Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread
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Yak-40 was at the altitude of 50 m over the runway threshold (the reason for the go-round order) and only landed safely because it needs a much shorter runway. What role the RA played in its landing, if any, is unknown.
From the MAK Report, Page 169: -
As the information on the landing system was not discussed between the crew and the controller, the landing radar was not requested by the crew, the crew did not read back in most cases the controller’s information and the altitude information was not reported to the controller during the descent on final, the investigation team assumes that actually the crew did not conduct the landing radar+2NDB approach. The crew made the "trial" approach using their own instruments, autopilot and autothrottle. This type of approach is not described in the FCOM so the weather minima and SOP are not determined.
This is an important conclusion from the investigating group. Perhaps it cannot be proven absolutely, but to me it seems entirely logical and as such deserves further consideration because it could be the key to understanding the basis on which the approach was conducted. There are several rather vague references by MAK to the “onboard equipment”. The report determines beyond doubt that LNAV data from the FMS was being used for lateral navigation but says nothing definite about guidance for the vertical profile. The inference is they believe FMS distance was being used like a DME, which would make complete sense.
The use of an LNAV approach (assuming continuous updating by DMEs or GPS) to navigate a non-precision procedure is sensible, provided that the profile conforms to the published and approved procedure. In such a case the approach is included in the FMS data base and can be checked against the appropriate chart. The difference here was that Severny was not even in the data base so the final four waypoints were loaded manually. This could still be helpful in assisting a VMC approach or even a cloudbreak followed by a visual approach. In no way should it be considered a satisfactory standalone IMC approach procedure to low limits.
Let us now consider the ATC position. They believed that PLF101 had some sort of special equipment on board and so specified 100m as the minimum height for the approach. This was also the DH for the Radar+2NDB approach. They were not to know the crew did not even have the correct chart on board (they only had the non-radar plate - MAK unfortunately has not published this) and they were not to know the basis on which the crew intended to conduct the approach. If they had known all this they surely would never have set limits as low as 100m. They expected the crew to conform to the Radar+ 2NDB, then provided the corresponding service. But the crew had their own separate agenda. The essential contract between ATC and crew was never established. Crew and ATC were at cross purposes.
So looking at the approach analysis we see that they did not commence descent at the ATC radar “Entering Glideslope” call, and they made significant adjustments to their descent path that clearly bore no relationship to ATC’s “on glidepath” calls. The answer to the very pertinent question of whether should ATC have provided more timely descent path information may be “yes, but the crew would have not responded to it” .
Now consider the crew perspective. They would have established at or even before their preflight briefing that data on Severny was poor, they had only the non-radar 2NDB approach chart available. Did they even know about the existence of some sort of radar and if so did they dismiss it as old and of poor accuracy ? It is easy to imagine why they may have considered FMS guidance a better method of approaching Severny. And so it would have been if the weather had been better - they did not know about the fog.
It is noteworthy that once they were aware of the fog, the CVR shows no evidence of any crew discussions on limits for the approach, until, with the flight about to commence base turn, ATC stipulates 100m. What would they have done without this ATC intervention?
Next the approach itself. Their destination user-waypoint XUBS was the aerodrome ARP not the runway touchdown zone. This means that if they were using FMS distance to XUBS to follow the published profile, their descent initation point would be approx 1.2km inside the formal FAP (unless allowed for in their calculations).
Further, it looks probable that FMS distance was annunciated in nautical miles, not kilometers (their waypoint 10XUB was a distance of 10nm, 18.5 km). They could have converted nms to kms, but surely an easier mental calculation, 500m from 5nm means 100m per nm, which happens to correspond almost exactly to a 3-degree glideslope . But 5nm is 9.3km and this could bring their descent point a further 700m closer to the airfield.
So total distance discrepancy 1900m i.e. 8.2km to TDZ, , and Fig46 of the MAK report seems to indicate descent initiation in the range 8.7- 8.5 km, and the leaving 500m height at 8.2km. Co-incidence?
In an NDB approach, height at Outer Marker is an absolutely fundamental component of the procedure. PLF101 crossed 120m too high. That is a major discrepancy yet there was no crew comment! Why not ? Was it because they accepted they were flying a different glideslope ? Were they even looking at their 2NDB chart ? MAK believes the dramatic increase in descent rate to 8m/s was a correction to the OM height excess - but that did not commence until 35 seconds after the OM. Is that likely ?
