Where next for CRM?
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Back in the mid-1980s CRM was used to address issues of dominant captains. It also had to cope with Captains who were ex-military and used to single-seat operations. But things have changed. Pilots nowadays come from a different background. School is different, family life is different.
Also, CRM is not an absolute; not a constant around the world. In some countries and in some airlines the situation is the same as the North American situation in 1980. Some airlines have good management practices while others have idiots in control.
And aviation is an economic activity, so why not have 250 hour FOs if they can do the job?
Also, CRM is not an absolute; not a constant around the world. In some countries and in some airlines the situation is the same as the North American situation in 1980. Some airlines have good management practices while others have idiots in control.
And aviation is an economic activity, so why not have 250 hour FOs if they can do the job?
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I am not opposed to 250 hr pilots flying planes...I am opposed to the 'rationale' of chief pilots passing up piles of 10,000 hr pilots in order to hire the 250 hr pilots.
Congress got wise to it.....so it's 1500 hrs now....
Congress got wise to it.....so it's 1500 hrs now....
Johns, re #20.
You cite a very narrow and dated view of CRM. Whilst modern crewing problems and behaviours are far from perfect, there have been many improvements.
CRM has evolved; I prefer a view which is based on knowledge of human factors, particularly about the individual, and the application of that knowledge to produce the required behaviours. I believe that this definition encompasses most modern definitions of CRM.
A high number of flight hours can be an advantage if experience has been gathered (knowledge, understanding, memory) and then that this is used in context, but even these pilots are not exempt from human weakness.
A low-hours first officer should have sufficient experience to be ‘safe’ (requirements) and the knowledge to conduct specified duties. S/he has to recognise that this is the first step on the ladder and there is a need to learn how to apply that knowledge in context. There has to be a willingness to learn – an individual behaviour, and Captains have to provide the necessary ‘CRM’ instruction – a willingness to help.
Congress appears to be blaming pilots, and in requiring change, are they admitting that new pilots are not ‘safe’. Thus, as the principal law maker, is Congress also admitting that they have misjudged previous law; on what evidence, what basis, data, research …? Can Congress change human behaviour? Perhaps they should consider a CRM course, or at least some HF training, with reference to (political) bias – being seen to do something.
Moving on; Turbo ‘where next for CRM’.
“ the list of topics contained in EU-OPS is irrelevant. ” (Appendix 1 to EU-OPS 1.965 Para 4, A to K).
No I don’t believe so; at least use A to H as a basis of teaching HF knowledge. Then – CRM is the application of that knowledge.
“ Targets. ” It’s a good idea to have a target, but how are these to be defined, particularly in CRM terms. Existing targets for acceptable levels of behaviour (behavioural markers) appear to be reasonable if they are used. Thus, perhaps the poor implementation of existing concepts is a problem.
“ modes of training delivery need rethinking ”. Not mode as in method of delivery, but yes as in training content. Rebalance the social - cognitive items towards the latter. Yes HF instruction requires more time, but then how will pilots gain experience of applying HF.
“ the skills of most facilitator need strengthening ”. Do we need facilitators?
HF knowledge can be taught – instructors. The application of HF would benefit from facilitation, but better results may be gained from facilitation in context - exercising HF skills with a mentor on the flight deck.
“ training development needs to be recognised as more important than delivery ”. I don’t follow this. If training is to impart HF knowledge then what else other than instructional skills can be developed?
Considering the application of HF as training, then yes this is important and requires recognition as an operational task. Many operators have taken CRM into LOFT, but this needs extending to all operations; embed CRM into daily activities – this is one of the prime requirements covered by ICAO.
Are all Captain’s willing to be a mentor? They should be capable of delivering the CRM ‘message’ as these skills fall within Captaincy. The main problem is time, particularly debriefing time;- time to digest the knowledge, its application, and commit this to memory for future behaviour.
These activities are not flight hours, its time available for learning, and some of that is controlled by the individual - a willingness to learn and keep on learning.
You cite a very narrow and dated view of CRM. Whilst modern crewing problems and behaviours are far from perfect, there have been many improvements.
