" on charter flights, filling on the gauges rather than using a litreage uplift (which was company policy), failing to take account of the fact that every time fuel was put into the centre tank, there would be 200kg less by the time it had been burnt than was shown on the gauges at the start of the flight
- nearly flown the aircraft into the approach track for another runway due to changing the radio set up after briefing the approach (and without telling me)
Your questions are easy to answer. An FO is there to execute the orders of the Captain and run the ship according to his plan (military XO and CO). The FO's responsibility extends to a monitoring aspect of flight safety and the duty to intervene should it become endangered. Personal preferences like flying 15nm iso 25nm off track to circumnavigate CBs will have to wait until the tailor has stiched on the 4th stripe. The same goes for descent planning (your FMS story). Maybe you knew better, your margine for error had gotten narrower as you had many hours on type, but you have to grant the other guy a more conservative plan if wanted. I let the FOs do stuff like that, what do I care. The opposite (I'll show you a descent where we don't have to add power until 1500'...) calls for absolute alertness and maybe intevention, be you CPT or FO.
In a Sim session during my conversion training last week I was flying with a guy just out of flightschool. He had not even sat one hour in a real jet, but he straight out refused my acceptance of a clearance below MSA (in FRA, radarvectored). I was shocked, had not expected such resistance. As we were in a timecritical scenario (Elec problems, Battery discharging) I quickly weighed the need for saving a minute of flighttime (shooting the ILS out of 3000' iso 4000') and the time it would take to explain to the new guy something about MRVA, emergency authority, OMA regulations,...
I swallowed my pride (harder than I thought, to not let my ego insist on having my order followed), got on the ILS in 4000' and flew to a happy outcome of the situation.
During the debriefing however I told the FO about the difference of taking a clearance below MSA in Frankfurt to doing so in other parts of the world.
Just curious - these "difficult" co-pilots, would I be right in guessing that they're largely the newer people: most likely with low hours or off an integrated course.
Just my gut feeling, but I'd expect somebody who has been sat in that seat longer, or for that matter done a few thousand hours instructing before switching to the airlines, to be better at understanding and accepting non-standard, but safe, instructions? The chap with less experience is more likely to be aggressively by the book (not below MSA, etc.) - although one hope's he or she would still stop you trying to fly through a lump of cumulo-granitus!
G
Just my gut feeling, but I'd expect somebody who has been sat in that seat longer, or for that matter done a few thousand hours instructing before switching to the airlines, to be better at understanding and accepting non-standard, but safe, instructions? The chap with less experience is more likely to be aggressively by the book (not below MSA, etc.) - although one hope's he or she would still stop you trying to fly through a lump of cumulo-granitus!
G
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Well Tee Emm, welcome to the club.
That's two of us who have had a "whatever" when suggesting that perhaps a more introspective approach might be in order. Normally a response I get from those champions of good manners and management, my teenage children.
There is no doubt that "CRM" in all it's manifestations will never, nor is it intended to, homogenize the enormous variety of personalities and character traits that make up any given work force. The purpose is to provide an improved level of awareness and self awareness of how aspects of those traits may impact on flight safety. This is not only a factor when it comes to differences, but also as much so when two or more individuals share very similar traits.
Understanding other people and your own interaction with their personality traits and character can often be a very difficult and time consuming exercise. Thinking about my teenage children again, I would even venture so far as to say, impossible on occaissions.
As a Captain, I almost exclusively share a workspace the size of a small cloakroom, with First Officers. In that aspect of my professional environment they are the people I have the most professional interaction with. First officers, in much the same way, have most of their day to day interaction with Captains. I regularly hear stories of Captains who have irritated, amused, upset, impressed, bored, or generally been cause for comment. I don't doubt that to other Captains I have been the subject of similiar discussions.
This is just the way of the world. It is what happens in many walks of life and occupations, and isn't in itself a particular cause for concern.
Ghengis, it may surprise you to hear, that the low time integrated course cadets, are in fact some of the least problematic people in this respect. I fly with a lot, and have done consistently for the last 15 years. I have always maintained (and still do) that what these pilots lack in experience they more than make up for in their understanding and adaption to what we would term "CRM" techniques. Unlike those of us brought up in an era of "assertiveness = command" these pilots as part of their integrated training, grow up with the ingrained concepts of "CRM" awareness and self awareness. They tend to have a much more defined awareness of their limitations, and they absorb information like a sponge.