The approach method may or may not have been the direct cause of the accident. They still could have flown their unauthorised unapproved approach and gone around safely. We will never know the judgements and thought processes of the crew and especially the PIC during the final 40 seconds before impact, in particular concerning the initiation of and failure to recover from the excessive descent rate.
Apologies for the length of post in developing this theme It is intended to show how a non-standard approach using “on board equipment”could have been conducted . It seems to fit, but of course it is ultimately unprovable
From the MAK Report, Page 169: -
As the information on the landing system was not discussed between the crew and the controller, the landing radar was not requested by the crew, the crew did not read back in most cases the controller’s information and the altitude information was not reported to the controller during the descent on final, the investigation team assumes that actually the crew did not conduct the landing radar+2NDB approach. The crew made the "trial" approach using their own instruments, autopilot and autothrottle. This type of approach is not described in the FCOM so the weather minima and SOP are not determined.
This is an important conclusion from the investigating group. Perhaps it cannot be proven absolutely, but to me it seems entirely logical and as such deserves further consideration because it could be the key to understanding the basis on which the approach was conducted. There are several rather vague references by MAK to the “onboard equipment”. The report determines beyond doubt that LNAV data from the FMS was being used for lateral navigation but says nothing definite about guidance for the vertical profile. The inference is they believe FMS distance was being used like a DME, which would make complete sense.
The use of an LNAV approach (assuming continuous updating by DMEs or GPS) to navigate a non-precision procedure is sensible, provided that the profile conforms to the published and approved procedure. In such a case the approach is included in the FMS data base and can be checked against the appropriate chart. The difference here was that Severny was not even in the data base so the final four waypoints were loaded manually. This could still be helpful in assisting a VMC approach or even a cloudbreak followed by a visual approach. In no way should it be considered a satisfactory standalone IMC approach procedure to low limits.
Let us now consider the ATC position. They believed that PLF101 had some sort of special equipment on board and so specified 100m as the minimum height for the approach. This was also the DH for the Radar+2NDB approach. They were not to know the crew did not even have the correct chart on board (they only had the non-radar plate - MAK unfortunately has not published this) and they were not to know the basis on which the crew intended to conduct the approach. If they had known all this they surely would never have set limits as low as 100m. They expected the crew to conform to the Radar+ 2NDB, then provided the corresponding service. But the crew had their own separate agenda. The essential contract between ATC and crew was never established. Crew and ATC were at cross purposes.
So looking at the approach analysis we see that they did not commence descent at the ATC radar “Entering Glideslope” call, and they made significant adjustments to their descent path that clearly bore no relationship to ATC’s “on glidepath” calls. The answer to the very pertinent question of whether should ATC have provided more timely descent path information may be “yes, but the crew would have not responded to it” .
Now consider the crew perspective. They would have established at or even before their preflight briefing that data on Severny was poor, they had only the non-radar 2NDB approach chart available. Did they even know about the existence of some sort of radar and if so did they dismiss it as old and of poor accuracy ? It is easy to imagine why they may have considered FMS guidance a better method of approaching Severny. And so it would have been if the weather had been better - they did not know about the fog.
It is noteworthy that once they were aware of the fog, the CVR shows no evidence of any crew discussions on limits for the approach, until, with the flight about to commence base turn, ATC stipulates 100m. What would they have done without this ATC intervention?
Next the approach itself. Their destination user-waypoint XUBS was the aerodrome ARP not the runway touchdown zone. This means that if they were using FMS distance to XUBS to follow the published profile, their descent initation point would be approx 1.2km inside the formal FAP (unless allowed for in their calculations).
Further, it looks probable that FMS distance was annunciated in nautical miles, not kilometers (their waypoint 10XUB was a distance of 10nm, 18.5 km). They could have converted nms to kms, but surely an easier mental calculation, 500m from 5nm means 100m per nm, which happens to correspond almost exactly to a 3-degree glideslope . But 5nm is 9.3km and this could bring their descent point a further 700m closer to the airfield.
So total distance discrepancy 1900m i.e. 8.2km to TDZ, , and Fig46 of the MAK report seems to indicate descent initiation in the range 8.7- 8.5 km, and the leaving 500m height at 8.2km. Co-incidence?
In an NDB approach, height at Outer Marker is an absolutely fundamental component of the procedure. PLF101 crossed 120m too high. That is a major discrepancy yet there was no crew comment! Why not ? Was it because they accepted they were flying a different glideslope ? Were they even looking at their 2NDB chart ? MAK believes the dramatic increase in descent rate to 8m/s was a correction to the OM height excess - but that did not commence until 35 seconds after the OM. Is that likely ?