CRM has evolved; I prefer a view which is based on knowledge of human factors, particularly about the individual, and the application of that knowledge to produce the required behaviours. I believe that this definition encompasses most modern definitions of CRM.
A high number of flight hours can be an advantage if experience has been gathered (knowledge, understanding, memory) and then that this is used in context, but even these pilots are not exempt from human weakness.
A low-hours first officer should have sufficient experience to be ‘safe’ (requirements) and the knowledge to conduct specified duties. S/he has to recognise that this is the first step on the ladder and there is a need to learn how to apply that knowledge in context. There has to be a willingness to learn – an individual behaviour, and Captains have to provide the necessary ‘CRM’ instruction – a willingness to help.
Congress appears to be blaming pilots, and in requiring change, are they admitting that new pilots are not ‘safe’. Thus, as the principal law maker, is Congress also admitting that they have misjudged previous law; on what evidence, what basis, data, research …? Can Congress change human behaviour? Perhaps they should consider a CRM course, or at least some HF training, with reference to (political) bias – being seen to do something.
Moving on; Turbo ‘where next for CRM’.
“ the list of topics contained in EU-OPS is irrelevant. ” (Appendix 1 to EU-OPS 1.965 Para 4, A to K).
No I don’t believe so; at least use A to H as a basis of teaching HF knowledge. Then – CRM is the application of that knowledge.
“ Targets. ” It’s a good idea to have a target, but how are these to be defined, particularly in CRM terms. Existing targets for acceptable levels of behaviour (behavioural markers) appear to be reasonable if they are used. Thus, perhaps the poor implementation of existing concepts is a problem.
“ modes of training delivery need rethinking ”. Not mode as in method of delivery, but yes as in training content. Rebalance the social - cognitive items towards the latter. Yes HF instruction requires more time, but then how will pilots gain experience of applying HF.
“ the skills of most facilitator need strengthening ”. Do we need facilitators?
HF knowledge can be taught – instructors. The application of HF would benefit from facilitation, but better results may be gained from facilitation in context - exercising HF skills with a mentor on the flight deck.
“ training development needs to be recognised as more important than delivery ”. I don’t follow this. If training is to impart HF knowledge then what else other than instructional skills can be developed?
Considering the application of HF as training, then yes this is important and requires recognition as an operational task. Many operators have taken CRM into LOFT, but this needs extending to all operations; embed CRM into daily activities – this is one of the prime requirements covered by ICAO.
Are all Captain’s willing to be a mentor? They should be capable of delivering the CRM ‘message’ as these skills fall within Captaincy. The main problem is time, particularly debriefing time;- time to digest the knowledge, its application, and commit this to memory for future behaviour.
These activities are not flight hours, its time available for learning, and some of that is controlled by the individual - a willingness to learn and keep on learning.
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Training Development
alf,
My point is that the list of topics contained in EU-OPS, having been covered in initial, then serve no real purpose. To insist that the list is covered again over a training cycle serves no real purpose.
My point about 'training development' is that I distinguish between the design of training courses and their delivery. The UK system of accreditation covered delivery but is lacking on design. But f you have a weak product in the first place, no amount of skill in delivery will compensate. Many of the criticisms in this thread relate to the design aspect.
I agree with you about mentoring. However, for captains to be CRM mentors will require a significant shift in attitude and a raising of standards.
And, many years ago, I did a project looking at accident rates in a single aircraft type. Time on type was not significant. It was the 3000-4000 total time guys that were most represented in the stats.
My point is that the list of topics contained in EU-OPS, having been covered in initial, then serve no real purpose. To insist that the list is covered again over a training cycle serves no real purpose.
My point about 'training development' is that I distinguish between the design of training courses and their delivery. The UK system of accreditation covered delivery but is lacking on design. But f you have a weak product in the first place, no amount of skill in delivery will compensate. Many of the criticisms in this thread relate to the design aspect.
I agree with you about mentoring. However, for captains to be CRM mentors will require a significant shift in attitude and a raising of standards.
And, many years ago, I did a project looking at accident rates in a single aircraft type. Time on type was not significant. It was the 3000-4000 total time guys that were most represented in the stats.
Turbo, “ the list of topics contained in EU-OPS is irrelevant. ”
I had overlooked the ‘recurrent’ point; I agree with you.