I find as I get older that "difficult co-pilots" are a very rare commodity. These days I put into that category people who persistently turn up late, scruffy, or fail to put in what I consider the requisite attitude and application needed to complete a task. When I was a new captain in my twenties, "difficult co-pilots" may have been older first officers who had been long term pass-overs for promotion, or new hire military pilots with a bit of underlying resentment at adopting a new found junior rank. Even then such instances were very rare, and it was still as much of a challenge for me to understand and adapt to their sensitivities, as it was for them to accept the reality.
Without doubt it is much harder for a First Officer, who is usually on a much steeper learning curve, to have to adapt to perhaps a hundred different Captains, who "CRM" and "SOP's" notwithstanding, will still all have their own foibles and differences. It amazes me how so many F/O's do this so well. Nevertheless, the Captain brings his own experience to the ingredient mix, and is him/herself promoted on the basis of experience and ability as well as being subject to the normal ongoing performance criteria.
In these days of OQAR's and safety channels, it is much easier for an individual to report flagrant breaches of safety, whoever they are, and (natural reluctance notwithstanding) whatever their rank.
I have said it before in another thread running on this forum, but I cannot understand why such things as a "Captain wanting to eat his meal in courses" causes so much angst to the author of that thread. It isn't a safety issue, it might be a foible, but it does raise the question of introspection, and perhaps something of an underlying issue here?
That's two of us who have had a "whatever" when suggesting that perhaps a more introspective approach might be in order. Normally a response I get from those champions of good manners and management, my teenage children.
There is no doubt that "CRM" in all it's manifestations will never, nor is it intended to, homogenize the enormous variety of personalities and character traits that make up any given work force. The purpose is to provide an improved level of awareness and self awareness of how aspects of those traits may impact on flight safety. This is not only a factor when it comes to differences, but also as much so when two or more individuals share very similar traits.
Understanding other people and your own interaction with their personality traits and character can often be a very difficult and time consuming exercise. Thinking about my teenage children again, I would even venture so far as to say, impossible on occaissions.
As a Captain, I almost exclusively share a workspace the size of a small cloakroom, with First Officers. In that aspect of my professional environment they are the people I have the most professional interaction with. First officers, in much the same way, have most of their day to day interaction with Captains. I regularly hear stories of Captains who have irritated, amused, upset, impressed, bored, or generally been cause for comment. I don't doubt that to other Captains I have been the subject of similiar discussions.
This is just the way of the world. It is what happens in many walks of life and occupations, and isn't in itself a particular cause for concern.
Ghengis, it may surprise you to hear, that the low time integrated course cadets, are in fact some of the least problematic people in this respect. I fly with a lot, and have done consistently for the last 15 years. I have always maintained (and still do) that what these pilots lack in experience they more than make up for in their understanding and adaption to what we would term "CRM" techniques. Unlike those of us brought up in an era of "assertiveness = command" these pilots as part of their integrated training, grow up with the ingrained concepts of "CRM" awareness and self awareness. They tend to have a much more defined awareness of their limitations, and they absorb information like a sponge.
I find as I get older that "difficult co-pilots" are a very rare commodity. These days I put into that category people who persistently turn up late, scruffy, or fail to put in what I consider the requisite attitude and application needed to complete a task. When I was a new captain in my twenties, "difficult co-pilots" may have been older first officers who had been long term pass-overs for promotion, or new hire military pilots with a bit of underlying resentment at adopting a new found junior rank. Even then such instances were very rare, and it was still as much of a challenge for me to understand and adapt to their sensitivities, as it was for them to accept the reality.
Without doubt it is much harder for a First Officer, who is usually on a much steeper learning curve, to have to adapt to perhaps a hundred different Captains, who "CRM" and "SOP's" notwithstanding, will still all have their own foibles and differences. It amazes me how so many F/O's do this so well. Nevertheless, the Captain brings his own experience to the ingredient mix, and is him/herself promoted on the basis of experience and ability as well as being subject to the normal ongoing performance criteria.
In these days of OQAR's and safety channels, it is much easier for an individual to report flagrant breaches of safety, whoever they are, and (natural reluctance notwithstanding) whatever their rank.
I have said it before in another thread running on this forum, but I cannot understand why such things as a "Captain wanting to eat his meal in courses" causes so much angst to the author of that thread. It isn't a safety issue, it might be a foible, but it does raise the question of introspection, and perhaps something of an underlying issue here?
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Pilots: It was my post that was described as a "pissing contest". And I couldn't be bothered to reply to your ad hominem arguments. Manners? Pot, kettle, black? I stick to addressing it as rumours and I'm told I'm obsessed. I supply evidence and I'm told I'm involved in a pissing contest. I thought it better to stop wasting my time than answer in kind. WTGROMT. As you were....
