Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread
- but should they commence this approach at all - that's the question. Weather was not "barely meeting minimum", it was many times below it.
It is not dangerous to fly down to the minimum and go around, if runway not in sight, or to land, if runway is in sight and the aircraft is in a position to land.
I have done it numerous times with worse equipment and survived. It is not a question of good or bad weather, it is a question of safe handling the aircraft on the approach down to the decision height in any kind of weather. If you stick to the procedures, you either land or you go around. But you will not die by doing it in a correct mannor. You press below the minimum, you might die.
Concerning the training of the polish military i´m at loss here. I have no imformation about the effectiveness of the system, although i´m familiar with NATO procedures and evaluation. A loss rate might have a lot of reasons, bad training would be only one out of many.
franzl
Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: United States
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Criss-
FYI,
http://www.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/10179/news
Notably, ATC never stated there was a ceiling. They only stated the visibility.
Moreover, there are only two different system approaches on the approach plate that have the 100x1000 min.
РМС or РСП + ОСП
http://slimak.onet.pl/_m/TVN/tvn24/smolensk_.pdf
The others are 100x1500.
More on the types of system approaches below.
http://training.unnt.ru/docs/files/ApproachTypes.pdf
Information on landing procedure for the РСП+ОСП.
Maybe. But you seem not to understand the internal problems of Polish military a/c transport. Pilot saying "of course you can try" with 200m visibility while minima are 1500m says a lot about his attitude towards his tasks.
http://www.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/10179/news
The weather conditions were bad - the fog cover was near complete. Visibility was estimated 400 metres, while the norm is 1000.
Vladimir Putin: The norm is 1000?
Igor Levitin: 1000 metres.
Vladimir Putin: And visibility was 400?
Vladimir Putin: The norm is 1000?
Igor Levitin: 1000 metres.
Vladimir Putin: And visibility was 400?
Moreover, there are only two different system approaches on the approach plate that have the 100x1000 min.
РМС or РСП + ОСП
http://slimak.onet.pl/_m/TVN/tvn24/smolensk_.pdf
The others are 100x1500.
More on the types of system approaches below.
http://training.unnt.ru/docs/files/ApproachTypes.pdf
Information on landing procedure for the РСП+ОСП.
On Approval of Federal Aviation Regulations" Implementation of the Radiocommunication airspace of the Russian Federation "(registered in Ministry of Justice of Russia 06.12.2007 N 10627
(translated)
5.4.4.
Approach on the radar (CPR, CPR + CAP) is performed under the guidance of Manager PSL to LMM crossing, and after BMB Manager PDP informs the crew to remove the Sun to the runway.
В тех случаях, когда из-за помех на индикаторе посадочного радиолокатора диспетчер ПДП не может наблюдать отметку от ВС до БПРМ, он сообщает экипажу ВС то удаление, до которого может выполняться заход по радиолокатору под руководством диспетчера ПДП:
In cases where due to interference on the indicator PAR DMA controller can not see a mark on the Sun to the BMB, he tells the crew to remove all that to which you can run to pace the radar under the leadership of PDP Manager:
5.4.4.1.
By reducing the glide path of guidance and information on sticking trajectory flight passed continuously with pauses between messages for the crew 's entry opportunities for communication.
After passing the entry point in the glide path (HRG) Instructions and information manager "landing" may be accepted without confirmation.
Guidance on the resolution (Ban) reduction and landing crew shall always be confirmed.
5.4.4.2.
(translated)
5.4.4.
Заход на посадку по радиолокатору (РСП, РСП+ОСП) выполняется под руководством диспетчера ПДП до пролета БПРМ, а после БПРМ диспетчер ПДП информирует экипаж ВС об удалении ВС до ВПП.
Approach on the radar (CPR, CPR + CAP) is performed under the guidance of Manager PSL to LMM crossing, and after BMB Manager PDP informs the crew to remove the Sun to the runway.