“ training development ”.
I would not have considered the design aspect to be of significance, particularly in any regulatory document (accreditation) which at best might only enhance the requirement. However, if there is a wide range of interpretations of CRM as I fear, then guidance for the design (content) of the initial training would help, but the content should available from other documentation, e.g. UK CAA CAP 737. What remains is how to put the content together and in context.
A major problem in EASA land, is that the regulator either does not see a need for guidance, on this or other subjects, and where good reference and guidance materials are created by national authorities they are not endorsed by EASA.
“…for captains to be CRM mentors will require a significant shift in attitude and a raising of standards ”
Thus this is a significant challenge for the regulator and operators, and perhaps delineates ‘low safety’ operators from the others.
Perhaps this is the ‘where next’ for CRM - a learning culture.
I had overlooked the ‘recurrent’ point; I agree with you.
“ training development ”.
I would not have considered the design aspect to be of significance, particularly in any regulatory document (accreditation) which at best might only enhance the requirement. However, if there is a wide range of interpretations of CRM as I fear, then guidance for the design (content) of the initial training would help, but the content should available from other documentation, e.g. UK CAA CAP 737. What remains is how to put the content together and in context.
A major problem in EASA land, is that the regulator either does not see a need for guidance, on this or other subjects, and where good reference and guidance materials are created by national authorities they are not endorsed by EASA.
“…for captains to be CRM mentors will require a significant shift in attitude and a raising of standards ”
Thus this is a significant challenge for the regulator and operators, and perhaps delineates ‘low safety’ operators from the others.
Perhaps this is the ‘where next’ for CRM - a learning culture.
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While not strictly on the subject of CRM/TEM etc this from a colleague in the training business. He might well be right, too. Remember there are 300 hour pilots operating as second in command of heavy jet transports and whose total real in command time is as low as 75 hours while learning to fly. And most of these on single engine trainers.
"What worries me is the possibility of very low time pilots getting their initial big plane check out on a new high tech airplane like the 777 or 787. Once they get enough hours to upgrade to Captain, they won't move to the left seat on their current high tech airplane, they will have to do their time in the "lesser" airplanes the company is flying while they build seniority. That means you could have a new captain flying a 737 who has never had to compensate for an engine failure at a high power setting and low airspeed. I think the airplane could become unrecoverable before he even had a clue as to what happened, let alone how he could have compensated. I think we can find several examples of similar situations in the aviation accidents over the past several months"
"What worries me is the possibility of very low time pilots getting their initial big plane check out on a new high tech airplane like the 777 or 787. Once they get enough hours to upgrade to Captain, they won't move to the left seat on their current high tech airplane, they will have to do their time in the "lesser" airplanes the company is flying while they build seniority. That means you could have a new captain flying a 737 who has never had to compensate for an engine failure at a high power setting and low airspeed. I think the airplane could become unrecoverable before he even had a clue as to what happened, let alone how he could have compensated. I think we can find several examples of similar situations in the aviation accidents over the past several months"
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The structure and conduct of training in its broadest sense has implications for my concern for CRM. All training is under attack from the bean-counters.
I would argue that the future of 'CRM' is to develop flexible and resilient crew that can rapidly cope with situations. This requires a better framework of 'behavioural markers', more relevant training and better assessing.
However, I'd rather the 'hours' debate - which I agree is important - was conducted in a different thread to avoid topic drift.
Cheers
I would argue that the future of 'CRM' is to develop flexible and resilient crew that can rapidly cope with situations. This requires a better framework of 'behavioural markers', more relevant training and better assessing.
However, I'd rather the 'hours' debate - which I agree is important - was conducted in a different thread to avoid topic drift.
Cheers
I would argue that the future of 'CRM' is to develop flexible and resilient crew that can rapidly cope with situations.
Yes, I would agree, and you would have support here:-
Barriers to Regulating Resilience: Example of Pilots’ Crew Resource Management Training. (A translation from French?)
Audit of HF Training implementation.
But what is required to develop a flexible and resilient crew, how is this to be achieved?