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Feels like this thread suffered a bit from thread hijack.
To me the post by alf5071h rings a few bells.
Being the father of teenagers, I do recognise the what I for lack of better words call "lack of respect" that seems to be innate in the young generation.
Not that they mean to be rude, but they appear to be raised on a steady diet of immediate gratification, democracy between the generations, talking back at teachers, police and authorities in general.
They have learned that their opinions, matter. Everybody's opinion seems to matter nowadays, even the untrained opinions.
I am not advocating a return to the stone age. But there are some areas of life where an untrained opinion, if followed, can kill. That is where there is a system of hierarchy, which should be but not always is, based on merit can play a mitigating role.
When I need to buy a car, my kids don't get to decide which one. Their needs will be taken into account and they can voice their opinion, but I make the final decision based on all the information I have and how I weigh it in the equasion.
To me, an eager beaver F/O would be an F/O who does not realise his limits with regards to experience, training, local knowledge or any other area that is important to the flight, yet feels his/her opinion is equal to that of the captain.
Now, my kids are not bad kids and they actually do respect people. It is just that society seems to impress upon them that their opinions are important (mostly for commercial reasons, I'm afraid) without demanding proof of knowledge on most subjects. So in their view opinions are interchangeable.
Why study for years if you can find the answer on the internet in seconds? What value is an education for the new generation?
I value life experience, as well as an education. But they lack the life experience to know its value, and one cannot blame them for it. For we have helped create a society that caters for the young and the quick, not the wise and the thoughtful. We want soundbites, not well considered explanations. We want instant opinions, not having to wait for someone to collect information and then make their mind up.
And then we are surprised that this attitude finds its way into our cockpits.
I realise that I probably sound like an old fart. I was once a young and eager F/O, having to deal with a wide range of characters in the command seat. I learned from each of them, if only that I would do it differently when my time came. But I never felt like going against their decisions, unless they were unsafe. I did always ask for an explanation later, for the purposes of learning.
And I am sure even that was too much for some of the ex-mil captains (other equally ex-mil captains had no problem with that, so it probably was a character thing as well) who were not used to a "subordinate" asking for the whys of their decisions.
When I became a captain I always tried to have a post flight debrief, as a mutual learning opportunity. I have not performed a flawless flight yet, so it went both ways.
Nowadays I have the pleasure of working in an environment where a post flight debrief is mandatory, and an open forum between professionals. Sometimes harsh words are spoken, but always with the aim to improve the total performance and with respect for the professionalism we bring to the game.
But in an age where kids surf the internet on their mobile phones in the classroom, some problems in the cockpit environment should be expected unless and until the value of knowledge and experience is understood.
To me the post by alf5071h rings a few bells.
Being the father of teenagers, I do recognise the what I for lack of better words call "lack of respect" that seems to be innate in the young generation.
Not that they mean to be rude, but they appear to be raised on a steady diet of immediate gratification, democracy between the generations, talking back at teachers, police and authorities in general.
They have learned that their opinions, matter. Everybody's opinion seems to matter nowadays, even the untrained opinions.
I am not advocating a return to the stone age. But there are some areas of life where an untrained opinion, if followed, can kill. That is where there is a system of hierarchy, which should be but not always is, based on merit can play a mitigating role.
When I need to buy a car, my kids don't get to decide which one. Their needs will be taken into account and they can voice their opinion, but I make the final decision based on all the information I have and how I weigh it in the equasion.
To me, an eager beaver F/O would be an F/O who does not realise his limits with regards to experience, training, local knowledge or any other area that is important to the flight, yet feels his/her opinion is equal to that of the captain.
Now, my kids are not bad kids and they actually do respect people. It is just that society seems to impress upon them that their opinions are important (mostly for commercial reasons, I'm afraid) without demanding proof of knowledge on most subjects. So in their view opinions are interchangeable.
Why study for years if you can find the answer on the internet in seconds? What value is an education for the new generation?
I value life experience, as well as an education. But they lack the life experience to know its value, and one cannot blame them for it. For we have helped create a society that caters for the young and the quick, not the wise and the thoughtful. We want soundbites, not well considered explanations. We want instant opinions, not having to wait for someone to collect information and then make their mind up.
And then we are surprised that this attitude finds its way into our cockpits.
I realise that I probably sound like an old fart. I was once a young and eager F/O, having to deal with a wide range of characters in the command seat. I learned from each of them, if only that I would do it differently when my time came. But I never felt like going against their decisions, unless they were unsafe. I did always ask for an explanation later, for the purposes of learning.