The approach method may or may not have been the direct cause of the accident. They still could have flown their unauthorised unapproved approach and gone around safely. We will never know the judgements and thought processes of the crew and especially the PIC during the final 40 seconds before impact, in particular concerning the initiation of and failure to recover from the excessive descent rate.
Apologies for the length of post in developing this theme It is intended to show how a non-standard approach using “on board equipment”could have been conducted . It seems to fit, but of course it is ultimately unprovable
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Tagron, excellent analysis. 
Indeed, a crucial element of the causes leading to the crash is probably the "special" approach procedure planned by the crew, which was probably not conducted by the book.
It is highly likely that the procedure planned by TU-154 crew was the same or similar to that of the JAK-40 crew.
From the report page. 169:
So they planned to do NDB approach monitored by GPS. In fact, according to statements of the Jak-40 PIC, it was rather a GPS approach with additionally NDB guiding. The PIC acknowledged that - beause they thought the markers were malfunctioning - used GPS alone shortly before landing!
As you properly observed, the GPS waypoints entered in the FMS didnt match the fix points of the NDB chart:
Instead of runway treshhold, ARP was used. Additionally, the waypoint for the outer marker was not converted to WGS-84 and thus erroneous. The middle marker wasnt entered at all.
So, they monitored NDB approach by matching the plates fix points with supposedly corresponding waymarkers on the GPS.
The problem was, the reference points werent matching at all.
Conclusion:
Jak-40 were lucky not to crash as well.
Indeed, a crucial element of the causes leading to the crash is probably the "special" approach procedure planned by the crew, which was probably not conducted by the book.
It is highly likely that the procedure planned by TU-154 crew was the same or similar to that of the JAK-40 crew.
From the report page. 169:
... is also confirmed by the interview with the YAK-40 crew, who stated that they were preparing to land using the markers with GPS monitoring
As you properly observed, the GPS waypoints entered in the FMS didnt match the fix points of the NDB chart:
Instead of runway treshhold, ARP was used. Additionally, the waypoint for the outer marker was not converted to WGS-84 and thus erroneous. The middle marker wasnt entered at all.
So, they monitored NDB approach by matching the plates fix points with supposedly corresponding waymarkers on the GPS.
The problem was, the reference points werent matching at all.
Conclusion:
Jak-40 were lucky not to crash as well.
Last edited by janeczku; 31st Jan 2011 at 23:24.
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Breaking news!
Disciplinary proceedings against the pilots of Jak-40 because they violated procedures!
According to TVN24, headquarters of PAF have started disciplinary proceedings against the pilots. They face a warning or expulsion from service.
"According to the findings of the investigation, the pilots broke the rules of the air, approaching less than the minimum amount specified to the airport in Smolensk - explained the military."
"The pilots landed despite the lack of final approval of the tower. Above the airstrip was already gathering fog and visibility was so limited that the landing was dangerous."
"The machine hit the ground much later than it should, the plane had trouble slowing down and almost slid off the runway.
"Because of the fog, the controllers couldnt see the aircraft until it was already over the runway treshold. They also observed, that the Yak-40 was still to high when passing the treshold (SCUD DIVING!!!!) and therefore landed much further than it should."
"According to statements made before the russian prosecutors, the ATC personal couldnt still see the plane when it was 1000m from the treshold. Additionally the crew of JAK-40 didnt request permission to land or informed that they would leave to second. Because of that, the controller commanded them to go around. But the crew didnt react and landed anyway.
Polish captain, in turn, testified that he did not hear the command."
"The Tu-154m did neither request or receive permission to land as well. The crew must have been aware that they didnt have permission - says the former squadron commander Capt. Tu 154 Stefan Gruszczyk. All pilots interviewed by TVN24 agree that at the height of 100 meters the crew will report to the controller that either go around, or see the runway threshold."
As i see it, our early speculations about the crew conducting "scud diving" have been confirmed .
Diving below the cloudbase it was for the Jak-40. And their buddies from the TU-154 were about to do the same.
Case closed.
Disciplinary proceedings against the pilots of Jak-40 because they violated procedures!
According to TVN24, headquarters of PAF have started disciplinary proceedings against the pilots. They face a warning or expulsion from service.
"According to the findings of the investigation, the pilots broke the rules of the air, approaching less than the minimum amount specified to the airport in Smolensk - explained the military."