Yes, I would agree, and you would have support here:-
Barriers to Regulating Resilience: Example of Pilots’ Crew Resource Management Training. (A translation from French?)
Audit of HF Training implementation.
But what is required to develop a flexible and resilient crew, how is this to be achieved?
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Not sure I understood the 'resilience' paper.
Resilience must rest on better-trained crew. By which I'm referring to the technical (handling and procedural) training.
Then its a case of developing the 'soft' skills of 'managing' in a team context.
Finally, it's a case of reminding management that all 'rules' can be broken and often are crews try to create solutions when the rules don't work.
Resilience must rest on better-trained crew. By which I'm referring to the technical (handling and procedural) training.
Then its a case of developing the 'soft' skills of 'managing' in a team context.
Finally, it's a case of reminding management that all 'rules' can be broken and often are crews try to create solutions when the rules don't work.
Turbo, re your Not sure I understood the 'resilience' paper.
I think that it was a gentle poke at the regulatory organisations. (By someone who was then in an organisation)
The significant issues are in the conclusion, and that “you cant impose CRM on organisations”:-
A. “Resilience needs expertise and flexible and learning organizations”.
As per Hollnagel.
B. “… are regulatory authorities able to introduce and monitor resilient tools … if they are not themselves attuned to resilience?”
This suggests that regulators need to update their views on organizational safety, CRM, SMS, etc. ‘Resilience’ gives a pointer towards Hollngel’s work, which is by no means isolated. See the work of Woods. ** May be inop; Google David D Woods – error, bias, etc.
C. “…. authorities … question their strategy of expertise and monitoring of their practices …”
This identifies the need for regulators to have appropriate expertise within the organization (HF, CRM) and questions whether the ‘inspect’ aspects of safety oversight / SMS will improve safety.
Other than some technical training aspects, resilience does not have to be linked to a crew.
Although much of the existing work focuses on organizations, individuals can be resilient both in the sense of a personal attribute and in safety, CRM behaviors.
However, I do not link achievement of the latter with ‘soft’ skills and team management as you imply; it is first necessary to improve the individual – the thinking skills, knowledge, and personal controls associated with behavior.
Rules – SOPs; yes there are many problems here. This too requires that management and regulators need the skills to identify and rectify these problems, they too need to be resilient, hence the conclusions in the paper.
I think that it was a gentle poke at the regulatory organisations. (By someone who was then in an organisation)
The significant issues are in the conclusion, and that “you cant impose CRM on organisations”:-
A. “Resilience needs expertise and flexible and learning organizations”.
As per Hollnagel.
B. “… are regulatory authorities able to introduce and monitor resilient tools … if they are not themselves attuned to resilience?”
This suggests that regulators need to update their views on organizational safety, CRM, SMS, etc. ‘Resilience’ gives a pointer towards Hollngel’s work, which is by no means isolated. See the work of Woods. ** May be inop; Google David D Woods – error, bias, etc.
C. “…. authorities … question their strategy of expertise and monitoring of their practices …”
This identifies the need for regulators to have appropriate expertise within the organization (HF, CRM) and questions whether the ‘inspect’ aspects of safety oversight / SMS will improve safety.
Other than some technical training aspects, resilience does not have to be linked to a crew.
Although much of the existing work focuses on organizations, individuals can be resilient both in the sense of a personal attribute and in safety, CRM behaviors.
However, I do not link achievement of the latter with ‘soft’ skills and team management as you imply; it is first necessary to improve the individual – the thinking skills, knowledge, and personal controls associated with behavior.
Rules – SOPs; yes there are many problems here. This too requires that management and regulators need the skills to identify and rectify these problems, they too need to be resilient, hence the conclusions in the paper.
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The future is stopping CRM being a repetative hobby project and absorbing CRM into an operator's SMS as part of holistic safety promotion as per ICAO's Doc 5859
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What's next for CRM? It goes away, like the linotype.
The new Airbus's will have ten thousand hour pilots, flying single captain, with UAV pilots on the ground in case something goes wrong....
The new Airbus's will have ten thousand hour pilots, flying single captain, with UAV pilots on the ground in case something goes wrong....
johns it would help if you provided an explanation, or supporting evidence for your remarks.