And I am sure even that was too much for some of the ex-mil captains (other equally ex-mil captains had no problem with that, so it probably was a character thing as well) who were not used to a "subordinate" asking for the whys of their decisions.
When I became a captain I always tried to have a post flight debrief, as a mutual learning opportunity. I have not performed a flawless flight yet, so it went both ways.
Nowadays I have the pleasure of working in an environment where a post flight debrief is mandatory, and an open forum between professionals. Sometimes harsh words are spoken, but always with the aim to improve the total performance and with respect for the professionalism we bring to the game.
But in an age where kids surf the internet on their mobile phones in the classroom, some problems in the cockpit environment should be expected unless and until the value of knowledge and experience is understood.
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Quote:
On the basis of an audit of my 13000 hours
I wondered when the inevitable pissing contest would start...
Reply
On the basis of an audit of my 13000 hours
I wondered when the inevitable pissing contest would start...
Reply
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Because I was citing it as the sample size for my evidence? I thought that was a somewhat sounder basis for discussion than "A first officer once said something nasty to me."
But forget it, it's not important. I'm deleting the posts. Sorry for hijacking the thread.
But forget it, it's not important. I'm deleting the posts. Sorry for hijacking the thread.
Last edited by Young Paul; 19th Jun 2011 at 08:45.
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S76Heavy:
That is exactly how I viewed my job as an FO. I don't find this to sound like an old fart's opinion. I believe my role as an FO was kind of lake a safety advisor. To carry along with the CPT's decision and to intervene once it became unsafe.
Just as Youg Paul, I have to conduct a flawless flight yet. Years ago someone published an essay in our companies flight safety publication with the essence that he would always wonder what mistake he would make next. To expect not to make a mistake is essentially dangerous and to have your mind set for being corrected by your colleague for the next one you make. It was a brilliant piece of writing.
I don't believe it is a matter of experience (or lack thereof) wether somebody is an "eager beaver" FO, but moreso that it is personality or education. With the older FOs it is also how bad they think they should be in your seat and would know better than you. This can result in either the "eager beaver" syndrome or a frustrated lack of input and being drawn back (sorry, I lack the words on how to describe this in english).
I realise that I probably sound like an old fart. I was once a young and eager F/O, having to deal with a wide range of characters in the command seat. I learned from each of them, if only that I would do it differently when my time came. But I never felt like going against their decisions, unless they were unsafe. I did always ask for an explanation later, for the purposes of learning.
Just as Youg Paul, I have to conduct a flawless flight yet. Years ago someone published an essay in our companies flight safety publication with the essence that he would always wonder what mistake he would make next. To expect not to make a mistake is essentially dangerous and to have your mind set for being corrected by your colleague for the next one you make. It was a brilliant piece of writing.
I don't believe it is a matter of experience (or lack thereof) wether somebody is an "eager beaver" FO, but moreso that it is personality or education. With the older FOs it is also how bad they think they should be in your seat and would know better than you. This can result in either the "eager beaver" syndrome or a frustrated lack of input and being drawn back (sorry, I lack the words on how to describe this in english).
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I see the following opinions (forgive me of I've over-simplified):
1. New FOs from modular training schools don't present a problem and are better trained to deal with cockpit interpersonal issues.
2. New FOs are possibly more likely to generate interpersonal issues as a result of their lack of experience.
3. New FOs come from the new generational need for 'instant gratification' and become frustrated by lack of communication/inadequate explanation.
4. Some older FOs are at fault because they consider that they should be captains and actively fault find to prove their competence over that of the Captain.
5. Some Captains...are just difficult.
6. A combination of all the above? Like all teams, sooner or later you're bound to come across combinations of personalities that just simply clash.
Should we put it to a vote?
1. New FOs from modular training schools don't present a problem and are better trained to deal with cockpit interpersonal issues.
2. New FOs are possibly more likely to generate interpersonal issues as a result of their lack of experience.
3. New FOs come from the new generational need for 'instant gratification' and become frustrated by lack of communication/inadequate explanation.
4. Some older FOs are at fault because they consider that they should be captains and actively fault find to prove their competence over that of the Captain.
5. Some Captains...are just difficult.
6. A combination of all the above? Like all teams, sooner or later you're bound to come across combinations of personalities that just simply clash.
Should we put it to a vote?
B-W, “Should we put it to a vote?”
The options would require that people, or situations involving interpersonal relations, are categorised – put in separate boxes – good / bad, pass / fail.
IMHO this cannot be done without either compromising the definitions, or by restricting the situations. This is like some SOP cultures; a generalised SOP for crew intervention / discussion may not cover all situations (compromise), or there may have to be many SOPs, one for each foreseeable situation, resulting in complexity.