"The pilots landed despite the lack of final approval of the tower. Above the airstrip was already gathering fog and visibility was so limited that the landing was dangerous."
"The machine hit the ground much later than it should, the plane had trouble slowing down and almost slid off the runway.
ATC personal from the tower reacted to the polish stunt by shouting "Maładiec!" (Engl. adventurer, a person who happily does something very risky)."
"Because of the fog, the controllers couldnt see the aircraft until it was already over the runway treshold. They also observed, that the Yak-40 was still to high when passing the treshold (SCUD DIVING!!!!) and therefore landed much further than it should."
"According to statements made before the russian prosecutors, the ATC personal couldnt still see the plane when it was 1000m from the treshold. Additionally the crew of JAK-40 didnt request permission to land or informed that they would leave to second. Because of that, the controller commanded them to go around. But the crew didnt react and landed anyway.
Polish captain, in turn, testified that he did not hear the command."
"The Tu-154m did neither request or receive permission to land as well. The crew must have been aware that they didnt have permission - says the former squadron commander Capt. Tu 154 Stefan Gruszczyk. All pilots interviewed by TVN24 agree that at the height of 100 meters the crew will report to the controller that either go around, or see the runway threshold."
As i see it, our early speculations about the crew conducting "scud diving" have been confirmed .
Diving below the cloudbase it was for the Jak-40. And their buddies from the TU-154 were about to do the same.
Case closed.
Last edited by janeczku; 1st Feb 2011 at 00:46.
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Well, an ex military pilot at smolensk blog has suggested that in his view Capt. Protasiuk planned "to do a rat" (don't know if it's the same), because he thinks him quite able to follow the recommended glidepath if he intended to. He thinks the Capt. recognised his resource deficiencies, of un-trained manual approach, that he knew it will be very exhausting enterprise to enter on the runway without deviation in fog when guided by just 2 beacons, instead of ILS, that he didn't trust the dilapidated aerodrome and its ATC entirely, that he knew he will get limited support from hs crew, also untrained to get oriented in fog by two beakons plus what the controller says, add to this the Capt. had no time even for go-around, no time for second attempts, as they were awfully late for the ceremony beg.
He thinks the Capt., given these limitations, would try "to do a rat". Namely (as I understood it), to lower to 40 metres height before the runway, and possibly even down to 20, given the time the plane would take to assume parallel to the ground flight sorry for my un-avionic English, then go parallel along hoping to see the runway right below in front, and, should he see it being too leftwards or too rightwards - to go away what to do, but should the runway appear suddenly more or less straight ahead - to turn down to it.
With chances 50/50 provided the ground below has no those hills and holes. (of which the Captain didn't think)
It was pointed out by several folks in the smolensk place that what the Yak said to TU was not passed over to Capt. Protasiuk in full beauty.
Namely, to Capt Protasiuk was re-told that the Yak saw the ground at 50 metres, that the Yak thinks the border of the cloud is there.
But then Yak added, re visibility, "its total xxxxx here now" - which the second pilot did not copy-say to Protasiuk, telling him only ab 50 metres. According to the transcripts. In effect, Capt. Protasiuk could have formed an idea that lower than 50 metres it is more or less alright with visibility. And got interested in crossing those 50 metres "level".
It's not that that Russian pilot thinks it's alright to do those "rats" but his idea explains, at least, why the crew kept cool, Captain was following his plan, was not lost and dis-oriented, not perfect as it were - there was still a plan behind what he was doing. There were simply a bit of holes in that imperfect planning - the actual landscape, for one thing.
Just an idea.
He thinks the Capt., given these limitations, would try "to do a rat". Namely (as I understood it), to lower to 40 metres height before the runway, and possibly even down to 20, given the time the plane would take to assume parallel to the ground flight sorry for my un-avionic English, then go parallel along hoping to see the runway right below in front, and, should he see it being too leftwards or too rightwards - to go away what to do, but should the runway appear suddenly more or less straight ahead - to turn down to it.
With chances 50/50 provided the ground below has no those hills and holes. (of which the Captain didn't think)
It was pointed out by several folks in the smolensk place that what the Yak said to TU was not passed over to Capt. Protasiuk in full beauty.
Namely, to Capt Protasiuk was re-told that the Yak saw the ground at 50 metres, that the Yak thinks the border of the cloud is there.