Of passing interest, my ex company considered a single-pilot aircraft which was predominantly automatic. However, the pilot still required more than the basic flying skills, and the ability to think before acting.
Of passing interest, my ex company considered a single-pilot aircraft which was predominantly automatic. However, the pilot still required more than the basic flying skills, and the ability to think before acting.
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Well, lots of clever words, but no facts to suggest that all of the CRM training that pilots and others endure has made a difference. What a shame.
Occasionally, when the topic comes up in a presentation or lecture, I ask for a definition of 'CRM'. I've yet to hear a concise and meaningful one. If something can't be defined in a few words, how can it be valid?
'CRM' seems to me to be an abstract concept, without foundation in science and without tangible benefit.
Comparing fleet ages to the accident rate gives a good match, though. Modern aircraft are safer.
Now, why not acknowledge that 'CRM' has failed to deliver the desired effect and abandon it? Three reasons: the accident rate is acceptably low; there is no young pretender to take its place; there is a huge and influential industry around 'CRM' to protest its own dissolution...
I fear that the failure of 'CRM' to deliver is only another building block as we unwittingly construct the great new road to pilotless air transport.
Occasionally, when the topic comes up in a presentation or lecture, I ask for a definition of 'CRM'. I've yet to hear a concise and meaningful one. If something can't be defined in a few words, how can it be valid?
'CRM' seems to me to be an abstract concept, without foundation in science and without tangible benefit.
Comparing fleet ages to the accident rate gives a good match, though. Modern aircraft are safer.
Now, why not acknowledge that 'CRM' has failed to deliver the desired effect and abandon it? Three reasons: the accident rate is acceptably low; there is no young pretender to take its place; there is a huge and influential industry around 'CRM' to protest its own dissolution...
I fear that the failure of 'CRM' to deliver is only another building block as we unwittingly construct the great new road to pilotless air transport.
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'CRM' seems to me to be an abstract concept, without foundation in science and without tangible benefit.
I find it interesting also that there is no shortage of CRM advice to first officers on what to say to the captain when an approach becomes unstable or some other condition has arrived where CRM says the F/O should "assume control" if the captain has been a naughty boy and refuses to go-around when the F/O tells him so.
Exactly how does a worried F/O - particularly a recently graduated low hour cadet - physically take over command from the captain? Does he knock the captain's hands of the thrust levers and flight controls. Does he first smash the captain over the gob to show he means business John Wayne style?
If the F/O attempts to force a late go-around, can he expect the captain to meekly submit and the captain immediately revert to some sort of subordinate role where he raises the gear and flaps, tunes the radios and then waits patiently to see if and when the F/O relinquishes command back to the captain.
What tosh! Why is something as critical to the safety of the aircraft and occupants, shoved under the carpet as being politically incorrect. I bet few company operations manuals or even regulatory advice from the parent CAA ever address this situation. Having said all that I know of one situation in a 737 where the F/O grabbed the crash axe and threatened to belt the recalcitrant skipper over the head when he (the captain) was intending to deliberately descend below the MSA in IMC. It worked like a charm, too
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If nothing else, CRM has been a paradigm shift. It has forced the industry to recognise that we need more than simply stick and rudder skills to fly safely. The lack of measurable success is no reason to discard the concept: maybe it evidence that we still have some way to go. Maybe 'accident rates' is the wrong measure?
Spooning 'CRM' into 'SMS' is not an answer. The SMS must inform the CRM training but the fact remains both the SMS 'action' and CRM represent interventions. If poorly designed in the first place, neither is likely to work. Is an SMS any better at fixing problems? Does an SMS guarantee a 100% success rate in dealing with issues arising?
Spooning 'CRM' into 'SMS' is not an answer. The SMS must inform the CRM training but the fact remains both the SMS 'action' and CRM represent interventions. If poorly designed in the first place, neither is likely to work. Is an SMS any better at fixing problems? Does an SMS guarantee a 100% success rate in dealing with issues arising?
K-A KG, How do you know that CRM training has not made a difference? Absence of evidence of CRM being effective is not the same as evidence of CRM being ineffective. "Impatience with ambiguity".