В тех случаях, когда из-за помех на индикаторе посадочного радиолокатора диспетчер ПДП не может наблюдать отметку от ВС до БПРМ, он сообщает экипажу ВС то удаление, до которого может выполняться заход по радиолокатору под руководством диспетчера ПДП:
In cases where due to interference on the indicator PAR DMA controller can not see a mark on the Sun to the BMB, he tells the crew to remove all that to which you can run to pace the radar under the leadership of PDP Manager:
5.4.4.1.
При снижении по глиссаде указания и информация по выдерживанию заданной траектории полета передаются постоянно с паузами между сообщениями для обеспечения экипажу ВС возможности выхода на связь.
By reducing the glide path of guidance and information on sticking trajectory flight passed continuously with pauses between messages for the crew 's entry opportunities for communication.
После пролета точки входа в глиссаду (ТВГ) указания и информация диспетчера "Посадки" могут приниматься без подтверждения.
After passing the entry point in the glide path (HRG) Instructions and information manager "landing" may be accepted without confirmation.
Указания о разрешении (запрещении) снижения и посадки подтверждаются экипажем ВС обязательно.
Guidance on the resolution (Ban) reduction and landing crew shall always be confirmed.
После пролета БПРМ диспетчер "Посадки" передает только информацию.
After the passage of BMB Manager "landing" only transmits information. 5.4.4.2.
5.4.4.2.
На предпосадочной прямой информация об удалении ВС от начала ВПП сообщается диспетчером "Посадки" экипажу ВС:
At preplant direct information about how to remove Sun from the beginning of WFP reported dispatcher "landing" of the crew of aircraft:
до пролета ДПРМ - не реже чем через 2 км;
before the passage of the OMB - not less than 2 km;
после пролета ДПРМ - не реже чем через 1 км.
after the passage of the OMB - not less than 1 km.
Last edited by 210thars; 21st Jul 2010 at 07:27.
Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: Czech Republic
Posts: 185
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I tried to translate it more acurate:
5.4.4.
Radar landing (RSP, RSP+OSP) is provided under control of ATC till MM and then ATC inform a/c crew about distance to RWY.
In cases of interferences on radar screen when ATC cannot follow blip of the a/c to MM, he inform the crew about the distance to which he is able to control the flight.
5.4.4.1.
In the time of descend by the GS the instructions and information about following the correct flight trajectory are sending continuously with pauses between messages to give the crew a chance for communication.
The ATC commands and information can be received without confirmation after passing initial point of GP.
The crew confirms instruction of clearance (ban) for descent and landing .
5.4.4.2
On final approach ATC gives information about distance to THR to the crew:
- till OM not less then every 2 km
- after OM not less then every 1 km
5.4.4.
Radar landing (RSP, RSP+OSP) is provided under control of ATC till MM and then ATC inform a/c crew about distance to RWY.
In cases of interferences on radar screen when ATC cannot follow blip of the a/c to MM, he inform the crew about the distance to which he is able to control the flight.
5.4.4.1.
In the time of descend by the GS the instructions and information about following the correct flight trajectory are sending continuously with pauses between messages to give the crew a chance for communication.
The ATC commands and information can be received without confirmation after passing initial point of GP.
The crew confirms instruction of clearance (ban) for descent and landing .
5.4.4.2
On final approach ATC gives information about distance to THR to the crew:
- till OM not less then every 2 km
- after OM not less then every 1 km
Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: United States
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Smole?sk: Radar na lotnisku by? zepsuty! Kontrolerzy podawali pilotom b??dne dane?! . Rosjanie odkryli, ?e radar na lotnisku w Smole?sku by? uszkodzony - Awaria, Dane, Edmund Klich, Fakt, Katastrofa, Kontrolerzy, Piloci, Radar, Radiolatarnia,
google translated
Smolensk: Radar at the airport was broken! Inspectors handed pilots incorrect data?
Everything seems to indicate that there has been a breakthrough in the investigation ws. Russian Tupolev Presidential disaster. During a test flight over the military airport in Smolensk, the Russians agreed that the radar showed the incorrect data. Our eastern neighbors did not want the Poles to give the report of the study.