But then Yak added, re visibility, "its total xxxxx here now" - which the second pilot did not copy-say to Protasiuk, telling him only ab 50 metres. According to the transcripts. In effect, Capt. Protasiuk could have formed an idea that lower than 50 metres it is more or less alright with visibility. And got interested in crossing those 50 metres "level".
It's not that that Russian pilot thinks it's alright to do those "rats" but his idea explains, at least, why the crew kept cool, Captain was following his plan, was not lost and dis-oriented, not perfect as it were - there was still a plan behind what he was doing. There were simply a bit of holes in that imperfect planning - the actual landscape, for one thing.
Just an idea.
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and, to be objective, that 'MolodEts!' said by the ATC, is a compliment, it's "At a boy!"
Possibly a reduced with centuries "molodoy chelovek" / young man.
But I think as it was free-flowing speech of ATC, and in surprise situation, it was not a well-thought through a comment :o), but expressing rather a relief, their own relief, that the plane is safe.
Possibly a reduced with centuries "molodoy chelovek" / young man.
But I think as it was free-flowing speech of ATC, and in surprise situation, it was not a well-thought through a comment :o), but expressing rather a relief, their own relief, that the plane is safe.
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I'd agree with Alice025 on her last comment.
Controller saying "MolodEts" shoud not be simply seen as praising Yak pilot performance.
For one thing, intonation is crucial - there is a way to voice it that the meaning would be just the opposite, like "crazy SOB". Easy to do it, just say it slower that usual, stretch it a bit and You are sounding sarcastic.
Or if the first syllable is stressed, like "mOlodets", it would not be praise for sure. On the contrary, it's more like scorn.
The most likely meaning in our instance though is controller's relief that a dangerous situation has turned out all right. Like "Phew, he made it!"
Controller saying "MolodEts" shoud not be simply seen as praising Yak pilot performance.
For one thing, intonation is crucial - there is a way to voice it that the meaning would be just the opposite, like "crazy SOB". Easy to do it, just say it slower that usual, stretch it a bit and You are sounding sarcastic.
Or if the first syllable is stressed, like "mOlodets", it would not be praise for sure. On the contrary, it's more like scorn.
The most likely meaning in our instance though is controller's relief that a dangerous situation has turned out all right. Like "Phew, he made it!"
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janeczku
As i see it, our early speculations about the crew conducting "scud diving" have been confirmed .
Both these theories were propaganda from the very beginning. The crew did not do anything according to what ATC told them or anything that would resemble decision height procedure. They only started contemplating/attempting goaround when rapidly falling readings of RA spooked them.
Now, you have to consider why would such propaganda be pushed. Generally, in a situation like that the intention is to draw attention from other significant issues. And that issue would be????
p.s. Doing things "by the book" is sort of a heresy in Slavlands anyway, as, for example, it is the silly "norm" to drive 2 to 3 times the speed limit on bad quality residential zone roads. All attempts to change this situation generally amount to nothing. They tried to install photo radars and large number of them were demolished during first week of operation. Having small kids, this situation pisses me off to no end but, the only realistic way to put an end to it would be to start sniping the f***ers. A few weeks ago one "organ donor" was doing >200km/h on residential road nearby. The silly cops tried to block him, and obviously he took them out tearing their little disco wagon in half.
But still, there are those who know how to do it and get away with it and those who don't. A politician gets used to have a "miracle" pilot who can get away with anything. He then tries to go one crazy bridge too many, has an argument with the pilot, gets rid of the "miracle" pilot, and gets himself a "nice" pilot expecting him to be both crazy miracle competent and obedient. And the result is…
But, "miracle" pilots happen not only in Poland or Russia. Here is an American B52 pilot performing his last miracle show:
Last edited by SadPole; 1st Feb 2011 at 09:10.
Sorry to say that,
But the thread is again drifting from facts to speculation and assumption.
And also i repeat myself here:
Assumption is the mother of all f**kups.
Franzl
But the thread is again drifting from facts to speculation and assumption.
And also i repeat myself here:
Assumption is the mother of all f**kups.
Franzl
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Tagron
From an interview with Col. Robert Latkowski, former commander of the 36. SPLT, corresponds in a way to what Tagron wrote.
Source
Source
They continued the approach all the time. [The guy] from the tower tells them there are no conditions for landing but they continued. Not only that. They drafted the [approach] procedure themselves. They performed it themselves. They were doing everything on their own. ATC was passive in the first stage.
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RetiredF4:
Sorry to say that, but the thread is again drifting from facts to speculation and assumption.
Sorry to say that, but the thread is again drifting from facts to speculation and assumption.