The definition of CRM provided earlier - ‘the application of Human Factors’ is based on the science of human factors and should simple enough for even the most uninterested of participants. Even though the science within the definition may be complex, the instructional task is to impart understanding, thus the success of instruction could be questioned.
Rather than say that CRM has failed, I would prefer to explore the idea that CRM has yet to be taught and used effectively. Only a few operators have really embedded CRM within their operations.
The range of CRM definitions adds confusion, as does the evolving nature of the CRM ‘concept’. Currently most CRM is reactive, whereas some of the suggestions for ‘where next’ involve proactive CRM – getting ahead of the game.
Abandon CRM? I don’t think so; where is the evidence that the ‘low’ accident rate was not in part achieved by positive human behaviour. If accidents only occur in 1 in a million instances, what happened in all of the other 999,999 instances; why didn’t they result in accidents?
CRM, IMHO, remains in an immature state, and thus with further evolution (knowledge of human performance) there will be a significant future for using appropriate human behaviour in aviation.
There are some aspects of the CRM implementation ‘industry’ which do not aid safety; the ‘we will fix it for you’ brigade tends to encourage operators to ‘jump through hoops’ to satisfy regulations.
The regulatory requirements for instructor qualification could be rethought, perhaps separating instructional technique from CRM. However, all instructors, ground, flight, instrument, etc, should be qualified in instructional technique; often this better achieved with the domain expertise. Thus, a bold view might suggest that ‘all’ types of instructor should be CRM (CRMI) qualified.
Your view of the future appears to centre on the machine end of the man-machine interface (automatic, pilotless aircraft) and thus overlooks the human end of the system interface and particularly the mechanism in between. These will exist in some form even with a fully automated system, thus there will be a role for CRM – applied human behaviour training for a long time to come
ALF (Not a CRMI or a provider)
The definition of CRM provided earlier - ‘the application of Human Factors’ is based on the science of human factors and should simple enough for even the most uninterested of participants. Even though the science within the definition may be complex, the instructional task is to impart understanding, thus the success of instruction could be questioned.
Rather than say that CRM has failed, I would prefer to explore the idea that CRM has yet to be taught and used effectively. Only a few operators have really embedded CRM within their operations.
The range of CRM definitions adds confusion, as does the evolving nature of the CRM ‘concept’. Currently most CRM is reactive, whereas some of the suggestions for ‘where next’ involve proactive CRM – getting ahead of the game.
Abandon CRM? I don’t think so; where is the evidence that the ‘low’ accident rate was not in part achieved by positive human behaviour. If accidents only occur in 1 in a million instances, what happened in all of the other 999,999 instances; why didn’t they result in accidents?
CRM, IMHO, remains in an immature state, and thus with further evolution (knowledge of human performance) there will be a significant future for using appropriate human behaviour in aviation.
There are some aspects of the CRM implementation ‘industry’ which do not aid safety; the ‘we will fix it for you’ brigade tends to encourage operators to ‘jump through hoops’ to satisfy regulations.
The regulatory requirements for instructor qualification could be rethought, perhaps separating instructional technique from CRM. However, all instructors, ground, flight, instrument, etc, should be qualified in instructional technique; often this better achieved with the domain expertise. Thus, a bold view might suggest that ‘all’ types of instructor should be CRM (CRMI) qualified.
Your view of the future appears to centre on the machine end of the man-machine interface (automatic, pilotless aircraft) and thus overlooks the human end of the system interface and particularly the mechanism in between. These will exist in some form even with a fully automated system, thus there will be a role for CRM – applied human behaviour training for a long time to come
ALF (Not a CRMI or a provider)
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Ex CRM facilitator at a legacy carrier. Now retired.
I do believe CRM training was necessary to introduce a change to that mindset which made many cockpits very nasty places to work in the 60's, 70's, and 80's.
However, while my carrier gave lots of lip service to CRM - in 2001 they decided to abolish the CRM Dept and 'integrated' the training into the regular type training dept (who didn't appreciate the extra workload).
Then, two years ago, Management used a bout of industrial strife to force a 'cost saving' on crews by cutting out the annual Ground School Day, and instead put all training on-line. Foolishly, the Training Dept have been jacking up the content level continuously since then, creating further resentment at the added workload on busy crews (at zero cost to the company).