Everything seems to indicate that there has been a breakthrough in the investigation ws. Russian Tupolev Presidential disaster. During a test flight over the military airport in Smolensk, the Russians agreed that the radar showed the incorrect data. Our eastern neighbors did not want the Poles to give the report of the study.
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: Alameda, CA, USA
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BOAC
Nothing new to report.
210thars
Be very careful with google translator. It is sometimes very inaccurate. Last sentence from your quote should be.
Our eastern neighbors did not want to give the report of the study to the Poles.
not
Our eastern neighbors did not want the Poles to give the report of the study.
Although one can still correctly interpret (I think) the sentence from the context, the other cases are much worse. My favorite (from MAK report):
Самолет перед вылетом был полностью исправен.
was translated as (try it yourself)
The plane before the flight was completely defective.
the correct translation
The plane before flight was fully serviceable.
Olek
Nothing new to report.
210thars
Be very careful with google translator. It is sometimes very inaccurate. Last sentence from your quote should be.
Our eastern neighbors did not want to give the report of the study to the Poles.
not
Our eastern neighbors did not want the Poles to give the report of the study.
Although one can still correctly interpret (I think) the sentence from the context, the other cases are much worse. My favorite (from MAK report):
Самолет перед вылетом был полностью исправен.
was translated as (try it yourself)
The plane before the flight was completely defective.
the correct translation
The plane before flight was fully serviceable.
Olek
Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: Czech Republic
Posts: 185
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Smolensk: Radar at the airport was broken! Inspectors handed pilots incorrect data?
Analysing CVR you can suspect that ATC gived distances with inaccuracy ca 600m.
Last edited by Karel_x; 4th Aug 2010 at 10:37.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: KIAD east downwind
Posts: 155
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Analyzing the CVR transcript, you can be pretty sure that the controller was very accurate — see his heads-up about the airplane's approaching the LOM at 10:39:49 and the LOM signal at 10:39:50.
Besides, no ground radar can explain why the airplane dove under OCH/MDH without the field in sight.
Besides, no ground radar can explain why the airplane dove under OCH/MDH without the field in sight.
Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: Czech Republic
Posts: 185
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
you can be pretty sure that the controller was very accurate
I fully agree that a eventual radar inaccuracy was not the reason of the crash. Your last sentence implies the reason.
In graphic: distance vs. time Imageshack - smo00.png blue OM/MM, brown ATCO
Last edited by Karel_x; 4th Aug 2010 at 10:45.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Guys and girls - we cannot be sure until we get this new' CVR transcript, but as far as we know there was NO radar approach service for this flight so not only would any 'inaccurate' range information not affect the crew's flying of their approach, but it is also possible that the 'ranges' offered by the controller were not precise as he/she might perceive there was no need for them to be.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: KIAD east downwind
Posts: 155
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Karel_x,
Huh? Are you saying that because of the radar malfunction, the controller didn't know where the LOM was, and it was a sheer coincidence that he reported the airplane's approaching the LOM exactly when the airplane was approaching the LOM?
At 10:39:50 gived ATC distance 6 km. Acoustic signal of OM sounded betveen 50-58th second, middle is 10:39:54 and distance OM-THR is 6.26 km. The horn of OM sounded 4sec after moment when ATCO was reporting 6km. It ought to sound 3.3sec earlier.
Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: Czech Republic
Posts: 185
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No, of course I am sure that controller knew the right distance of LOM (6,26km). But I belive that his primary information was the distance. He had reported it in that moment when a/c blip crossed 6 km distance line on his radar screen. And the same for 4, 3 and 2km. Look at the graph, all this events lies on straight line (brown), the line of constant speed ca 290km/h. I suppose that this electronic generated distance scale on the screen of this mobile radar could be shifted by knob for compensation of the offset betveen THR and actual radar site. It could be set uncorectly or setting inadvertently changed. Or drifted as a result that out-of-date military radar (with his electron tubes, rusted contacts, elektrolytic capacitors etc.) was not used for long period.
I think that information about LOM was just to be sure. Both informations cannot be correct together (6km or approaching LOM).