1. It has been officially confirmed (by PAF investigation) that Jak-40 busted their minimas going below 100m and conducted landing too high above the treshold. Given the absence of technical failures and glidepath guidance by NDB and ATC, this is evidence "e contrario" that they were conducting a "scud" or "rat dive".
2. The Jak-40 pilot informs the TU-154, that there is a cloud base "well below 50 meters", but in the same breath tells them they should try by all means to land. Thus he suggested an approach that would violate the airport, planes and pilots minimas. This is evidence for the kind of "esprit de corps" that prevailed in the PAF special regiment. - eg giving a damn about "cumbersome" rules.
3. Tu-154 were well aware of the limited visibility and the cloud base, that would in no way allow them to get visual at MDA. Nevertheless, 20 seconds after receiving this information from Jak-40, they decided to try an approach. This decision would only make sense if they intended to bust minimas trying to establish visual below the MDA. It is hardly believable that they expected to have even a slightly change to get visual at MDA with a cloud base "well below 50m" and "visibility of 200m".
4. It is proven by the FDR and CVR recordings that they didnt call for or conducted a go-around at 120 or even 100m, neither did they get visual ("Voice in cockpit: You can't see a thing"). Instead they kept descending below MDA.
5. They used radar alt from 300m, which was their SOP on Jak-40 in a landing configuration. If they had have had the intention to do an approach by the book, means descending to MDA and then decide on landing they would in now way have used the radar alt. Given the decision to bust minimas, it seems logical for them to use the radar alt, because of - ironically - better ground level seperation indication in a hilly terrain.
6. The last message from Jak-40 ("Visibility now 200") shortly before final didnt lead to any reaction in the cockpit. They knew that with this visibilty, there is no chance of getting visual at MDA. Nevertheless they continued to final approach, which is evidence that they had plans to do their approach the polish way, busting the MDA (Poles are both known for and proud of their ability to "kombinowac", which means to wangle sth not by the book under difficult circumstances).
7. FDR shows, that as of the height of 80 meters pull force was applied to the control column two times within 4 seconds, leading to counter push of the still engaged autopilot, because the force was not enough to override it. It is not known if that was done by the PIC or the FO. There are two possible explanations for this:
a) An attempt of the FO to conduct a go-around. Highly unprobable, as go-around thrust was not applied and autopilot not disconnected!
b) An attempt of the PIC to level out the A/C at an (still safe) altitude of around 50m trying to get visual in horizontal flight. When, 3 seconds after the first pull of the control column, the autopilot pushed back and plane didnt level out, the PIC realized something went wrong and initiated go-around, disconnecting AP and applying go-around thrust. Quite probable! And also proove that they were actually still aware how to do a go around on this plane!
Last edited by janeczku; 1st Feb 2011 at 14:00.
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You understand Polish, I believe. Please look at the whole sentence where the bolded quote is an excerpt from.
Can you give insight into what the JAK-40 pilot had in mind when saying at 10:25:06:0 "No, nam się udało tak w ostatniej chwili wylądować. No, natomiast powiem szczerze, że możecie spróbować, jak najbardziej. Dwa APM-y są, bramkę zrobili, tak, że możecie spróbować, ale... Jeżeli wam się nie uda za drugim razem, to proponuję wam lecieć na przykład do Moskwy, albo gdzieś." Especially the "No, natomiast powiem szczerze, że możecie spróbować, jak najbardziej". Here the intonation and other nuances play a role. Could "natomiast powiem szczerze" be ironic or a kind of shrug, or even in fact mean in this context the opposite? Like if you say in English: Of course, you can always try, could in this context mean "useless to try".
If so, the view presented in a link in a previous post that the message did not get through to the 101 PIC, that landing was not encouraged looks plausible.
The end result, of course is that if the 101 PIC took it as YAK-40 crew suggestion, the way it was said is secondary.
but in the same breath tells them they should try by all means to land. Thus he suggested an approach that would violate the airport, planes and pilots minimas.
Can you give insight into what the JAK-40 pilot had in mind when saying at 10:25:06:0 "No, nam się udało tak w ostatniej chwili wylądować. No, natomiast powiem szczerze, że możecie spróbować, jak najbardziej. Dwa APM-y są, bramkę zrobili, tak, że możecie spróbować, ale... Jeżeli wam się nie uda za drugim razem, to proponuję wam lecieć na przykład do Moskwy, albo gdzieś." Especially the "No, natomiast powiem szczerze, że możecie spróbować, jak najbardziej". Here the intonation and other nuances play a role. Could "natomiast powiem szczerze" be ironic or a kind of shrug, or even in fact mean in this context the opposite? Like if you say in English: Of course, you can always try, could in this context mean "useless to try".