So recurrent training went from being a useful forum which allowed the face to face exchange of valuable information related to actual line events - to a wearisome and solitary pass/fail computer based imposition termed 'training'.
One of the most retrograde events I ever saw in my career. It truly discredits the whole safety system. Why do the authorities allow it?
Money of course.....
I do believe CRM training was necessary to introduce a change to that mindset which made many cockpits very nasty places to work in the 60's, 70's, and 80's.
However, while my carrier gave lots of lip service to CRM - in 2001 they decided to abolish the CRM Dept and 'integrated' the training into the regular type training dept (who didn't appreciate the extra workload).
Then, two years ago, Management used a bout of industrial strife to force a 'cost saving' on crews by cutting out the annual Ground School Day, and instead put all training on-line. Foolishly, the Training Dept have been jacking up the content level continuously since then, creating further resentment at the added workload on busy crews (at zero cost to the company).
So recurrent training went from being a useful forum which allowed the face to face exchange of valuable information related to actual line events - to a wearisome and solitary pass/fail computer based imposition termed 'training'.
One of the most retrograde events I ever saw in my career. It truly discredits the whole safety system. Why do the authorities allow it?
Money of course.....
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The discussion is still divided between what purpose CRM training serves and how CRM is delivered.
Many of the comments seem to reflect poor experiences in training. Algol's observation reflects a deeper problem in airline training generally - 'compliance at least cost'.
Rather than throw the baby out with the bath water, perhaps we need to refocus.
What we call 'CRM', I suggest, needs to be anchored in the task of managing the aircraft. This, in turn, needs a curriculum more clearly linked to management skills. This then drives the training methodology and the skill set of the instructors.
It also means that we need more sensitive measures of success rather than expecting fewer accidents to show that CRM 'works'.
To be honest, if you read the thread in this forum on reading newspapers while flying you can see that CRM has not made a dent in some peoples' understanding.
Many of the comments seem to reflect poor experiences in training. Algol's observation reflects a deeper problem in airline training generally - 'compliance at least cost'.
Rather than throw the baby out with the bath water, perhaps we need to refocus.
What we call 'CRM', I suggest, needs to be anchored in the task of managing the aircraft. This, in turn, needs a curriculum more clearly linked to management skills. This then drives the training methodology and the skill set of the instructors.
It also means that we need more sensitive measures of success rather than expecting fewer accidents to show that CRM 'works'.
To be honest, if you read the thread in this forum on reading newspapers while flying you can see that CRM has not made a dent in some peoples' understanding.
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You're right Turbo, what next?
CRM and HF are embedded from the very beginning in todays training regimes. Whilst it does no harm to have the usual subject matter revisited regularly, I can see why the more experienced could become jaded by that, especially if the delivery is lacking in energy and originality.
The trouble with CRM is its need to be driven by the culture of the airline/unit/operation that's asking for it. They have to find their own path and if the management doesn't support the training, the material doesn't interest and, worst of all, the CRMI lacks the ability to inspire, then it's no wonder that some of us end up questioning the status quo
But I find myself going back to tbc's comments about the CRM toolbox, and aircraft management could be yet another tool without necessarily driving the direction of CRM as a whole? Same goes for TEM, I feel more comfortable with TEM by treating it as an intrinsic part of CRM.
Sorry Turbo, does that take us back to the drawing board?
CRM and HF are embedded from the very beginning in todays training regimes. Whilst it does no harm to have the usual subject matter revisited regularly, I can see why the more experienced could become jaded by that, especially if the delivery is lacking in energy and originality.
The trouble with CRM is its need to be driven by the culture of the airline/unit/operation that's asking for it. They have to find their own path and if the management doesn't support the training, the material doesn't interest and, worst of all, the CRMI lacks the ability to inspire, then it's no wonder that some of us end up questioning the status quo
But I find myself going back to tbc's comments about the CRM toolbox, and aircraft management could be yet another tool without necessarily driving the direction of CRM as a whole? Same goes for TEM, I feel more comfortable with TEM by treating it as an intrinsic part of CRM.
Sorry Turbo, does that take us back to the drawing board?