Many, if not all of the problems discussed have their roots in ‘change’. Thus the industry needs to understand what has changed, its origins, and any solutions. This is a general process which some people include in, or call, SMS, but it’s not necessary to have a formal or even documented approach for these aspects, as good behaviour involves portions of CRM which should be embedded in everyday operation – the norm, personal SOPs, a way of living.
The older view -“ “lack of respect" that seems to be innate in the young generation.”, perhaps suggests that the new pilots have to conform to the status quo.
However, a younger - new view may have difficulties working in the current system due to issues including “personality or education”; or that the older view has not, or cannot adapted to the new training methods and constraints. The irony is that the old view may have proposed and implemented the change in selection and training.
'The change' does not appear to have been implemented very well; e.g. did the new methods consider any need for ‘training’ for the older generation (adaptation and guidance). Were there too many hidden assumptions, e.g. that Captains would mentor new pilots - identify necessary experiences, or that new pilots would gain manual flying skills foreshortened by new training methods.
Recent accident reports has caused the industry to take a hard look at crew acquisition and training processes, but the solutions so far appear to be recommending ‘more of the same’.
IMHO, the industry has to look at the assumptions in the change; that the knowledge, the flying experiences, and social abilities of new generation pilots may be insufficient for operations in the existing system.
If so, we might have to change training; - expensive; which perhaps negates the reason for change. Alternatively we have to accept that the existing system asks too much of the new crews and thus has to be restricted to the capabilities of the people in it.
The industry is at, or is rapidly approaching a point where the people in the existing system may not be able to continue to operate to the same level of safety as has been achieved so far – the level expected by public opinion.
Something has to change; we cannot turn the clock back. A compromise would appear to be necessary, this should start with a long hard look at ourselves, old and new, and see how we fit in with the current system.
The options would require that people, or situations involving interpersonal relations, are categorised – put in separate boxes – good / bad, pass / fail.
IMHO this cannot be done without either compromising the definitions, or by restricting the situations. This is like some SOP cultures; a generalised SOP for crew intervention / discussion may not cover all situations (compromise), or there may have to be many SOPs, one for each foreseeable situation, resulting in complexity.
Many, if not all of the problems discussed have their roots in ‘change’. Thus the industry needs to understand what has changed, its origins, and any solutions. This is a general process which some people include in, or call, SMS, but it’s not necessary to have a formal or even documented approach for these aspects, as good behaviour involves portions of CRM which should be embedded in everyday operation – the norm, personal SOPs, a way of living.
The older view -“ “lack of respect" that seems to be innate in the young generation.”, perhaps suggests that the new pilots have to conform to the status quo.
However, a younger - new view may have difficulties working in the current system due to issues including “personality or education”; or that the older view has not, or cannot adapted to the new training methods and constraints. The irony is that the old view may have proposed and implemented the change in selection and training.
'The change' does not appear to have been implemented very well; e.g. did the new methods consider any need for ‘training’ for the older generation (adaptation and guidance). Were there too many hidden assumptions, e.g. that Captains would mentor new pilots - identify necessary experiences, or that new pilots would gain manual flying skills foreshortened by new training methods.
Recent accident reports has caused the industry to take a hard look at crew acquisition and training processes, but the solutions so far appear to be recommending ‘more of the same’.
IMHO, the industry has to look at the assumptions in the change; that the knowledge, the flying experiences, and social abilities of new generation pilots may be insufficient for operations in the existing system.
If so, we might have to change training; - expensive; which perhaps negates the reason for change. Alternatively we have to accept that the existing system asks too much of the new crews and thus has to be restricted to the capabilities of the people in it.
The industry is at, or is rapidly approaching a point where the people in the existing system may not be able to continue to operate to the same level of safety as has been achieved so far – the level expected by public opinion.
Something has to change; we cannot turn the clock back. A compromise would appear to be necessary, this should start with a long hard look at ourselves, old and new, and see how we fit in with the current system.
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So my interpretation of what you're saying is that a major cultural change has taken place in the airliner cockpit. It used to be controlled by the captain having the last word, but it seems he can't do that anymore?
The role of the captain has been reduced to 'chairman'? Ever mindful of the RHS presence as more of a regular source of irritation than a supportive resource.
I feel this question should lie with the training schools. I know little about how CRM is taught there but maybe they're the first place to look?
The role of the captain has been reduced to 'chairman'? Ever mindful of the RHS presence as more of a regular source of irritation than a supportive resource.
I feel this question should lie with the training schools. I know little about how CRM is taught there but maybe they're the first place to look?