If so, the view presented in a link in a previous post that the message did not get through to the 101 PIC, that landing was not encouraged looks plausible.
The end result, of course is that if the 101 PIC took it as YAK-40 crew suggestion, the way it was said is secondary.
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From the same source as Tonden:
- Let's start from the beginning. The first conflict occurred even before the departure. The leaks say that the commander of the crew, captain Protasiuk, after receiving the weather forecast, did not want to take off. And that's why the readiness of the crew was reported to the President by the commander of the Polish Air Force. Maybe he expected support from the president, which would help him in locating himself in the NATO structures?
- So they say ...
- Let's start from the beginning. The first conflict occurred even before the departure. The leaks say that the commander of the crew, captain Protasiuk, after receiving the weather forecast, did not want to take off. And that's why the readiness of the crew was reported to the President by the commander of the Polish Air Force. Maybe he expected support from the president, which would help him in locating himself in the NATO structures?
- So they say ...
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@RegDep
Cant see any irony here. "You can try despite, sure thing / of course". In the next sentence, he even suggests that they try to approach TWO times before diverting to moscow. Dont forget: Jak-40 also busted minimas, diving below MDA! Its the way things are done in this regiment. Like silencing the TAWS by resetting barometer! Four fatal PAF crashes within only 2 years, tells a lot...
Cant see any irony here. "You can try despite, sure thing / of course". In the next sentence, he even suggests that they try to approach TWO times before diverting to moscow. Dont forget: Jak-40 also busted minimas, diving below MDA! Its the way things are done in this regiment. Like silencing the TAWS by resetting barometer! Four fatal PAF crashes within only 2 years, tells a lot...
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Another nice quote:
- Can you imagine this? Russian navigator, who tells them that they should not land?
- Well ... Szczyglo (former MoD under Kaczyński, cancelled simulator training in 36th) supposedly, on behalf of the President said, that no Russian officer will be strolling around on board of the aircraft. And yet, there should be a leader (Russian navigator). As the Hindus were here, I gave them the leader. As we were in the U.S., they gave us one. So that I will not screw up. To help.
- Can you imagine this? Russian navigator, who tells them that they should not land?
- Well ... Szczyglo (former MoD under Kaczyński, cancelled simulator training in 36th) supposedly, on behalf of the President said, that no Russian officer will be strolling around on board of the aircraft. And yet, there should be a leader (Russian navigator). As the Hindus were here, I gave them the leader. As we were in the U.S., they gave us one. So that I will not screw up. To help.
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Can you give insight into what the JAK-40 pilot had in mind when saying at 10:25:06:0 ...
Having realised the enormous blunder he made /had the TU diverted at this stage surely the YAK pilot would come under close scrutiny on what basis he had judged the visibility and under what authority he had advised the presidential flight to turn back/ - the YAK pilot went into cover-my-ass mode and tried to back down, saying that 'yeah, it is bad, but you should really have a go at it'.
The YAK pilot would have really done best if he did not interfere at all.
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Look, look everyone. Slowly but surely, the SadPole's point of view is coming to forefront and cannot be discredited anymore, me thinks. 
Tonden's article. An experienced ex-commander of the military unit that flies VIP in Poland has his say.
Here we go AGAIN. He was such a NICE guy. They got rid of a competent experienced pilot after the Tbilisi incident and got a NICE guy. The Tbilisi pilot apparently was not even allowed to fly as commander of the YAKs after "offending" the main passenger over the Tbilisi incident.
So, here is my request to all the Poles who still try to support the ATC at fault propaganda story.
Please, shut up. Covering for Kaczynski is not worth making us all look like FOOLS for years to come. The story will break, because it is impossible to keep it under wraps any longer, and every reasonable person knows it. Just black-listing the pilot for not obeying insane orders to fly the Tu-154 into a war zone should be enough for any reasonable person to see that Kaczynski was at fault over what happened.
Tonden's article. An experienced ex-commander of the military unit that flies VIP in Poland has his say.
- Let's start from the beginning. The first friction occurred even before the departure. It was reported that the commander of the crew, captain Protasiuk, did not want to fly after receiving the weather forecast. And that's why the crew's readiness was reported to the President by the commander of the Polish Air Force. Did he count on the favor of the president, to help him to obtain an assignment in NATO?