Of cause it is only my speculation and nothing of it could dive a/c beneath MDH.
I think that information about LOM was just to be sure. Both informations cannot be correct together (6km or approaching LOM).
Of cause it is only my speculation and nothing of it could dive a/c beneath MDH.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: KIAD east downwind
Posts: 155
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Karel_x, I believe your belief is wrong, and it was never the controller's intention to provide distance readings with the accuracy of less than a couple of hundred of meters, but only to confirm the generally correct progress of the approach. Hence he said the airplane was approaching the LOM before it had passed the LOM and not after that. I don't see any problem whatsoever in his rounding the distance reading to the nearest km point with a fudge factor of only about 5%.
It's not a question of belief. It's a fact clearly visible on the transcript.
The time shift is around 5 seconds which makes around 400-450 m. It's unquestionable.
Of course, that doesn't change the fact, they went below MDA.
From the last information, not before October.
Arrakis
The time shift is around 5 seconds which makes around 400-450 m. It's unquestionable.
Of course, that doesn't change the fact, they went below MDA.
So - any news on the 'new' CVR transcript?
Arrakis
Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: Czech Republic
Posts: 185
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If the controller´s report (app LOM/ 6km distance) is done at a point of first appearing of LOM signal (ca 6,7 km) and if the distance 4 km is reported correctly, I calculated ground speed 388km/h. If report is done just above LOM, GS=340km/h. Both much more then 290km/h at the rest of fatal route.
Surely you can be right and it may be just pure coincidence that all distance reports lies almost exactly on the only streight line. Let us hope that soon the final report will give us the right answer. Maybe will not because this radar inacuracy factor looks irrelevant in sight of crash.
Surely you can be right and it may be just pure coincidence that all distance reports lies almost exactly on the only streight line. Let us hope that soon the final report will give us the right answer. Maybe will not because this radar inacuracy factor looks irrelevant in sight of crash.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: KIAD east downwind
Posts: 155
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Like I said, apparently, reporting exact distances was not the controller's intent or duty. So while these charts and calculations are an interesting exercise in arithmetic, as these numbers were not intended to be exact, it's also a "garbage in/garbage out" type of exercise.
As the type of approach used is still unclear, you don't know that.
The fact is the ground equipment, if I recall from Smolensk forum, was tested a few days after the crash. The results of those tests were not released so far or handed over to the other side.
Arrakis
The fact is the ground equipment, if I recall from Smolensk forum, was tested a few days after the crash. The results of those tests were not released so far or handed over to the other side.
Arrakis
Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: Czech Republic
Posts: 185
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes, not only Smolensk forum, also Edmund Klich (polish representative in MAK team) told that after his request he could see results of this test. I think that to blame MAK for obstructions with final report is not correct. Many accidents are investigate for several years and giving partial informations before finalizaton of investigation is not usual anywhere in the world.
It was common air disaster after human error(s) and it is not good to use it for evoking of nacional and political antagonism and russophobia in newspapers.
It was common air disaster after human error(s) and it is not good to use it for evoking of nacional and political antagonism and russophobia in newspapers.
"Many accidents are investigate for several years and giving partial informations before finalizaton of investigation is not usual anywhere in the world."
True. However, Mr. E. Klich didn't suggest premature publishing of partial documents but rather reported poor (and postponed) availability of the documents for Polish investigators.
True. However, Mr. E. Klich didn't suggest premature publishing of partial documents but rather reported poor (and postponed) availability of the documents for Polish investigators.
dvv:
Like I said, apparently, reporting exact distances was not the controller's intent or duty. So while these charts and calculations are an interesting exercise in arithmetic, as these numbers were not intended to be exact, it's also a "garbage in/garbage out" type of exercise.
Like I said, apparently, reporting exact distances was not the controller's intent or duty. So while these charts and calculations are an interesting exercise in arithmetic, as these numbers were not intended to be exact, it's also a "garbage in/garbage out" type of exercise.
Would be better then that he just shuts up, wouldn´it?
franzl