- That's what they say.
...
- So, why did they fly there?
- They were obeying the decision by their superior.
- Those were not captain Protasiuk's decisions?
- I knew the pilot. Nice, polite and capable. I think it was too early to make him the commander of the Tu-154. They should have waited a few years. Smooth things out. And here the task has overwhelmed him. Besides, to be honest, this is no fun when there is a superior, three-star general, standing behind the commander.
- That's what they say.
...
- So, why did they fly there?
- They were obeying the decision by their superior.
- Those were not captain Protasiuk's decisions?
- I knew the pilot. Nice, polite and capable. I think it was too early to make him the commander of the Tu-154. They should have waited a few years. Smooth things out. And here the task has overwhelmed him. Besides, to be honest, this is no fun when there is a superior, three-star general, standing behind the commander.
God forbid if the disaster matter was taken into the hands of an international commission. This would completely discredit us. They would ask: What have you done? Whom did you send? And together with the Air Force commander! What did he do to stop that? Did he lose his survival instinct? It's unbelievable for the President to be flown by such a young crew, and for such crazy nonsense be allowed by the top commander of the Air Force.
Please, shut up. Covering for Kaczynski is not worth making us all look like FOOLS for years to come. The story will break, because it is impossible to keep it under wraps any longer, and every reasonable person knows it. Just black-listing the pilot for not obeying insane orders to fly the Tu-154 into a war zone should be enough for any reasonable person to see that Kaczynski was at fault over what happened.
RegDep,
Yak's pilot informed Tu-154 F/O about weather conditions, runway lighting system set because of the fog and suggested to give it a try. I would translate it as "we were able to do it/pull this out", next he informs them about fog searchlights, that were set and, the part you were interested in "you can give it a try, but... if you fail at the second attempt, you should go to Moscow or somewhere else, but you can really give it a try".
Regarding your previous question, altitude control was one of the key elements during that crash. I think we all agree about that. The 2005 incident was also related to altitude and would be a proof, that this kind of problem didn't start on 04/10.
Arrakis
Yak's pilot informed Tu-154 F/O about weather conditions, runway lighting system set because of the fog and suggested to give it a try. I would translate it as "we were able to do it/pull this out", next he informs them about fog searchlights, that were set and, the part you were interested in "you can give it a try, but... if you fail at the second attempt, you should go to Moscow or somewhere else, but you can really give it a try".
Regarding your previous question, altitude control was one of the key elements during that crash. I think we all agree about that. The 2005 incident was also related to altitude and would be a proof, that this kind of problem didn't start on 04/10.
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Tonden's article. An experienced ex-commander of the military unit that flies VIP in Poland has his say.
So, here is my request to all the Poles who still try to support the ATC at fault propaganda story.
Please, shut up. Covering for Kaczynski is not worth making us all look like FOOLS for years to come.
Please, shut up. Covering for Kaczynski is not worth making us all look like FOOLS for years to come.
Regards,
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Golf-Sierra
But I guess for some people getting into the camera spotlights and earning a few extra ZŁ is all that counts. One of the few points where I have to agree with J Kaczynski - something should be done about these so called 'experts'.
1. He was the commander of the 36th Special Air Regiment for many years, longer than anybody else.
2. He used to train everybody there before things went… "south?"
3. He flew the Tu-154 with VIPs longer than anybody else in Poland
4. He knows all the Russian procedures better than anybody else flying VIPs.
It won't hurt you to read this thing. Among other things, he states he never even allowed anybody (main passenger included) to decide where to land. He had a flight plan with alternates, and if necessary he would decide to go to alternate of his choosing, upon which he would tell the stewardess to inform the "main passenger".
I don’t think he would raise the issue if it wasn't for the latest Kaczynski "President not cargo, can decide where to land" revelations. The core of the issue is IDIOTS getting rid of competent people and micro-managing and meddling with things they have no clue about. I see it every day in Poland.
Anyway, you are saying that like Kaczynski you want people arrested any time they simply disagree with some official line???? That's the idea?
Meanwhile, there is a little struggle at the "Polish commission" which wants to kick out Edmund Klich for not being… assertive enough with the Russians. Meaning, they actually are trying to keep all their BS alive – and this is what forces the people in the know to finally start talking. They don't want us to be any more embarrassed.
Anyway, I am ecstatic you finally agree with me on the ATC issue.